By  Bositkhon Islamov , UWED undergraduate, Research Assistant at IAIS   Context and the logic of Iran's position. The talks at Bürgenstock are under threat of collapse because of the acute interdependence of two conflicts: the Iran–US war, which is being brought to a close by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and Israel's ongoing military campaign in Lebanon. Tehran has advanced a settlement in Lebanon as a de facto condition for continuing the dialogue, a condition also reflected in the 14-point Memorandum, the very first point of which states the need for a ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon. It was precisely Israel's attacks on Lebanon after the signing of the MoU between Iran and the US that caused the negotiation process to be pushed back from Friday the 19th to Sunday, 21 June. Tellingly, as far back as February 2026 — two days before the American–Israeli strikes began — Iran proposed in Geneva to lower uranium enrichment from 60% to 3.67%, that is, it accepted the key nuclear demand in advance and without military pressure. The condition it maintained was precisely regional security. The grounds for linking the two conflicts reinforce one another. Strategically: Hezbollah and the Lebanese theatre constitute the first echelon of Iran's system of asymmetric deterrence; the Israeli occupation of one-fifth of Lebanon means the degradation of that system in parallel with negotiations on the lifting of sanctions. Domestically: ultraconservatives are demanding the resumption of parliament's work (suspended since the start of the war) in order to block an unfavourable deal; the Lebanese demand allows the negotiating team to frame the MoU as a victory rather than a concession. Israeli attacks as an instrument of disruption. Since 2 March 2026, Israeli strikes on Lebanon have claimed at least 4,057 lives, with 12,121 wounded. On 20 June — the day the Swiss talks opened — a further 32 people were killed in a single day. A key precedent: on 19 June the US and the Gulf states agreed to a ceasefire effective from 16:00 local time. According to accounts from the ground, after the appointed hour Israeli air strikes and artillery shelling of southern Lebanon continued — at least 12 violations were recorded; Lebanon's National News Agency (NNA) reported two people killed after the truce had been announced. Tel Aviv's tactics are transparent: the Israeli military-political leadership, in the persons of Netanyahu and Katz,personally sanctioned the ceasefire, yet without withdrawing troops from the country's territory, thereby using Lebanon as a platform for pressuring Iranian decision-making and derailing the peace talks. At the same time, Israel is formally not a party to the negotiations, which relieves it of direct responsibility for their possible collapse. In response, on 20 June the IRGC announced the reinstatement of restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, pointing directly to “Israel's crimes in Lebanon” and the US failure to honour its ceasefire commitments. On the same day 55 commercial vessels transited the strait, and the spokesman for US Central Command – CENTCOM, Captain Tim Hawkins stated that Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz. Risks of the Iranian position. A former senior State Department official, Mark Kimmitt, bluntly characterised Iran's tactic as an “extremely unwise” and risky move, in which the entanglement of two distinct conflicts may complicate the negotiating process, since “Iran cannot control what Hezbollah will do, and the United States does not control what Israel will do. Washington and Tel Aviv have overlapping but not identical interests”. By tying negotiating progress to the behaviour of Israel, which neither the US nor Iran fully controls, Tehran has handed Tel Aviv a de facto veto over the Iran–US deal. Any new Israeli operation — deliberate or accidental — is capable of nullifying days of negotiating progress. The stakes are raised further by the fact that the MoU already provides for the immediate lifting of sanctions on the oil sector: Tehran has an acute economic incentive not to let the process break down. Conclusion. Thus, the linkage of the Iran–US negotiations to the situation in Lebanon is not a tactical episode but a reflection of Tehran's broader regional strategy, in which the nuclear programme, the sanctions regime and the security of allies are treated as elements of a single negotiating package. For Iran, preserving its positions in Lebanon carries not only military-strategic significance as part of a system of regional deterrence, but also domestic political value, allowing the leadership to present possible compromises on the nuclear programme as the result of achieving broader national security goals. At the same time, such a strategy significantly complicates the negotiating process, since it makes it dependent on factors lying beyond the direct control of the parties. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Co-authored with  Zulkhayo Nishanova , teacher at the Department of International Economy of UWED Over the past two decades, labour migrant remittances have become a vital factor in the socio-economic stability of Central Asian countries, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. While these financial inflows significantly reduce poverty and support domestic demand in the short term, a heavy reliance on them creates a profound structural risk known as the “remittance curse.” This phenomenon occurs when external income substitutes internal growth sources, ultimately delaying essential structural and institutional reforms. Prolonged dependence on labour exports leads to a consumer-driven economic model, limiting industrialization and productivity growth. Furthermore, it risks triggering elements of the “Dutch disease,” where external capital inflows stimulate imports and weaken the competitiveness of domestic production. The massive outflow of labour also depletes the domestic market of active, skilled workers. Data indicates that high remittance volumes do not automatically guarantee human capital accumulation. