Iran has announced the completion of the 730 km Chabahar-Zahedan railway project. Work on the project began in 2020, and it aligns with the country’s strategy to expand regional transport corridors, which is one of the priorities of Iran's 14th government. The new transport line will provide rail access to Chabahar, which is Iran's only deep-sea port. The launch of the railway serves the geo-economic interests of several foreign policy actors, most notably India. New Delhi is investing in the port’s infrastructure and is a signatory to the 2016 Chabahar Agreement. The long-term objective of this agreement is to ensure India's transport connectivity with Central Asia via Afghanistan. Construction of the Chabahar-Zahedan railway is seen as a vital step towards achieving this goal. The railway line is intended to strengthen Iran’s position in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), as it will extend to Mashhad, from where it can branch out toward both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan via Turkmenistan. Establishing a direct rail link between southern and northern Iran via the Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad route creates significant opportunities for another one of Iran’s strategic initiatives: the Khaf-Herat Railway, which connects Iran to Afghanistan. This corridor is already operational for cross-border freight transport. During the 2025–2026 financial year, over 640,000 tons of freight were transported via this route, several times more than in the previous period. Amid the ongoing conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Kabul is placing greater hope in the Khaf-Herat line, viewing it as a vital link to global markets. With direct involvement from Iranian companies, the Afghan government is planning to construct a railway line from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif. This will provide Iran, as well as the Gulf states and Türkiye, with an alternative route to the Eurasian market via Uzbekistan. At the same time, it should be emphasized that Ankara is a third party to the agreement for the joint construction of a railway to Mazar-i-Sharif. This agreement was signed in October 2025 during the 36th Regional Meeting of the International Union of Railways in Istanbul. The Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif transport line will serve as an extension of the cross-border trade route between Iran and Afghanistan, as well as being a vital part of the Afghan section of the Five Nation Railway Corridor, spanning a total distance of around 2,100 km. Designed to reach Kashgar in China, the railway uses a standard 1,435 mm gauge and crosses the borders of two Central Asian states: Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In a global context, this will create a more competitive continental east-west corridor, in which Afghanistan, alongside its northern neighbors, is set to play the role of a key connecting link. Uzbekistan has the potential to join the Five Nation Railway Corridor project via a spur extending into Tajikistan through the Sughd section. This would allow the route to bypass the congested transport hub in Tashkent, reducing the distance to Afghanistan by several hundred kilometers. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

There has been intensive practical development of the transport and logistics component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia this year. This marks both an expansion of China’s transport access to the region and a strengthening of the Central Asian states’ position in continental logistics between East and West. The latest milestone was the test run of a container train travelling from China to Iran via Uzbekistan. This marked the first shipment dispatched along this new route by JSC Uzemiryulkonteyner. Departing from Chengxiang Station, the train crosses the China–Kazakhstan border and continues through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It is scheduled to arrive in Iran via the Sarakhs border crossing in two weeks. Since 2025, a rail link has been in operation between Xi’an in China and the dry port of Aprin, near Tehran. Although Uzbekistan was not initially part of this supply chain, the country actively participating in regular meetings between the heads of the six countries’ railway administrations. A notable outcome of this cooperation is the Xi’an-Aprin trade route, along which block trains now operate regularly. The parties are also developing the China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey/EU transcontinental route. The Southern Railway Corridor is the central component of this project and is designed to ensure uninterrupted land transport links between major Asian and European markets. Taken together, these trends are part of the long-term strategy to promote the China-Europe Railway Express Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative. The expansion of the freight route network linking various regions of China and Central Asia should also be viewed in this context. Since early 2026, several regular and test block trains have been launched from industrial and economic centers in China, such as Chongqing, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Hubei and Xining, bound for Central Asia, with the potential to extend into Iran and beyond. Notably, an increasing volume of freight is now travelling to Uzbekistan via the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan route, which highlights the growing importance of Kyrgyz transit in strengthening regional connectivity. In 2025, 1.8 million tons of freight were transported via the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan multimodal transport corridor, compared with approximately 34,000 tons in 2020. Chinese cargo from Central Asia can also be redirected to other markets, such as Afghanistan. Clearly, given China’s growing demand for overland trade routes, Central Asia’s transformation into a key Eurasian transit hub is set to continue. The region thus gains a valuable asset that can strengthen its influence in global geopolitics and serve as a cornerstone for economic growth. More broadly, this could pave the way for strategic autonomy by uniting the five republics in the pursuit of an independent, coordinated transport policy, thereby laying the foundations for more equal relations with major powers. