In their opinion article for The Times of Central Asia, co-authored with Farrukh Yunuskhojaev, Odilbek Manabov examines what will determine whether the railway delivers lasting economic gains for communities along its route. Moving beyond discussions of transit volumes and shorter international connections, they focus on opportunities for local producers, businesses and workers in Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn and Jalal-Abad regions and Uzbekistan’s Andijan region. The authors argue that improved connectivity alone will not guarantee local development. Affordable and transparent tariffs, access to terminals for small consignments, efficient border procedures and connections between production sites and stations will be essential. Warehouses, cold storage and processing facilities could help producers retain more value locally, while training programmes introduced before operations begin would better prepare residents for permanent employment in railway services, customs and logistics. The opinion also calls for a more accountable approach to assessing the project’s impact. Alongside transit figures, the authors recommend tracking local freight participation, delivery costs, permanent jobs, wages and procurement from local firms. They emphasise the importance of disclosing environmental assessments and resettlement plans, arguing that the railway’s success should be measured by tangible improvements in neighbouring communities as well as its role in international trade. Read in The Times of Central Asia * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal in northern Afghanistan is gradually becoming one of the most sensitive issues in Central Asian water security. For Afghanistan, the project is linked to food security, employment, and the development of the northern provinces. For Uzbekistan, it creates a new situation in the Amu Darya basin, where the water balance, the environmental sustainability of the Aral Sea region, and the modernization of the irrigation system are becoming part of a single regional agenda. The central question today is not whether the project can be stopped, but how to bring its operation into a format of regular data exchange, monitoring, and predictable interaction. Qosh Tepa on Afghanistan’s Agenda after 2021 After 2021, Afghanistan’s domestic politics have developed under conditions of limited international legitimacy, economic uncertainty, and the population’s heavy dependence on humanitarian assistance. Against this background, projects that can be presented as evidence of governability, of the capacity to create jobs, and of rural development have become particularly important for the de facto authorities. In this situation, the Qosh Tepa Canal is for Kabul not only an irrigation project but also an element of domestic political legitimation. The project allows the de facto authorities to demonstrate their ability to govern territory, sustain employment, and build a food base in the northern provinces. It therefore appears more realistic to expect not the termination of the project but a search for a format of negotiations on the terms of its operation. What Is Known about the Project In open sources, the Qosh Tepa Canal is usually described as a project about 285 km in length, involving water withdrawal from the Amu Darya and the irrigation of substantial areas of northern Afghanistan. However, the exact parameters of the future water intake, actual water losses, and the canal’s operating regime remain insufficiently transparent. It is precisely the limited availability of verifiable technical information that makes the project particularly sensitive for downstream countries. There is currently insufficient publicly available data on a full feasibility study, an environmental assessment, and an independent engineering review of the canal. There are already political assessments, satellite observations, and individual engineering studies concerning the project; however, a transparent system of regular data exchange has not yet been established. For the basin countries, information on actual water withdrawal, losses, the seasonal operating regime, and the condition of the earthen channel is of fundamental importance. In this situation, the most reliable approach is a comparative one, based on the analysis of three groups of sources: official statements by Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, documents of international organizations, and independent scientific and engineering assessments. The Afghan Logic: Why Kabul Will Continue the Project From the Afghan perspective, the Qosh Tepa Canal is a project of not only agricultural but also political and administrative significance. The country’s northern provinces have long been perceived as an agrarian periphery and, at the same time, as a space where ethnic, trade, border, and political interests intersect. In this context, irrigation becomes an instrument of employment, food provision, and the consolidation of control over territory. At the same time, the project remains subject to serious constraints. Afghanistan faces a shortage of engineering resources, limited access to international financing, sanctions risks, and a lack of trust on the part of its neighbors. The question is therefore not whether Afghanistan needs to develop agriculture, but whether Kabul can implement this project without heightening tensions over the Amu Darya. For Tashkent, the most important task in this situation is to move the issue onto a technical plane. Discussing the water-withdrawal regime, water losses, the condition of the channel, and mechanisms of advance notification makes it possible to reduce uncertainty without directly linking water issues to the question of the official recognition of the de facto