A landmark shift in financial policy has taken place in the United States with President Trump’s signing of a legislative package on cryptocurrency, the central element of which is the GENIUS Act (Guidance and Implementation of National Innovations for US Stablecoins). For the first time in U.S. history, this act establishes a clear federal regulatory framework for stablecoins — cryptocurrencies whose value is firmly pegged to stable real assets. The Trump Administration presents this legislation as a historic milestone that will enable the United States to lead the global revolution in digital currencies.   Until now, despite their decade-long existence and market capitalization reaching nearly $244 billion by May 2025, stablecoins performed a narrowly specialized function as a bridge between traditional finance and the volatile world of crypto assets. Having now obtained legal status as a means of payment, this cryptocurrency is prepared to challenge traditional payment systems. As RAND Corporation researcher Jim Mignano observes, “this law effectively legitimizes a long-awaited but politically fraught phenomenon, the so-called corporate cryptocurrency”.   The key innovation of the GENIUS Act is the requirement for one-hundred-percent backing of tokens — digital records in a distributed ledger (blockchain) certifying rights to specific assets or services. Following the enactment of this law, stablecoin tokens must be fully backed by highly liquid and secure assets, specifically U.S. dollars and short-term Treasury securities.   This provision, alongside the obligation of stablecoin issuers to publish monthly reports on their reserves, is intended to eliminate major regulatory concerns. Yet the geopolitical and macroeconomic dimensions of this step are no less significant. The law’s adoption occurs against the backdrop of mounting challenges for the American economy: a national debt reaching $37 trillion and a growing budget deficit. In this context, the legalization of stablecoins is viewed as a tool to alleviate the debt crisis, since the mandatory holding of reserves in government securities is expected to substantially increase demand for them.   Despite the optimism of proponents, including Trump himself, who has thus rewarded the crypto community for contributions to his election campaign, such rapid integration of crypto assets raises serious concerns. Critics, among them Senator Elizabeth Warren, warn of risks to financial stability, as the law erases the traditional separation between banking activities and commerce.   Given the decentralized nature of cryptocurrency production, legalization opens the door to a new class of issuers: in addition to individuals, large multinational corporations may also issue tokens. Companies such as Meta (formerly Facebook), which had previously abandoned its “Libra” cryptocurrency project under regulatory pressure, are now cautiously re-entering the field. Similarly, the forthcoming “JPMD” token by JP Morgan represents a calculated attempt to integrate traditional banking infrastructure with stablecoin innovations. This marks the emergence of a paradoxical phenomenon: a technology originally designed to undermine the foundations of traditional finance now receives its strongest impetus for development from the very institutions it was intended to bypass.   The failure of the Libra project was largely due to the absence of institutional trust. The GENIUS Act, by contrast, provides precisely the legal foundation that may clear the path for such projects in the future. Nevertheless, as experts emphasize, legal compliance alone is insufficient for achieving socially beneficial outcomes. Corporate cryptocurrencies may simplify payments, but this potential will only be realized if the systems created are transparent, inclusive, and interoperable. Otherwise, there is a risk that these innovations will merely reinforce market concentration in the hands of a few technological giants.   The Trump Administration’s approach stands in marked contrast to the regulatory strategies of other global centers. While the European Union has implemented a comprehensive and unified framework for crypto-asset regulation under “MiCA”, and Russia is cautiously experimenting with cross-border settlements under special legal regimes, the U.S. is betting on liberalization under private-sector leadership. Notably, U.S. law explicitly prohibits the Federal Reserve from issuing its own digital currency, thereby cementing the private nature of digital money, whereas BRICS countries are actively developing state-backed equivalents.   In parallel with stablecoin legalization, the tokenization of real assets is also gathering momentum, with the market already reaching $25 billion. Giants such as BlackRock are actively issuing tokenized funds. Yet legal complications persist, as evidenced by SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce’s reminder that “tokenized securities remain securities”, and therefore must comply with all disclosure requirements.   Despite the adoption of a framework law, there remains a vast field of work for regulators. At the federal level, it will be necessary to harmonize consumer protection and data governance rules across different agencies. At the state level, policy remains fragmented: there are significant divergences between jurisdictions embracing crypto-experimentation, such as Wyoming, and those maintaining cautious licensing regimes, such as New York. At the international level, the challenge is to manage systemic risks and combat illicit financial activities.   