The signing of a bilateral agreement between the Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan and China Energy Engineering Corporation Limited (CEEC) in June 2025 represents a pivotal development in the energy diplomacy of the South Caucasus. Held in the Chinese city of Ningbo during the official visit of Azerbaijan’s Minister of Energy Parviz Shahbazov, the agreement formalizes a comprehensive strategic partnership in the field of green energy and signals a shift in regional energy architecture with broader implications for Eurasia, including Central Asia.   The agreement encompasses multiple dimensions of renewable energy cooperation. It includes provisions for joint electricity system planning and grid analysis, the implementation of solar, hydro, and offshore wind energy projects, and the establishment of a Joint Research Center for Green Energy. One of the most strategic components of the agreement is the development of so-called "green energy interconnectors" - transnational infrastructure intended to facilitate the export and integration of renewable energy across borders.   The document outlines long-term plans for the expansion of Azerbaijan’s renewable energy capacity through 2030 and beyond. Planned projects include utility-scale solar power plants in the southern regions, offshore wind farms in the Caspian Sea, and technical advisory services provided by China’s EPPEI (Electric Power Planning & Engineering Institute). These services will include energy system modeling, grid integration simulations, load forecasting, and assessments of system stability and resilience.   The significance of this agreement is both practical and symbolic. For Azerbaijan, a country traditionally reliant on oil and gas exports, this partnership indicates a strategic move toward energy diversification and sustainable development. For China, it represents another step in its global strategy of exporting green infrastructure, technology, and energy planning capabilities under the Belt and Road Initiative framework.   In this context, the potential implications for Central Asia merit close attention. The region faces similar challenges: heavy dependence on conventional energy sources coupled with growing commitments to green transition and renewable integration. Countries like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have already articulated ambitious targets for renewable energy deployment. Azerbaijan’s model of securing Chinese capital and expertise could serve as a viable blueprint for Central Asian economies seeking technological modernization in their energy sectors. Of particular interest is the knowledge-based component of the agreement - the establishment of a joint research center and engagement of Chinese technical institutes in national grid planning. This highlights China’s role not merely as an investor, but also as a provider of analytical and institutional capacity-building. Such components could be adapted in Central Asia, where institutional frameworks for energy transition remain in development.   The geographical dimension further reinforces this dynamic. Azerbaijan’s proximity to the Caspian Sea and its borders with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan open up the possibility of future trans-Caspian energy corridors - including "green" ones. These could complement or even compete with existing regional initiatives such as the Central Asian Power System (CAPS), positioning China as a systemic actor in the post-Soviet renewable transformation.   Finally, it is important to situate this agreement within the broader context of the global energy transition. Countries with high solar irradiance, untapped wind potential, and small hydropower resources are emerging as critical nodes in the reconfiguration of the global energy map. Azerbaijan is among the first post-Soviet states to propose a comprehensive and technologically advanced partnership with China in this sphere. Central Asian states, if they maintain political stability and openness to international capital and technical cooperation, may replicate and adapt this approach to fit their own energy security strategies.   In conclusion, the Azerbaijan–China renewable energy agreement should be viewed not only as a national development strategy, but also as a potential accelerator of regional transformation. For Central Asia, the agreement offers a case study in integrating renewable energy, upgrading grid infrastructure, and leveraging international expertise - all essential components for a resilient and diversified energy future.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague took place at a pivotal moment for the Euro-Atlantic community. Set against the backdrop of renewed geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and rising concerns about long-term strategic cohesion within the alliance, the summit offered an important opportunity to reassess priorities and commitments. The presence of U.S. President Donald Trump was especially influential, shaping both the outcomes and the tone of the discussions, particularly on defense spending and transatlantic security arrangements.   Among the most consequential developments was the formal adoption of a new target of allocating 5% of GDP toward defense and related expenditures by 2035. This marked a substantial increase from the previous 2% guideline and appeared to reflect a convergence between longstanding American calls for greater burden-sharing and European recognition of an evolving security environment. Although framed as a collective response to persistent threats, the target also underscores ongoing disparities in capabilities and expectations among alliance members. President Trump, for his part, presented the agreement as a significant success for the United States and emphasized the importance of directing the additional resources toward military procurement, preferably through domestic production.   