On 3 June 2026, the UN General Assembly elected Kyrgyzstan as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the 2027–2028 term. In the vote for the Asia-Pacific Group seat, Bishkek defeated Manila in the fourth round of secret balloting by a margin of 142 votes to 49. This is Kyrgyzstan’s first membership in the Security Council since the country joined the United Nations in 1992, and for Central Asia it marks the return of representation to the highest platform of global security for the first time since Kazakhstan’s 2017–2018 term. Non-permanent members of the Security Council are elected by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly (127 of 193). If no candidate secures the required majority in the first round, additional rounds are held between the two frontrunners. In the case of Kyrgyzstan and the Philippines, four rounds were needed: in the first round Bishkek received 105 votes against Manila’s 85 short of victory, yet enough to give it the advantage in the subsequent rounds. The final score of 142:49 reflected consolidation around the principle of rotation and historical justice. Alongside Kyrgyzstan, Austria and Portugal (from the Western European and Others Group), Trinidad and Tobago (Latin America and the Caribbean) and Zimbabwe (Africa) were also elected. Notably, Germany failed to win a Security Council seat for the first time, ceding both Western European seats to Austria and Portugal. Bishkek’s campaign was built on several mutually reinforcing arguments that set it apart from standard diplomatic canvassing. Central among them was the argument of historical justice: Kyrgyzstan had never served on the Security Council, whereas the Philippines had already held the seat four times, and by 2027 another 59 UN member states will never have held it. President Sadyr Japarov appealed directly to this inequity, framing Kyrgyzstan’s election as restoring the inclusiveness of the UN’s key organ. The next argument was the country’s exportable experience in preventive diplomacy. The completion of years-long border negotiations with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — processes that had previously escalated into armed clashes more than once — was presented as proof of the country’s capacity to facilitate peaceful settlement. Kyrgyzstan also highlighted its role in establishing the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and its signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2025. The coalition foundation of the victory was laid institutionally as early as November 2025, when all Central Asian heads of state formally appealed to UN member states to support the Kyrgyz candidacy. Türkiye’s backing and the consolidated bloc of Muslim states played a decisive role in the final vote. On 31 May 2026, three days before the ballot, Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a state reception in New York for the final push of the candidacy. The opportunities of the status and the priority agenda. As a non-permanent member, from January 2027 Kyrgyzstan will gain a vote on all Security Council matters, participation in closed consultations, membership in all of the Council’s sanctions committees and working groups, a monthly presidency by alphabetical rotation and — most importantly — a seat in negotiations over the wording of resolutions. It is precisely at the level of wording, at the stage of agreeing on drafts, that non-permanent members effectively shape the legal language later cited as precedent. The practical weight of a non-permanent member is determined not so much by its vote as by its ability to work in coalitions. Small and medium-sized states systematically secure influence through building durable issue-based blocs — on climate security or the Afghan dossier, for example. Foreign Minister Zheenbek Kulubaev put it plainly: “No state can cope with today’s threats alone, which is why multilateral diplomacy is critically important.” Kyrgyzstan’s official programme for its term is structured around four substantive blocks. The first block – Afghanistan and preventive diplomacy. Sadyr Japarov has stated outright that Afghanistan’s security is inseparable from that of Central Asia: the transit of instability across the Afghan border exposes the region’s countries to risks ranging from cross-border terrorism to migration pressure. The return of a Central Asian voice to the Council reinforces the institutional link with UNRCCA in Ashgabat, the UN centre for preventive diplomacy established at the initiative of all five states of the region. The second block – the water, climate and glacier agenda. The melting of the Tian Shan and Pamir glaciers directly threatens the water supply of the entire region. Kyrgyzstan intends to press for recognition of the nexus between climate risks and security on the Council’s platform: this is an area where small mountainous states hold a moral and factual high ground that is hard to contest even amid obstruction by permanent members. The third block – a growing focus on transport connectivity. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, the CAREC corridors and the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant as a joint project of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — all of these initiatives require political accompaniment at the international level. The Security Council is not a development bank, but its platform can be used to legitimise regional projects in the eyes of international donors and partners. The fourth block – reform of multilateral cooperation. Speaking at the Security Council’s open debate on the eve of the vote, Zheenbek Kulubaev raised a question of principle: the Council must not be perceived as a “closed club”, and its decisions must take into account the interests of the majority of UN member states. This argument reflects a broader coalition of states that have never sat on the Council and are concerned about the structural inequality of international institutions. The most systemic constraint is the structural paralysis of the Security Council itself. The deep