The International Monetary Fund’s report (“World Economic Outlook: A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts”) presented very interesting historical facts, estimates and forecasts of the global economy in 2025 and 2026.   According to the IMF forecast, global growth rates will be lower and will be in the range of 2.8% in 2025 and 3% in 2026, compared with the level of 3.3%, which was predicted for both years back in January 2025. Growth in advanced economies is expected to reach 1.4% in 2025, while growth in the United States may slow to 1.8% due to increased uncertainty about economic policy, trade tensions and weakening demand dynamics. Economic growth in the euro area will also slow down by 0.2% to 0.8%. In emerging and developing economies, growth will slow to 3.7% in 2025 and 3.9% in 2026. At the same time, growth is expected to decline significantly for the countries most affected by recent trade measures, such as China. Global overall inflation is projected to decline slightly more slowly than expected in January 2025, reaching 4.3% in 2025 and 3.6% in 2026. At the same time, the forecast for 2025 has been significantly adjusted upward for advanced economies, while it has been slightly lowered for emerging and developing countries. Governments of advanced economies are also expected to tighten fiscal policy on average in 2025-26 and, to a lesser extent, in 2027.   As noted in the IMF report, a rapid escalation of trade tensions and an extremely high level of uncertainty in global politics will have a significant impact on global economic activity. The forecast is dominated by the position that further increased uncertainty in trade policy may lead to an even greater slowdown in global economic growth in the short and long term. Thus, global trade growth is expected to slow down to 1.7 percentage points in 2025. This forecast reflects the strengthening of tariff restrictions affecting trade flows.   The IMF forecasts that growth in Central Asia will accelerate from an estimated 2.4 percent in 2024 to 3.0 percent in 2025 and 3.5 percent in 2026. GDP growth in Central Asian countries is projected as follows: in Kazakhstan in 2025 – 4.9%, in 2026 – 4.3%; Kyrgyzstan in 2025 – 6.8%, in 2026 – 5.3%; Tajikistan in 2025 – 6.7%, in 2026 – 5.0%; Turkmenistan in 2025 – 2.3%, in 2026 – 2.3%; Uzbekistan in 2025 – 5.9%, in 2026 – 5.8%.   In connection with the emerging trends in the global economy, the IMF in its report calls for prudent actions and increased cooperation, emphasizing that the first priority should be to restore stability in trade policy and develop mutually beneficial agreements. According to the IMF, the global economy needs a clear and predictable trading system that addresses long-standing weaknesses in international trade rules, including the widespread use of non-tariff barriers or other trade-distorting measures. This will require improved cooperation.   Summing up, it should be noted that the situation in the global economy has changed dramatically, and government agencies in almost many countries are reviewing the priorities of their foreign and domestic economic policies.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Ashwin Raghuraman’s commentary is a sharp, policy-focused critique of the recent decision by President Donald Trump to drastically downsize the U.S. National Security Council (NSC). The piece argues that this move not only reflects a dangerous centralization of power but also risks repeating the catastrophic mistakes that defined the U.S. war in Afghanistan.   Raghuraman draws extensively on the findings of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which documented how the failure in Afghanistan was not simply due to flawed tactics but was fundamentally rooted in institutional dysfunction—particularly a lack of strategic coherence, interagency coordination, continuity, and oversight. By cutting the NSC and removing many of its seasoned analysts and aides with little notice, the Trump administration, Raghuraman warns, is dismantling one of the very safeguards meant to prevent such policy disasters.   The author contextualizes the NSC’s evolving role across administrations—from a modest staff under George H.W. Bush to post-9/11 expansion, subsequent contractions under Trump and Obama, and Biden’s later reinvestment. Now, with Trump returning to a loyalty-based, top-down leadership model that sidelines dissent and expert input, Raghuraman sees this as more than bureaucratic restructuring; it’s an erosion of deliberative policymaking that could have deadly real-world consequences.   Ultimately, Raghuraman’s message is that institutional memory and coordination — embodied in a functioning NSC — are essential to avoiding foreign policy blunders. Ignoring SIGAR’s hard-earned lessons, he argues, is not just a mistake; it’s an invitation for history to repeat itself in new and potentially more dangerous ways. The haunting of Kabul, he suggests, is not over — it’s being willfully resurrected.   