There has been intensive practical development of the transport and logistics component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia this year. This marks both an expansion of China’s transport access to the region and a strengthening of the Central Asian states’ position in continental logistics between East and West. The latest milestone was the test run of a container train travelling from China to Iran via Uzbekistan. This marked the first shipment dispatched along this new route by JSC Uzemiryulkonteyner. Departing from Chengxiang Station, the train crosses the China–Kazakhstan border and continues through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It is scheduled to arrive in Iran via the Sarakhs border crossing in two weeks. Since 2025, a rail link has been in operation between Xi’an in China and the dry port of Aprin, near Tehran. Although Uzbekistan was not initially part of this supply chain, the country actively participating in regular meetings between the heads of the six countries’ railway administrations. A notable outcome of this cooperation is the Xi’an-Aprin trade route, along which block trains now operate regularly. The parties are also developing the China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey/EU transcontinental route. The Southern Railway Corridor is the central component of this project and is designed to ensure uninterrupted land transport links between major Asian and European markets. Taken together, these trends are part of the long-term strategy to promote the China-Europe Railway Express Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative. The expansion of the freight route network linking various regions of China and Central Asia should also be viewed in this context. Since early 2026, several regular and test block trains have been launched from industrial and economic centers in China, such as Chongqing, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Hubei and Xining, bound for Central Asia, with the potential to extend into Iran and beyond. Notably, an increasing volume of freight is now travelling to Uzbekistan via the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan route, which highlights the growing importance of Kyrgyz transit in strengthening regional connectivity. In 2025, 1.8 million tons of freight were transported via the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan multimodal transport corridor, compared with approximately 34,000 tons in 2020. Chinese cargo from Central Asia can also be redirected to other markets, such as Afghanistan. Clearly, given China’s growing demand for overland trade routes, Central Asia’s transformation into a key Eurasian transit hub is set to continue. The region thus gains a valuable asset that can strengthen its influence in global geopolitics and serve as a cornerstone for economic growth. More broadly, this could pave the way for strategic autonomy by uniting the five republics in the pursuit of an independent, coordinated transport policy, thereby laying the foundations for more equal relations with major powers. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In this commentary, Dr Allison Evans examines the political dynamics surrounding the 2026 U.S. midterm elections, focusing on the balance of power in Congress and the factors shaping electoral competition. She discusses traditional midterm patterns, presidential approval, closely contested Senate races, and the broader implications of a possible change in congressional control. Particular attention is given to the uncertainty surrounding the Senate, where the limited number and geographic distribution of seats up for election make the outcome considerably harder to assess. The commentary also offers a closer look at Nevada as a prominent “swing state”, illustrating how national political trends interact with local electoral dynamics. Drawing on congressional and gubernatorial races in the state, Dr Evans highlights the competitiveness of Nevada politics and the possibility of voters supporting candidates from different parties in different races. Overall, the piece provides a practical overview of the key factors to watch ahead of the 2026 midterms and explains why these elections may have significant consequences for the direction of U.S. domestic politics and governance. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Dr. Abbos Bobokhonov and IAIS Research Intern Muhammad Khujanazarov examine the changing geography of global scientific talent. The authors focus on the growing movement of prominent researchers from universities in the United States and the United Kingdom to Chinese institutions, arguing that these cases form part of a broader transformation in international competition for scientific expertise. The commentary analyses the factors strengthening China’s position, including rising research and development expenditure, substantial recruitment packages, specialised visa mechanisms and long-term programmes aimed at attracting both overseas Chinese scholars and foreign scientists. At the same time, it considers the pressures affecting Western research systems, including funding uncertainty, tighter immigration rules and heightened scrutiny of international scientific collaboration. Particular attention is given to artificial intelligence, where declining inflows of researchers to the United States have coincided with a significant narrowing of the technological performance gap between American and Chinese models. The authors nevertheless caution against interpreting these developments simply as an irreversible “brain drain” from the West. Scientific mobility increasingly takes the form of international “brain circulation”, while the United States and the United Kingdom continue to retain major advantages in research institutions, university systems and the training of highly qualified scientists. The commentary concludes that the durability of China’s gains will depend not only on funding and recruitment, but also on its ability to provide the institutional autonomy and openness required for world-class scientific research. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By  Bositkhon Islamov , UWED undergraduate, Research Assistant at IAIS   Context and the logic of Iran's position. The talks at Bürgenstock are under threat of collapse because of the acute interdependence of two conflicts: the Iran–US war, which is being brought to a close by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and Israel's ongoing military campaign in Lebanon. Tehran has advanced a settlement in Lebanon as a de facto condition for continuing the dialogue, a condition also reflected in the 14-point Memorandum, the very first point of which states the need for a ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon. It was precisely Israel's attacks on Lebanon after the signing of the MoU between Iran and the US that caused the negotiation process to be pushed back from Friday the 19th to Sunday, 21 June. Tellingly, as far back as February 2026 — two days before the American–Israeli strikes began — Iran proposed in Geneva to lower uranium enrichment from 60% to 3.67%, that is, it accepted the key nuclear demand in advance and without military pressure. The condition it maintained was precisely regional security. The grounds for linking the two conflicts reinforce one another. Strategically: Hezbollah and the Lebanese theatre constitute the first echelon of Iran's system of asymmetric deterrence; the Israeli occupation of one-fifth of Lebanon means the degradation of that system in parallel with negotiations on the lifting of sanctions. Domestically: ultraconservatives are demanding the resumption of parliament's work (suspended since the start of the war) in order to block an unfavourable deal; the Lebanese demand allows the negotiating team to frame the MoU as a victory rather than a concession. Israeli attacks as an instrument of disruption. Since 2 March 2026, Israeli strikes on Lebanon have claimed at least 4,057 lives, with 12,121 wounded. On 20 June — the day the Swiss talks opened — a further 32 people were killed in a single day. A key precedent: on 19 June the US and the Gulf states agreed to a ceasefire effective from 16:00 local time. According to accounts from the ground, after the appointed hour Israeli air strikes and artillery shelling of southern Lebanon continued — at least 12 violations were recorded; Lebanon's National News Agency (NNA) reported two people killed after the truce had been announced. Tel Aviv's tactics are transparent: the Israeli military-political leadership, in the persons of Netanyahu and Katz,personally sanctioned the ceasefire, yet without withdrawing troops from the country's territory, thereby using Lebanon as a platform for pressuring Iranian decision-making and derailing the peace talks. At the same time, Israel is formally not a party to the negotiations, which relieves it of direct responsibility for their possible collapse. In response, on 20 June the IRGC announced the reinstatement of restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, pointing directly to “Israel's crimes in Lebanon” and the US failure to honour its ceasefire commitments. On the same day 55 commercial vessels transited the strait, and the spokesman for US Central Command – CENTCOM, Captain Tim Hawkins stated that Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz. Risks of the Iranian position. A former senior State Department official, Mark Kimmitt, bluntly characterised Iran's tactic as an “extremely unwise” and risky move, in which the entanglement of two distinct conflicts may complicate the negotiating process, since “Iran cannot control what Hezbollah will do, and the United States does not control what Israel will do. Washington and Tel Aviv have overlapping but not identical interests”. By tying negotiating progress to the behaviour of Israel, which neither the US nor Iran fully controls, Tehran has handed Tel Aviv a de facto veto over the Iran–US deal. Any new Israeli operation — deliberate or accidental — is capable of nullifying days of negotiating progress. The stakes are raised further by the fact that the MoU already provides for the immediate lifting of sanctions on the oil sector: Tehran has an acute economic incentive not to let the process break down. Conclusion. Thus, the linkage of the Iran–US negotiations to the situation in Lebanon is not a tactical episode but a reflection of Tehran's broader regional strategy, in which the nuclear programme, the sanctions regime and the security of allies are treated as elements of a single negotiating package. For Iran, preserving its positions in Lebanon carries not only military-strategic significance as part of a system of regional deterrence, but also domestic political value, allowing the leadership to present possible compromises on the nuclear programme as the result of achieving broader national security goals. At the same time, such a strategy significantly complicates the negotiating process, since it makes it dependent on factors lying beyond the direct control of the parties. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Co-authored with  Zulkhayo Nishanova , teacher at the Department of International Economy of UWED Over the past two decades, labour migrant remittances have become a vital factor in the socio-economic stability of Central Asian countries, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. While these financial inflows significantly reduce poverty and support domestic demand in the short term, a heavy reliance on them creates a profound structural risk known as the “remittance curse.” This phenomenon occurs when external income substitutes internal growth sources, ultimately delaying essential structural and institutional reforms. Prolonged dependence on labour exports leads to a consumer-driven economic model, limiting industrialization and productivity growth. Furthermore, it risks triggering elements of the “Dutch disease,” where external capital inflows stimulate imports and weaken the competitiveness of domestic production. The massive outflow of labour also depletes the domestic market of active, skilled workers. Data indicates that high remittance volumes do not automatically guarantee human capital accumulation. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan, which has minimal dependence on remittances, faces a different structural challenge in the form of “brain drain” (the loss of highly qualified professionals). Crucially, remittances create an “institutional trap.” By acting as a social buffer that supports household incomes, they reduce public pressure on governments to improve governance, protect business environments, and create local jobs. As a result, countries highly dependent on remittances (such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) often exhibit stagnant institutional quality. In contrast, Uzbekistan has shown positive institutional dynamics alongside its post-2017 reforms, and Kazakhstandemonstrates strong institutional progress entirely independent of migration capital. To avoid this institutional trap, state policies must transform these financial flows from mere source of consumption into drivers of internal development. Key measures include stimulating productive investments, developing high-value industries (manufacturing, IT, modern services), creating local high-productivity jobs, and supporting returning migrants to integrate their accumulated capital and skills into domestic entrepreneurship. Ultimately, remittances should not serve as a substitute for domestic reforms, but rather as a temporary resource to fund sustainable economic modernization. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Georgia has become a strategic partner of Uzbekistan. Following negotiations in Tbilisi on July 3, 2026, the leaders of the two countries signed a declaration to this effect. The state visit of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Georgia — the first in 23 years — is laying the foundation for ambitious new endeavors. Clearly, Georgia has shifted its focus significantly towards Central Asia over the past year. The country is linking its long-term development plans in a number of areas, including trade and transport logistics, with this region. Tbilisi and Tashkent are already aiming to increase trade turnover from the current $270 million to $1 billion. This will be challenging and will require the active involvement of the private sector. Improving transport connectivity is expected to be a key driver of growing mutual trade. Tashkent has specific proposals in this regard. These include extending the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, whose construction began in April 2025, to the South Caucasus, Türkiye and Europe via the Caspian and Black Seas. This will create a new multimodal route along the east-west axis, incorporating the Middle Corridor. The CKU could also be connected to the Middle Corridor via the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, which now has a capacity of 5 million tons per year. In both cases, Georgia serves as a key hub for transcontinental logistics thanks to its geographical location and modernizing railway and port infrastructure. In 2025, 1.2 million tons of cargo from Uzbekistan were transported along the Middle Corridor. The ongoing instability in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine are likely to continue emphasizing the trans-Caspian and trans-Caucasian routes for Central Asian exports. Against this backdrop, Uzbekistan is showing increasing interest in the ports of Poti and Batumi, which provide maritime access to Europe. The creation of a logistics hub for the efficient transportation of goods via Georgia’s Black Sea ports is under consideration. These plans are in line with the development of the CASCA+ corridor (Central Asia – South Caucasus –Anatolia+), which was launched at the initiative of Tashkent in 2019. The project, which also involves Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye, aims to increase rail transport both between the beneficiary countries and in the Europe-China-Europe direction. In June 2026, the parties met in Istanbul to discuss measures to improve the efficiency of the CASCA+ corridor. Following the meeting, they signed an agreement to increase freight volumes. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.