The modern architecture of European security, which for decades has been based on American guarantees and the concept of the “end of history”, is today undergoing significant transformation. Recent years’ events have demonstrated that the era of minimal defense spending under the protection of transatlantic partnership is passing through a period of substantial change. The transformation of the global order, characterized by shifts in the balance of power among great powers, poses important strategic questions for the European Union. The situation is complicated by the fact that the United States, in its 2025 National Security Strategy, called to “resist Europe’s current course”, while the introduction of trade tariffs on partners has shown the need to revise existing agreements. Even while maintaining formal commitments under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, US strategic priorities are shifting toward managing competition with China. To ensure its security and protect citizens’ interests, Europe should transition to a more active role in defense matters, developing its own integrated military potential. The historically established European dependence on the US in defense matters has created a dangerous illusion of security, which has led to the degradation of national armed forces and deep fragmentation of the military-industrial complex. The role of the United States in the European security system has traditionally been highly significant, including not only the provision of security guarantees but also the provision of critically important capabilities without which European armed forces have limited capacity to conduct prolonged high-intensity operations. This refers to strategic intelligence, satellite communications, aerial refueling, and heavy transport aviation. The conflict in Ukraine revealed that European militaries, structured for expeditionary missions and crisis response, must strengthen their capacity for high-intensity warfare, where scale of production, logistics, and resilient procurement matter as much as technology. Even if the conflict stabilizes, Europe still needs a robust security system: Russia continues to expand its military potential, which requires constant readiness along NATO‘s eastern flank. As long as European security relies on American guarantees, projects aimed at European defense autonomy face limits. Against this backdrop, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced talks with French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer on extending French and British nuclear deterrence guarantees to the European level. This move shifts what was once a theoretical debate about the “Europeanization” of nuclear forces into practical policy. Analysis of the current state of EU countries’ capabilities in conventional weapons reveals a fundamental paradox: with total military spending exceeding 290 billion euros, Europe’s actual combat readiness remains low. Despite NATO countries agreeing to increase spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, the financial component alone cannot solve the structural problem. The significant US defense budget, approaching 1 trillion dollars, allows Washington to invest in research and development (R&D) amounts comparable to the combined military budgets of the largest European countries. This creates a situation of technological gap, where the acquisition of American weapons often becomes a preferable solution for Europe in terms of cost-effectiveness. The main opportunity for improving the efficiency of European approaches is connected with strengthening coordination and eliminating duplication of functions at the national level. The main constraint remains the institutional architecture of the EU: defense decisions still require consensus, and differences in strategic cultures (from Polish mobilization logic to Southern European priorities in the Mediterranean) create certain complexities for unified planning. Each state seeks to preserve its own industrial base, which leads to small production runs and weak economies of scale. National defense ministries often resist deeper integration to protect existing structures and domestic contracts. Experts estimate that the lack of integration costs Europe €25–30 billion annually, while joint procurement could reduce rearmament costs by half. For comparison: if the US operates one main type of battle tank, the M1 Abrams, European countries’ armies have seventeen different types. A similar situation is observed regarding infantry fighting vehicles, artillery systems, and aviation. Such diversity of armaments creates logistical challenges, complicating joint operations without additional coordination and support, which requires attention given the US shift in focus toward the Indo-Pacific region. The fifth-generation F-35 fighter program is an illustrative example. Large-scale purchases of this aircraft by Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands mean technological dependence on American partners. By acquiring the F-35, European countries gain access to an advanced digital ecosystem, which provides a high level of technological capabilities while maintaining a certain interdependence. Meanwhile, approximately 78% of all defense procurement by European countries over the past two years has been directed to external suppliers, predominantly American companies through the Foreign Military Sales mechanism. This reflects the competitiveness of the American defense industry, but also points to the need to develop the European technological base to ensure greater balance. The conflict in Ukraine has shown the importance of diversifying supply sources: European production faced difficulties in making up the deficit of 155mm caliber shells, while high-tech systems such as HIMARS, Patriot missiles, and real-time intelligence came predominantly from American partners. This underscores the importance of developing indigenous production capabilities to enhance the resilience of the European security system. Fragmented procurement reduces economic efficiency and burdens national budgets. Today, defense also functions as industrial policy: production of munitions, drones, cyber defense systems, and space-based intelligence can sustain Europe’s broader technological competitiveness. The current geopolitical environment forces Europe to rethink the foundations of transatlantic relations, as the concept of burden-sharing gains practical meaning. Budget constraints in the United States may reshape American military presence across regions. The European Union faces a choice: deepen defense integration and strengthen its role as an autonomous security actor, or maintain the current model of dependence on external support. By building more integrated defense structures, the EU can create effective coordination mechanisms. A first step could involve forming Rapid Deployment Forces numbering 50,000–100,000 personnel, with major contributions from countries such as Spain and Italy. These forces would operate under unified