authorities. Uzbekistan’s Water Security and the Downstream Factor The significance of the Qosh Tepa Canal for Uzbekistan is determined by the country’s position in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya and by the agricultural sector’s heavy dependence on irrigated farming. Additional water withdrawal upstream may aggravate existing water-supply problems, particularly in the context of climate variability, growing demand from the agricultural sector, and persistent losses in the irrigation system. Therefore, for Tashkent the Qosh Tepa issue is related not only to transboundary water use. It directly affectsfood security, the resilience of rural areas, the environmental situation in the Aral Sea region, and the need for accelerated modernization of the water sector. In November 2024, measures for the rational use of water and the reduction of losses in agriculture were considered separately at the level of the country’s leadership. Among the priorities identified were the concrete lining of canals, digital metering, the introduction of water-saving technologies, and the creation of a unified information system for monitoring water consumption. This shows that Uzbekistan treats the problem not only as an external challenge associated with Afghanistan but also as an incentive for the internal modernization of the water sector. Reducing losses, improving the accuracy of metering, and adapting the agricultural sector to less predictable transboundary flow are becoming important elements of national resilience. At the Seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025, the President of Uzbekistan proposed declaring 2026–2036 the “Decade of Practical Actions for the Rational Use of Water in Central Asia” and stressed the need for Afghanistan’s active involvement in the regional dialogue on the joint use of the water resources of the Amu Darya basin. Under these conditions, reducing uncertainty about the actual operating regime of the canal becomes key for Uzbekistan. Without data on water withdrawal, losses, seasonal dynamics, and the condition of the channel, any assessments will be incomplete. The priority is therefore a transition from general forecasts to continuous monitoring and verifiable information. The Regional Dimension: Afghanistan’s New Role in the Amu Darya Basin The construction of the canal changes not only the balance of interests between Afghanistan and the downstream countries but also the conditions of regional water governance. Afghanistan is gradually becoming an active participant in Amu Darya-related issues, whereas the earlier coordination mechanisms were formed without its full participation. The impact of the Qosh Tepa Canal on the Central Asian states is uneven and depends on their position in the Amu Darya basin, the structure of their water use, and their foreign economic interests. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remain the most sensitive countries, since both states are located in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya and depend on irrigated farming. For Turkmenistan, the issue is complicated by the fact that water-management risks are combined with an interest in preserving economic ties with Afghanistan, primarily in energy, transport, and transit infrastructure. Ashgabat’s position will therefore likely be built on a cautious balance between protecting its water interests and maintaining working contacts with Kabul. For Kazakhstan, the significance of the Qosh Tepa Canal is predominantly indirect. Astana does not depend directly on water withdrawal from the Amu Darya; however, possible changes in the water balance are important for the Aral Sea region, the environmental sustainability of the region, and the overall effectiveness of water coordination in Central Asia. For Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the canal’s impact is less direct. These countries are not located in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya; however, the emergence of Afghanistan as a more active water user heightens the importance of regional consultations on transboundary water resources. Their interest is related primarily to how the overall system of water-energy interaction in the region will change. The Afghan Dimension in Uzbekistan’s Water and Transport Policy The Qosh Tepa Canal should be considered in the broader context of Afghanistan’s transformation after 2021. Kabul seeks to integrate into regional transport, energy, and trade projects. For Uzbekistan, Afghanistan remains at once a source of water-management risks and a potential corridor to South Asia. Uzbekistan’s approach to Afghanistan therefore cannot be limited to water issues alone. Alongside the risks associated with the Amu Darya, transit, trade, security, and southern transport connectivity remain important for Uzbekistan. This requires Tashkent to address two tasks simultaneously: protecting its water interests and maintaining working channels of engagement with Kabul. For Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, and the Persian Gulf states, Afghanistan remains an important area in terms of transit, energy, security, natural resources, and access to regional markets. Their interest in Afghanistan may facilitate the development of infrastructure and economic projects in which Uzbekistan is also interested. At the same time, this configuration carries a certain limitation: against the background of large transport and energy initiatives, water issues may recede into the background. It is therefore important for Tashkent to keep the Amu Darya issue on the general agenda of its engagement with Afghanistan. Risks and Opportunities for Uzbekistan First, the main risk is associated with a possible reduction in the available flow of the Amu Darya. This is particularly