Read on Inkstick Media   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Europe is actively discussing plans for militarization: strengthening its own defense industry, ramping up production of tanks, aircraft, drones, missiles, air defense systems, and satellites. But there is one little-discussed factor that becomes a silent yet serious bottleneck for these ambitions: critical dependence on supplies of rare earth elements (REEs) and strategic raw materials from China.     According to the data presented in the infographic (2024), Europe depends on Chinese supplies by: 100% - heavy rare earth elements, 97% - magnesium, 85% - light rare earth elements, 79% - lithium, 71% - gallium, 65% - bismuth, 62% - vanadium, 45% - germanium, baryte, 40% - natural graphite, 32% - tungsten.   This means that virtually every segment of Europe’s military, IT, and high-tech industries is directly linked to China. Why is this so critical?   The Importance of Rare Elements for Defense and IT Rare earth elements (REEs): Essential materials for manufacturing jet engines, missile systems, precision weapons, navigation systems, magnets for electric motors, laser systems, and even electronic warfare (EW) equipment. Magnesium: Used in light alloys for aviation, armored vehicles, and missiles. Without it, no lightweight bodies or heat-resistant, high-strength parts. Lithium: The core element for batteries powering military electronics, drones, autonomous systems, and even underwater equipment. Gallium, germanium: Used in IT and electronics — for semiconductors, infrared sensors, communication systems, and radar. Tungsten, vanadium: Heavy metals critical for super-strong tools, armor, and armor-piercing rounds. Scandium: Lightens aluminum alloys for aerospace and space applications — vital for developing lightweight yet strong structures.   Why Is This Dependency Dangerous? Any modern tank, fighter jet, drone, or missile is not just steel and armor — it’s a sophisticated mix of alloys, sensors, electronics, communication modules, batteries, and composites.   Without these elements: tanks become heavier and slower, planes lose maneuverability, drones have limited flight time, missiles can’t handle high stress, radars “go blind.”   This is why Russia has long classified its REE consumption data, and why the U.S. and Europe carefully analyze supply chains. In essence, China, by controlling global supplies of rare earths and other critical elements, effectively determines the military potential of any country.   China’s Role: The “Global Valve” China has built this dominance over decades: capturing markets for cheap extraction and processing, overtaking the U.S. and EU in refining and separation technologies, acquiring stakes in African and Latin American mines.   Now, if China decides to “turn off the tap,” Europe, the U.S., India, and even Japan could see the halt of production of precision weapons, electronics, satellite systems, and IT hardware.   Previously, Europe partially relied on supplies from Russia, Kazakhstan, and South Africa — but due to sanctions, geopolitics, and instability, these routes are now closed or weakened.   Europe’s Prospects: What Can Be Done? Diversifying Supply Sources. The EU is investing in rare earth projects within Europe (e.g., Scandinavia, Portugal), but mining here is more expensive and tightly regulated for environmental reasons. Reducing Dependence Through Recycling. Recycling (e.g., from old electronics) offers only a partial solution — current volumes are too small. Building Alliances with Africa and Latin America. The EU is seeking long-term contracts with Niger, the DRC, Brazil — but this is a slow and complex process. Cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. Creating joint reserves, strategic stockpiles, and shared projects for processing.   While Europe debates rearmament, China remains the invisible conductor behind these efforts. Without access to magnesium, scandium, lithium, gallium, and rare earth elements, Europe’s ambitions in defense and IT remain just plans on paper. Europe is already in a position of strategic dependence, which at any moment could turn into geopolitical vulnerability.   If tomorrow Beijing decides to limit supplies, Europe risks being left without the components needed for modern weapons systems — from drones to missiles. This is the key challenge the EU must acknowledge and address today.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

