Azerbaijan is strengthening its political and economic ties with the Taliban government by playing an active role in creating and developing promising transport routes to South Asia. At the forefront is the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, launched in 2018 through a joint initiative of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and Turkmenistan, similar to the ancient route of the Great Silk Road.   On July 2, 2025, on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Khankendi, Azerbaijan, Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, met with Azerbaijani Prime Minister Ali Asadov. They emphasized Baku’s readiness to increase export and import volumes with Afghanistan. They also discussed prospects for developing deliveries in the South Asia-Caucasus-Europe direction. This would involve expanding the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to Pakistan and India, enabling participants to attract transit cargo from India and the EU. Trade between these two economic giants has grown steadily and reached $137 billion in 2024.   However, the transit corridor from Europe to India via the South Caucasus, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan could threaten the viability of the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Indian Ocean ports multimodal corridor suggested by Uzbekistan. This initiative is linked to the Trans-Afghan Railway project (also known as the Kabul Corridor), which would run from Termez to Naibabad, Maidanshahr, Logar and Kharlachi, with a projected carrying capacity of up to 20 million tons per year. If the Lapis Lazuli Corridor is activated in an expanded version, Tashkent risks losing these flows, as the cargo will bypass the country.   It is highly probable that the Lapis Lazuli Corridor will be integrated with the western Trans-Afghan Railway along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Buldak route. This route is being promoted by Ashgabat and Astana as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor, which would also conflict with Uzbekistan’s interests.   Russia may be seriously interested in the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, particularly given that Moscow has already announced its intention to establish a connection with Afghanistan via the Caspian Sea, making use of Turkmenistan’s port and railway infrastructure.   To maintain and increase its competitive advantages in the trans-Eurasian and trans-Afghan transport sectors, Uzbekistan must strengthen its coordination with neighbouring partner countries, including Azerbaijan, regarding transport and transit issues. Consideration should be given to extending the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan via Uzbekistan, with the possibility of continuing the route to Pakistan through the Kabul Corridor.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In global politics, the words and actions of major powers are often the first to be scrutinized, which can foster a misleading perception of their outsized role in advancing key decisions and initiatives. Yet this is not always the case. Smaller states, too, are capable of setting the tone on the international agenda. A vivid example of this was seen at the anniversary summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin, China.   The Central Asian states form the very core of the SCO. At their current stage of development, they are emerging as responsible actors in international relations, increasingly aware of the need to pool efforts in building a shared regional destiny. The first signs of this long-anticipated regional cohesion can be discerned in the remarkable alignment of positions on pressing foreign-policy issues.   At the Tianjin summit, the leaders of the Central Asian states spoke with remarkable unanimity on strengthening regional security, dismantling trade barriers, harnessing water, energy and transit potential more effectively, and attracting investment to promising sectors of industrial production — including the extraction and processing of critical minerals. Importantly, these priorities were articulated not from a position of petitioning for support, but from one of agency and initiative. Hence the bold and forward-looking ideas placed on the table before the larger “Shanghai family”. One proposal in particular deserves closer attention.   The President of Uzbekistan advanced the initiative of creating a unified SCO transport space — in essence, a call for an extensive network of digitalized transport corridors linking all SCO members, irrespective of geography.   At the heart of this significant initiative lies a structural challenge: the fragmented integration of road and railway networks among SCO countries. For instance, India and Pakistan — the largest states in South Asia and full members of the SCO — lack direct access to Central Asia and to the northern latitudes of Eurasia, such as Russia and Belarus. Existing routes between these macro-regions are prohibitively long and costly, significantly constraining trade flows.   Consider also the case of Iran. As a pivotal actor in Eurasia’s transit architecture and a participant in the Southern Railway Corridor linking East and Central Asia with Europe, Iran nevertheless remains insufficiently integrated into the transport networks of the Central Asian republics — and more broadly, the CIS space, many of whose members are part of the SCO. Divergent transport regulations, shipping documentation, technical standards, and border-customs regimes undermine the effective functioning of interregional transport corridors, with predictable negative consequences.   