By Shokhruzbek Gulmetov   The Iran-Israel confrontation has evolved beyond a regional dispute, drawing close attention from the wider international community. In response to recent developments, major global players have taken clear positions, reflecting their respective strategic interests. India, long viewed as a key partner of the Islamic Republic of Iran and consistently recognizing Tehran’s regional significance, has taken a cautious and calibrated approach. Unlike several other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), New Delhi refrained from issuing any direct condemnation of Israel, instead calling for de-escalation and maintaining a position of formal neutrality, albeit with subtle indications of diplomatic alignment with Tel Aviv.   Converging Political Outlooks To understand India’s motives for abstaining from condemning Israel’s actions, it is essential to examine the nature of India-Israel relations, particularly in the political and strategic domains. New Delhi’s decision not to align with the joint SCO position reveals a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. When both parties to a conflict represent important partners, states often opt for neutrality, guided by national interests and long-term strategic calculations.   In India’s case, cooperation with Israel has been steadily expanding across sectors such as defense, technology, and intelligence. Following the October 2023 attacks by Hamas on Israeli territory, India expressed solidarity with Tel Aviv. In turn, during India’s “Sindhur” operation on Pakistani territory, Israel offered diplomatic support to India, a move that drew concern from the international community due to reports of civilian casualties.   In April 2025, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, during a meeting with India’s new ambassador, emphasized the importance of deepening bilateral ties, especially in the field of geostrategic cooperation. He also noted Israel’s generally favorable perception of India. On the morning of June 13, 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. India abstained from the vote, despite traditional Israeli allies such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany having supported the resolution.   India’s behavior reflects its effort to maintain a delicate balance in its relationships with key partners, particularly Israel. However, its abstention on a humanitarian resolution raises questions, especially given the alignment of Indian and Israeli approaches to various developments in the Muslim world. This position may be interpreted as a lack of sufficient sensitivity to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict.   New Delhi’s Economic Priorities India-Israel relations are rooted not only in political alignment but also in expanding economic cooperation, which New Delhi considers more promising than its projects with Iran, such as the Chabahar Port or the North-South Transport Corridor. In February 2025, the India-Israel Business Forum brought together over 100 leading companies. At the forum, Israel’s Minister of Economy emphasized the geopolitical importance of strengthening partnerships with India and the United States, reflecting Tel Aviv’s strategic pivot toward Asia.   Economic data highlights New Delhi’s pragmatic choice: in 2024, trade between India and Iran totaled USD 4.13 billion, whereas trade with Israel reached USD 6.53 billion, despite a decline from 2023, when it had exceeded USD 10 billion. Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal stated that trade volumes between India and Israel should be increased tenfold, underscoring the prioritization of economic dialogue with Israel.   Beyond bilateral projects, multilateral economic initiatives also play a crucial role in bringing India and Israel closer together. Notable among them are the I2U2 coalition (India, Israel, the U.S., and the UAE) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). I2U2 focuses on key areas, including food security, sustainable energy, and the private sector. It envisions up to USD 2 billion in investments for agro-industrial parks in India, along with projects to reach 500 GW of clean energy capacity by 2030.   Initiated with U.S. support, IMEC offers India direct and stable access to Middle Eastern and European markets, circumventing unstable transit routes. Amid sanctions on Iran and Russia, New Delhi views IMEC as a more reliable and advantageous alternative to the North-South Corridor. For the U.S., IMEC represents not only an infrastructure initiative but also a strategic counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as a vehicle for deepening ties with India in the context of regional balancing.   India’s participation in these multilateral formats strengthens its economic ties with Israel and the U.S., while also helping explain New Delhi’s cautious foreign policy stance in the Iran-Israel context.   Military-Technical Cooperation Israel has proven to be a reliable strategic partner for India, particularly in enhancing its defense capabilities during periods of heightened tensions with Pakistan. During Operation Sindhur, Israel provided substantial support, including medium-range air defense systems such as the Barak 8, as well as precision strike drones like the HAROP. The latter, classified as loitering munitions, proved effective in targeted strikes against strategic enemy assets.   