On May 25, Venezuela held parliamentary and regional elections in which the ruling coalition, the “Great Patriotic Pole” (Gran Polo Patriótico), led by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), secured a decisive victory, receiving approximately 82.7% of the vote. Opposition alliances achieved significantly more modest results: “Democratic Alliance” – ~6.25% of the vote; UNTC Única coalition (consisting of “A New Era” and “Unity and Change” parties) – ~5.18%; “Neighborhood Power” movement – ~2.57%.   Voter turnout was only 42.6%, reflecting relatively low electoral participation. The Great Patriotic Pole (which includes President Nicolás Maduro’s PSUV) garnered 82.68% of the votes, securing an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. In comparison, the most successful opposition group allowed to participate, the Democratic Alliance, received only 6.25%, while other coalitions such as UNTC Única and Neighborhood Power garnered 5.18% and 2.57% respectively. Collectively, all opposition candidates received less than 15% of the vote, resulting in the near-monopoly of the pro-government coalition in the new parliament and at the regional governor level.   One of the key factors influencing the vote distribution and low turnout was the decision by major opposition leaders to boycott the elections. Prominent anti-government figures, such as María Corina Machado, publicly called on citizens to abstain from voting in protest against the official results of the 2024 presidential elections. In July 2024, Venezuela held presidential elections whose results the opposition did not recognize, claiming victory while electoral authorities declared Maduro the winner. The 2025 boycott was also motivated by continued pressure on opposition activists — independent observers and human rights organizations reported arrests and other repressive actions in the run-up to the vote. As a result, most citizens sympathetic to the opposition ignored the elections. According to Machado, in some areas up to 85% of voters “defied the regime” and did not turn out. This helps explain why turnout was only around 42% of Venezuela’s 21 million registered voters — a level comparable to the low participation in the 2021 local elections, which were also boycotted by the opposition.   Beyond the organized boycott, the low turnout reflects a broader crisis of confidence in Venezuela’s electoral system. In recent years, the government has significantly curtailed real competition: several opposition parties have been disqualified or split through loyalist courts, and many charismatic opposition leaders have been imprisoned, exiled, or barred from political activity. Under such conditions, many voters see no point in participating in elections whose outcome, according to regime critics, is predetermined in favor of the ruling party. The long-standing economic crisis exacerbates public apathy: years of hyperinflation, industrial decline, and international sanctions have driven millions of Venezuelans to emigrate, while those who remain are more concerned with survival than with political engagement. These factors collectively contributed to the ruling bloc’s record-high share of the vote and the minimal representation of the opposition.   Following the May 25 elections, the balance of political forces in Venezuela shifted further in favor of the incumbent leadership. Having secured virtually all seats in the National Assembly and winning 23 out of 24 governorships, Maduro’s party and its allies now control all key levels of power. In the short term, such consolidation offers the regime a certain level of political stability — the opposition has been stripped of institutional levers of influence, and the likelihood of legal or parliamentary challenges to Maduro’s agenda is virtually eliminated. Representatives of the ruling party have already proclaimed a “victory of peace and stability,” implying that the elections demonstrated the people’s support for the government’s course.   International reaction. On the international stage, the elections are likely to deepen divisions over Venezuela. Countries and organizations critical of Maduro’s regime are expected to view the May 25 vote as undemocratic. The absence of independent observers and the large-scale opposition boycott have already prompted statements declaring that the elections failed to meet the standards of free and fair democratic expression. The United States, which did not recognize the legitimacy of previous Venezuelan elections, increased its sanctions following the disputed 2024 presidential vote and is expected to maintain a hardline stance. In particular, the Trump administration in 2025 revoked oil sector sanctions relief, ordering Chevron to halt its operations in Venezuela by May 27 — effectively cutting off Caracas from one of its few legal oil export channels. This decision deprives the Maduro government of a critical source of foreign currency revenue and intensifies the country’s economic isolation.   Meanwhile, Venezuela’s allies (such as Russia, Cuba, Iran, and several left-leaning Latin American governments) supported the election results. Russian observers, for example, reported no serious violations during the vote and declared the elections transparent. Such polarization of opinion complicates efforts by international organizations (such as the Organization of American States or the United Nations) to formulate a unified approach to the Venezuelan crisis. The European Union and some Latin American mediators will likely continue to call for dialogue between the government and the opposition, but given Maduro’s strengthened position and the opposition’s weakened status, the prospects for meaningful negotiations appear dim.   