Uzbekistan is preparing to operationalize the Trans-Afghan (Kabul) Corridor — the Termez–Naybabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi route — envisioned as a transport bridge connecting Europe, China and South Asia. This project is expected to dovetail with the ambitious China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan high-mountain railway and the Northern Corridor. Together, they will dramatically expand the export and transit capacity of Central Asian states, securing long-sought direct rail access to the Indian Ocean ports.   Preliminary estimates indicate that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan could attract an additional transit flow of up to 20 million tons annually, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could receive as much as 5 million tons per year. To prepare for such a prospect, Uzbekistan is already urging SCO partners to institutionalize the concept of a unified transport space. Its realization would ostensibly fall under the purview of the Council for the Integration of Railway Spaces of SCO Countries, the establishment of which — with headquarters in Tashkent — was proposed a year ago.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya to Central Asian states was closely linked to Tokyo’s domestic political and economic agenda. The trip was seen as a preparatory stage for the C5+Japan summit and was intended to give new substance to Japan’s engagement with the region.   Amid growing competition from China, Russia, Turkey, and the EU, Japan seeks to emphasize its willingness to remain a significant partner for Central Asia, relying on economic diplomacy, technological cooperation, and support for structural reforms. A key factor is economic security policy, which has been a central element of Japan’s strategy since 2022. The Economic Security Promotion Act is forcing Tokyo to seek more reliable sources of critical minerals, which determines the importance of cooperation with Uzbekistan for Japan. Tokyo seeks to guarantee long-term access to strategic raw materials, primarily metals for battery production and renewable energy.   Japanese diplomacy is currently characterized by a desire to “make up for lost time”, which highlights the weakness of the country’s political leadership against a backdrop of internal instability and declining popularity of the prime minister. According to experts, the visit yielded important results in the form of agreements in the fields of industry, energy, and logistics, as well as the establishment of a Strategic Dialogue between the foreign ministers.   In its official releases, Japan’s Foreign Ministry notes that Uzbekistan is showing steady economic growth and that bilateral relations with Japan have strengthened significantly, especially after the Uzbek president’s visit to Japan in December 2019.   The launch of the new Strategic Dialogue format sets an institutionalized and predictable rhythm of interaction, which increases the stability of Japan’s relations with Central Asia and forms a coordination mechanism, including the preparation of the agenda for the upcoming C5+Japan summit.   Thanks to the agreements reached, Uzbekistan’s potential for receiving development assistance and access to advanced technologies is expanding. The project in the Surkhandarya region is forming a model of “human security + green growth” that can be scaled up in the Aral Sea region, Fergana, and Kashkadarya.   In addition, the potential for developing educational and humanitarian cooperation is gaining momentum. In particular, scholarship programs, Japanese language studies, and academic exchanges are opening up new opportunities for Uzbek universities to expand dual degree programs and specialist training. The establishment of the first Japanese university in Tashkent will form the basis for long-term cooperation and training personnel for joint initiatives.   Practical steps to maximize the results of the visit cover several areas. It seems appropriate to put forward new initiatives at the C5+Japan summit to deepen cooperation with Japan in areas such as green transport corridors, energy, smart cities, visa programs for IT specialists and engineers, and the organization of a forum on critical minerals.   Thus, Takeshi Iwaya’s visit confirmed Japan’s increased interest in Central Asia and underscored Uzbekistan’s strategic role in supply chains, sustainable development, and humanitarian initiatives. Institutionalizing dialogue, accelerating pilot projects, and establishing the first Japanese university in Tashkent will allow Japan to maximize the results of its diplomatic activity.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The recent trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in Kabul was a significant event in regional diplomacy. Organized by China, the meeting aimed to reduce tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and promote regional stability and economic cooperation, particularly through the expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.   