By Roksana Izzatova, Dilorom Gulomjonova, Mushtariybonu Nazarova, UWED undergraduates, interns at IAIS The Future Combat Air System (FCAS), conceived in 2017 by Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel as Europe’s flagship defence programme, is now on the verge of collapse. The growing tension between Germany and France over the development of next-generation fighter jets showcases more than an industrial disagreement, it exposes the fragility of Europe’s ambition to become strategically autonomous in security matters. The viability of the FCAS program and Europe’s broader defense integration are threatened by escalating political, industrial and strategic risks.  The conflict in Ukraine and the changing transatlantic landscape have fueled demands for Europe to take more ownership of its security affairs. For several decades, European security has been heavily dependent on NATO and, by extension, the United States. However, France revived their concept of “strategic autonomy”, due to strategic uncertainty and also concerns about long-term U.S. commitment. Germany, with its long-standing Atlanticist approach, has increasingly come to accept this narrative, especially since the Zeitenwende in 2022. But while there is a broad consensus on the need for strategic autonomy, there is no smooth sailing in collaborative efforts. The FCAS project was meant to be the backbone of Europe’s future airpower capabilities, which would have combined advanced fighter aircraft, drones and digital combat systems. At the heart of the impasse lies a fundamental mismatch in military requirements. France, on the one hand, wants to safeguard its strategic autonomy in the defense industry and export flexibility. Germany, on the other hand, emphasizes shared governance and parliamentary control. France needs a jet capable of carrying nuclear weapons and launching from aircraft carriers, while Germany does not. These diverging operational needs were, remarkably, never reconciled at the programme’s outset. As one former senior French official told The Guardian, the project appeared to have been conceived “at a very high political level”, without adequate discussion about whether the two countries actually needed the same aircraft. The industrial dimension has compounded the problem. Dassault sees no obligation to surrender its intellectual property to Airbus, while Berlin increasingly views French behaviour as an attempt to extract German financing for a platform Paris control. Germany’s patience is fraying. One German MP described FCAS as “not a strategic necessity but an industrial trophy” for Dassault. What makes the current moment particularly consequential is the shift in the underlying power dynamic. When FCAS began, Germany’s defence spending was modest. Now, Berlin expects to spend €150bn by 2029, nearly twice France’s budget. Germany is no longer willing to play a deferential role, and France’s Rafale export success means Dassault has little commercial incentive to compromise. Achieving strategic autonomy requires three elements, industrial integration, political trust and joint defense strategy. Europe has the technological know-how and resources. However, the political will to share sovereignty in areas such as defense production is still in question. Without harmonization between the two leading European powers, Germany and France, European autonomy will be prone to splintering into multiple parallel national projects rather than a single security framework. Furthermore, the ambition for autonomy in Europe must not be conflated with a disconnection from NATO. Rather, it represents a more balanced relationship between Europe and the United States, where Europe has meaningful capabilities. However, division within Europe undermines its leverage and credibility. Without success in flagship programs such as FCAS, the ambition to be an autonomous security provider will remain a dream rather than a reality. The project is on the brink of collapse because of the controversial approaches between Germany and France. Despite having a deadline till December 2025, to make final decisions about its implementation, neither side commented on making a compromise. The delay or failure of FCAS leads both countries to make costly interim upgrades in their Rafale and Eurofighter jets, which weakens the implementation of the project. Furthermore, there is another project signed altogether with FCAS in 2017, the Main Ground Combat System, that can fail if FCAS is not achieved. Also, it could lead to fragmentation in European air power as the countries could rely on buying fighter jets from the US Next Generation Air Dominance(NGAD) or Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) of the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan. For all the talk of reducing European industry fragmentation, the continent could end up with different sixth-generation fighter programmes. At a moment when Europe urgently needs to demonstrate strategic coherence, the FCAS crisis reveals just how fragile its foundations remain. In this regard, the split between Germany and France in the FCAS program is more than a difference in aircraft design and industrial participation. It is a representation of a larger strategic issue, whether Europe can move beyond the national interests of defense to build an integrated security framework. Without resolving these contradictions, Europe’s dependence on external security guarantees will continue. However, if it manages to do so, the FCAS program could become the bedrock of a more autonomous and strategically integrated Europe. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Energy cooperation between China and Russia remains one of the key pillars of their economic relationship, particularly amid the structural transformations of global energy markets in recent years. The reallocation of export flows and the changing geography of demand have increased the importance of the Asian direction for Russian energy resources, with China firmly establishing itself among the primary consumers. Against the backdrop of declining Russian gas supplies to Europe, China has become a crucial export market, reflected in the growing volumes of pipeline deliveries via the Power of Siberia-1 route. At the same time, prospects for further infrastructure expansion, including potential new routes, continue to be discussed, although the timelines and parameters of their implementation remain subject to negotiation. Financial and economic interaction in the energy sector is accompanied by an increasing use of national currencies in settlements, reflecting a broader trend toward the diversification of international trade instruments. At the same time, constraints persist, related to infrastructure capacity, pricing parameters, and external economic conditions. In parallel, China continues to pursue a strategy of diversifying its energy supply sources. A significant role in this regard is played by liquefied natural gas (LNG) suppliers, as well as the development of alternative routes and directions of cooperation, including with countries in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. In the medium term, demand for natural gas in China is expected to grow, accompanied by an increase in import dependence. This dynamic creates conditions for further development of cooperation with various suppliers, including Russia, albeit within a competitive environment where price, reliability of supply, and flexibility of terms remain key factors. The escalation of tensions in the Middle East and the associated risks to maritime logistics have increased attention to overland energy supply routes. In this context, Eurasian directions, including Russian and Central Asian routes, are gaining additional importance as elements of supply resilience. At the same time, the growing role of overland infrastructure does not negate the broader logic of diversification. China continues to adhere to a pragmatic approach, seeking to balance different sources of energy supply and minimize risks associated with external shocks. For Central Asian countries, these developments create both new opportunities and additional challenges. On the one hand, their importance as transit and resource nodes within the regional energy architecture is increasing. On the other, there is a growing need to balance domestic demand with external commitments, while preserving a multi-vector foreign economic policy. Under these conditions, a key factor of resilience is the ability of regional states to pursue a balanced and flexible energy policy aimed at strengthening internal security and effectively leveraging emerging opportunities for international cooperation. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In recent years, international migration processes have become closely linked to global geopolitical changes, and political and security issues have had a significant impact on the movement of citizens. The Middle East region, in particular, is at the center of complex political and security developments, making the issue of ensuring the safety of foreign citizens living or working in the region particularly urgent. In this regard, the measures taken by Uzbekistan to repatriate citizens from the Middle East can be recognized as one of the effective indicators of the state's consular policy and migration management system. According to official data, as of March 10, 2026, more than 25,000 citizens from the Middle East have been repatriated to Uzbekistan. In particular, more than 21,000 citizens from Saudi Arabia, more than 3,500 from the United Arab Emirates, as well as citizens from Iran, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, were repatriated. This process once again confirms the direct link between global migration and geopolitical factors. The Middle East has long been a center of global political competition, representing a key point in international politics in terms of energy resources, strategic transport corridors, and geopolitical interests. This region is a destination for labor migration for many countries, and many foreign citizens work in the service, trade, and tourism sectors. Therefore, political changes in the region have a significant impact on migration flows. In modern international practice, consular diplomacy is an important tool in ensuring the safety of citizens, and the evacuation measures being implemented by Uzbekistan are a practical expression of this policy. The importance of coordinated cooperation between state bodies and international transport infrastructure and diplomatic relations is reflected in the repatriation of citizens. This demonstrates the state's ability to take quick and effective measures in emergencies. Today, the migration process is seen as a complex issue related not only to economic, but also to national security and social stability. The increase in the number of citizens