In the broader context of the new U.S. crypto policy, another ambitious initiative should also be considered — the potential use of Bitcoin as a state reserve asset. This idea, outlined in the 2024 Bitcoin Bill, envisages that the U.S. Federal Reserve would be required to acquire up to 200,000 bitcoins annually. According to its authors, such a measure would not only officially recognize Bitcoin as a significant financial instrument alongside gold but also serve the goal of strengthening the U.S. monetary system.   Alongside these legislative shifts, the Trump Administration is also using executive authority to accelerate cryptocurrency integration, this time at the level of mass retail investors. A presidential executive order grants more than 90 million Americans participating in retirement plans access to alternative assets, including private equity, real estate, and, most notably, digital assets.   The White House regards this step as a means of democratizing investment and potentially increasing the returns on workers’ retirement savings, by providing them the same opportunities that were previously available only to wealthy investors. This decision is a direct continuation of Trump’s campaign promise to make the United States the cryptocurrency capital of the world, and it represents another step towards legitimizing cryptocurrencies as a fully-fledged investment class.   At the same time, the legalization of cryptocurrencies exposes a profound ideological contradiction between the letter of the new law and the very “spirit of cryptocurrency”. Cryptocurrencies were originally conceived as a decentralized and anonymous alternative to state financial systems. The imposition of strict rules, though necessary to restore investor confidence, constitutes a compromise that reshapes the crypto market and threatens its fundamental principles. Here, the concept of the “digital footprint” plays a central role. Unlike cash, every stablecoin transaction is permanently recorded in a public distributed ledger. This mechanism creates an indelible history of all operations, potentially open to analysis, thereby posing the risk of total financial transparency — contrary to the original principles of privacy.   Finally, U.S. regulatory efforts extend beyond stablecoins, with the next step being the elimination of legal uncertainty in the sector. The key problem lies in the absence of clear criteria for determining whether a digital asset should be classified as a security, under SEC oversight, or as a commodity, under the jurisdiction of the CFTC. This ambiguity generates ongoing conflicts. It is precisely this issue that the newly introduced Digital Asset Market Transparency Act “CLARITY” is intended to address by establishing clear rules of the game and delineating regulatory authority.   Simultaneously, a more nuanced approach is being developed toward decentralized finance (DeFi). This strategy envisages a distinction between financial intermediaries, such as centralized exchanges, which will be subject to strict oversight, and decentralized protocols themselves. The latter, being by nature software code rather than legal entities, may fall under a different regulatory model, focused not on financial licensing but on security audits and technical standards of transparency.   Overall, the American approach is designed to stimulate technological innovation at the core of the industry, while maintaining investor protection on the platforms that serve as their primary gateways into the world of digital assets.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her recent policy brief for the Caspian Policy Center, Nargiza Umarova highlights how Azerbaijan’s transport diplomacy — particularly its drive to consolidate the East-West and North-South corridors — is transforming the South Caucasus into a key logistical hub. Azerbaijan's infrastructure push, which includes upgrades to the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and expansion of the Baku International Sea Trade Port, aims to enhance the Middle Corridor’s competitiveness as a viable alternative to northern routes that pass-through Russia. This creates new geopolitical and geo-economic openings for landlocked Central Asian states, especially Uzbekistan, to access European and global markets more efficiently via the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR).   The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian route, has gained traction in recent years as an East-West trade artery connecting China and Central Asia with Europe through the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye. The European Union’s TRACECA program and various multilateral logistics initiatives have given further momentum to this alignment. With Azerbaijan investing heavily in upgrading port capacity, rail infrastructure, and its merchant fleet, the region is witnessing a significant reduction in logistical bottlenecks and freight delays. This benefits not only Azerbaijani ambitions but also aligns with the long-term transport strategies of Central Asian countries seeking to diversify their export and transit pathways beyond Russia and China.   