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan, which has minimal dependence on remittances, faces a different structural challenge in the form of “brain drain” (the loss of highly qualified professionals). Crucially, remittances create an “institutional trap.” By acting as a social buffer that supports household incomes, they reduce public pressure on governments to improve governance, protect business environments, and create local jobs. As a result, countries highly dependent on remittances (such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) often exhibit stagnant institutional quality. In contrast, Uzbekistan has shown positive institutional dynamics alongside its post-2017 reforms, and Kazakhstandemonstrates strong institutional progress entirely independent of migration capital. To avoid this institutional trap, state policies must transform these financial flows from mere source of consumption into drivers of internal development. Key measures include stimulating productive investments, developing high-value industries (manufacturing, IT, modern services), creating local high-productivity jobs, and supporting returning migrants to integrate their accumulated capital and skills into domestic entrepreneurship. Ultimately, remittances should not serve as a substitute for domestic reforms, but rather as a temporary resource to fund sustainable economic modernization. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Georgia has become a strategic partner of Uzbekistan. Following negotiations in Tbilisi on July 3, 2026, the leaders of the two countries signed a declaration to this effect. The state visit of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Georgia — the first in 23 years — is laying the foundation for ambitious new endeavors. Clearly, Georgia has shifted its focus significantly towards Central Asia over the past year. The country is linking its long-term development plans in a number of areas, including trade and transport logistics, with this region. Tbilisi and Tashkent are already aiming to increase trade turnover from the current $270 million to $1 billion. This will be challenging and will require the active involvement of the private sector. Improving transport connectivity is expected to be a key driver of growing mutual trade. Tashkent has specific proposals in this regard. These include extending the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, whose construction began in April 2025, to the South Caucasus, Türkiye and Europe via the Caspian and Black Seas. This will create a new multimodal route along the east-west axis, incorporating the Middle Corridor. The CKU could also be connected to the Middle Corridor via the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, which now has a capacity of 5 million tons per year. In both cases, Georgia serves as a key hub for transcontinental logistics thanks to its geographical location and modernizing railway and port infrastructure. In 2025, 1.2 million tons of cargo from Uzbekistan were transported along the Middle Corridor. The ongoing instability in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine are likely to continue emphasizing the trans-Caspian and trans-Caucasian routes for Central Asian exports. Against this backdrop, Uzbekistan is showing increasing interest in the ports of Poti and Batumi, which provide maritime access to Europe. The creation of a logistics hub for the efficient transportation of goods via Georgia’s Black Sea ports is under consideration. These plans are in line with the development of the CASCA+ corridor (Central Asia – South Caucasus –Anatolia+), which was launched at the initiative of Tashkent in 2019. The project, which also involves Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye, aims to increase rail transport both between the beneficiary countries and in the Europe-China-Europe direction. In June 2026, the parties met in Istanbul to discuss measures to improve the efficiency of the CASCA+ corridor. Following the meeting, they signed an agreement to increase freight volumes. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Zulkhumor Makhmudova, PhD student at UWED Since the second decade of the twenty-first century, regional cooperation and integration processes in Central Asia have entered a new stage of development. In particular, the transformation of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has intensified political dialogue among the regional states and contributed to the emergence of a new model of Central Asian integration. Simultaneously, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) has evolved from a predominantly cultural and humanitarian platform into an important institution for political, economic, and geostrategic cooperation. The parallel development of these two integration processes raises an important academic question: are the OTS and Central Asian integration competing projects, or do they represent complementary forms of political integration operating at different levels? Many scholars characterize Central Asian integration as a model of regional integration based on geographical proximity. Indeed, cooperation among the states of the region is rooted in common historical experiences, shared security challenges, environmental concerns, water resource management, and economic interdependence. Since 2018, the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia have become the principal platform for regional political dialogue. In particular, the adoption of the “Central Asia–2040” Development Concept at the Sixth Consultative Meeting held in Astana in 2024 demonstrated that political rapprochement among the regional states has entered a qualitatively new stage. This document outlines the long-term strategic directions of regional cooperation and aims to establish common approaches in political dialogue, economic cooperation, and security issues. However, a distinctive feature of Central Asian integration is that it remains only partially institutionalized. Unlike the European Union, ASEAN, or even the OTS, the region does not possess a permanent secretariat, parliament, or specialized integration bodies. Decision-making is largely based on political consultations among heads of state and consensus-building mechanisms. While this flexibility facilitates pragmatic cooperation, it simultaneously limits the institutional sustainability of the integration process. Therefore, at its current stage, Central Asian integration can be described primarily as a model of political consolidation and confidence-building among regional states. The Organization of Turkic States, by contrast, represents a different model of political integration. Whereas Central Asian integration is founded on geographical proximity, the OTS is based on shared history, language, culture, and Turkic identity. In this respect, the OTS constitutes a transregional rather than a purely regional integration model. The inclusion of Türkiye and Azerbaijan alongside the Central Asian member states significantly expands its geographical scope. Consequently, the OTS should be viewed