sensitive for Uzbekistan, since water scarcity is already becoming one of the region’s systemic problems. The lower-lying territories, agriculture, and the Aral Sea region are the most vulnerable. A possible reduction in water could affect not only production but also the social resilience of rural areas. In the most vulnerable districts, this could increase pressure on employment, household incomes, and state support measures. Second, the problem of a lack of transparent data persists. Without regular exchange of information on water withdrawal, losses, and the canal’s operating regime, every low-water season may deepen mistrust between the parties. At the same time, the actual impact of the canal may differ from preliminary expert forecasts. Third, there is an engineering risk. If the canal is operated with high water losses, seepage, or instability of the earthen channel, this will create problems not only for the downstream countries but also for Afghanistan itself, since the effectiveness of the project directly depends on the quality of its construction and operation. Alongside the risks, opportunities for practical cooperation also remain. Uzbekistan can strengthen its role in regional water coordination if it promotes a working format of cooperation with Afghanistan: regular monitoring, technical consultations, the exchange of hydrological data, the training of specialists, and discussion of water losses. Such an approach would allow Tashkent to combine the protection of national interests with a pragmatic dialogue with Kabul. Scenarios for the Development of the Situation In the controlled scenario, construction of the canal continues with data exchange and technical consultations in place. In this case, the risks to the downstream countries persist but become more manageable. Monitoring, diplomatic dialogue, and the acceleration of water-saving measures remain priorities for Uzbekistan. The baseline scenario assumes that the canal gradually reaches higher operating parameters while a data-exchange mechanism takes shape slowly. In that case, periodic tension may arise in low-water years. For Uzbekistan, this means the need to accelerate internal reforms, expand digital metering, and strengthen regional coordination. A critical scenario is possible if maximum water withdrawal, a dry period, and the absence of transparent dialogue coincide. In this case, the water-management problem may move into a more sensitive political and diplomatic plane. An anti-crisis interagency mechanism and urgent consultations with Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries become necessary measures. Practical Recommendations Establish a permanent technical communication channel with Afghanistan on Amu Darya issues: water withdrawal, seasonal regime, water losses, the condition of the channel, and advance notification. Accelerate the modernization of irrigation infrastructure within Uzbekistan, primarily by reducing water losses, introducing digital metering, and ensuring more precise control of water consumption. Expand the adoption of water-saving technologies in agriculture and take into account possible changes in the water balance when planning the crop structure. Create an interagency monitoring system for the Qosh Tepa Canal that will regularly assess the hydrological, environmental, and socio-economic consequences of its operation. Promote a regional dialogue on the Amu Darya involving the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan, with an emphasis on data, technical consultations, and practical coordination. Conclusion The Qosh Tepa Canal is becoming one of the key factors changing the water situation in the Amu Darya basin. For Afghanistan, it is a project of domestic development, employment, and food security. For Uzbekistan, it is a source of new water-management, environmental, and socio-economic risks, particularly given the agricultural sector’s dependence on irrigation and the sensitivity of the Aral Sea region. The main conclusion is that the Qosh Tepa problem cannot be resolved solely through political statements or by relying on external pressure on Kabul. A more sustainable approach is a combination of internal water modernization, continuous monitoring, data exchange, and practical engagement with Afghanistan. The sooner the issue is moved onto a technical and institutional plane, the greater the chances of reducing uncertainty and preventing the water problem from becoming a source of long-term regional tension. For Tashkent, the Qosh Tepa Canal is not only a challenge but also an opportunity to strengthen its own water policy, accelerate irrigation reforms, and advance a new model of regional dialogue on the Amu Darya. Such an approach will allow Uzbekistan to defend its national interests while maintaining pragmatic engagement with Afghanistan. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her article published in the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at IAIS, examines how closer transport cooperation between Afghanistan and Iran could reshape regional connectivity. The analysis focuses on the proposed Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway and its potential to link Central Asia and China with Iran, Türkiye and European markets. The article explores how maritime shipping risks, Afghanistan’s strained relations with Pakistan and China’s efforts to diversify overland routes are driving interest in alternative railway corridors. Umarova highlights the opportunities these developments could create for Uzbekistan, including broader access to southern markets and connections between emerging transport networks, while noting unresolved infrastructure and implementation challenges. Read on CACI Analyst * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In