The effectiveness of Israeli drones was also observed during the conflict in Karabakh, where they were deployed by Azerbaijan. India-Israel military-technical cooperation goes beyond arms deliveries. It encompasses joint exercises, cybersecurity collaboration, joint development of advanced defense technologies, and training of personnel. This comprehensive approach enhances not only operational interoperability but also the strategic resilience of the partnership.   Support in the Sphere of Digital Diplomacy Beyond conventional military cooperation, Israel’s support for India extends into the digital realm. Digital diplomacy has emerged as a vital instrument for strengthening bilateral relations, particularly in the absence of a shared border. On various online platforms, there is a noticeable level of mutual understanding and friendly interaction between the governmental institutions of the two countries and their civil societies. Through digital channels, New Delhi and Tel Aviv successfully carry out joint cultural, educational, and scientific initiatives, significantly contributing to the development of a positive bilateral image and mutual trust between the peoples.   Conclusion An analysis of India-Israel relations highlights New Delhi’s pragmatic and adaptive foreign policy, which aims to balance interests amid shifting global dynamics. In the context of rising tensions, including the Iran-Israel conflict, India avoids unilateral positions while maintaining ties with key actors.   Cooperation with Israel in technology, security, and trade is important but not exclusive. India preserves strategic flexibility and remains open to recalibrating partnerships based on regional shifts and national priorities, avoiding rigid commitments in favor of diplomatic maneuverability.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The issue of water resources in Central Asia is becoming increasingly relevant. A number of experts, especially on social media, are making alarming predictions about a possible acute shortage of fresh water in the region by 2050. These estimates are based on climate change, population growth, and the dominance of the agricultural sector in water consumption.   It should be noted that over 90% of all water used in Central Asia is consumed by agriculture. In Uzbekistan, this figure is about 92%, with a significant portion of water resources going to irrigate rice and cotton. For comparison, in developed countries, agriculture accounts for 30 to 40% of available water. Meanwhile, less than 8% of water in the region is used for domestic and drinking water supply. This means that the water shortage for the population is not critical – the main challenge is to optimize water use in the agricultural sector.   Uzbekistan is taking steps to overcome this imbalance. Recognizing the scale of water risks, the country has begun implementing a set of water policy reforms in recent years. Among the priorities are the modernization of irrigation infrastructure, the introduction of water-saving technologies, the expansion of drip and sprinkler irrigation methods, and the digitization of water use accounting processes. The state is investing in hydraulic structures and improving water resource management models, with a focus on international cooperation, especially in transboundary river basins.   One of the key areas is the diversification of agriculture and the transition to crops with lower water requirements. In this context, an important step was the decision taken in 2025 to review approaches to rice cultivation, one of the most water-intensive crops. As an alternative, farmers are being offered a transition to crops that are more resistant to climate change and less dependent on intensive irrigation.   At the same time, resource-saving technologies will be introduced in rice cultivation and new varieties adapted to extreme temperatures and droughts will be used. From 2026, a pilot project on rice cultivation using drip irrigation will be expanded. Currently, rice is mainly grown on flooded fields. It is important that international experts, including specialists from the KOPIA center (South Korea), will be actively involved in this process.   Thus, Uzbekistan is demonstrating a strategic approach to water management issues and a readiness to take practical action in the face of growing water shortages. A set of preventive measures aimed at rationalizing water use and revising agricultural policy can serve as a benchmark for other countries in the region and contribute to the formation of sustainable water security in Central Asia.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Mirjalol Murtozaev   On July 3, 2025, within the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Summit held in the city of Khankendi, Azerbaijan, a historic high-level meeting took place between the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and the acting deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs of Afghanistan’s Interim Government, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. This marked the first official high-level engagement between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The meeting, held on the sidelines of the ECO Summit, reflects the growing dynamism of Uzbekistan’s diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan. While Uzbekistan has gradually intensified its diplomatic outreach toward Afghanistan since 2021, this encounter signals the opening of a new chapter-one characterized by direct dialogue at the highest levels of leadership. This development demonstrates not only Uzbekistan’s sustained interest in Afghanistan but also its broader strategic objective of strengthening and activating its regional diplomacy. Uzbekistan’s proactive approach indicates a deliberate effort to expand its role as a stabilizing actor and constructive partner in regional affairs, particularly concerning the Afghan direction.   