Co-authored with  Bositkhon Islamov , UWED undergraduate, intern at IAIS   Kazakhstan’s policy towards Afghanistan is entering a phase of accelerated economic and institutional engagement. Without formally recognizing the government established by the Taliban movement, Astana is consistently expanding diplomatic contacts, trade mechanisms, transport projects, and sectoral cooperation. The visit to Kabul on 19–21 June 2026 by a Kazakh delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin represented the most concentrated manifestation of this course. The signing of 25commercial agreements supplemented approximately 20 arrangements worth USD 140 million reached in April2025. Kazakhstan is thus moving from isolated contacts towards a multi-level model of presence encompassing trade, transport, raw-material extraction, education, technology, and security. The political foundation of Kazakhstan’s course lies in normalizing relations without formal recognition. Astana seeks to separate the question of the Taliban government’s status under international law from the practical necessity of engaging with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. In December 2023, the Taliban movement was removed from Kazakhstan’s national list of terrorist organizations, eliminating the principal domestic legal restrictions on official contacts. As early as April of the same year, representatives of the new Afghan authorities assumed control of the Afghan embassy building in Astana. These decisions established the political basis for a transition from cautious dialogue to regular interagency and economic engagement. This model allows Kazakhstan to remain aligned with the broader position of the international community while avoiding being outpaced by other regional states in access to the Afghan market. As a result, non-recognition ceases to be an obstacle to practical cooperation and becomes a form of political distance that enables Astana to minimize reputational and sanctions-related risks. The trade strategy is primarily aimed at consolidating Afghanistan as a market for Kazakh products. In 2025, bilateral trade amounted to USD 541.8 million, of which USD 519 million was attributable to Kazakh exports and only USD 22.8 million to imports from Afghanistan. This imbalance persisted in the first quarter of 2026: of USD 242.6 million in mutual trade, USD 240.1 million was generated by Kazakhstan’s exports. Supplies consist mainly of wheat, flour, vegetable oil, medicines, and other mass-consumption goods. The opening of a Kazakhstan trade house in Herat demonstrates an intention to move from episodic transactions to a permanent infrastructure for promoting products. However, the jointly declared target of increasing trade turnover to USD 3 billion appears excessively ambitious without an expansion of Afghan exports, the development of payment mechanisms, and lower transport costs. The current model makes Afghanistan dependent on Kazakh supplies, while the Afghan market’s limited purchasing power simultaneously constrains the sustainability of trade. The transport dimension forms part of a broader strategy to diversify Kazakhstan’s external routes.Constraints along northern corridors, geopolitical tensions surrounding Russia, and the risk of secondary sanctions are increasing Astana’s interest in obtaining access to South Asian ports. In this context, Afghan territory is viewed as a potential link connecting Kazakhstan with Pakistan, India, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean. The most advanced initiative is the Torghundi–Herat railway project, with a prospective extension through Kandahar to Spin Boldak and the Pakistani border. In parallel, Kazakhstan is participating in the development of the Khaf–Herat section and discussing general principles for establishing a railway connection between Central and South Asia. The strategic value of these routes lies not only in expanding exports, but also in reducing dependence on a limited number of transit corridors. At the same time, these projects require substantial investment, international financing, and long-term security guarantees. In the short term, they therefore remain instruments of strategic positioning rather than full-fledged alternatives to existing routes. Uzbekistan’s geographical advantage limits the autonomy of Kazakhstan’s Afghanistan policy. Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan shares a border with Afghanistan and possesses the Termez–Hairatan bridge, functioning railway infrastructure, and stable channels for electricity supplies. In 2025, Uzbek–Afghan trade reached USD 1.68 billion, substantially exceeding Kazakhstan’s figures. For Astana, this creates a dual situation. On the one hand, Uzbekistan’s growing role intensifies competition for the Afghan market and influence over future transport corridors. On the other hand, Kazakhstan cannot secure direct access to Afghanistan without using Uzbek or Turkmen infrastructure. Consequently, its strategy will inevitably combine competitive ambitions with transit cooperation. Kazakhstan may claim the role of a major supplier and investor, but not full control over the logistical architecture of the Central Asia–South Asia corridor. Mining cooperation is shaping a potential model of “Afghan raw materials–Kazakh processing.” Afghanistan possesses substantial reserves of copper, zinc, chromium, lithium, rare-earth metals, and natural stone; however, weak infrastructure and prolonged instability have constrained their industrial development. Kazakhstan, with its mining companies, engineering expertise, and processing capacity, seeks to occupy the niche between initial exploration and advanced processing. A visit by specialists from Tau-Ken Samruk to the Pami-Kakrak deposit in Bamyan Province, followed by sample analysis by Kazzinc enterprises, demonstrated the possibility of processing Afghan ore in Kazakhstan. The