Commentary

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Commentary

06 March, 2026

Amid Military Crises, Uzbekistan is Redirecting Cargo Flows to Alternative Routes

The escalation of the situation in the Middle East poses an increased risk to Uzbekistan's ability to deliver goods to promising export markets, including Europe and South Asia, via effective routes. A month ago, the Uzbek Ministry of Transport proposed alternative transport routes to bypass problematic countries. These included routes through Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, given that all three countries are currently experiencing active military conflict, the feasibility of transporting cargo through their territories is limited. This places Central Asian countries, which already face high transport costs in foreign trade due to their geographical distance from open seas, in an extremely difficult position. During the 12-day Iran-Israel war in the summer of 2025, Uzbekistan was forced to seek urgent alternatives to Iran’s southern ports, leading to a 30 per cent increase in logistics costs. The country is likely to incur even greater losses in the current situation due to the temporary need to deviate from both the Iranian and the Afghan-Pakistani transit, which would give it access to the Indian Ocean. In 2025, a total of 1.2 million tons of cargo was transported by Uzbekistan through Iran. Deliveries were made to Türkiye and Western countries. Meanwhile, Iranian ports handled over 330,000 tons of domestic cargo. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz severely restricts the movement of merchant ships, particularly oil tankers, along this important global transport and energy artery. Marine insurance within the Strait has not only become extremely expensive, but also difficult to obtain, leading to an 80% decline in transit shipping. All of this has a negative impact on the port of Bandar Abbas, the region's largest transport hub, which is located on the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf. As a preventive measure, Iran's northern ports of Caspian and Anzali have ceased operations. Meanwhile, land trade routes remain active, including those crossing the Iranian-Turkmen border via the Sarakhs crossing. Iran also maintains transport links with Afghanistan via the Khaf-Herat railway line. Recently, the Afghan side announced that freight trains were running smoothly between the two cities.    Due to security threats to its southern flank, Uzbekistan has been forced to redirect cargo flows to longer and more complex routes. One option could be to use a combination of transport via the Strait of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, followed by railways in Russia and Kazakhstan. Another alternative option is the transport corridor Uzbekistan (Andijan)-Kyrgyzstan (Osh, Irkeshtam)-China (Kashgar, Urumqi)/Pacific ports of China. The Northern Railway Corridor to the EU also remains relevant. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Commentary

04 March, 2026

China’s Positioning in the Emerging Multipolar System

China’s current foreign policy reflects the country’s adaptation to a transforming international system and its effort to secure a sustainable position within evolving global dynamics. As suggested by Chinese experts, the world is undergoing a transition toward a more complex and conflict-prone multipolar order, driven in part by intensifying strategic competition with the United States. In this context, the People’s Republic of China presents itself as a stabilizing actor advocating for the reform of global governance and for an enhanced role of the Global South. The primary instruments advancing this agenda are China’s major global initiatives, including the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. Beijing emphasizes its rejection of imposing political models and underscores principles of sovereignty and mutual benefit. At the same time, the expansion of China’s institutional footprint through multilateral cooperation frameworks and financial mechanisms indicates a broader effort to shape alternative platforms for international engagement. Within this framework, relations with the Russian Federation remain an important dimension of China’s foreign policy. Beijing continues to develop bilateral economic cooperation while taking into account the prevailing international environment. Bilateral engagement is conducted with due consideration of existing international constraints and is oriented toward maintaining stable trade and economic ties. Alongside its relations with key partners, the Taiwan issue occupies a significant place in China’s foreign policy agenda. China consistently strengthens its position on this matter, combining military-political measures with diplomatic channels of communication. Discussions within Chinese expert and academic circles emphasize the importance of a calibrated approach that considers the potential economic and strategic implications of various scenarios. Accordingly, Beijing appears to favor a phased strategy that expands the range of policy instruments while preserving space for political and diplomatic resolution. Simultaneously, China has intensified its engagement in the Middle East, Africa, and more broadly across the Global South. Economic cooperation is increasingly complemented by elements of political and security interaction. The expansion of duty-free trade arrangements with African states, infrastructure initiatives, and energy agreements in the Gulf region contribute to strengthening China’s role as an alternative center of economic and diplomatic engagement. China is also expanding economic cooperation and political dialogue with the countries of Central Asia, viewing the region as a key component of the land-based corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative and as an important area for cooperation in defense and security. The growth of China’s involvement is accompanied by the development of trade and investment projects as well as institutional cooperation frameworks, creating additional opportunities for infrastructure modernization, logistics development, and economic growth in the region. At the same time, the long-term sustainability of such initiatives depends on their financial viability, transparency, and alignment with national development strategies. Ultimately, the current priorities of China’s foreign policy suggest an intention to expand its global presence without formally assuming the role of a traditional hegemonic leader. By combining economic instruments, institutional initiatives, and flexible diplomacy, China seeks to consolidate its position within a rapidly evolving international order. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Commentary