This suggests that Uzbekistan is not only engaging in direct dialogue with Afghanistan but is also beginning to utilize its diplomacy through international platforms. It is likely that Uzbekistan will continue to demonstrate activity in such multilateral formats. In particular, Afghanistan’s participation may be expected at the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit scheduled to take place in China on August 31 and September 1, 2025. Uzbekistan has long advocated for the revival of the “SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group” within the framework of the organization. Developments in this direction appear increasingly likely. Moreover, opportunities are emerging for Afghanistan to be involved in processes within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States and other regional bodies, with Uzbekistan potentially playing a facilitating role. Uzbekistan promotes a cooperative and balanced political approach to the Afghan issue, grounded in international consensus. This evolving strategy is elevating Uzbekistan’s relations with Afghanistan to a new level while simultaneously enhancing the scope and sophistication of Uzbek diplomacy itself. The consistency in this approach indicates that Uzbekistan is committed to supporting Afghanistan’s integration into the international community through constructive and inclusive engagement.   It is unlikely that Afghanistan will be able to fully reintegrate into the international community in a short period of time. In this regard, Uzbekistan is contributing to the process by supporting a gradual, step-by-step approach. High-level meetings of this nature may serve as a model for other countries, encouraging greater international attention toward Afghanistan and potentially leading to an increase in humanitarian assistance - particularly in support of the Afghan people.   Furthermore, Uzbekistan has expressed its intention to advance an initiative titled “Communicating the Real Situation in Afghanistan within the United Nations Framework.” This proposal aims to foster a more informed and pragmatic international dialogue about developments in the country.   During the bilateral meeting, the two sides focused on several key areas of cooperation:   First, in the field of transport connectivity, the importance of the Trans-Afghan Railway Project was once again emphasized. Both sides agreed on the need to accelerate the project and intensify practical steps toward its realization. The railway corridor is expected to link Uzbekistan with Pakistan’s Peshawar and, ultimately, the ports of the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan. The project’s major advantages include significantly reducing transportation costs and shortening delivery times, making it a strategic asset for regional trade.   Additionally, concrete initiatives such as the development of the Termez International Trade Center were discussed. This platform would allow Afghanistan - particularly its agricultural sector - to utilize Uzbekistan’s transit infrastructure for exporting goods to Central Asia and Russia.   Second, Uzbekistan expressed interest in investing in several key sectors of the Afghan economy. Among the priority areas mentioned were the construction of the Balkh-Herat–Kandahar railway, cement and textile production, electronic governance systems, salt processing, and the establishment of oil refining facilities. These investments would not only stimulate Afghanistan’s economic revitalization but could also position Uzbekistan as one of the country’s leading foreign investors.   Third, Mullah Baradar emphasized that bilateral trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan has already surpassed $1 billion and expressed his desire to increase it to $2 billion in the near future. This projection appears realistic, considering that by the end of 2024, the total volume of trade between the two countries exceeded $1.13 billion - a 30.7% increase compared to 2023. Of that total, $1.09 billion accounted for Uzbekistan’s exports of goods and services to Afghanistan. During the first five months of 2025, bilateral trade grew to $622 million, marking a 62.8% increase compared to the same period the previous year. In this context, the opening of Uzbekistan’s trade houses in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, along with the signing of the Preferential Trade Agreement in June 2025, serves as concrete evidence of an increasingly proactive and structured trade diplomacy between the two countries.   Fourth, the dialogue concluded with an agreement to establish a joint working group that will convene quarterly to coordinate the implementation of previously agreed commitments. This development is expected to bring strategic coherence and institutional continuity to bilateral cooperation efforts.   In conclusion, this inaugural high-level meeting between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan could serve as a foundation for future steps aimed at gradually integrating Afghanistan into regional cooperation frameworks. By connecting Afghanistan to trade and transit corridors and attracting investment flows, such efforts may contribute to the country’s internal stabilization. In this context, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan can be seen as a clear example of pragmatic diplomacy focused on tangible and constructive outcomes.