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In this commentary, Dr Allison Evans examines the political dynamics surrounding the 2026 U.S. midterm elections, focusing on the balance of power in Congress and the factors shaping electoral competition. She discusses traditional midterm patterns, presidential approval, closely contested Senate races, and the broader implications of a possible change in congressional control. Particular attention is given to the uncertainty surrounding the Senate, where the limited number and geographic distribution of seats up for election make the outcome considerably harder to assess. The commentary also offers a closer look at Nevada as a prominent “swing state”, illustrating how national political trends interact with local electoral dynamics. Drawing on congressional and gubernatorial races in the state, Dr Evans highlights the competitiveness of Nevada politics and the possibility of voters supporting candidates from different parties in different races. Overall, the piece provides a practical overview of the key factors to watch ahead of the 2026 midterms and explains why these elections may have significant consequences for the direction of U.S. domestic politics and governance. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Dr. Abbos Bobokhonov and IAIS Research Intern Muhammad Khujanazarov examine the changing geography of global scientific talent. The authors focus on the growing movement of prominent researchers from universities in the United States and the United Kingdom to Chinese institutions, arguing that these cases form part of a broader transformation in international competition for scientific expertise. The commentary analyses the factors strengthening China’s position, including rising research and development expenditure, substantial recruitment packages, specialised visa mechanisms and long-term programmes aimed at attracting both overseas Chinese scholars and foreign scientists. At the same time, it considers the pressures affecting Western research systems, including funding uncertainty, tighter immigration rules and heightened scrutiny of international scientific collaboration. Particular attention is given to artificial intelligence, where declining inflows of researchers to the United States have coincided with a significant narrowing of the technological performance gap between American and Chinese models. The authors nevertheless caution against interpreting these developments simply as an irreversible “brain drain” from the West. Scientific mobility increasingly takes the form of international “brain circulation”, while the United States and the United Kingdom continue to retain major advantages in research institutions, university systems and the training of highly qualified scientists. The commentary concludes that the durability of China’s gains will depend not only on funding and recruitment, but also on its ability to provide the institutional autonomy and openness required for world-class scientific research. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By  Bositkhon Islamov , UWED undergraduate, Research Assistant at IAIS   Context and the logic of Iran's position. The talks at Bürgenstock are under threat of collapse because of the acute interdependence of two conflicts: the Iran–US war, which is being brought to a close by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and Israel's ongoing military campaign in Lebanon. Tehran has advanced a settlement in Lebanon as a de facto condition for continuing the dialogue, a condition also reflected in the 14-point Memorandum, the very first point of which states the need for a ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon. It was precisely Israel's attacks on Lebanon after the signing of the MoU between Iran and the US that caused the negotiation process to be pushed back from Friday the 19th to Sunday, 21 June. Tellingly, as far back as February 2026 — two days before the American–Israeli strikes began — Iran proposed in Geneva to lower uranium enrichment from 60% to 3.67%, that is, it accepted the key nuclear demand in advance and without military pressure. The condition it maintained was precisely regional security. The grounds for linking the two conflicts reinforce one another. Strategically: Hezbollah and the Lebanese theatre constitute the first echelon of Iran's system of asymmetric deterrence; the Israeli occupation of one-fifth of Lebanon means the degradation of that system in parallel with negotiations on the lifting of sanctions. Domestically: ultraconservatives are demanding the resumption of parliament's work (suspended since the start of the war) in order to block an unfavourable deal; the Lebanese demand allows the negotiating team to frame the MoU as a victory rather than a concession. Israeli attacks as an instrument of disruption. Since 2 March 2026, Israeli strikes on Lebanon have claimed at least 4,057 lives, with 12,121 wounded. On 20 June — the day