command and coordinate with Eastern European militaries. Financial integration would support this process, including potential European defense bonds to fund long-term innovation. For genuine autonomy, Europe should integrate procurement and intelligence cooperation by establishing a unified EU intelligence coordination service and a European Security Council that includes the United Kingdom. A symbolic step could involve appointing a European general as Supreme Commander of joint forces in Europe, reflecting Europe’s growing responsibility for its own defense. Such measures find public support: according to polls, only 19% of Europeans fully trust their national armies, while 60% positively evaluate the idea of pan-European defense structures. Political will for such changes is gradually forming: leading politicians are actively discussing the possibility of transferring part of procurement coordination powers to the supranational level. The path to strategic autonomy will require European leaders to balance national interests and collective security goals. A more independent Europe can become a more effective and predictable partner for the US, capable of independently solving stabilization tasks in neighboring regions, thereby allowing American partners to concentrate resources on global priorities. The development of European military potential is viewed not as a weakening of transatlantic partnership but as a way to strengthen it through more balanced distribution of responsibility. On the path to this goal, there are differences in approaches between countries due to historical features and different strategic cultures, however, joint projects for developing a new generation fighter and tank platforms create the foundation for a new model of cooperation. Thus, a more integrated and effective European defense system will allow the continent to play a more active role in determining the contours of the future world order and will strengthen transatlantic partnership on a more equal basis. Strategic autonomy is viewed not as an alternative to existing alliances but as an important condition for ensuring European security in a changing international environment. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her analytical article, Nargiza Umarova examines the drivers behind the growing engagement of Central Asian states in Afghanistan and its implications for the emerging architecture of regional connectivity. The author notes that the state visits of the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Pakistan in early 2026 reflect a shift toward a more pragmatic model of cooperation based on transport corridors, industrial collaboration and energy interdependence. The article focuses on the rapid advancement of trans-Afghan railway projects and the development of new North–South transport routes. Particular attention is given to the Western Trans-Afghan Railway and the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan project, which are viewed as key components of Central Asia’s strategy to gain alternative access to the Indian Ocean through Pakistani ports. According to the author, the increasing interest in these initiatives stems not only from the region’s geographical isolation but also from broader shifts in global logistics amid rising geopolitical uncertainty. Ms. Umarova also explores the intersection between transport initiatives and energy infrastructure, including the development of the TAPI gas pipeline and the role of external actors. She argues that the expansion of regional transit ambitions requires stronger coordination among Central Asian states, as competing initiatives may reduce the overall political and economic impact. In conclusion, the author highlights the need to institutionalize dialogue among the countries of the region and to develop a coordinated approach toward engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Only through the synchronization of infrastructure strategies, she suggests, can Central Asia strengthen its role in the evolving Eurasian transport system. Read the article on CACI Analyst’s website * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her analytical piece, Nargiza Umarova examines how Iran has emerged as a central actor in the ongoing reconfiguration of Eurasian transport routes. Against the backdrop of geopolitical instability, sanctions pressure on Tehran, and disruptions along the Northern Corridor, the article shows how Iran is intensifying transport diplomacy with Central Asian states to position itself as a key land bridge linking East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Southern Corridor is presented not as an abstract alternative, but as a practical response to shifting trade geographies and mounting risks in traditional routes. A central argument of the article is that the Southern Corridor aligns the strategic interests of several actors at once. For China, constrained by maritime insecurity and the war in Ukraine, trans-Iranian routes offer a technically efficient, container-friendly overland option for high-value exports to the EU. For Iran, large-scale investments in rail infrastructure—including new transit corridors and cross-border links—are designed to consolidate its role as the shortest East–West land route. For Central Asia, participation in these projects enhances transit competitiveness, diversifies export pathways, and reduces over-dependence on any single corridor or partner. In her conclusions, the author stresses that the strategic value of the Southern Corridor goes beyond logistics. Access to Iran’s ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean opens new north–south dimensions for Central Asian trade, reinforcing the region’s global connectivity. At the same time, she argues that sustained progress will require harmonized transport policies, unified documentation standards, and a collective approach to managing geopolitical risks related to Iran, making transport diplomacy a key instrument of Central Asia’s long-term strategic autonomy. Read on CACI Analyst * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his article, Timur Dadabaev analyzes the evolution of Japan’s policy toward Central Asia, noting that in 2025 Tokyo placed particular emphasis on cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence within the Central Asia + Japan format. Unlike infrastructure- and technology-driven models, Japan promotes AI primarily as a tool for institutional development, governance, and human capital formation. The author emphasizes that Japan’s approach differs markedly from the strategies of other Asian actors. While China and the Republic of Korea focus on digital infrastructure and corporate-led technological projects, Japan prioritizes the integration of AI into existing administrative processes—particularly in public administration, customs, and logistics. In this context, artificial intelligence is not treated as an autonomous technology, but rather as a means of enhancing the efficiency of state institutions. According to