In conclusion, the results of the May 25 elections in Venezuela signify a substantial consolidation of the ruling Great Patriotic Pole coalition’s power and confirm the existing political configuration in the country. However, the low turnout and limited opposition participation — much of which was due to a boycott — underscore deep challenges concerning citizens’ trust in the electoral process and political institutions.   The current situation calls for urgent attention to issues of inclusive political dialogue and the restoration of broad public legitimacy. Political stability achieved through power consolidation can be more sustainable if accompanied by openness, transparency, and the engagement of diverse political forces in discussions on pressing socio-economic issues.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In May 2025, India made significant strides in strengthening energy and trade ties with the Gulf States, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. These steps are aimed at ensuring stable energy supplies, reducing the trade deficit and expanding India’s strategic influence in the region.   Agreement with UAE: Expanding energy cooperation India and the UAE have signed a number of agreements covering key energy sectors. These include long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply contracts, expansion of oil storage capacity in India and civil nuclear energy cooperation. Notably, India and the UAE have entered into a memorandum of understanding to involve Indian expertise in the operation and maintenance of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, the first nuclear power plant in the Arabian Peninsula.   Upcoming agreement with Oman: Diversifying energy supply India is close to concluding a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Oman. The agreement is expected to be signed soon and will result in duty reductions on about $3 billion worth of Indian exports, including agricultural products, jewelry, and automobiles. In return, India has agreed to reduce duties on some Omani goods such as petrochemicals and aluminum, with limited import volumes.   The strategic importance of the Gulf region Despite increased imports of Russian oil since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, India remains dependent on energy supplies from the Gulf. The threat of increased international sanctions on Russian oil underscores the importance of strengthening ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to ensure India's energy security.   Joint renewable energy projects Indian companies are also actively involved in the development of renewable energy in the region. For instance, Jindal Renewables has signed an agreement with OQ Alternative Energy (OQAE) to jointly develop and operate large-scale renewable energy facilities in Oman, including solar and wind power projects.   India’s activism in strengthening energy and trade ties with the Gulf states reflects its desire to secure a stable energy supply, reduce the trade deficit and strengthen its strategic presence in the region. Agreements with the UAE and Oman offer new opportunities for cooperation in the conventional and renewable energy sectors, contributing to India’s sustainable economic development.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The recent open letter endorsed by nine European Union member states represents a significant challenge to the post-World War II human rights architecture that has underpinned the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) since 1950. Spearheaded by Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her counterpart – Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen, the signatories seek to recalibrate the Convention’s interpretation to permit more expansive national discretion over migration controls. Their initiative underscores a broader trend within Europe, where concerns about migration flows and domestic political pressures have driven a coalition of governments to question whether supranational legal constraints unduly hamper sovereign decision-making.   At the heart of the nine governments’ argument lies a perception that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, in recent decades, extended the Convention’s scope beyond the original aspirations of its drafters. By invoking the need to “re-examine whether the Court has over-extended the scope of the Convention”, the letter’s authors effectively posit that shifts in judicial interpretation have upset the balance between collective human rights protections and the prerogatives of democratic states. This critique resonates strongly with electorates in several of the signatory countries, where anti-immigration parties have made substantial electoral gains by framing migration as an existential challenge to national identity and social cohesion.   