their brief, Odilbek Manabov and Sabina Gulyamova, Research Assistant at the Center for Sustainable Development, examine the expanding role of Chinese companies in Kyrgyzstan’s water infrastructure, focusing on irrigation, hydropower, wastewater treatment and related engineering projects. The authors distinguish between Chinese state-backed financing and contracts awarded to Chinese firms through multilateral institutions, arguing that this distinction is essential for accurately assessing Beijing’s involvement. The brief also analyses the strategic dimension of Kyrgyzstan–China water relations, particularly the significance of transboundary rivers feeding China’s Tarim Basin, the absence of a dedicated bilateral water-sharing framework, and the risks associated with technological dependence and limited domestic maintenance capacity. It concludes that Chinese participation can help Kyrgyzstan address major infrastructure gaps, but stresses the importance of strengthening local expertise, ensuring financial sustainability, improving hydrological data exchange and preserving effective regional coordination on water and energy issues. Read on The Times of Central Asia * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Co-authored with  Sibghatullah Arsalai , a political economy specialist, researcher and analyst, policy advisor, and business strategist with over a decade of experience in geopolitical and geoeconomic affairs, regional diplomacy, national security, and private-sector development. He previously held senior positions at the Office of the National Security Council of Afghanistan, where he contributed to peace negotiations, regional cooperation, national strategic planning, and political and economic risk assessment. He currently serves as a Freelance Researcher and Senior Advisor to Sahil Marble Mining and Processing, focusing on regional connectivity, international market expansion, and strategic business development. Arsalai holds an M.S. in International Political Economy from the University of Texas at Dallas through Fulbright Scholarship and a B.B.A. from the American University of Afghanistan. His research interests include geopolitics, geoeconomics, political economy, regional connectivity, and strategic affairs in Afghanistan, Central Asia and South Asia.   Abstract: The paper is inspired by participation in a workshop named “Generating an Economic Vision for Afghanistan” in Tashkent in December 2025. The workshop was co-hosted by the Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy, and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. The participants came from Central Asian countries, Afghanistan and the United States. The participants from Uzbekistan showed vision, preparedness and willingness to tackle challenges regarding Afghanistan in a pragmatic manner. From Central Asian perspective, it is concluded that Afghanistan is no more seen as a security threat but an economic opportunity, and if properly integrated to the Central Asian region, can prosper itself and benefit the region. This paper is an effort to advance this shared vision. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Co-authored with  Bositkhon Islamov , UWED undergraduate, intern at IAIS   Kazakhstan’s policy towards Afghanistan is entering a phase of accelerated economic and institutional engagement. Without formally recognizing the government established by the Taliban movement, Astana is consistently expanding diplomatic contacts, trade mechanisms, transport projects, and sectoral cooperation. The visit to Kabul on 19–21 June 2026 by a Kazakh delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin represented the most concentrated manifestation of this course. The signing of 25commercial agreements supplemented approximately 20 arrangements worth USD 140 million reached in April2025. Kazakhstan is thus moving from isolated contacts towards a multi-level model of presence encompassing trade, transport, raw-material extraction, education, technology, and security. The political foundation of Kazakhstan’s course lies in normalizing relations without formal recognition. Astana seeks to separate the question of the Taliban government’s status under international law from the practical necessity of engaging with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. In December 2023, the Taliban movement was removed from Kazakhstan’s national list of terrorist organizations, eliminating the principal domestic legal restrictions on official contacts. As early as April of the same year, representatives of the new Afghan authorities assumed control of the Afghan embassy building in Astana. These decisions established the political basis for a transition from cautious dialogue to regular interagency and economic engagement. This model allows Kazakhstan to remain aligned with the broader position of the international community while avoiding being outpaced by other regional states in access to the Afghan market. As a result, non-recognition ceases to be an obstacle to practical cooperation and becomes a form of political distance that enables Astana to minimize reputational and sanctions-related risks. The trade strategy is primarily aimed at consolidating Afghanistan as a market for Kazakh products. In 2025, bilateral trade amounted to USD 541.8 million, of which USD 519 million was attributable to Kazakh exports and only USD 22.8 million to imports from Afghanistan. This imbalance persisted in the first quarter of 2026: of USD 242.6 million in mutual trade, USD 240.1 million was generated by Kazakhstan’s exports. Supplies consist mainly of wheat, flour, vegetable oil, medicines, and other mass-consumption goods. The opening of a Kazakhstan trade house in Herat demonstrates an intention to move from episodic transactions