19 February, 2026

The Global Market of Rare Earth Metals

By Zulkhayo Nishanova, Assistant teacher, UWED Rare earth metals comprise a group of 17 chemical elements used in the production of batteries, permanent magnets, electronics, renewable energy equipment, electric transport, and high-tech industries. These materials play an important role in the global energy transition, digitalization, and the development of modern industry. Global Market and Trends Global reserves of rare earth elements are unevenly distributed. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, a significant share of proven reserves is concentrated in a limited number of countries, including China, Brazil, India, and Australia. The modern market structure is shaped not only by raw material extraction, but also by processing, separation of elements, and the production of high value-added products. Participation in such value chains determines countries’ competitiveness in the global market. Demand for rare earth metals is steadily growing amid the development of green energy, electric mobility, and digital technologies. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency, this growth is structural and long-term in nature and is expected to intensify over the coming decades. Opportunities for Central Asia and Uzbekistan Countries of Central Asia possess promising mineral resource potential and benefit from a favorable geographic location between the markets of Europe and Asia. This creates preconditions for their deeper integration into international supply chains for critical minerals. Uzbekistan views the development of rare earth metals as one of the pillars of industrialization and economic diversification. Ongoing reforms in the field of subsoil use and improvements in the investment climate create favorable conditions for the implementation of projects in geological exploration, mining, and primary processing of raw materials. A prospective participation model envisages phased development: geological exploration and mining with the participation of international partners; establishment of primary processing and beneficiation capacities; in the medium term, localization of selected components manufacturing for the energy and industrial electronics sectors. International Partnerships Uzbekistan is expanding cooperation with a number of foreign partners in the field of critical minerals and processing technologies. Engagement with the European Union, the United States, and Japan is aimed at developing resilient supply chains, attracting investment, introducing environmental and social responsibility standards (ESG), and strengthening technological cooperation. Partnership projects are viewed as a tool to increase domestic value added and strengthen industrial capacity. Conditions for Sustainable Sector Development The development of the rare earth metals sector requires a comprehensive approach that includes: attracting long-term investment; developing processing and research & technological infrastructure; training qualified personnel; introducing modern environmental standards and mechanisms for public engagement. A balanced industrial policy helps avoid locking the country into the role of, exceptionally, a raw material supplier and creates conditions for gradual upgrading along the technological value chain. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Commentary

19 February, 2026

Iran Seeks a Shortcut to China

The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is considering launching a transport corridor between Iran, Afghanistan and China through Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, which borders China's Xinjiang region. The project involves establishing a rail link between the cities of Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif, as well as the high-altitude Wakhan Valley on the Little Pamir, also known as the 'Roof of the World'. This area was once a central route of the Great Silk Road, which linked East and West. According to Iranian sources, the Wakhan Corridor would halve delivery times from China to Europe, providing a significant advantage over existing supply chains through Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.   A year ago, Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Urban Development unveiled plans for the development of nine transit rail corridors, with an estimated cost of over $10 billion. Some of these cross Afghanistan, including the Five Nations Railway Corridor, which Tehran has promoted since the early 2000s. Another strategic priority appears to be a trans-Afghan corridor to China. Construction of the 225-kilometre Haf-Herat railway line, the first three sections of which were commissioned in 2020, marked the beginning of both projects. The final section is scheduled to open soon. On 22 October 2025, Tehran signed an agreement with Ankara and Kabul to jointly construct a 1,435 mm-gauge railway line from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif. Iran will allocate an unprecedented $2.5 billion towards this project. The country subsequently intends to extend the railway to the Wakhan through the north-eastern province of Kunduz. Since 2023, Tehran has been negotiating this with the Afghan authorities. Meanwhile, the Taliban are taking practical steps to establish a direct transport link with China. In September 2023, work resumed using Afghan budget funds to gravel the 120-kilometre Wakhan Corridor to the Wakhjir Pass on the border with China, which began in 2019. By the end of 2025, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development reported that 70 per cent of the work had been completed. The Taliban have repeatedly appealed to Beijing for financial assistance to create transport infrastructure along the Wakhan Corridor, capitalizing on their eastern neighbor’s desire to include Afghanistan in the Belt and Road Initiative. However, due to security concerns, Chinese diplomacy is currently adopting a wait-and-see approach to opening the shared border for trade. Preference is instead given to establishing a link to Afghanistan through Pakistan, via the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Badakhshan, or through Central Asian countries. In the latter case, Tajikistan could strengthen its position as a transit hub by becoming a reliable conduit between China and Afghanistan. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Commentary