potential participation of ERG, Kazakhmys Barlau, and other companies in geological exploration and deposit development is also under discussion. Such an arrangement reduces the need to construct costly processing facilities in Afghanistan while providing Kazakh industry with an additional raw-material base. Its implementation, however, will depend on security guarantees, transparent licensing, and investment protection. Educational and technological projects are being used as instruments of long-term presence.Kazakhstan provides scholarships to Afghan students in medicine, agriculture, and engineering. The establishment of a joint centre for water-resource management, irrigation, and sustainable farming expands cooperation in an area of critical importance to Afghanistan’s food security. An additional area is the promotion of Kazakh technological solutions, including the HES-7 mobile diagnostic platform. Such initiatives enable Astana to build durable professional ties with Afghan institutions and consolidate its position in sectors where the geographical advantage of neighbouring countries is less significant. The location in Kazakhstan of the UN Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan also strengthens its claim to a regional coordinating role. Security cooperation remains a necessary precondition for economic rapprochement. Contacts with the leadership of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior focus on countering drug trafficking, extremism, and transnational crime. The training of Afghan canine specialists in Kazakhstan and the establishment of direct links between the relevant agencies reflect a shift towards limited practical cooperation. At the same time, Astana avoids formats that could be interpreted as a full-fledged security partnership or as political legitimation of the Taliban government. Conclusion. Kazakhstan is moving from cautious political engagement with Afghanistan towards institutionally structured economic expansion without formally recognizing the Taliban government. Astana simultaneously seeks access to the Afghan market and resources, the development of southern transport corridors, and the consolidation of long-term influence through education and technology. The implementation of this strategy, however, is constrained by geographical dependence on neighboring states, the Afghan market’s limited purchasing power, sanctions-related risks, and Uzbekistan’s advantages. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Published by CACI Analyst, the brief by Nargiza Umarova examines Central Asia’s growing importance within emerging Eurasian transport and logistics networks. Against the backdrop of geopolitical disruptions, insecurity in maritime shipping and the restructuring of global supply chains, the author argues that the region has a significant opportunity to transform its landlocked geography from a structural constraint into a strategic advantage. The brief highlights the rapid development of major east–west and north–south transport initiatives involving Central Asian states, including the CASCA+ corridor, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and emerging railway connections through Afghanistan. At the same time, it identifies a fundamental weakness in the current regional approach: despite broadly shared interests, Central Asian countries continue to pursue a number of transport projects largely through national strategies and separate partnerships with external actors. According to the author, insufficient coordination risks producing duplicated infrastructure, competing transit routes and unhealthy rivalry for investment and cargo flows. Particular attention is given to the practical barriers that continue to restrict intra-regional connectivity, including differences in tariff policies and transport legislation, cumbersome customs procedures, insufficient border-crossing capacity, limited digitalisation and the absence of unified documentation and regulatory standards. The brief argues that addressing these constraints collectively would not only reduce transport costs but also strengthen Central Asia’s position in negotiations with major external partners such as China, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and the Gulf states. The author concludes that Central Asian states require a unified regional strategy for the development and promotion of international transport corridors, supported by a permanent coordinating institution with appropriate legal status. Such an approach could help prevent unnecessary duplication, align national infrastructure priorities and enable Central Asia to participate in the evolving geopolitics of Eurasian connectivity as a more coherent regional actor rather than as a collection of competing transit states. Read on CACI Analyst * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The policy brief by Muhammad Khujanazarov, published by the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), examines the broader institutional and geopolitical significance of Uzbekistan’s first international equity listing. Focusing on the May 2026 London Stock Exchange debut of the National Investment Fund of Uzbekistan (UzNIF), the author argues that the transaction should be understood not simply as a successful capital-raising exercise, but as an important step towards embedding Uzbekistan’s economic reforms within the rules, disclosure requirements and accountability mechanisms of global capital markets. The brief highlights how the listing of minority stakes in major state-owned enterprises could strengthen corporate transparency, create new incentives for sustained reform and make future policy reversals more costly. It also assesses the wider international implications of Uzbekistan’s growing integration into global financial markets, including deeper engagement with European investors and institutions, diversification within Tashkent’s