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Sanjarbek Tilavoldiev   On June 30 and July 1 of this year, another meeting on the Afghan issue took place in the Qatari capital, Doha, under the auspices of the United Nations. It is worth noting that the Taliban government officially participated in the Doha-format meetings for the second time. This indicates the Taliban’s intention to expand its diplomatic capabilities and defend its interests on the international stage. Whereas in the past, representatives of the movement were wary of criticism at such platforms, they are now approaching it constructively, seeking solutions and engaging in international dialogue.   The main focus of the meetings held in the Doha format was the issue of drug cultivation in Afghanistan, particularly opium. For many years, opium cultivation had been one of the country’s primary sources of income. However, following the Taliban’s rise to power, this figure began to decline significantly. According to statistics, after the Taliban assumed control, the area of land used for opium poppy cultivation decreased from 232,000 hectares to 7,382 hectares by 2024. In order to further reduce these figures, the authorities have resorted to the use of force when necessary. For example, in 2025, several clashes occurred between Taliban representatives and local residents in the Badakhshan province. This demonstrates that the Taliban seeks to avoid being associated on the international stage with a state involved in opium production, as such a reputation hinders its international recognition and limits the inflow of humanitarian aid and foreign investment into Afghanistan. For this reason, the movement is making efforts to combat this issue and aims to present itself as an open government ready for constructive dialogue.   In addition, within the framework of the UN-led process, the United States has maintained silence regarding the Taliban, while a number of Western countries continue to express criticism toward the movement. This, in turn, is prompting the Taliban to strengthen its relations with Eastern countries. On June 30, 2025, alongside its participation in the Doha meetings, Taliban representatives held talks with Pakistan, China, and Russia, during which important regional political issues were discussed. Such diplomatic engagement contributes to the enhancement of the Taliban’s foreign policy capacity. Notably, on July 3, 2025, shortly after the Doha talks, Russia officially recognized the Taliban government for the first time. This may lead to a further shift in Afghanistan’s orientation toward Eastern countries, should the West continue its policy of non-recognition.   Overall, the Taliban government took part in these meetings with the aim of strengthening its authority on the international stage. In this context, it sought to present itself not as a state associated with drug trafficking, but as an actor ready for meaningful diplomatic engagement. This, in turn, may accelerate the process of international recognition of the Taliban government by a larger number of states and contribute to the consolidation of its position in regional politics.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Fayoziddin Bakhriddinov   It is becoming increasingly clear that Tashkent is taking a more pragmatic approach in its relations with war-torn, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, which remains unrecognized by much of the international community. This pragmatism is most evident in the growing economic and social ties between the border regions. Uzbekistan sees Afghanistan not only as a key player in regional security but also as a potential strategic transit corridor that could provide access to South Asian markets in the future. Furthermore, Afghanistan may serve as a promising market for Uzbekistan’s products and goods. For this reason, Tashkent is attempting to prioritize economic interests even against the backdrop of ongoing challenges from Afghanistan.   Uzbekistan, which has openly embraced the stance that “Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia”, seeks to gain significant benefits through broader cooperation in areas such as transboundary water resources, counterterrorism, transportation connectivity, and trade integration. Additionally, in his April 1, 2024 interview, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized that stabilizing Afghanistan is in the shared interest of both Central Asia and the European Union. The Taliban administration received this message warmly, expressing its intention to pursue a policy based on “sincere neighborhood and mutual interests” with Uzbekistan - a clear example of the current diplomatic momentum.   Therefore, Tashkent’s pragmatism appears to be rooted in the idea that, if ideological considerations can temporarily be set aside, broad economic cooperation with Taliban-led Afghanistan could lead to deep integration between the two neighbors. A practical step in realizing this vision was the opening of the Termez International Trade Center in Surkhandarya in 2022, which has significantly boosted freight traffic between the two countries. It’s worth noting that in 2024, the total volume of trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan reached $1.1 billion, of whichover $1 billion consisted of Uzbek exports to Afghanistan. In March, both nations agreed to increase this trade volume to $3 billion, indicating that the majority of bilateral trade is driven by Uzbekistan’s exports.   