For Uzbekistan, the picture is nuanced. While the TITR offers promising prospects for trade with the South Caucasus and Türkiye, its use for large-scale continental transit to Europe remains constrained. Umarova notes that although 4.5 million tons of cargo were shipped via the Middle Corridor in 2024, up 62% from the previous year, only 1 million tons originated from Uzbekistan. Moreover, the World Bank projects that even by 2030, only 40% of the total 11 million tons of cargo anticipated to transit the corridor will be truly transcontinental. Much of the benefit will accrue to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, given their geographic proximity and infrastructural integration. For Uzbekistan, deeper engagement with southern corridors via Iran or Pakistan may offer a more direct and efficient trade route to Europe and the Middle East.   The emerging Southern Corrido, linking China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and extending through Turkmenistan and Iran to Türkiye and the EU, could redefine Eurasian connectivity. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, once completed, will shorten the East Asia–Europe trade route by 900 km and cut delivery times by up to eight days. Furthermore, the integration of the Trans-Afghan Railway into the broader Middle Corridor framework could create a multi-nodal logistics network stretching from India and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea and Europe. Uzbekistan’s strategic location at the heart of these intersecting routes underscores its potential as a key player in Eurasian transit — provided it can continue to align its infrastructure development with evolving regional corridors.   Ultimately, Ms. Umarova argues that the expansion of trans-Caspian transport links is about more than just moving goods. It represents a shift in Central Asia’s geopolitical posture from isolation to integration, from dependency to diversification. As new railways and ports come online, the region has the chance to assert itself as a nexus of Eurasian connectivity. Yet the benefits will not be evenly distributed; strategic planning and interregional coordination will be crucial for Uzbekistan and its neighbors to fully capitalize on these opportunities.   Read on Caspian Policy Center   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

A new analytical paper by the Centre for American Studies examines the growing competition between the foreign policy vectors of the United States, Russia and Iran over the fate of the Zangezur Corridor, a key link in the Middle Transport Route designed to connect China with Europe via the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The authors emphasise that the Zangezur Corridor is not just an infrastructure project, but an instrument of geo-economic redistribution of influence in the region, exacerbating issues of sovereignty, security and long-term regional architecture.   The report pays particular attention to the US proposal to lease the route through southern Armenia for 100 years, with operational control transferred to a private company acting as a neutral guarantor. This initiative aims to provide Azerbaijan with stable transit to Nakhchivan and further to Turkey, while allowing Armenia to retain its formal sovereignty. The study emphasises that such a solution could change the balance of power in the region, weakening the leverage of Russia and Iran, while providing Central Asian countries — especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — with direct access to European markets, bypassing Russian and Iranian routes.   At the same time, the authors soberly assess the numerous obstacles. In Armenia, the lease of the corridor is perceived as a threat to losing control over the strategic Syunik region. Domestic political instability, pressure from the opposition, and historical distrust of major powers create a significant risk of negotiations breaking down. Russia and Iran, in turn, view the implementation of the project as undermining their geo-economic interests: Moscow may restrict energy supplies to Armenia and tighten control over alternative routes, while Tehran is already openly demonstrating military activity near the Azerbaijani border and stepping up its rhetoric regarding regional isolation.   The paper concludes that the Zangezur corridor is becoming a point of intersection for the strategies of three competing powers, and its implementation will require not only diplomatic flexibility but also the creation of trust-building mechanisms for regional security. According to the authors, the success of the project could set a precedent for resolving long-term conflicts through institutionalised forms of economic cooperation. However, if it fails, the corridor risks becoming yet another frozen line of tension in the complex system of South Caucasus contradictions.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