multi-vector foreign policy, and the gradual alignment of domestic economic governance with international market standards. At the same time, the author cautions that an international listing alone cannot resolve the structural challenges facing Uzbekistan’s economy. The continued large role of the state, governance weaknesses and external vulnerabilities mean that the effectiveness of the UzNIF model will ultimately depend on sustained regulatory, managerial and institutional reforms. Nevertheless, the brief concludes that the listing represents a potentially significant mechanism for consolidating Uzbekistan’s reform trajectory by making economic openness more transparent, institutionalized and difficult to reverse. Read on ISDP’s web-site * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The policy brief by Farangiz Junasheva, UWED master’s student, examines China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI), introduced by President Xi Jinping in 2025, and its place within Beijing’s broader vision for reforming the international order. It analyses the initiative’s core principles, including sovereign equality, multilateralism, the central role of the United Nations, stronger representation of the Global South, and the reform of international institutions to reflect shifts in the global balance of power. The brief places the GGI within the wider framework of China’s global initiatives, alongside the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI) and the Belt and Road Initiative. Particular attention is paid to the significance of the GGI for developing countries, which may view its emphasis on representation, the right to development and greater participation in global rule-making as an alternative approach to international cooperation. At the same time, the author considers critical perspectives questioning whether China’s rhetoric of equitable global governance fully corresponds with its economic and foreign-policy practices. The analysis concludes that the GGI reflects a broader transformation in China’s international role: from adapting to the existing global governance system towards seeking a more active role in shaping its norms, institutions and mechanisms. The initiative can therefore be understood both as a conceptual proposal for reforming global governance and as an instrument through which Beijing seeks to expand its normative and political influence internationally. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By  Sabina Gulyamova , Master’s degree student at UWED, intern at the Center for Sustainable Development at IAIS This policy brief explores the relationship between climate change and migration in the Republic of Karakalpakstan. Drawing on statistical data and expert insights, the author examines contemporary migration trends in the region and their implications for socioeconomic development. The brief highlights the growing role of labor migration and remittances in supporting household livelihoods, while also examining how environmental and economic factors influence population mobility. Particular attention is given to the challenges associated with demographic change, urbanization, and regional disparities within Karakalpakstan. More broadly, the study situates Karakalpakstan within the wider context of the Aral Sea basin and Central Asia, emphasizing the links between migration, climate adaptation, water security, and sustainable development. The author concludes that strengthening resilience in environmentally vulnerable regions will require coordinated efforts in economic development, climate adaptation, and regional cooperation. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The article co-authored with Aziza Saginbaeva, Research Intern at IAIS, examines how the inauguration of President Lee Jae-myung in June 2025 has marked a shift in South Korea’s foreign policy from the value-oriented and geopolitically ambitious approach of the previous administration towards a more pragmatic strategy centred on national interests and economic security. The article argues that Central Asia is no longer treated as an autonomous geopolitical priority under Seoul’s revised foreign policy framework. Instead, the region is increasingly viewed through the lens of resource diplomacy, supply-chain resilience and access to strategically important raw materials. Particular attention is given to South Korea’s need to diversify its imports of rare earth elements and critical minerals following China’s tightening of export controls and the resulting disruption of supplies to Korean industries. According to the authors, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are well positioned to benefit from this transformation by expanding cooperation with South Korea in geological exploration, mineral extraction, advanced processing technologies and long-term supply arrangements. The article also notes that Seoul’s less confrontational approach towards China may create additional diplomatic flexibility for Central Asian governments, allowing them to deepen cooperation with South Korea without being compelled to make politically sensitive choices between competing external powers. The forthcoming Korea–Central Asia Summit in 2026 is presented as an important test of the sustainability of these relations. The authors conclude that Central Asian states should move beyond broad political declarations and offer concrete cooperation packages in lithium, uranium, rare earth elements and other critical resources. By becoming structurally integrated into South Korea’s technological and economic security architecture, the region could secure long-term Korean investment, diversify its international partnerships and strengthen its position within an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment. Read on the website of Seoul Institute of Global Affairs (SIGA) * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.