divisions among the permanent members over Ukraine, Gaza and the Taiwan question have repeatedly blocked substantive decisions. In such an environment a non-permanent member cannot guarantee the adoption of desired resolutions, but it can influence coalitions, textual formulations and the framing of issues in closed consultations. This is real yet inherently limited leverage, which must be communicated accurately at home and across the region to avoid inflated expectations. At the same time, international attention to Kyrgyzstan will inevitably extend from its foreign policy positions to its domestic practices. NGOs, Western governments and international media will step up their monitoring of the rule of law, judicial independence and media freedom. This creates a dual dynamic: external pressure for domestic reform may intensify precisely when Bishkek needs to consolidate its diplomatic capital. Moreover, there is a risk of a gap between the collective expectations of neighbours and legal reality: it is Kyrgyzstan as a sovereign state, not a “representative of Central Asia”, that sits on the Council. Kyrgyzstan votes independently, including when the positions of the region’s states diverge — on the Afghan agenda, for instance, or towards initiatives of the permanent members. The risk of interstate friction arises precisely where expectations of coordination fail to match the position actually taken. Implications for the countries of Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, the effect is most pronounced in the “security + development” dimension: Astana consistently supported Kyrgyzstan’s candidacy, has its own experience of serving on the Council (2017–2018) and is promoting the UN Sustainable Development Goals Centre for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. Synchronising the Kyrgyz agenda in the Council with Kazakhstan’s SDG initiatives creates potential for mutual reinforcement. For Uzbekistan, two intersections of priorities matter most: the Afghan dossier (Tashkent is a key partner in stabilising Afghanistan) and the transport block, as the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway gains additional political accompaniment. For Tajikistan and Turkmenistan the effect is primarily institutional. For Tajikistan heightened attention to the Afghan border vector and to water-energy cooperation. For Turkmenistan further strengthening of the mandate of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia in Ashgabat: the republic’s neutral status and its cooperation with the UN blend organically with the Kyrgyz emphasis on preventive dialogue and inclusiveness, without requiring Ashgabat to depart from neutrality. Overall, Kyrgyzstan’s election to the Security Council is a functional instrument whose effectiveness will depend on three factors. First – institutional readiness: the capacity of Kyrgyz diplomacy to formulate positions promptly across a wide range of issues, including topics far removed from direct regional experience. It is here that support from international partners in preparing the delegation will prove most practically valuable. Second – the quality of C5 coordination: a light but regular model of aligning positions on a limited set of package themes — Afghanistan, water and climate, transport — will deliver far more than attempts to build a cumbersome regional mechanism. Third – expectation management: public communication must consistently distinguish between what a non-permanent member actually does (wording, coalitions, framing of issues) and what it cannot do under a blocking veto. For the region, the window of opportunity has coincided with a phase of institutional consolidation in Central Asia: the “Central Asia – 2040” concept, the 2025–2027 Roadmap and the precedent of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border settlement form a real basis for substantive rather than declarative coordination. If Bishkek manages to confine itself to the four designated thematic packages and refrains from “regionalising” the Council’s entire docket, the membership will become a long-term contribution to Central Asia’s agency on global platforms. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief examines the contemporary evolution of Iran–Afghanistan relations in the context of shifting regional security dynamics, economic interdependence, and geopolitical realignment following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. It argues that the relationship between Tehran and Kabul is neither purely adversarial nor genuinely strategic, but rather defined by a complex mixture of pragmatic cooperation, mutual suspicion, and competing security imperatives. While Iran views Afghanistan as a crucial buffer on its eastern frontier, it also perceives the country as a potential source of instability, terrorism, sectarian tension, migration pressure, and foreign military penetration. The brief traces the historical foundations of Iran’s Afghanistan policy, beginning with Tehran’s engagement with Afghan political and armed factions after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and continuing through its later tactical contacts with elements of the Taliban. It highlights the fact that Iran’s relations with the Taliban have remained fundamentally pragmatic rather than ideological, shaped above all by Tehran’s desire to limit American influence, prevent Afghanistan from becoming a platform for operations against Iran, and preserve influence among Afghan Shiite communities, particularly the Hazaras. At the same time, the Taliban’s insistence on strategic autonomy has repeatedly limited Iran’s ability to transform tactical cooperation into durable political control. Particular attention is given to the security, migration, and humanitarian dimensions of the bilateral relationship. Iran remains deeply concerned about the activities of ISKP, anti-Shiite militant networks, cross-border criminal groups, narcotics trafficking, and the possible return of American military infrastructure to Afghanistan. These concerns have been intensified by refugee flows and Iran’s growing deportation campaign against undocumented Afghans, which has placed additional pressure on Afghanistan’s already fragile economy and social infrastructure. The brief shows that migration has become not only a humanitarian issue, but also a major security and political factor shaping Tehran’s approach towards Kabul. Despite these tensions, economic interdependence continues to function as an important stabilising element in Iran–Afghanistan relations. Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on Iranian fuel, food products, construction materials, and transit infrastructure, while Iran views Afghanistan as a valuable export market amid continued Western sanctions. The policy brief therefore concludes that the future of the Iran–Afghanistan relationship will be determined by the balance between security mistrust and practical cooperation. As regional actors such as China, Russia, Pakistan, and Central Asian states increase their engagement with Afghanistan, Tehran and Kabul will likely remain bound by necessity, even as distrust, border insecurity, migration pressures, and wider Middle Eastern instability continue to constrain deeper rapprochement. Read on Topchubashov Center’s web-site * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Fatima Dalieva, an independent researcher specializing “International Relations, Political Problems of Global and Regional Issues” at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy and works as Chief Specialist at the Postgraduate Education Office.   By the third decade of the twenty-first century, transport-logistics systems and trade corridors have emerged as one of the central arenas of global geopolitical competition. Whereas geopolitical superiority in the twentieth century was largely determined by military power, territorial control, or energy resources, contemporary global influence is increasingly defined by the ability to control logistics networks, transit infrastructure, maritime routes, ports, digital transport systems, and supply chains. China’s transformation into the world’s principal manufacturing platform has elevated transport and logistics systems into a strategic component of global geopolitics. Within the contemporary international system, the interests of the United States, Russia, and China are increasingly colliding over the control of logistics corridors, energy routes, and trade networks. In this context, Eurasia is becoming not merely a geographical space but a strategic arena in which a new architecture of the global economy is taking shape. In recent years, Russia–China economic cooperation has expanded significantly. In particular, Western sanctions imposed after the Russia–Ukraine war accelerated Russia’s economic dependence on China. Bilateral trade reached a record level exceeding 244 billion USD in 2024. Although a temporary decline was observed in 2025, trade growth resumed in early 2026. Chinese exports to Russia increased by more than 23 percent, while Russian exports to China grew by 17 percent, demonstrating the growing interdependence of the two economies. However, this rapprochement does not represent an equal partnership; rather, it reflects an asymmetric model of economic dependence. Russia primarily exports oil, natural gas, coal, and raw materials, while China supplies Russia with automobiles, electronics, industrial equipment, and high-technology products. This structure increasingly binds the Russian economy to raw-material exports while simultaneously strengthening Beijing’s technological and industrial dominance. Transport and logistics systems are becoming the central element of this emerging economic model. Russia’s Far East has evolved into a major transit hub for trade with China, while cargo transportation through border crossings and newly constructed bridges has expanded rapidly. Consequently, transport-logistics cooperation has evolved beyond a purely technical sphere and has become a mechanism of strategic integration between Moscow and Beijing. At the same time, it is precisely within the logistics sector that the sharpest contradiction between U.S. and Chinese interests is emerging. The core of the contemporary global economy lies in Chinese manufacturing and the logistics systems that distribute Chinese products worldwide. More than 80 percent of Chinese exports are transported by sea, and a substantial part of this system is controlled by Western companies. Major corporations such as Mediterranean Shipping Company, A.P. Moller - Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, Ocean Network Express, and Evergreen Marine play decisive roles in the global logistics of Chinese exports. This creates a major geopolitical paradox. On the one hand, the United States and its Western allies seek to limit China’s geopolitical influence. On the other hand, Western logistics corporations derive enormous profits from China’s export economy. This demonstrates the extraordinarily high degree of interdependence within the global economic system. In particular, Maersk and MSC have established deeply integrated logistics systems connected with Chinese ports. These corporations manage not only maritime shipping but also warehouses, terminals, container networks, and multimodal logistics infrastructure. As a result, the contemporary global trade system increasingly represents a symbiosis between Chinese manufacturing power and Western logistics capital. This creates a major strategic dilemma for Washington. While the United States attempts to constrain China technologically and economically, global capital and logistics networks remain deeply dependent on Chinese production. Consequently, U.S. tariff policies and technological sanctions have not isolated China; instead, they have accelerated the restructuring of global supply chains. The concept of “China Shock 2.0” reflects this transformation. China is no longer exporting only low-cost consumer goods; it is now dominating sectors such as electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, robotics, and semiconductors. This development poses new