As Dr. Gafarov notes, Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban government on 3 July 2025 marks a significant turning point in the international community’s approach to Afghanistan. Unlike the Taliban’s first period in power (1996–2001), the current regime has steadily cultivated diplomatic legitimacy over the past four years. Recognition by a major non-Islamic power such as Russia underscores the Taliban’s evolution into a more pragmatic and diplomatically active political actor. The move also reframes the Afghan question — from a largely security-driven regional concern to a component of broader geopolitical competition between East and West.   Russia’s decision follows a series of incremental steps, including the removal of the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations and preparations for the Taliban’s full participation in the upcoming Moscow Format talks. The Kremlin’s approach is driven by strategic considerations: securing its influence in Central Asia, accessing new export markets, and countering Western isolation through partnerships in the Global South. In particular, the prospect of military cooperation, arms trade, and connectivity initiatives such as the Trans-Afghan Railway indicate that Moscow views Afghanistan as a valuable partner in its evolving foreign policy matrix.   The implications of this recognition are likely to reverberate across the region. Some neighboring states may feel encouraged to reassess their own positions. Uzbekistan, while maintaining an independent foreign policy, has shown willingness to engage the Taliban in dialogue, as evidenced by President Mirziyoyev’s recent meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Baradar. However, a formal recognition from Tashkent remains contingent on its own national priorities. Iran, despite being geographically and politically proximate, is unlikely to follow Moscow’s lead due to deteriorating bilateral ties with Kabul. Pakistan’s stance, though historically more sympathetic to the Taliban, has been complicated by domestic security concerns and refugee tensions. All eyes now turn to the upcoming SCO Summit in Tianjin.   Looking ahead, Russia’s initiative may create momentum for broader recognition, especially if China or key regional actors such as Kazakhstan move in a similar direction. The upcoming SCO Summit in Tianjin may provide an opportunity for collective deliberation on Afghanistan’s place in the regional order. Whether Russia’s move triggers a true domino effect remains uncertain, but it undeniably signals a shift in the diplomatic status quo. Afghanistan, long treated as a marginal or exceptional case, is increasingly becoming integrated into mainstream geopolitical calculations.   Read on Geopolitical Monitor   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

On June 24, 33-year-old Zohran Kwame Mamdani achieved a surprising victory in the Democratic Party primaries ahead of the New York City mayoral election. His main rival was 68-year-old former state governor Andrew Cuomo—a representative of the political establishment backed by Bill Clinton, Michael Bloomberg, major labor unions, and Wall Street. However, Mamdani, a previously little-known politician, managed to mobilize youth and minority voters, securing a sensational win. According to the results, Mamdani garnered 43.5% of the vote, while Cuomo received 36.4%. The remaining votes went to other candidates, including city comptroller Brad Lander, whose preferences were later redistributed through the ranked-choice voting system. Cuomo conceded defeat and described Mamdani’s campaign as “smart and effective.”   Effectively, victory in the primaries secured Mamdani the status of the Democratic Party’s main candidate in the upcoming general election on November 4, 2025. His key opponents will include Republican Curtis Sliwa, independent candidate and incumbent Mayor Eric Adams, and several centrist contenders. Adams’s popularity has sharply declined amid a corruption scandal, and his decision to run outside the Democratic Party has only deepened internal divisions. In this context, Mamdani remains the front-runner in the race.   Biography and Political Career. Zohran Mamdani represents a new generation of progressive politicians. He was born in Uganda to a prominent academic, Mahmood Mamdani, and an Indian mother, Mira Nair—an award-winning actress and filmmaker. During childhood, he moved to New York and grew up in the Astoria neighborhood of Queens. After earning a degree in African Studies from a college in Maine, Mamdani became involved in community work, music, and later, politics. He openly identifies as a democratic socialist, holds progressive views, and is politically aligned with Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Beyond politics, he participated in cultural projects and released music under the pseudonym Mr. Cardamom, which helped him attract attention from younger audiences. His engagement in cultural and volunteer work allowed him to establish strong ties with local communities and build a stable electoral base.   Mamdani’s political career began at the city and state level. In 2020, he was elected to the New York State Assembly, representing a district that includes Queens, and took office in early 2021. In the Assembly, he promoted initiatives benefiting ordinary New Yorkers—such as spearheading a pilot project for free bus service in the city (in 2023, five bus routes operated free of charge). He also supported legislation protecting tenants from eviction, advocated increased funding for social services, and called for restrictions on luxury real estate development in low-income neighborhoods. Mamdani was one of the initiators of a law requiring language support services for immigrants in city institutions. Although he achieved limited legislative success in Albany, Mamdani gained a reputation as a passionate activist defending the rights of tenants, immigrants, and workers. He actively participated in protests, championed climate justice, and called for reforms in the criminal justice system, opposing aggressive policing in impoverished neighborhoods.   