12 February, 2026

The Great Rupture: Astonishing Realities Transforming Global Trade

The 56th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum was held under the optimistic theme The Spirit of Dialogue. The serene, snow-capped peaks of the Swiss Alps stood in stark contrast to a global system undergoing profound structural transformation. While 3,000 officials from 130 countries gathered to discuss “planetary boundaries” and “shared prosperity”, private discussions and keynote speeches revealed a more defined perspective. Policymakers now need to go beyond simply managing cycles; they need to address a significant rupture in the global structure. Outdated trade rules have been replaced by new ones focused on security, sovereignty, and dirigisme. For the past decade, world leaders have used the term “transition” to allay their fears. They believed the world was merely transforming into a digital, more environmentally sustainable, yet still interconnected version of the 20th century. Davos 2026 has shattered this sense of certainty. Most now agree that we are experiencing a structural rupture, not a cyclical transition. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney offered the most serious assessment of this week: “Let me be frank. We are not experiencing a transition, but a rupture. This rupture requires more than just adaptation. It requires candor about the true state of affairs”. This “honesty” means recognizing that the rules that have historically governed organizational activity over the past century are no longer as strict as they once were. This rupture marks a definitive departure from the idea of universal cooperation. It forces leaders to stop passively observing and acknowledge a reality characterized by diverse sources of shock and disparate instability. Despite reports of chaos, global trade has demonstrated an unexpected, almost daring, resilience. The Davos Resilience Paradox posits that as geopolitical challenges intensify, trade doesn't cease; instead, it adapts, opening up new, often more complex, avenues of movement. We are constantly engaged in trade and will continue to do so. “Trade is like water flowing in a river. If an obstacle arises, it will move around it”, noted Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. This “water” is increasingly flowing through digital and service channels, largely isolated from the challenges associated with physical goods. Trade is accelerating thanks to new bilateral and regional mechanisms. The upcoming EU-Mercosur agreement and the upcoming EU-India agreement, dubbed the “mother of all deals”, demonstrate how trade is opening up innovative avenues for expansion, circumventing traditional international barriers. The most striking statistic of the year is the 262 percent increase in the scale of intervention in industrial policy since 2019. The significant increase in state dirigisme demonstrates that state intervention has evolved from a measure of last resort to a central component of modern economic policy. French President Emmanuel Macron declared, “Protectionism is not the same as protection”, thus reflecting the new doctrine. This shift is driven not only by the need for privacy for individuals; it is driven by four strategic imperatives that have become more significant than mere market efficiency: maintaining the stability of basic goods, maintaining the country's status as a leader in advanced technologies, ensuring that trade is consistent with the planet's resource constraints and climate goals, and using public authority to protect domestic labor markets. The private sector faces the challenge of managing the dramatic increase in government intervention while mitigating the negative impacts and complexities associated with such strict government measures. As the global landscape shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity, the most successful companies are shifting from “reactive risk management”, characterized by asset divestments and market exits, to a proactive approach known as “geopolitical power”. This refers to an organization's ability to leverage geopolitical intelligence to gain strategic business advantages. At its summit, the World Economic Forum established the Geopolitical Leadership Network, signaling the rise of this role to the C-suite. However, a significant disparity remains: only 20% of companies have a geopolitical position reporting directly to the C-suite. The Forum identifies five key components necessary for developing this “skill”: Building consensus between the CEO and the board to move from a wait-and-see approach to proactive opportunity generation. Use of systematic scenario planning and field information obtained from regional groups. Integration of geopolitical specialists into key decision-making structures. Integrating expertise in diplomacy and politics with an understanding of corporate logic and strategy. Ensuring their immediate impact on financial costs, production locations and supply chain configuration. The incident surrounding US President Donald Trump’s proposed purchase of Greenland exemplifies an emerging trade strategy that prioritizes security. After European countries rejected the plan, the administration threatened to impose taxes on eight of them. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's decisive intervention halted these actions, though the lesson for Davos attendees was clear. Trade measures are currently being applied not for economic but for strategic purposes, which are often difficult to foresee. The concept of “national security” has become an ambiguous one, linked to economic policy, leading corporate executives to not only monitor market trends but also engage in strategic maneuvering. Events in Greenland serve as a stark reminder that, in the current situation, security is determined solely by the discretion of the sovereign power on any given day. As the global trade landscape transforms, the old rules no longer apply. The “disruption” is irreversible, but resilience mechanisms are beginning to emerge. New growth strategies include the “trade technology paradox”, characterized by the development of artificial intelligence and digital tools that level the playing field for small and medium-sized enterprises and developing economies. In modern society, trade extends beyond financial transactions; it encompasses security, sovereignty, and survival. The fundamental advantage in business is no longer simply size, but the speed of adaptation. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Commentary