However, in June 2025, local media and other sources reported that the Taliban's so-called “morality police” banned Afghan women under the age of 40 from working in the Termez Free Economic Zone. The ban, reportedly lacking clear legal basis, especially targeted women working without a male guardian (“mahram”). As a result, the purchasing power within the zone might in future see substantial decline, should not only women entrepreneurs but also female consumers became scarce. Naturally, such measures pose a serious risk to bilateral trade relations and Tashkent’s strategy of fostering regional stability through economic engagement.   While Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach to Afghanistan is driven by economic interests and the ambition to strengthen its regional transit role, maintaining this approach will depend heavily on how the Taliban’s ideological stance evolves in future. If the ideology continues gaining dominance in the country, it could not only weaken Uzbekistan-Afghanistan relations but also undermine broader regional integration efforts that Tashkent is pursuing today.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Uzbekistan’s current context in global politics is often described as ‘post-Soviet.’ This label seems fitting when walking around Tashkent’s boulevards, exploring the subway, and witnessing the architecture. Additionally, in the sphere of soft power, the Russians have left a lasting legacy in Uzbekistan, specifically in the use of the Russian language and the popularity of Russian music. Nevertheless, in other nations described as post-Socialist, notably Russia and states in Central and Eastern Europe, the transition to market economy with the collapse of the USSR was rapid and chaotic, especially in the decade following the collapse. This is contrasted by Uzbekistan, which has only recently begun to implement economic privatization. After the death of Uzbekistan’s first president Islom Karimov in 2016, his successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, rapidly began to change the country’s economic structure. It can even be argued in certain areas like education that Uzbekistan’s recent policy goals are closer to transitions that have taken place in East-Asian nations, particularly Korea and Singapore, as opposed to Eastern European ones like Hungary or Russia.   Although never part of the Soviet Union, Hungary is a nation that experienced rapid economic changes in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Now an official observer state of the Organization of Turkic States, and enjoying friendly diplomatic relations with most Turkic states, Hungary provides a fitting case study for comparison with Uzbekistan’s current orientation as a post-Socialist nation. Although exhibiting present-day parallels, the direction of the two states’ trajectories differ. While Hungary rapidly privatized and as a result destabilized politically during the 1990s, as did most eastern European states including Russia, and then reconsolidated under prime minister Viktor Orbán, Uzbekistan is only at the beginning of a steadier and more gradual privatization, having experienced decades of centralized consolidation.   Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán welcomes president Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Budapest, May 20th, 2025, (Hungarian government photography)   Both Hungary and Uzbekistan manifest a strong emphasis on patriotism, which can be seen as a natural post-Soviet instinct against Russification and assimilation in both states. Regarding the education sector, the Hungarian Diaspora Scholarship program provides full scholarships to diaspora students at top domestic institutions, with the conditions that the scholars will learn Hungarian and engage in a project that serves their local diaspora community within 2 years after the completion of the scholarship. The goal of the program is to foster patriotic spirit and mitigate the effects of brain drain from Hungary. The El-yurt Umidi program in Uzbekistan, established in 2018 by the new president, takes the inverse solution to the same issue. By subsidizing study abroad, it attracts knowledge and experience to Uzbekistan from abroad, with the condition that scholarship recipients work for a minimum of 5 years (2 years for masters) after the completion of the program within Uzbekistan. The National Scholarship in Hungary also has a similar condition of working in Hungary for the same length of time that studies lasted under the scholarship, but the program only applies to domestic universities. What makes Uzbekistan’s policy different is its emphasis on sending students abroad, as opposed to simply consolidating them domestically.   Driving through any city in Uzbekistan, it is impossible not to notice the abundance of private learning centres, specifically for the English language, IELTS, and SAT. Consulting jobs in these areas offer incredibly lucrative opportunities for youth looking to start a business. Due to the legalization of private education in 2017, and thanks to the power of the internet and of social media in bringing success stories to students all over the country, there is sweeping demand for foreign education in Uzbekistan. Programs like El-yurt Umidi, and government subsidies into private education support the supply that is naturally growing to meet this demand. In 2024, the government announced support for paying back interest on loans that were taken out with the purpose of constructing new private educational institutions. According to this decision, the government will also cover 50% of the utility costs for newly constructed private school buildings. These drivers of privatization related to education have little in common with the experiences of other post-Socialist nations in Eastern Europe and are specific to the current social media age. The world was not so globalized or connected when Hungary was going through its transition economy 30 years ago. Further, Uzbekistan is still at an early phase of its development where education is often the only way out of poverty and low-wage labour for many families, further pulling demand.   