challenges for both the United States and Europe because the state that controls logistics routes is gradually acquiring dominance in high-technology industries as well. Competition surrounding semiconductors and electric transportation is transforming global logistics into a strategic instrument of power. For the United States, the Taiwan issue is no longer solely political or military in nature. Since Taiwan is the center of global semiconductor production, it has also become a crucial element of logistics and technological security. In this context, Xi Jinping’s reference to the “Thucydides Trap” carries particular significance. Beijing seeks to manage competition with the United States without allowing it to escalate into open military conflict. Both China and the United States clearly understand the depth of their mutual economic dependence. China remains heavily export-oriented, while the United States continues to dominate global capital flows and the dollar-centered financial system. Nevertheless, this model of “managed competition” is becoming increasingly complex. American technological restrictions have compelled China to rely more heavily on domestic resources. As a result, Beijing has accelerated its strategy of technological self-sufficiency while simultaneously diversifying logistics corridors. The Belt and Road Initiative represents the central component of this strategy. In this regard, the role of Central Asia and Russia is growing substantially. Eurasian land corridors are increasingly viewed by China as strategic alternatives to maritime trade routes. In particular, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project significantly strengthens Beijing’s geoeconomic influence in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan’s acquisition of 305 million USD in Chinese financial support for this railway project demonstrates the deepening of Beijing’s influence through transport-logistics diplomacy. However, an important geopolitical risk also emerges here. Since the overall project cost exceeds 5 billion USD, Kyrgyzstan will require additional external financing in the future, potentially increasing its dependence on Chinese capital. Indeed, contemporary Chinese strategy is fundamentally centered on logistics and infrastructure diplomacy. Through loans, transport corridors, port construction, and industrial projects, Beijing is creating long-term economic dependencies. This model is frequently described as “infrastructural geopolitics.” Russia, however, occupies a more complicated position within this process. On the one hand, Moscow benefits from economic rapprochement with China because Western sanctions have sharply restricted Russia’s access to European markets and technologies. On the other hand, China’s expanding economic influence in Central Asia and Eurasia weakens Russia’s traditional geopolitical position. In Central Asia, Russian and Chinese interests increasingly intersect. While Moscow continues to perceive the region as part of its historical sphere of influence, Beijing primarily views it as a logistics and transit space. As a result, transport corridors are becoming the principal arena of geopolitical competition. The United States is also actively involved in this process. Washington views Central Asia not merely as a security zone but as a strategic space capable of balancing Chinese and Russian influence. Consequently, the United States is showing growing interest in transport, energy, and digital infrastructure projects throughout the region. In the contemporary global system, logistics is no longer simply an economic issue. It has become an instrument of geopolitical dominance, strategic security, and technological control. Those who control transport corridors, ports, logistics corporations, and information flows are able to exert substantial influence over the global economy itself. Therefore, the current rivalry among the United States, Russia, and China is fundamentally a struggle for the “new geopolitics of logistics.” In this competition, transport corridors, maritime routes, railways, ports, and digital infrastructure increasingly play a more decisive role than traditional military force. This rivalry is likely to intensify further in the future. The development of artificial intelligence, electric transportation, semiconductors, and green energy technologies will continue to increase the strategic importance of logistics systems. As a result, Eurasia is expected to remain one of the principal centers of global competition in the twenty-first century. Ultimately, in the current era of geopolitical transformation, transport-logistics systems are becoming the central element of international relations. Competition among the United States, Russia, and China is increasingly unfolding precisely within this infrastructural and logistical sphere. This process will shape not only the future architecture of Eurasia but also the broader structure of the global economic and political order. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Zulkhumor Makhmudova, UWED PhD Student   The contemporary global environment increasingly requires the Turkic states not only to maintain traditional cultural cooperation but also to deepen practical and functional integration. The growing deficit of trust in international relations and the weakening influence of global institutions have created conditions in which regional mechanisms aimed at ensuring transport security, food sustainability, ecological stability, and protection against digital threats are becoming a strategic necessity. Within this context, Turkic integration is acquiring a fundamentally new geopolitical significance. In recent years, the overall economic potential of the member states of the Organization of Turkic States has increased substantially, while the volume of intra-regional trade has expanded steadily. Nevertheless, economic growth alone is insufficient. The principal challenge lies in transforming this growth into sustainable institutional integration. At the current stage, the Turkic states face four major