not merely as a regional organization but as a broader political cooperation platform encompassing the Turkic world. An important question arises at this point: does the growing influence of the OTS pose a challenge to Central Asian integration? Russian, European, and American expert communities offer differing interpretations of the relationship between the OTS and Central Asian integration. Russian scholars such as V. Avatkov, A. Lukin, and others regard the strengthening of the OTS as one of the emerging regional cooperation formats in Eurasia. In their view, although the organization contributes to the institutionalization of cooperation among Turkic states, it is unlikely to become an alternative geopolitical center comparable to the Eurasian Economic Union or the Commonwealth of Independent States in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, some Russian analysts emphasize that the increasing political and economic activism of the OTS may enhance Türkiye’s influence in Central Asia. Western experts tend to adopt a different perspective. Research centers in the United States and Europe generally view the OTS as a platform that promotes regional cooperation and connectivity. According to this interpretation, the development of the organization strengthens the international political subjectivity of Central Asian states and reduces the risk of excessive dependence on any single geopolitical center. European scholars, in particular, often analyze the OTS within the context of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route and the Middle Corridor, considering it an important component of emerging geoeconomic linkages between Europe and Asia. At the same time, several American strategic research institutions regard Central Asian integration itself as an important factor in strengthening the political agency of regional states. From this perspective, the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia contribute to the formation of an independent regional political agenda. The OTS, in turn, is seen as an additional mechanism that supports and extends this process within the broader Turkic space. Consequently, most Western experts do not perceive the OTS and Central Asian integration as competing initiatives but rather as integration mechanisms operating at different levels. A comparative analysis of these approaches demonstrates that Russian experts tend to focus on the geopolitical implications of the OTS, whereas European and American scholars emphasize issues such as connectivity, economic diversification, and regional stability. Nevertheless, all three expert communities increasingly acknowledge that the relationship between the OTS and Central Asian integration cannot be adequately explained through a simple competition framework. First, the Central Asian member states of the OTS simultaneously remain active participants in regional consultative formats. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan play key roles both in Central Asian integration and in the OTS. If these two projects were genuinely competing with one another, states would eventually be compelled to prioritize one framework over the other. In practice, however, no such tendency has emerged. Second, the OTS and Central Asian integration perform distinct political functions. Central Asian integration is primarily aimed at ensuring regional stability, strengthening good-neighborly relations, and addressing common regional challenges. The OTS, by contrast, extends this cooperation into a broader geopolitical space. In other words, while Central Asian integration serves as a mechanism of internal political consolidation, the OTS functions as a platform for external political projection. This dynamic is particularly evident in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has consistently identified Central Asian cooperation as a strategic priority of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. At the same time, he has actively promoted initiatives within the framework of the OTS aimed at expanding the organization’s political and economic potential. This demonstrates that Uzbekistan does not perceive these two integration platforms as contradictory but rather as interconnected mechanisms serving complementary objectives. From the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, the OTS and Central Asian integration represent institutions operating at different levels for coordinating state interests. While the Central Asian framework contributes to confidence-building and cooperation within the region, the OTS strengthens this cooperation through institutional mechanisms and enhances its international visibility and influence. From a constructivist perspective, Central Asian integration reinforces a regional identity, whereas the OTS promotes the formation of a broader political community based on Turkic identity and shared historical memory. In conclusion, it is becoming increasingly difficult to explain the relationship between the Organization of Turkic States and Central Asian integration through the concept of competition. Contemporary political developments indicate that these two integration frameworks perform distinct but complementary functions. While Central Asian integration contributes to regional political solidarity and stability, the OTS transforms this solidarity into broader forms of political cooperation and international influence within the Turkic world. Therefore, rather than viewing them as alternative projects, it is more appropriate to regard them as interconnected and mutually reinforcing elements of a multi-level integration process. Such an interpretation most accurately reflects Uzbekistan’s national interests, its multi-vector foreign policy, and the broader dynamics of regional diplomacy. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Jasurbek Khamrakulov, UWED undergraduate, intern at IAIS The President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, paid an official visit to Tashkent on 17–18 June 2026 as the final stop of his Asia tour. The visit marked an important step in the evolution of Uzbek-German relations, taking place in the context of Uzbekistan’s pragmatic economic reforms and Germany’s growing interest in diversifying supply chains, expanding labor partnerships and green transition projects. Germany has been one of Uzbekistan’s most reliable European partners since diplomatic relations were established in 1992. Bilateral trade has recently reached approximately €1.2–1.4 billion, driven predominantly by German exports of machinery, vehicles and pharmaceuticals. More than 225 enterprises with German capital operate in Uzbekistan, illustrating the deepening of economic cooperation in private sector. Previous high-level engagements, including President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visits to Germany and Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Uzbekistan in 2024, laid the groundwork for the current stage of cooperation. The visit took place against the backdrop of the annual Tashkent International Investment Forum (TIIF), Uzbekistan’s premier platform for attracting foreign investment and promoting international economic cooperation. In this context, talks between Presidents Mirziyoyev and Steinmeier focused on expanding cooperation in trade, investment, education, labor mobility and sustainable development. The negotiations concluded with the adoption of a Joint Statementoutlining priorities for deeper bilateral engagement. A significant outcome of the visit was the launch of several joint economic initiatives. These included the establishment of a semi-knockdown assembly facility for Volkswagen vehicles in Tashkent, the construction of a logistics center in the Andijan region and the production of liquid household detergents. Together, these projects demonstrate a shift from political dialogue toward practical industrial cooperation and technology transfer. Moreover, human capital development and vocational education were also outlined as crucial areas on the agenda. The two sides agreed to expand cooperation in the training of railway specialists, a sphere of growing importance, as Uzbekistan seeks to modernize its transport infrastructure and enhance regional connectivity. Plans were also announced for the establishment of modern examination and certification centers, which will help improve professional qualifications and facilitate access to employment opportunities both within Uzbekistan and abroad. These initiatives demonstrate a strong emphasis placed on education, skills development and workforce mobility in Uzbek-German relations. The discussions also produced financial agreements designed to support Uzbekistan’s objectives in sustainable development. German institutions committed grants and concessional financing for projects focused on sustainable urban development, environmental management, and infrastructure modernization. These measures correspond with Uzbekistan’s reform policy in the context of Uzbekistan’s Strategy 2030 goals and Germany’s commitment to supporting green transition in partner countries. Beyond economic cooperation, the meeting also emphasized cultural ties through visits to the Islamic Civilisation Centre and German-operated enterprises in Uzbekistan, highlighting the broader scope of bilateral engagement. The broader significance of the event lies in its focus on implementation. The agreements reached in automotive manufacturing, logistics, vocational education and sustainable development provide specific mechanisms for expanding economic cooperation. At the same time, labor mobility and skills-development initiatives address Germany’s demand for qualified workers, creating legal ways for skilled labor mobility that can simultaneously address Germany's demographic challenges and contribute to workforce development in Uzbekistan. President Steinmeier’s visit indicates not only Germany’s growing interest in Central Asia, but also Uzbekistan’s strong image as a highly important partner for Europe. The successful implementation of the initiatives could move bilateral relations to a more strategic level. More importantly, it demonstrates how Uzbekistan is becoming Germany’s principal partner in Central Asia, creating the conditions for broader European engagement with the region. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

New dialogues with the US in the field of migration indicate the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in Uzbekistan's foreign labor policy. It is noteworthy that these partnerships are aimed not only at increasing labor exports, but also at training human capital based on international standards. The meetings held within the framework of the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) in New York demonstrated that Uzbekistan is becoming an increasingly active participant in the global migration agenda. In particular, the interpretation of migration not as an “economic necessity” but as an “investment in human capital” is an important conceptual change in modern migration policy. This approach means viewing labor migration not only as a means of earning foreign exchange or alleviating unemployment, but also as a mechanism for integrating national human resources into the requirements of the international labor market. The institutional partnerships being established with the US in the medical, transport, and agro-industrial sectors solve several strategic tasks. Firstly, by improving the professional and language competencies of migrants, competitive personnel are prepared. Secondly, the risks of illegal migration are reduced, as official and targeted recruitment channels are expanded. Thirdly, the issue of legal protection of Uzbek labor migrants is becoming the focus of bilateral dialogue. At the same time, this process also means the formation of the concept of “labor diplomacy” in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Today, the issue of migration is becoming not only a social or economic issue, but also a geopolitical and demographic factor. Opportunities to enter a highly qualified labor market such as the USA will allow Uzbekistan to integrate human resources into the global value chain. On May 18-19, Tashkent became an important forum for dialogue on international migration issues. More than 600 experts, officials and representatives of international organizations from about 50 countries of the world gathered in one place within the framework of the “Tashkent International Migration Forum - 2026”. The initiative to hold the International Migration Forum in Tashkent demonstrates the country's intention to become a regional platform for shaping migration policy in Central Asia. In his speech at the forum, the Director of the Migration Agency, Behzod Musaev, noted: “Today, the issue of migration has become not only a labor market or economic process, but also a matter of human dignity, trust and shared responsibility”. In today’s global environment, states are judged not only by borders, but also by trust, cooperation and respect for human dignity. Uzbekistan is trying to form a new migration policy based on this principle. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.