The U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, conducted shortly before the summit, drew considerable attention. While President Trump characterized the operation as a decisive strategic achievement, early assessments from intelligence sources and international partners were more cautious. Differing interpretations of the operation’s effectiveness illustrated the challenges of aligning military actions with multilateral consensus. At the same time, the broader diplomatic implications of the Israel-Iran ceasefire remained unresolved, even as leaders expressed support for continued efforts to de-escalate tensions and re-engage in negotiation processes.   The summit also reflected the role of personal diplomacy in alliance dynamics. Remarks made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, including a moment of referring to Trump as a paternal figure in negotiations, were widely interpreted as part of a broader effort to maintain constructive engagement with the United States. While such gestures may have helped to reinforce cohesion during the summit, they also raised questions about the degree to which institutional decisions are increasingly shaped by the personalities and preferences of individual leaders.   Ukraine’s position within NATO discussions remained highly prominent. President Volodymyr Zelensky offered a direct warning that Russia could target a NATO member state within the next five years, urging the alliance to accelerate its commitments. While NATO leaders reiterated their support for Ukraine, including increased defense assistance and industrial cooperation, the issue of formal membership remained unresolved. Diverging views, particularly from Hungary, highlighted the persistent ambivalence within the alliance over Ukraine’s future integration and the broader question of enlargement.   The economic dimension of the summit was not ignored either. French President Emmanuel Macron expressed concern over the potential contradiction between increased defense spending and rising trade frictions across the Atlantic. His remarks reflected a growing awareness that military commitments must be supported by stable economic foundations and mutual trust among allies. Macron’s intervention thus served as a reminder of the interdependence between strategic, political, and economic dimensions of transatlantic relations.   The Dutch role in hosting the summit further illustrated the importance of diplomatic symbolism. Through careful planning and a personalized approach to engagement, including high-level hospitality extended to President Trump, the Netherlands aimed to reinforce the alliance’s unity and demonstrate its continued relevance. These efforts may have contributed to the relatively smooth adoption of summit declarations, even amid underlying tensions on key policy issues.   In sum, the 2025 NATO Summit demonstrated that while institutional commitments can be reaffirmed and policy goals realigned, the strategic autonomy of the alliance remains contested. NATO today is adjusting to a security landscape shaped as much by institutional priorities as by the personalities steering them. Whether this transformation strengthens or destabilizes the alliance in the long term remains an open question.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Uzbekistan has launched a pilot transport corridor to Mongolia via Kyrgyzstan and China. Delivery of goods along the new 4,500-kilometre road route takes eight days. This gives domestic exporters additional access to the relatively unexplored Mongolian market, which is particularly relevant in light of the strengthening of trade and economic ties with this country.   The course for intensifying mutual trade was set last year, when the President of Mongolia made his first state visit to Tashkent. During high-level negotiations, the parties set the goal of increasing trade turnover several times over, which spurred the preparation of a preferential trade agreement. During the return state visit of the head of Uzbekistan to Ulaanbaatar on 24-25 June this year, this issue was once again prioritized.   Even under the current circumstances, bilateral trade indicators show steady growth. This is especially true for Uzbek exports, which in 2024 exceeded $26 million in total, twice as much as a year earlier. This dynamic gives impetus to the development of inter-country transport links, with a particular focus on road transport, given the signing last year of an agreement between the governments of Uzbekistan and Mongolia. Given the growing demand for mutual transport, an agreement has been reached to double the number of permit forms, and preparatory work has begun on their electronic exchange based on the E-Permit system.   Uzbekistan supplies Mongolia with vegetables and fruits, food products, textiles and cars. There is enormous potential for expanding the range and volume of supplies of in-demand products. Its realization undoubtedly requires effective and reliable transport links between the countries.   Mongolia is bordered by two major powers, Russia and China, but has no direct access to the sea, which determines its complex geo-economic position. Although the country is a key link in the Russia-Mongolia-China economic corridor, which includes the cross-border railway Ulan-Ude-Naushki-Ulan Bator-Erlian-Beijing-Tianjin and a motorway to northern Chinese seaports, which brings certain financial benefits, Mongolia’s transit capabilities are limited to this small geographical area. The expansion of trade routes to neighboring regions, including Central Asia, offers Ulaanbaatar great prospects in terms of diversifying its own exports.   However, the Central Asian region is not only a promising market for Mongolia, but also a land bridge to the world’s oceans. In particular, Uzbekistan, given its desire to create a Trans-Afghan railway corridor with access to Indian Ocean ports, could become Mongolia’s gateway to South Asia. The same effect will be achieved by connecting new freight routes from Mongolia to Uzbekistan with transport and transit corridors towards Iran, its southern seaports and the rest of Western Asia. In addition, transport links with Central Asian countries will open up a route for Mongolia to the South Caucasus, Turkey and Europe via the Caspian Sea. It is believed that after the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, all these connecting routes will become even more important and attractive due to the reduction in time and costs of transporting goods.