12 February, 2026

Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Policy Dilemmas in Post-Withdrawal Afghanistan

After the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan, Washington confronted a complex and enduring dilemma: how to provide humanitarian assistance to a population in acute need without conferring political legitimacy or material benefit upon the Taliban, now governing as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Since August 2021, the United States has attempted to navigate this challenge by relying on international organizations and nongovernmental actors to deliver aid, while simultaneously maintaining sanctions on Taliban leadership and restricting direct engagement with de facto authorities. This balancing act has increasingly shaped U.S. legislative, diplomatic, and humanitarian policy toward Afghanistan. Central to this approach is the effort to prevent U.S. taxpayer funds from being diverted – directly or indirectly – to the Taliban. The No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act represents the most recent and formalized expression of this objective. Introduced into Congress on January 23, 2025, the bill requires the Department of State to develop and implement a strategy aimed at discouraging foreign governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations from providing financial or material support to the Taliban, including through the misuse of U.S.-funded foreign assistance. Although still in the early stages of the legislative process, the bill signals a tightening of U.S. oversight and a potential recalibration of American engagement in Afghanistan. The legislation aligns with broader efforts to audit and reassess U.S. foreign aid following the withdrawal. A 2024 audit conducted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) identified significant weaknesses in the oversight of approximately $2.9 billion in U.S. assistance delivered after 2021. The report stated: “… remain concerned that the Department of State and USAID lack visibility into how funds are expended once they are transferred to international organizations, and that these funds may not be used as intended.” While some of these claims remain contested, the findings reinforced concerns within Congress that humanitarian channels were vulnerable to exploitation in a context where the Taliban exercised territorial and administrative control. Supporters of the No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act frame the legislation not only as a fiscal safeguard but as a moral obligation. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch has emphasized the human cost of the two-decade war, noting that more than 2,000 U.S. service members were killed and over 20,000 wounded. In this context, he characterized any transfer of U.S. funds to the IEA as “a betrayal of the victims of the war,” arguing that preventing such outcomes is a matter of accountability to both American taxpayers and those who served in Afghanistan. The bill was introduced by Senator Tim Sheehy and co-sponsored by Senators Bill Hagerty, Tommy Tuberville, and Steve Daines, all of whom have advocated a stricter approach to foreign assistance that could benefit the Taliban. The human consequences of these policy shifts are increasingly visible. A recent report by The New York Times argues that the suspension of U.S. humanitarian assistance has had serious and damaging effects on the daily lives of ordinary Afghans. Drawing on field research conducted in five provinces, the report documents how the halt in American funding disrupted programs that many families depended on for food security, healthcare, and basic survival. According to the findings, low-income households, internally displaced persons, and communities reliant on emergency assistance have been disproportionately affected. The reduction in funding has also constrained the capacity of humanitarian organizations operating on the ground. Some programs have been forced to scale down, while others have ceased operations entirely, increasing pressure on local communities already grappling with unemployment, rising prices, and prolonged economic decline. In the absence of sufficient alternative funding, the withdrawal of U.S. support has compounded existing vulnerabilities and intensified poverty in both urban and rural areas. These developments highlight a deeper structural problem underlying Afghanistan’s post-withdrawal crisis. For more than two decades, international assistance functioned not merely as emergency relief, but as a substitute for core state responsibilities, financing and delivering services such as healthcare, nutrition, and social protection. When U.S. and international aid was reduced, the effects were immediate and severe, revealing the extent to which essential services remained dependent on external actors. As a result, debates over the No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act and U.S. funding decisions are not only about aid diversion or sanctions compliance. They reflect a broader unresolved tension between humanitarian imperatives and political accountability.  It seems that responsibility for essential services in Afghanistan was diffused across international actors, while authority within the country evolved separately. Successes were attributed to partnership; failures were explained through insecurity, access constraints, or funding shortfalls, rather than deficiencies in governance. Over time, the boundary between humanitarian support and functional substitution blurred. As international assistance has declined, particularly following recent U.S. funding cuts, that distortion has become central to how Afghanistan’s crisis is interpreted. The withdrawal of aid is increasingly framed as the primary cause of humanitarian harm, obscuring the question of who bears responsibility for sustaining basic services once power is consolidated domestically. This framing risks conflating the prevention of suffering with the assumption of permanent obligation, transforming humanitarian support from a tool of relief into a substitute for governance. The current debate over aid, economic self-reliance, and humanitarian collapse cannot be understood without confronting this unresolved dependency. Afghanistan’s crisis is not occurring in a vacuum of authority. It is unfolding under a governing system that exercises control over territory, labor, access, and social policy, and therefore shapes humanitarian outcomes directly. Any assessment of aid withdrawal must therefore account not only for donor decisions, but for governing choices made within Afghanistan after the transition of power. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.