strategic challenges: transport and logistics integration, digital transformation, ecological security, and cybersecurity. One of the most critical problems concerns the insufficient integration of transport and logistics systems. In the contemporary global economy, transit corridors have become a central element of geopolitical competition. The Russia–Ukraine war, instability in the Red Sea region, and disruptions in global supply chains have intensified the need for alternative transport routes across Eurasia. Consequently, the strategic significance of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly referred to as the “Middle Corridor,” has grown considerably. However, the effectiveness of this corridor depends not only on railway and highway infrastructure. The primary obstacles include the complexity of customs procedures, the slow exchange of information, and bureaucratic barriers in transit operations. In this regard, the implementation of digital logistics instruments such as “E-Permit,” “e-CMR,” and “eTIR” is emerging as an important strategic solution. The introduction of digital logistics platforms enables the reduction of transit time, real-time cargo tracking, and the lowering of transportation costs. This, in turn, enhances the competitiveness of the Turkic states within the global trading system. In particular, the integration of the “China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan” railway with the “Middle Corridor” substantially increases Uzbekistan’s geoeconomic importance. If implemented successfully, this project could transform the country into one of the key transit and logistics hubs of Central Asia. Nevertheless, several serious challenges remain. First, infrastructure projects require enormous financial resources. Second, transport corridors are closely connected with the strategic interests of major powers, which intensifies geopolitical pressure. Third, differences in customs regulations and technical standards continue to slow the process of logistics integration. A viable solution to these challenges would be the establishment of a unified digital transit space. This would require the full digitalization of customs systems, the automation of information exchange, and the creation of a single coordination platform among transport operators. At the same time, it would be appropriate to develop special financial mechanisms within the framework of the Turkic Investment Fund aimed at supporting logistics infrastructure projects. The second major challenge is digital transformation and technological disparity. In the modern world, economic superiority increasingly depends on artificial intelligence, data centers, cloud technologies, and large-scale data infrastructures. Consequently, the digital economy is becoming not only a technological phenomenon but also a geopolitical factor. For the Turkic states, the principal risk lies in remaining on the periphery of global technological competition. Today, the markets of artificial intelligence and advanced technologies are dominated by the United States, China, and the European Union, while the Turkic states are still at the stage of constructing a common technological space. Therefore, the establishment of a strategic cooperation network in the field of artificial intelligence has become critically important. One of the greatest difficulties in this sphere is technological asymmetry. While Türkiye and Kazakhstan possess relatively advanced digital infrastructures, in some states this sector remains at an initial stage of development. In addition, the shortage of highly qualified IT specialists constitutes a serious obstacle. The solution to this problem requires the development of common educational and innovation platforms. The initiative known as “Five Million AI Leaders” represents an important effort aimed at strengthening human capital. Furthermore, the establishment of joint AI laboratories, technoparks, startup ecosystems, and venture funds could significantly accelerate technological integration. In addition, the concept of a “Digital Turkic Corridor” possesses considerable strategic value. This initiative envisages the integration of data centers, high-speed communication channels, and cloud technologies into a unified network. If fully implemented, it could enable the Turkic states to establish an independent digital space. The third major challenge concerns ecological security. Central Asia and the Caucasus are among the regions most severely affected by climate change. Glacier melting, water scarcity, desertification, and soil degradation pose serious threats to regional stability. Most importantly, ecological problems are no longer confined to environmental issues alone; they are increasingly becoming economic and security concerns as well. Water shortages directly affect agriculture, energy systems, and food security. Consequently, ecological cooperation is becoming one of the key dimensions of Turkic integration. In this regard, initiatives aimed at establishing climate monitoring systems based on satellite data and applying artificial intelligence to the management of transboundary water resources represent important strategic solutions. Such systems would enable the early detection of droughts, forecasting of water flows, and continuous monitoring of ecological risks. At the same time, strengthening ecological diplomacy is equally important, since conflicts over water and environmental resources may intensify political tensions in the future. Therefore, the establishment of common ecological platforms and scientific centers appears necessary. The fourth challenge relates to cybersecurity and digital threats. In the contemporary world, national economies, banking systems, transportation networks, and energy infrastructures are becoming increasingly dependent on digital technologies. This significantly increases vulnerability to cyberattacks. As a result, cybersecurity has become an integral component of national security. For the Turkic states, the principal threat lies in the insufficient protection of digital