In almost any economic sector, the ‘post-Soviet’ label fits Uzbekistan’s situation well. Its inheritance of a narrow-minded Soviet economy built entirely on cotton production, its fight against economic informalization, and its emphasis on independence and patriotism are just a few examples. Processes specific to education however are more recent, and parallels with other eastern bloc countries like Hungary become harder to draw. East-Asian nations like Singapore or Korea become relevant parallels. Singapore went from being a poor nation with high illiteracy when it declared independence to being one of the most advanced economies in the world, within the span of a few decades. Outside of its obvious geographical advantage, Singapore’s strong education system was central to its ascension, and made it the hub for technology and innovation that it is today. Singapore’s public education system is already very rigorous. Edusave accounts provide scholarships to students based on merit, incentivising competition. In 1985, like Uzbekistan recently, Singapore legalized independent schools with supplemental curricula. Like Uzbekistan, this move was largely inspired by educational programs from the US and UK.   The aim of Singapore’s policy at the time was the same as Uzbekistan’s today – to stimulate innovation in education. Although the difference between a public and private secondary school in Uzbekistan remains heavily noticeable, public opinion is optimistic. Instead of worrying about growing inequalities, students and teachers alike, in both types of schools, believe that such investments in human capital can only result in an upward spiral of innovation in the long-run for the country. Meritocratic competition in Uzbekistan has also been enlarged with the establishment of the Presidential School system in 2019. These schools are highly selective, with each school selecting only 24 students every year out of thousands of applications. Only one presidential school exists for each region of Uzbekistan, and students compete for top-tier education that is fully subsidized by the government and provides the Cambridge curriculum.   Ultimately, in cutting-edge and fundamental sectors of Uzbekistan’s economic development, most notably education, the ‘post-Soviet’ category in which Uzbekistan is so often placed is becoming almost completely irrelevant, save for the understanding of background context. Orbán’s Hungary, often described as being driven by post-Socialist dynamics in the sphere of politics, experienced a rapid period of privatization, market liberalization, and ultimately democratization in the early 1990s. Prime minister Orbán’s position as a result remains fragile, even after extensive reconsolidation and state capture, due to Hungary’s largely democratic culture. Uzbekistan’s more gradual and state supported trajectory provides a degree of stability, but political life must continue to advance at the same pace as economic and social life. Politics and economics are not separate disciplines, and where they are most interconnected is education. Education will bring new ideas into Uzbekistan, and the Uzbek government must continue to rejuvenate itself if long-term development is to be successful. As a parallel with South Korea would show, Uzbekistan is on the right path, but flexibility will be key to its long-term success.   Bibliography “About the Hungarian Diaspora Scholarship.” Hungarian Diaspora Scholarship, March 25, 2025. https://diasporascholarship.hu/en/about/. “Areas of Cooperation: Economic Cooperation.” Organizations of Turkic States, 2024. https://turkicstates.org/en/areas-of-cooperation-detail/2-economic-cooperation.   Cheang, Bryan, Bacchus Barua, Jake Fuss, Paige MacPherson, and Mackenzie Moir. “Meritocracy, Personal Responsibility, and Encouraging Investment: Lessons from Singapore’s Economic Growth Miracle.” Edited by Stephen Globerman. Realities of Socialism, Fraser Institute, February 2024, 83–106. https://doi.org/https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/meritocracy-personal-responsibility-and-encouraging-investment-lessons-from-Singapore.pdf. 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Accessed June 3, 2025. http://koreaneducentreinuk.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/Education_the-driving-force-for-the-development-of-Korea.pdf “Encouraging Measures to Open Private Schools Determined.” Kun.uz, February 2, 2024. https://kun.uz/en/news/2024/02/02/encouraging-measures-to-open-private-schools-determined.   “Monitoring Procedure: Approved by Resolution No. 2 of the Board of Trustees of the ‘El-Yurt Umidi’ Foundation.” eyuf.uz, April 22, 2021. https://eyuf.uz/site/view-page?id=134. “Tájékoztatók a Magyar Állami Ösztöndíjjal Kapcsolatban.” Oktatási Hivatal, December 21, 2022. https://www.oktatas.hu/magyar-allami-osztondij/altalanos_tajekoztatok.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.