Concretely, the letter proposes granting states broader latitude to expel foreign nationals who commit serious offences, to suspend certain procedural guarantees when deportation is not feasible, and to counter so-called “instrumentalization” of migrants by hostile external actors. Implicit in these recommendations is a redefinition of human rights obligations in the context of national security and public order. While the desire to deter criminal elements among migrant communities is understandable, the suggested measures risk undermining core Convention guarantees, such as the right to respect for private and family life and the prohibition of collective expulsion, both of which have been central to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.   Prime Minister Meloni’s call for a “political debate” on the Convention’s capacity to address contemporary issues highlights the tension between legal continuity and evolving policy needs. It reflects a longstanding debate within international law: to what extent should domestic political considerations shape the evolution of treaty obligations? By seeking to anchor the reinterpretation in an “open-minded conversation”, the signatories implicitly acknowledge that any recalibration of the Convention would require not only judicial but also political consensus — a prospect complicated by divergent national interests and the mandatory nature of the Court’s judgments for all 46 Council of Europe members.   The response from Council of Europe Secretary-General Alain Berset was swift and unequivocal. Emphasising that “no judiciary should face political pressure”, Berset underscored that undermining the ECtHR’s independence would erode the very foundations of the rule of law in Europe. His defence of the Court’s role — in particular its ongoing adjudication of human rights violations arising from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine — serves as a potent reminder of the Convention’s unique position as a bulwark against state excess, even in the most fraught geopolitical contexts.   Historical rulings provide a sobering illustration of the stakes involved. The Court’s decisions in cases such as the 2016 Lampedusa expulsions of Tunisian migrants and Denmark’s denial of family reunification to a Syrian refugee in 2021 reflect a commitment to protect individuals against collective enforcement measures and to uphold the right to family life. Meanwhile, pending litigation against the Baltic states and Poland over alleged pushbacks into Belarus highlights the Convention’s reach into situations where national border policies intersect with allegations of hybrid warfare tactics. Such jurisprudence not only safeguards individual rights but also establishes precedents that guide domestic policymaking.   The nine-nation initiative thus poses a dual risk. On one hand, it could diminish the ECtHR’s authority by inviting overt political interference in what must remain an independent judicial process. On the other, it could foster a fragmentation of rights protections across Europe if states begin to contest the binding nature of certain judgments. Either outcome would weaken the Convention’s ability to speak with one voice on matters of fundamental rights, eroding public confidence in the Court’s fairness and impartiality.   From an institutional standpoint, the debate raises profound questions about the viability of multilayered governance in Europe. The ECHR system was designed precisely to mediate tensions between national sovereignty and supranational oversight, providing both a safety-net for individuals and a framework for shared values. Reversing or diluting key aspects of the Convention would undermine this delicate equilibrium, potentially dissuading citizens from seeking redress through the Strasbourg Court and limiting the Convention’s capacity to function as a common yardstick of human rights.   Yet the signatories’ concerns cannot be dismissed outright. Legitimate questions arise over whether the Convention adequately anticipates modern migration dynamics, transnational criminal networks, and asymmetric tactics by non-state and state actors alike. Any constructive reform must therefore reconcile the imperative of human rights protection with the pressing demands of democratic governance and security. This necessitates a measured dialogue that respects both the rule of law and the prerogatives of elected governments.   In navigating this impasse, European states should consider convening a formal consultative process under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Such a mechanism could bring together legal experts, judges, parliamentarians, civil society representatives, and migration authorities to explore targeted amendments or protocol revisions. By fostering transparency and broad stakeholder engagement, it would help ensure that any evolution of the Convention remains rooted in consensus rather than unilateral political manoeuvring. Only through such an inclusive approach can Europe safeguard both the rights of individuals and the integrity of its foundational human rights institutions.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.