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Recently, economic and political rivalry between China and the US, including the trade war, has become a key factor in world politics. The global order formed during the era of globalization is being destabilized. The conflict between the two leading global economic players affects the entire world. The analysis presents the assessments of two leading international relations experts directly associated with Chinese government structures: Yang Xuetong from Tsinghua University and Wang Jisi from Peking University.   Technological competition between China and the United States The changing structure of trade and technological relations between China and the United States reflects growing strategic tensions and a course towards selective decoupling. The Trump administration’s America First policy marked a shift towards protectionism and attempts to curb China’s growth in key sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and advanced technologies. However, despite the tough rhetoric and tariff measures, their practical application has been limited by economic realities.   Business circles in both countries are interested in maintaining bilateral trade and investment, especially in strategically important areas such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals. Complete disengagement is seen as economically unfeasible.   Technological rivalry remains at the heart of the tension, but the depth of interdependence and the high cost of disrupting global supply chains make a complete split unlikely. The European Union takes a more balanced position, emphasizing multilateralism and regulatory autonomy, seeking to preserve technological sovereignty without open confrontation.   Overall, a model of partial, selective disengagement while maintaining limited cooperation is emerging.   Deglobalization and leadership dynamics Recent geopolitical changes point to a trend towards deglobalization, accompanied by the fragmentation of international relations and the redistribution of global leadership between the US, China and the EU. The US withdrawal from international institutions under the Trump administration, including the WHO and the Paris Agreement, as well as the strengthening of unilateral initiatives, expressed Washington’s growing skepticism towards multilateral formats. This weakened the soft power of the US, reducing the attractiveness of its model and undermining its normative leadership. Internal crises in American democracy and the increasingly coercive nature of its foreign policy have only reinforced these trends.   Against this backdrop, China continues its economic growth and pursuit of national rejuvenation, strengthening its international influence without directly challenging the existing order. This is perceived in Washington as a strategic threat.   The interaction between these actors reflects a shift in the global balance. The United States retains its superiority in ‘hard power,’ but China is closing the gap, especially in high technology. The world is becoming less integrated and more strategically tense, where leadership is determined not so much by economic or military potential as by the ability to manage multiple, overlapping crises.   Prospects for cooperation during Trump’s second term Donald Trump’s second term as US president is expected to complicate relations with China and the international community. The America First policy, focused on protectionism and unilateral action, will increase tensions, especially in trade, technology and ideology. Despite his confrontational rhetoric, Trump’s transactional style allows for deals that benefit the US, although internal disagreements between security hawks and economic pragmatists make it difficult to develop a consistent policy.   Pressure on China will be maintained through sanctions on human rights issues in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, while maintaining the ‘one China’ policy. Military and economic cooperation between China and the US is possible but limited by bureaucratic and political barriers, especially in the areas of military communications and crisis management. The EU will face US demands for fair trade and increased defence spending, balancing between countering Russian aggression and preventing escalation.   On the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Trump is inclined to be cautious and minimise military involvement, giving priority to domestic issues. Overall, Trump’s second term promises increased bilateral tensions, transactional diplomacy, and domestic political divisions that will require careful management to prevent escalation and maintain limited cooperation.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Ubaydullo Khojabekov, IAIS volunteer The recent protests in Los Angeles, sparked by the Trump administration’s tightening of immigration policy, have caused a huge stir both inside and outside the US. This situation is being discussed particularly actively in the Chinese media, due to both domestic political and geopolitical factors. This article examines the interpretation of events by the Chinese media, the expert community and users of digital platforms, and analyses the political narratives that are emerging in the context of US-China relations.   The mass protests in Los Angeles, dubbed the ‘Los Angeles riots’ by the press, were a reaction to the intensified activities of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) against illegal immigrants. The use of federal forces, including the National Guard and Marine Corps units, drew criticism from both American society and abroad, becoming the subject of controversy over violations of the principles of civil governance and federal law (in particular, the Posse Comitatus Act).   California Governor Gavin Newsom described what was happening as a ‘threat to democracy’ and warned of the possible transformation of the United States into an authoritarian state. Against this backdrop, suspicions of external influence on the protest movements intensified in political discourse. Republican congressmen have claimed that the protesters may have ties to organisations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Particular attention is being paid to Neville Roy Singham, an American entrepreneur who, according to a number of sources, is linked to the financial support of left-wing movements in the United States, including the Party for Socialism and Liberation (PSL).   