Electoral Platform and Ideological Orientation. The core tenets of Mamdani’s platform aim to address social inequality. His proposals include a rent freeze on nearly one million regulated apartments, construction of 200,000 affordable housing units over ten years, free citywide bus service by 2027, universal free school meals, and the establishment of a municipal network of grocery stores. He also supports the implementation of a “Green New York” plan for transitioning to sustainable urban infrastructure, including widespread solar panel installation, modernization of public buildings, and expansion of bicycle transit systems. These measures are to be funded through increased taxes on millionaires and corporations, subject to state approval.   Mamdani places particular emphasis on racial and social justice. He advocates for strengthening immigrant rights, protections for gig economy workers, access to mental health services, and expanded rehabilitation programs for former inmates. His policing reform agenda includes reducing the NYPD’s budget and reallocating funds to social services. In education, Mamdani proposes tuition-free municipal colleges, improved working conditions for teachers, and expanded after-school programs for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. On foreign policy, Mamdani supports Palestinian rights and criticizes U.S. policy toward Israel, which has attracted both praise and harsh criticism. He publicly condemned bombings in Gaza and proposed that New York cease government contracts with companies supporting the Israeli military.   The scope of his program has sparked debate. Critics accuse him of “magical realism” and populism, citing budgetary and legal constraints. However, Mamdani insists his plan responds to the real needs of New Yorkers. His campaign focused on social justice and making the city accessible to all—not just the elite. As he puts it, “the city should be a place where a decent life is available to everyone, not just those who run the stock market.”   Public and Political Response. Mamdani’s victory has become a symbol of a growing demand for change. However, it has also alarmed New York’s business community. Stakeholders in real estate, finance, and large retail expressed concerns about potential increases in taxation and regulation. In an effort to block Mamdani’s path to City Hall, major donors redirected support to independent candidate Eric Adams, despite his tarnished reputation. The New York Chamber of Commerce emphasized in its statement that “the city’s entrepreneurial environment must not fall victim to political experiments.” Analysts at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase, in private notes to investors, warned of a possible slowdown in capital investment due to tax uncertainty. A group of real estate owners sent an open letter to the State Senate demanding that any legislation curbing the rental market be blocked. Several large business associations have already launched lobbying campaigns at the state level aimed at containing what they perceive as a potential “anti-business tilt” of a Mamdani administration. Additionally, some groups have initiated media campaigns featuring attack ads and editorials portraying his economic program as a threat to jobs and investment. At the same time, some small business owners—particularly in immigrant-dominated neighborhoods—expressed cautious support for Mamdani’s policy proposals, hoping for reduced bureaucratic barriers and better support for microenterprises.   Mamdani succeeded in mobilizing traditionally disengaged voter groups: youth, immigrants, and nonwhite communities. His campaign deployed 30,000 volunteers who canvassed over 750,000 homes. He made active use of social media, especially TikTok and Instagram, to communicate directly with voters, share explanatory videos, and criticize opponents. In one such video, he discussed the concept of “housing justice,” describing New York as a “city of two speeds”—an elite center and impoverished outskirts. However, parts of the moderate electorate reacted warily to his win. This was reflected in strong support for Cuomo among affluent residents and religious minorities. In the primaries, Mamdani lost among registered voters in Manhattan and in neighborhoods with high concentrations of Russian-speaking and Orthodox Jewish populations.   Within the Democratic Party, reactions were mixed. The party’s left wing celebrated Mamdani’s success, while centrists expressed skepticism. Figures such as Chuck Schumer and Hakeem Jeffries withheld full endorsement. The New York Times described Mamdani’s platform as unrealistic and expressed hope for a more balanced candidate by 2029. Right-wing politicians, including Donald Trump, reacted harshly, accusing Mamdani of radicalism and questioning his legitimacy. Far-right commentators called for the “deportation of socialists” on social media. Nevertheless, Republicans do not pose a serious threat in traditionally Democratic New York.   