infrastructure. Particularly with the rapid development of artificial intelligence technologies, the risks of cybercrime and information manipulation continue to grow. Therefore, the proposal to establish a “Turkic Alliance for Cybersecurity and the Protection of Digital Infrastructure” carries substantial strategic significance. Such an initiative could facilitate rapid information exchange, joint training programs, the preparation of specialists, and the creation of coordinated mechanisms against digital threats. However, significant obstacles remain, including differences in technological capacities and the absence of unified standards. Moreover, the issue of artificial intelligence ethics is becoming increasingly urgent. If AI technologies are misused, they may intensify information manipulation, surveillance systems, and digital control. For this reason, the development of common ethical standards based on human-centered principles is of strategic importance. Overall, Turkic integration is entering a qualitatively new stage of development. Integration is no longer limited to historical affinity or cultural solidarity. Instead, transport systems, the digital economy, ecological security, artificial intelligence, and cyber resilience are becoming the principal pillars of cooperation. Nevertheless, the success of this process depends on several factors. First, sustained political will remains essential. Second, proposed initiatives must move beyond declarative rhetoric and be translated into practical mechanisms. Third, the volume of economic and technological investment must increase significantly. If the Turkic states are able to prioritize common strategic interests over narrow national competition, the Organization of Turkic States could evolve into one of the most influential functional regional platforms in Eurasia during the twenty-first century. In particular, the formation of a unified digital space, integrated logistics systems, ecological monitoring mechanisms, and cybersecurity frameworks may elevate Turkic integration to an entirely new level. Ultimately, the integration of the Turkic world may emerge not merely as a model of cultural unity, but as a new regional development model grounded in modern digital geopolitics, economic security, and innovative development.

The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) marks a definitive shift in China’s economic trajectory, signaling an era where the “quality” of growth takes precedence over its sheer velocity. By setting a modest GDP target of 4.5–5%, Beijing acknowledges that the era of debt-fueled real estate expansion and massive infrastructure projects has reached a point of diminishing returns. Instead, the strategy pivots toward “New Quality Productive Forces”, placing a heavy bet on high-tech frontiers like artificial intelligence, quantum technology, and the low-altitude economy. This transition aims to bake innovation directly into the country’s industrial DNA, targeting a digital economy that accounts for 12.5% of GDP by the decade's end. Strategically, the plan balances domestic social reform with global environmental commitments. To correct deep-seated imbalances, China is moving to bolster its “dual circulation” model by strengthening social safety nets—such as childcare and elderly care—to finally unlock sluggish household consumption. While the plan reaffirms a commitment to carbon neutrality by 2060, it adopts a pragmatic approach to emissions, focusing on a 17% reduction in carbon intensity. Internationally, the Belt and Road Initiative is being recalibrated to favor smaller, high-yield “boutique” projects, reflecting a more cautious and selective engagement with global markets. However, the path to 2030 is fraught with structural headwinds that could test the government's resolve. The persistent drag of the property sector, industrial overcapacity, and a cautious consumer base present significant risks to these modernization goals. The success of this policy brief’s vision hinges on whether the state can successfully navigate these financial vulnerabilities while simultaneously fostering an environment where technological self-reliance can thrive without stifling the very industrial momentum it seeks to preserve. Read on the website of the Center for Progressive Reforms * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova examines why India should pay closer attention to the Trans-Afghan Corridor as an alternative route for strengthening its connectivity with Central Asia and Eurasia. Against the backdrop of renewed U.S. sanctions on Iran and growing instability in the Middle East, India’s reliance on the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor faces increasing uncertainty. The brief argues that these developments create a strategic need for New Delhi to diversify its transport options and consider routes that bypass Iran. The author highlights the economic and geopolitical relevance of the Termez–Naibabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi railway project, also known as the Trans-Afghan or Kabul Corridor. By linking Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the corridor could provide India with a shorter and more cost-effective land route to Central Asian and Eurasian markets. It also has the potential to reduce transport time, expand trade opportunities and strengthen India’s role in a region it increasingly views as part of its extended neighbourhood. At the same time, the brief acknowledges the political constraints surrounding the project, including India’s difficult relations with Pakistan, instability along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border and China’s growing influence through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Despite these challenges, the author argues that Uzbekistan should intensify diplomatic engagement with India, explain the economic viability of the Kabul Corridor and establish regular consultations with relevant Indian agencies on transport cooperation. Read on SIGA’s website * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.