The events in Los Angeles have attracted widespread public interest in the Chinese information space. The digital platforms WeChat and Little Red Book have become venues for ironic comments, among which the expression ‘a beautiful sight’ has become particularly popular. Thus, part of Chinese society perceives what is happening in the United States as a ‘backlash’ against American foreign policy rhetoric.   State-run publications, including Global Times and China Daily, interpret the protests as a reflection of a systemic crisis in the American model of governance. Editorial articles emphasise the duality of the US approach to protest movements: while they are supported abroad as a manifestation of democratic freedoms, they are met with harsh repression on US soil.   At the same time, a significant portion of Chinese users and commentators are taking a wait-and-see or neutral stance, preferring to remain observers. One popular comment on the WeChat platform, quoted by The Monitor, reads: “As Chinese people, we should not take sides in what is happening in America. We can simply be observers and watch this picturesque American spectacle unfold — that is enough”.   In the context of analysing Chinese perceptions, the events in Los Angeles are seen not only as a local crisis, but as a manifestation of deeper systemic failures in the governance of the largest Western state. Chinese analysts point out that President Trump may use the situation to mobilise the electorate and expand presidential prerogatives. But international attention to the use of force against peaceful protesters, as well as to the legal aspects of this intervention, may affect the foreign policy image of the United States as a ‘bulwark of democracy.’   Beijing is officially refraining from assessing the events, but is actively monitoring developments. The events in Los Angeles illustrate the vulnerability of democratic institutions in the face of internal contradictions and, according to Chinese commentators, may serve as a lesson on the need to focus on internal governance rather than foreign policy intervention.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Military strikes by Israel and Iran against each other have raised the risks of blocking the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears of blocking international trade and transit corridors and ports of the Strait. Such a possible scenario is being considered by the Iranian authorities because of the “threat to national security”, Esmail Kosari, a member of the Iranian parliament’s committee on national security and foreign policy, said on June 14.   The geostrategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz for the global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade is since, according to various estimates, about 15-20% of the world’s oil, condensate, and petroleum products and more than 30% of liquefied natural gas pass through the strait. 82% of the volume of oil transported through the strait falls on Asian countries, the rest on Europe. 24% of China’s imported LNG is delivered through the strait.   Even the temporary suspension of the large Iranian seaport of Bandar Abbas in the north of the Strait may cause a collapse in international cargo flows, including from Central Asian countries. Other ports on the coast of the Strait, like Fujairah and major transshipment hubs for transporting goods to Dubai and other countries, may stand down. At the same time, it should be noted that while Saudi Arabia and the UAE can somehow bypass the Strait of Hormuz for part of their oil exports, Qatar and the UAE have no alternatives for exporting LNG.   Therefore, the Strait of Hormuz occupies an important place in the field of financial logistics, since any stop in the flow of ships through the strait will lead to enormous shipping costs around the world, the supply chain may be interrupted and become inefficient. As a result, energy prices on international markets will spiral out of control; countries both dependent on oil supplies and dependent on its sale will face devastating consequences. Thus, according to Iranian experts, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz may lead to a sharp reduction in oil supplies to the market and oil prices may rise to $250 per barrel. According to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, the closure of the strait could lead to the loss of about 5 million barrels of oil per day from the Persian Gulf and Iraq and an increase in prices to $200–$300 per barrel. JP Morgan estimates that with increased risks to ships, the price of Brent crude oil could jump to $120-130 per barrel.   Currently, oil supplies remain at the same level, although the risk that tensions in the Middle East will significantly worsen the situation is growing. The risks to oil supplies are at the highest level every day due to the uncertainty of resolving the conflict between Iran and Israel. Any further escalation will only bring the oil market closer to actual supply losses.   To summarize, we can state the following.   Firstly. The geopolitical conflict has led to a geo-economic zugzwang, which can have a huge impact on international oil supplies and global trade. International market participants will closely assess the risks not only of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, but also of trade and transport corridors and flows to the ports of the Strait. The Strait of Hormuz will increasingly become an important strategic leverage for stakeholders.   Secondly. The Strait of Hormuz has great potential for the coordinated development of the global economy. The nodal ports of the Strait are vital transit and logistics chains for international maritime trade, and not only for oil. Therefore, it is necessary that the flow of international vessels through the Strait continues unhindered, international trade through key seaports is carried out without interruption, and a mature view of the situation in the Strait of Hormuz prevails.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.