The sixth trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan took place on August 20, 2025, in Kabul. This dialogue, institutionalized in 2017, aims to strengthen political trust, coordinate the fight against terrorism, and promote economic integration between the three countries. Pakistani Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Afghan Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi participated in the talks.   During the meeting, the parties focused on several key aspects. First and foremost, significant progress was made in reducing tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, which had previously faced an increase in militant attacks in Pakistan. China acted as a mediator in this process, hosting an informal meeting in Beijing, which led to improved relations and an agreement to upgrade diplomatic ties to embassy level.   A key economic achievement of the meeting was an agreement to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. CPEC is a multi-billion dollar project aimed at connecting China and Pakistan through a network of roads, railways, and energy pipelines. The expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan is seen as an important step in stimulating trade, transit, and development in the region. The parties also reaffirmed their commitment to deepening cooperation in trade, transit, regional development, health, education, culture, and the fight against drug trafficking.   In the context of regional integration, it is worth noting that Pakistan and Afghanistan previously (in May) agreed on a joint feasibility study for the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project. This project aims to improve regional connectivity with Central Asia, and Ishaq Dar's visit to Kabul a month before the trilateral meeting was related to the signing of a framework agreement on this project.   Thus, the meeting underscored the three countries’ commitment to regional stability, economic development, and joint efforts to combat terrorism, with the expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan becoming a central element in achieving these goals.   At the same time, the expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan also has significant implications for Uzbekistan and its relations with Afghanistan. As a landlocked country, Uzbekistan is actively seeking to expand its trade routes and access to seaports. Afghanistan has historically been an important transit corridor for Uzbekistan, connecting it with South Asia and the Middle East.   Afghanistan's accession to the CPEC could provide Uzbekistan with new, more efficient and secure trade routes through Afghanistan and Pakistan to ports on the Arabian Sea, such as Gwadar. This would reduce Uzbekistan's dependence on existing routes and open up new opportunities for exports and imports. The CPEC project, which includes the development of infrastructure such as roads and railways, will contribute to overall regional connectivity, which is in line with Uzbekistan’s long-term goals of integrating into regional economic processes and creating transport corridors connecting Central Asia with South Asia.   The aforementioned Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project is a direct testament to Uzbekistan's desire to deepen ties through Afghanistan. The expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan could complement and accelerate the implementation of this project, creating synergies for the development of transport infrastructure in the region. The Termez-Mazar-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway, which is part of this project, will significantly reduce the time and cost of freight delivery.   Economic stabilization and development in Afghanistan, stimulated by investments under the CPEC, will create new economic opportunities for the parties. This may include increased bilateral trade, joint investment projects, and the development of border infrastructure.   The impact on Uzbek-Afghan relations will be multifaceted. The expansion of the CPEC and joint infrastructure projects, such as the UAP railway, will inevitably lead to deeper cooperation between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This will contribute to strengthening political dialogue, exchanging experiences, and jointly addressing regional issues. The economic stabilization of Afghanistan through the CPEC may also contribute to overall security in the region, which is a priority for Uzbekistan. A stable and prosperous Afghanistan reduces the risks associated with cross-border crime, extremism, and drug trafficking, which directly affect Uzbekistan's security. In addition, improved transport connectivity and economic development can help strengthen humanitarian and cultural ties between the two countries, given the presence of a significant Uzbek diaspora in northern Afghanistan.   Thus, the Sixth Trilateral Meeting of Foreign Ministers of China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan is an important step towards strengthening regional stability and economic cooperation. The expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan and the development of the UAP railway project open up new opportunities for all participants, including Uzbekistan. These initiatives not only promote economic development and integration, but also strengthen security and stability in the region, which is a key factor for long-term prosperity. Uzbek-Afghan relations, in turn, will receive a new impetus for development based on common economic interests and the desire for regional stability.