to a permanent infrastructure for promoting products. However, the jointly declared target of increasing trade turnover to USD 3 billion appears excessively ambitious without an expansion of Afghan exports, the development of payment mechanisms, and lower transport costs. The current model makes Afghanistan dependent on Kazakh supplies, while the Afghan market’s limited purchasing power simultaneously constrains the sustainability of trade. The transport dimension forms part of a broader strategy to diversify Kazakhstan’s external routes.Constraints along northern corridors, geopolitical tensions surrounding Russia, and the risk of secondary sanctions are increasing Astana’s interest in obtaining access to South Asian ports. In this context, Afghan territory is viewed as a potential link connecting Kazakhstan with Pakistan, India, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean. The most advanced initiative is the Torghundi–Herat railway project, with a prospective extension through Kandahar to Spin Boldak and the Pakistani border. In parallel, Kazakhstan is participating in the development of the Khaf–Herat section and discussing general principles for establishing a railway connection between Central and South Asia. The strategic value of these routes lies not only in expanding exports, but also in reducing dependence on a limited number of transit corridors. At the same time, these projects require substantial investment, international financing, and long-term security guarantees. In the short term, they therefore remain instruments of strategic positioning rather than full-fledged alternatives to existing routes. Uzbekistan’s geographical advantage limits the autonomy of Kazakhstan’s Afghanistan policy. Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan shares a border with Afghanistan and possesses the Termez–Hairatan bridge, functioning railway infrastructure, and stable channels for electricity supplies. In 2025, Uzbek–Afghan trade reached USD 1.68 billion, substantially exceeding Kazakhstan’s figures. For Astana, this creates a dual situation. On the one hand, Uzbekistan’s growing role intensifies competition for the Afghan market and influence over future transport corridors. On the other hand, Kazakhstan cannot secure direct access to Afghanistan without using Uzbek or Turkmen infrastructure. Consequently, its strategy will inevitably combine competitive ambitions with transit cooperation. Kazakhstan may claim the role of a major supplier and investor, but not full control over the logistical architecture of the Central Asia–South Asia corridor. Mining cooperation is shaping a potential model of “Afghan raw materials–Kazakh processing.” Afghanistan possesses substantial reserves of copper, zinc, chromium, lithium, rare-earth metals, and natural stone; however, weak infrastructure and prolonged instability have constrained their industrial development. Kazakhstan, with its mining companies, engineering expertise, and processing capacity, seeks to occupy the niche between initial exploration and advanced processing. A visit by specialists from Tau-Ken Samruk to the Pami-Kakrak deposit in Bamyan Province, followed by sample analysis by Kazzinc enterprises, demonstrated the possibility of processing Afghan ore in Kazakhstan. The potential participation of ERG, Kazakhmys Barlau, and other companies in geological exploration and deposit development is also under discussion. Such an arrangement reduces the need to construct costly processing facilities in Afghanistan while providing Kazakh industry with an additional raw-material base. Its implementation, however, will depend on security guarantees, transparent licensing, and investment protection. Educational and technological projects are being used as instruments of long-term presence.Kazakhstan provides scholarships to Afghan students in medicine, agriculture, and engineering. The establishment of a joint centre for water-resource management, irrigation, and sustainable farming expands cooperation in an area of critical importance to Afghanistan’s food security. An additional area is the promotion of Kazakh technological solutions, including the HES-7 mobile diagnostic platform. Such initiatives enable Astana to build durable professional ties with Afghan institutions and consolidate its position in sectors where the geographical advantage of neighbouring countries is less significant. The location in Kazakhstan of the UN Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan also strengthens its claim to a regional coordinating role. Security cooperation remains a necessary precondition for economic rapprochement. Contacts with the leadership of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior focus on countering drug trafficking, extremism, and transnational crime. The training of Afghan canine specialists in Kazakhstan and the establishment of direct links between the relevant agencies reflect a shift towards limited practical cooperation. At the same time, Astana avoids formats that could be interpreted as a full-fledged security partnership or as political legitimation of the Taliban government. Conclusion. Kazakhstan is moving from cautious political engagement with Afghanistan towards institutionally structured economic expansion without formally recognizing the Taliban government. Astana simultaneously seeks access to the Afghan market and resources, the development of southern transport corridors, and the consolidation of long-term influence through education and technology. The implementation of this strategy, however, is constrained by geographical dependence on neighboring states, the Afghan market’s limited purchasing power, sanctions-related risks, and Uzbekistan’s advantages. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.