Forecasts and Challenges. Analysts believe Mamdani has a strong chance of winning the general election, but his tenure as mayor will face substantial challenges. Fiscal constraints, reliance on state authorities, and business opposition may hinder the implementation of his ambitious agenda. Governor Kathy Hochul has already stated she will not support tax increases, citing fears of capital flight. This jeopardizes key initiatives, from free transportation to housing construction.   Successful implementation of reforms will require political skill and a willingness to compromise. The experience of past mayors, such as Bill de Blasio, shows how difficult it is to enact a social agenda in a city as complex as New York. Optimists argue that Mamdani may at least partially fulfill his program, strengthening the progressive movement nationwide. Skeptics maintain that the harsh realities of governance will inevitably moderate his course. Some analysts believe that Mamdani’s success or failure may serve as an indicator of the broader trajectory of the Democratic Party, especially amid growing leftist sentiment among youth in major U.S. cities. In this context, New York could either become a showcase for progressive reform or a cautionary tale of its limitations in the face of institutional resistance.   Thus, Zohran Mamdani’s victory in the primaries marks a potential turning point in New York City politics. If he wins the general election, the city could become a testing ground for an ambitious left-wing experiment in the heart of a global financial center. Whether this experiment succeeds will depend on the delicate balance between ideals and practical governance in the years ahead.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Central Asia is an important energy region with 3% of the world’s oil reserves, 12% of gas reserves, and significant potential for renewable energy sources. After the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the EU has increased its focus on the region, seeing it as a strategic partner for diversifying supplies and the green transition.   As emphasized in the EU Strategy for Central Asia, the goal is not to control resources, but to support reforms, harmonize legislation, and introduce environmental standards. This is being implemented through the Sustainable Energy Connections in Central Asia (2022–2026) initiative and the Global Gateway program, with investments of up to €12 billion in renewable energy, digitalization, and the environment. The EU offers a long-term partnership based on technology and sustainable development, which differs from resource-based strategies.   Today, the EU is one of the region’s largest economic partners, accounting for 22.6% of foreign trade and more than 40% of foreign direct investment. Its involvement in the energy sector takes the form of investment, technological support, and joint development of green solutions.   The EU as an investor in the energy sector of Central Asia. The EU plays a key role in Central Asia’s energy sector, providing not only investment but also access to modern technologies and expert support. In particular, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is a leading instrument, investing a record €2.26 billion in the region in 2024.   Most of these funds are directed towards sustainable and “green” infrastructure, including the modernization of networks and the construction of renewable energy facilities. Among the countries in the region, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan received the largest amounts of investment.   For reference: key projects include the construction of high-voltage power lines in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the region’s largest solar power plant with energy storage in the Tashkent region, and Central Asia’s first green hydrogen production project in Kazakhstan.   In addition, European companies are actively involved in the region’s energy development. The Italian company Eni owns shares in Kazakhstan’s largest oil and gas projects, while the French company Orano is involved in uranium mining in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. France covers a significant part of its nuclear power plant needs with uranium from the region, and the partnership in the nuclear sector continues to deepen.   The EU plays a leading role in harmonizing energy regulations, using the experience of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and the integration of the Balkan markets. Cooperation is conducted in the “5+EU” format and through bilateral agreements. The EU Strategy for Central Asia has been in force since 2019, and in 2023 a Roadmap with about 80 measures for the development of trade, climate, and energy was approved. All countries in the region have joined initiatives to reduce methane emissions and ratified the Paris Agreement. The EU provides technical assistance for energy sector reforms, competition development, and coordination on water resource management.   The EU as a regulator of standards and provider of technological solutions. The EU has a significant influence on Central Asia’s energy sector, spreading its standards, norms, and technologies. Countries in the region, seeking to enter European markets, are adapting to these requirements, from environmental standards to market rules. One example is the EU carbon levy mechanism introduced in 2023. It affects exports of energy-intensive products, including steel, cement, and electricity, and involves the imposition of a carbon charge if the products are manufactured with high greenhouse gas emissions. This puts additional pressure on producers in Central Asia and at the same time creates incentives for modernising production, switching to renewable energy sources and improving energy efficiency. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have already begun to look for ways to reduce the carbon intensity of their products, including with the help of European initiatives and technologies.   For reference: With the support of the EU and the EBRD, the first industrial energy storage system in the region (500 MWh) has been launched in Uzbekistan. European companies such as Siemens, ABB, and Total Eren are participating in the construction of solar power plants, the modernization of substations, and the transition to high-efficiency generation.   III. Balance of opportunities and challenges in energy cooperation with the EU. Cooperation with the EU opens up opportunities for Central Asia to diversify its export markets, primarily by reducing its previous dependence on transit routes through Russia and on exports to volatile or limited markets such as China or the Middle East. More than 70% of Kazakhstan’s oil goes to Europe, with exports in 2024 exceeding 1 million barrels per day, making Kazakhstan the third largest supplier to the EU. After Niger stopped exporting natural uranium in 2023, Kazakhstan became its main supplier, covering over 40% of the EU’s needs. This ensures stable foreign exchange earnings and long-term contracts.   At the same time, direct exports to Europe are limited by the lack of a common border and gas pipelines – oil is transported via the Black Sea and transit countries. In these conditions, the EU’s practical contribution to the development of the region’s energy sector becomes particularly significant: investments are directed towards infrastructure renewal, the construction of power lines, and support for green energy projects. The EU also transfers technology — energy-efficient equipment, digital control systems, modern turbines, and metering systems. This local approach not only strengthens the reliability of energy systems but also prepares Central Asian countries to enter more stable and diverse external markets.   However, Central Asia is an area of active competition. Over the past 20 years, China has invested over $105 billion, mainly in infrastructure projects and raw material assets, while the UAE and Saudi Arabia are financing renewable energy projects, and Russia is maintaining its influence through critical infrastructure such as gas pipelines, power lines, and transport routes. The EU must create more flexible conditions to maintain the interest of countries in the region.   Moreover, cooperation with the EU contributes to the growth of energy professionals’ qualifications: more than 500 specialists from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have been trained through Erasmus+, European Commission, and other programs, as well as through partnerships with European universities and institutions. They are working on the development of tariff models, energy efficiency, and digital accounting systems.   Investments face barriers: in Kazakhstan, the tariff model has changed, and in Uzbekistan, there are delays in payments from state-owned companies. Fitch Ratings, which assesses the reliability of countries for investors, notes delay in obligations to investors, which required the creation of a special company that officially purchases electricity from private producers – Uzenergosotish – and additional guarantees from international institutions.   Strategic priorities and directions for the development of energy cooperation with the EU. Geopolitical changes and the reorientation of export flows reinforce the importance of Central Asia’s infrastructure connectivity with the EU. The Middle Corridor, a strategic transport route for sustainable logistics, is of particular importance. Kazakhstan is modernizing the ports of Aktau and Kuryk, expanding their throughput capacity and increasing the fleet of Caspian tankers for transporting oil to the port of Alat (Azerbaijan). Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are renovating the port of Turkmenbashi, creating a regional logistics hub.   The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, construction of which began in 2022, will significantly reduce transit times for energy cargoes to Europe. The Trans-Caspian gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan will be able to supply up to 15 billion cubic meters of gas to the EU annually, expanding export opportunities and strengthening the region’s energy autonomy.   To integrate with the European market, Central Asian countries need to eliminate fragmentation in tariffs, standards, and network management. The creation of a Central Asian Energy Community, modeled on the South-East European Energy Community, will provide legal certainty and cross-border electricity trade.   Overall, the potential of the partnership is far from exhausted. With the successful implementation of EU initiatives and the willingness of Central Asian countries to reform, it is possible to create a new energy space from Europe to Central Asia as an important element of global security and climate stability.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.