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Bobur Mingyasharov   In August 2025, the US Department of State designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its sub-unit, the Majid Brigade, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Additionally, the Majid Brigade was incorporated into the BLA structure, which previously held the status of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). This decision is significant not only for regional security but also for the international geopolitical balance.   US–Pakistan Rapprochement. The designation was announced following the visit of Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, to Washington. It signals the beginning of a new phase in US – Pakistan relations. In recent years, Islamabad has been observed moving closer to Beijing in political and economic terms. In this context, the designation of the BLA as a terrorist organization can be interpreted as a political signal of trust and cooperation from Washington toward Pakistan.   Energy Factor. Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Pakistan to develop the country’s significant oil reserves. The agreement also includes provisions for reduced US tariffs on Pakistani products. Pakistan’s Finance Minister, Muhammad Aurangzeb, described this deal as a “win” for bilateral relations.   Although the details of the agreement have not yet been fully disclosed, the energy cooperation elevates trade and investment ties between Islamabad and Washington to a new level. Importantly, this announcement came just one day after the US imposed a 25% tariff on trade with Russia affecting India.   India and China Factors. The US decision to designate the BLA as a terrorist organization may run counter to India’s interests. Previously, the BLA’s attacks had weakened the China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which in some ways provided advantages for New Delhi. Now, restricting the group’s activities increases CPEC’s security and strengthens Beijing’s position in the region.   At the same time, the imposition of US trade tariffs on India and the enhancement of energy cooperation with Pakistan create a new strategic environment in South Asia. This development may complicate Washington’s balance of relations with New Delhi.   Conclusion. Overall, the designation of the BLA as a terrorist organization and the energy agreement with Pakistan have a significant impact on regional geopolitical dynamics. On one hand, US – Pakistan relations are entering a new phase; on the other, a complex strategic balance with India and China is being reshaped. This process is expected to generate new diplomatic dynamics and competitive fields in South Asia and neighboring regions.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The commentary by IAIS Visiting Junior Fellows offers a comparative and on-the-ground perspective on Uzbekistan’s road infrastructure, blending personal travel observations with policy analysis. Drawing parallels with Canada’s vast but well-connected highway system, the authors underscore the challenges Uzbekistan faces in developing safe, efficient, and sustainable road networks. They recount travel experiences across regions such as Samarkand, Bukhara, Nukus, and Muynak, highlighting pervasive potholes, uneven surfaces, and risky driving behaviors that undermine road safety. These firsthand accounts are reinforced by statistics from the United Nations and the World Health Organization, which reveal high accident rates and a significant economic cost—2.8% of GDP—associated with road incidents.   The fellows argue that inadequate road conditions not only compromise safety but also limit Uzbekistan’s economic potential. Citing World Bank data, they note that road freight capacity must increase dramatically—by nearly 500% by 2030—to meet future demand. While rail infrastructure, such as the Afrosiyab high-speed service, offers strong intercity connectivity, they suggest roads should prioritize regional and “last-mile” links, particularly to smaller towns and vulnerable areas like Muynak. They highlight opportunities for Uzbekistan to leverage foreign investment, including from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to address infrastructure deficits and integrate into emerging Trans-Caspian trade corridors.   Government initiatives, including the 2035 Transport Development Strategy and major projects like the $4.28 billion Tashkent–Andijan expressway, signal a strong political will to modernize the sector. However, the authors caution that large-scale projects should be matched with investments in safety measures, urban traffic management, and long-term maintenance budgets—areas where Canadian experience offers instructive lessons. They also advocate for integrating road safety into design and policy from the outset, noting that consistent enforcement and improved driver discipline are as vital as engineering upgrades.   Ultimately, the piece frames Uzbekistan’s current moment as a rare window of flexibility and ambition—conditions that Canada no longer enjoys due to entrenched infrastructure legacies. By balancing large-scale expressways with regional connectivity, embedding safety in construction, and ensuring sustained maintenance funding, Uzbekistan can lay the foundations for a transport network that boosts economic integration, supports rural communities, and meets the demands of future trade and mobility.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.