Prof. Dadabaev, this model helps reduce the political and administrative risks associated with AI adoption. At the same time, it may contribute to the entrenchment of external governance standards. Since algorithms and analytical frameworks are often developed outside the region, Central Asian states risk reproducing external conceptions of efficiency, risk, and good governance without sufficient local adaptation. Special attention is given to the application of AI in transport and logistics connectivity, including along the Trans-Caspian route. While the digitalization of procedures can reduce costs and improve the predictability of trade, the author stresses the importance of developing domestic analytical capacities in order to avoid dependence on external data and regulatory standards. In conclusion, Prof. Dadabaev argues that participation in AI diplomacy requires Central Asian states not only to adapt technologically, but also to build institutional readiness to shape and govern their own AI systems. Without this, the benefits of cooperation may remain asymmetric and could ultimately constrain the region’s strategic autonomy. Read on East Asia Forum * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

by Uskanboev Giyosbek & Khidirov Mardonbek This policy brief examines the “Zangezur Paradox” by asking whether a new transit route linking mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through Armenia’s Syunik region can function as a genuine peace-support instrument in the South Caucasus. It frames the corridor as more than a logistics upgrade within the broader Middle Corridor connecting China, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe: it is treated as a political test-case for post-conflict stabilisation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The central argument is deliberately conditional: the corridor can contribute to sustainable peace only if it is embedded in political normalisation, mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity, credible security guarantees, and enforceable legal arrangements that reduce uncertainty and prevent coercive reinterpretations. The analysis is anchored in neorealism and the security dilemma, emphasising how infrastructure projects in contested spaces are rarely neutral: the very measures one side considers “connectivity” can be perceived by the other as strategic encroachment. From this angle, the corridor’s peace-building promise lies in transforming rivalry into interdependence raising the economic costs of renewed confrontation and creating shared incentives for stability. Yet the brief stresses that interdependence does not emerge automatically; without transparent governance and robust confidence-building mechanisms, the corridor risks becoming a pressure point that deepens mistrust rather than a platform for cooperation. A major contribution of the brief is its actor-centred mapping of interests and anxieties. Azerbaijan is presented as prioritising uninterrupted, secure passage and national reintegration of Nakhchivan; Armenia is depicted as insisting on full jurisdiction rejecting any “extraterritorial” logic and reframing the concept through its “Crossroads of Peace” approach. Georgia is assessed as supportive of peace in principle but wary of losing transit primacy, while Iran is portrayed as viewing the corridor through a hard security lens, including fears of strategic isolation and a shift in regional power geometry. The United States is cast as a catalytic external sponsor seeking to institutionalise the route through international guarantees and investment, while Russia and Turkey are portrayed as balancing, respectively, concerns over influence and security architecture against pragmatic economic and strategic benefits. The brief concludes that the Zangezur Corridor is neither a guaranteed peace dividend nor an inevitable trigger of escalation; it is a strategic instrument whose effects depend on design and sequencing. If managed through inclusive, rules-based governance clarifying customs and border modalities, establishing credible monitoring and dispute-resolution mechanisms, and keeping external competition from dominating the agenda, the corridor could consolidate a “peace through connectivity” logic. If, however, it is securitised, used as leverage, or perceived as undermining sovereignty, it may intensify geopolitical contestation and revive conflict dynamics. In short, the corridor’s value as a peace-support measure rests on whether it is operationalised as a shared economic public good rather than a zero-sum geopolitical trophy. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

UWED PhD Candidate Nigina Saidova’s policy brief frames nationwide AI literacy not only as a domestic development priority, but as a new instrument of Uzbekistan’s soft power in the digital age. Drawing on Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power and the expanding logic of cyber power and digital diplomacy, the brief argues that a population equipped with AI skills becomes part of a country’s international attractiveness, signalling openness, innovation, and a future-oriented national identity. In this reading, human capital in AI is no longer simply an education agenda; it becomes a reputational asset that strengthens “digital nation branding” and enhances foreign-policy communication. At the centre of the analysis is Uzbekistan’s Five Million AI Leaders initiative, presented as an extension of the Digital Uzbekistan–2030 strategy and the AI development framework through 2030. The brief highlights how the initiative is underpinned by policy architecture and measurable targets, expanding AI products and services, improving governmental readiness for AI deployment, establishing research laboratories, and building a critical mass of specialists. It situates this agenda within broader progress in IT education and youth skills development, portraying Uzbekistan as deliberately building the foundations of a competitive AI ecosystem and positioning itself to function as a regional digital hub in Central Asia. The brief then explains how the initiative is designed to transmit clear external signals: investment in youth, openness to global tech partnerships, and regional leadership in convening AI dialogue. Cooperation with major technology actors, international internships, and platforms such as the Silk Road AI Forum are presented as channels of “digital diplomacy” that integrate Uzbekistan into global innovation networks while projecting a cooperative, modernising image, distinct from more closed models of digital sovereignty. Concluding, the author recommends institutionalising this soft-power potential through diplomatic promotion at major multilateral venues, consistent English-language reporting and success stories, alignment with SDGs (especially education and decent work), and stronger emphasis on AI ethics, data protection, and rights-based governance to reinforce Uzbekistan’s credibility in international AI discussions. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.