living abroad requires states to more effectively manage migration processes. In recent years, Uzbekistan has implemented a wide range of reforms to regulate labor migration, protect the rights of migrants, and establish a safe migration system. At the same time, I believe that measures to repatriate citizens from the Middle East will be considered an important part of this policy. The digitization of consular services, the creation of a rapid communication system with migrants, and the strengthening of emergency preparedness mechanisms may become even more relevant in the future. In conclusion, the geopolitical situation in the Middle East directly affects global migration processes, and one of the main tasks of states is to ensure the safety and protection of their citizens abroad. The evacuation measures being implemented by Uzbekistan are an effective example of modern consular diplomacy and migration management and are emerging as an important area of ​​the state's foreign policy aimed at protecting the interests of its citizens. In the future, improving migration policy, ensuring safe labor migration for citizens, and developing consular services will remain priority areas of Uzbekistan's foreign policy. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Ongoing geopolitical tensions around the world are affecting continental trade routes of strategic importance to Central Asian states. The war in Ukraine, the largest modern crisis in Eurasia, continues to impact the dynamics of cargo transportation along the east-west axis, emphasizing the importance of a diverse approach to logistics organization. Uzbekistan is demonstrating maximum flexibility in this regard, striving to reduce the cost of export and import deliveries and ensure the most effective and ensure access to promising markets, including the European Union. In 2024, Uzbekistan’s foreign trade with EU countries amounted to $6.4 billion, marking a 5.2% increase. According to last year's results, the country’s top 20 trading partners included several European states, such as Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy and Poland, with a combined trade turnover of over $1.4 billion. The Northern Corridor, passing through Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus, remains the optimal channel for Uzbekistan to deliver goods to the eurozone. In 2023, over 1 million tons of cargo were transported along the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-Russia-Belarus-EU railway route. One of the main transshipment hubs is the Małaszewicze railway terminal in Poland, where cargo from Central Asia arrives after crossing the Brest–Terespol checkpoint on the Belarusian–Polish border, before being delivered across Europe. This dry port, located along the Northern Corridor, handles over 90% of rail trade between the EU and China. In January 2026, the President of Uzbekistan instructed the government to consider creating a dedicated transport corridor for domestic carriers to Poland via Brest in Belarus. This is due to the need for the rapid delivery of perishable goods, primarily fruit and vegetables, to the European market. Meanwhile, Uzbek-Polish trade has declined in recent years due to high logistics costs and the introduction of restrictions related to security risks on routes to western direction using road transport. In 2025, bilateral trade turnover amounted to $383.7 million, compared to nearly $400 million the previous year. Reorienting freight traffic to railways going to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, with subsequent transshipment of goods into containers or trucks, could significantly reduce the cost of transportation from Central Asia to Europe. However, this would require addressing current issues relating to the shortage of rolling stock and the complexity of customs procedures, which impact the efficiency of northern railway routes.  In order to boost mutual trade and develop their own transit potential, Uzbekistan and Poland are planning to establish joint logistics centers. One of these centers will be located in Mazovia, the largest transport hub in Eastern Europe. This will pave the way for Uzbekistan’s integration into European supply chains and expand the scope for the practical implementation of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, which was signed in October 2025.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The escalation of the situation in the Middle East poses an increased risk to Uzbekistan's ability to deliver goods to promising export markets, including Europe and South Asia, via effective routes. A month ago, the Uzbek Ministry of Transport proposed alternative transport routes to bypass problematic countries. These included routes through Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, given that all three countries are currently experiencing active military conflict, the feasibility of transporting cargo through their territories is limited. This places Central Asian countries, which already face high transport costs in foreign trade due to their geographical distance from open seas, in an extremely difficult position. During the 12-day Iran-Israel war in the summer of 2025, Uzbekistan was forced to seek urgent alternatives to Iran’s southern ports, leading to a 30 per cent increase in logistics costs. The country is likely to incur even greater losses in the current situation due to the temporary need to deviate from both the Iranian and the Afghan-Pakistani transit, which would give it access to the Indian Ocean. In 2025, a total of 1.2 million tons of cargo was transported by Uzbekistan through Iran. Deliveries were made to Türkiye and Western countries. Meanwhile, Iranian ports handled over 330,000 tons of domestic cargo. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz severely restricts the movement of merchant ships, particularly oil tankers, along this important global transport and energy artery. Marine insurance within the Strait has not only become extremely expensive, but also difficult to obtain, leading to an 80% decline in transit shipping. All of this has a negative impact on the port of Bandar Abbas, the region's largest transport hub, which is located on the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf. As a preventive measure, Iran's northern ports of Caspian and Anzali have ceased operations. Meanwhile, land trade routes remain active, including those crossing the Iranian-Turkmen border via the Sarakhs crossing. Iran also maintains transport links with Afghanistan via the Khaf-Herat railway line. Recently, the Afghan side announced that freight trains were running smoothly between the two cities.    Due to security threats to its southern flank, Uzbekistan has been forced to redirect cargo flows to longer and more complex routes. One option could be to use a combination of transport via the Strait of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, followed by railways in Russia and Kazakhstan. Another alternative option is the transport corridor Uzbekistan (Andijan)-Kyrgyzstan (Osh, Irkeshtam)-China (Kashgar, Urumqi)/Pacific ports of China. The Northern Railway Corridor to the EU also remains relevant. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

China’s current foreign policy reflects the country’s adaptation to a transforming international system and its effort to secure a sustainable position within evolving global dynamics. As suggested by Chinese experts, the world is undergoing a transition toward a more complex and conflict-prone multipolar order, driven in part by intensifying strategic competition with the United States. In this context, the People’s Republic of China presents itself as a stabilizing actor advocating for the reform of global governance and for an enhanced role of the Global South. The primary instruments advancing this agenda are China’s major global initiatives, including the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. Beijing emphasizes its rejection of imposing political models and underscores principles of sovereignty and mutual benefit. At the same time, the expansion of China’s institutional footprint through multilateral cooperation frameworks and financial mechanisms indicates a broader effort to shape alternative platforms for international engagement. Within this framework, relations with the Russian Federation remain an important dimension of China’s foreign policy. Beijing continues to develop bilateral economic cooperation while taking into account the prevailing international environment. Bilateral engagement is conducted with due consideration of existing international constraints and is oriented toward maintaining stable trade and economic ties. Alongside its relations with key partners, the Taiwan issue occupies a significant place in China’s foreign policy agenda. China consistently strengthens its position on this matter, combining military-political measures with diplomatic channels of communication. Discussions within Chinese expert and academic circles emphasize the importance of a calibrated approach that considers the potential economic and strategic implications of various scenarios. Accordingly, Beijing appears to favor a phased strategy that expands the range of policy instruments while preserving space for political and diplomatic resolution. Simultaneously, China has intensified its engagement in the Middle East, Africa, and more broadly across the Global South. Economic cooperation is increasingly complemented by elements of political and security interaction. The expansion of duty-free trade arrangements with African states, infrastructure initiatives, and energy agreements in the Gulf region contribute to strengthening China’s role as an alternative center of economic and diplomatic engagement. China is also expanding economic cooperation and political dialogue with the countries of Central Asia, viewing the region as a key component of the land-based corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative and as an important area for cooperation in defense and security. The growth of China’s involvement is accompanied by the development of trade and investment projects as well as institutional cooperation frameworks, creating additional opportunities for infrastructure modernization, logistics development, and economic growth in the region. At the same time, the long-term sustainability of such initiatives depends on their financial viability, transparency, and alignment with national development strategies. Ultimately, the current priorities of China’s foreign policy suggest an intention to expand its global presence without formally assuming the role of a traditional hegemonic leader. By combining economic instruments, institutional initiatives, and flexible diplomacy, China seeks to consolidate its position within a rapidly evolving international order. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.