the Swiss talks opened — a further 32 people were killed in a single day. A key precedent: on 19 June the US and the Gulf states agreed to a ceasefire effective from 16:00 local time. According to accounts from the ground, after the appointed hour Israeli air strikes and artillery shelling of southern Lebanon continued — at least 12 violations were recorded; Lebanon's National News Agency (NNA) reported two people killed after the truce had been announced. Tel Aviv's tactics are transparent: the Israeli military-political leadership, in the persons of Netanyahu and Katz,personally sanctioned the ceasefire, yet without withdrawing troops from the country's territory, thereby using Lebanon as a platform for pressuring Iranian decision-making and derailing the peace talks. At the same time, Israel is formally not a party to the negotiations, which relieves it of direct responsibility for their possible collapse. In response, on 20 June the IRGC announced the reinstatement of restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, pointing directly to “Israel's crimes in Lebanon” and the US failure to honour its ceasefire commitments. On the same day 55 commercial vessels transited the strait, and the spokesman for US Central Command – CENTCOM, Captain Tim Hawkins stated that Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz. Risks of the Iranian position. A former senior State Department official, Mark Kimmitt, bluntly characterised Iran's tactic as an “extremely unwise” and risky move, in which the entanglement of two distinct conflicts may complicate the negotiating process, since “Iran cannot control what Hezbollah will do, and the United States does not control what Israel will do. Washington and Tel Aviv have overlapping but not identical interests”. By tying negotiating progress to the behaviour of Israel, which neither the US nor Iran fully controls, Tehran has handed Tel Aviv a de facto veto over the Iran–US deal. Any new Israeli operation — deliberate or accidental — is capable of nullifying days of negotiating progress. The stakes are raised further by the fact that the MoU already provides for the immediate lifting of sanctions on the oil sector: Tehran has an acute economic incentive not to let the process break down. Conclusion. Thus, the linkage of the Iran–US negotiations to the situation in Lebanon is not a tactical episode but a reflection of Tehran's broader regional strategy, in which the nuclear programme, the sanctions regime and the security of allies are treated as elements of a single negotiating package. For Iran, preserving its positions in Lebanon carries not only military-strategic significance as part of a system of regional deterrence, but also domestic political value, allowing the leadership to present possible compromises on the nuclear programme as the result of achieving broader national security goals. At the same time, such a strategy significantly complicates the negotiating process, since it makes it dependent on factors lying beyond the direct control of the parties. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Co-authored with  Zulkhayo Nishanova , teacher at the Department of International Economy of UWED Over the past two decades, labour migrant remittances have become a vital factor in the socio-economic stability of Central Asian countries, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. While these financial inflows significantly reduce poverty and support domestic demand in the short term, a heavy reliance on them creates a profound structural risk known as the “remittance curse.” This phenomenon occurs when external income substitutes internal growth sources, ultimately delaying essential structural and institutional reforms. Prolonged dependence on labour exports leads to a consumer-driven economic model, limiting industrialization and productivity growth. Furthermore, it risks triggering elements of the “Dutch disease,” where external capital inflows stimulate imports and weaken the competitiveness of domestic production. The massive outflow of labour also depletes the domestic market of active, skilled workers. Data indicates that high remittance volumes do not automatically guarantee human capital accumulation. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan, which has minimal dependence on remittances, faces a different structural challenge in the form of “brain drain” (the loss of highly qualified professionals). Crucially, remittances create an “institutional trap.” By acting as a social buffer that supports household incomes, they reduce public pressure on governments to improve governance, protect business environments, and create local jobs. As a result, countries highly dependent on remittances (such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) often exhibit stagnant institutional quality. In contrast, Uzbekistan has shown positive institutional dynamics alongside its post-2017 reforms, and Kazakhstandemonstrates strong institutional progress entirely independent of migration capital. To avoid this institutional trap, state policies must transform these financial flows from mere source of consumption into drivers of internal development. Key measures include stimulating productive investments, developing high-value industries (manufacturing, IT, modern services), creating local high-productivity jobs, and supporting returning migrants to integrate their accumulated capital and skills into domestic entrepreneurship. Ultimately, remittances should not serve as a substitute for domestic reforms, but rather as a temporary resource to fund sustainable economic modernization. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.