The 100-day mark of President Donald Trump’s second term has been defined by an extraordinary pace of executive activity, sparking intense debate both within the United States and across the international stage. At this juncture, political analysts and journalists alike have turned their attention to the trajectory of Trump’s approval ratings, the cohesion of his cabinet, and the administration’s early legislative and executive milestones.   Operating within the framework of the conservative “Project 2025” – an ideological blueprint for restoring traditional values and consolidating executive power – Trump launched a wave of sweeping reforms under the banner of “Make America Great Again”. His domestic policy agenda has been marked by what observers have dubbed a “Trumpian restructuring”: a concerted effort to downsize the federal bureaucracy, challenge prevailing socio-cultural norms, and redirect the nation’s economic strategy.   Note: Project 2025 is a set of conservative policy proposals aimed at overhauling the federal government and expanding presidential authority, developed by the Heritage Foundation and released in April 2023 in anticipation of the 2024 election.   Pursuing a strategy of “flooding the zone” — a deliberate inundation of executive actions to disorient opponents — Trump signed approximately 140 executive orders within his first 100 days, far exceeding the pace of both his first term and his predecessors. The overwhelming majority of these orders focused on domestic affairs.   Values Realignment. A central theme of Trump’s second-term agenda has been dismantling what he calls the “deep state” and rolling back “woke culture” – particularly the emphasis on minority rights and inclusivity in government institutions. One of Trump’s earliest actions was the repeal of all federal Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programs. His administration officially recognized only two genders and eliminated regulatory oversight on public discourse, citing the need to restore free speech.   This cultural rollback extended beyond government: corporations scaled back inclusion initiatives, and universities came under direct pressure to terminate DEI programs or face funding cuts. The administration’s crackdown on campus political activism, especially concerning pro-Palestinian movements, triggered high-profile clashes with leading academic institutions.   Government Downsizing. Trump established a new Department of Government Efficiency, reportedly headed by Elon Musk, to streamline federal operations and reduce bureaucracy. Under its oversight, an estimated 260,000 federal employees were laid off, with severance and termination-related costs surpassing $135 billion.   One of the hardest-hit institutions was the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which was merged into the State Department. Over 5,000 projects were cancelled, and 90% of staff were dismissed. The Department of Education began a phased dismantlement, transferring its functions to state and local governments. Major staffing cuts were also initiated in agencies overseeing national security, including the Pentagon, FBI, CIA, and NSA. The resulting budgetary savings were redirected to reindustrialization efforts and deficit reduction.   Migration. The administration adopted a stringent stance on immigration, resuming construction of the southern border wall and designating human smuggling cartels as terrorist organizations. Reports suggest illegal border crossings have dropped by up to 90% — a 60-year low. While many Americans supported these measures, critics, including human rights groups and courts, condemned the deportation of immigrants who had long integrated into American society and faced persecution in their countries of origin.   In parallel, Trump moved to tighten electoral regulations, introducing mandatory citizenship verification for voters and limiting mail-in ballots. These actions drew sharp accusations from Democrats, who claimed they infringed upon civil liberties.   Economy. Trump reignited a trade war with China and escalated global tariff disputes. Duties on Chinese imports soared to 145%, while base tariffs on goods from more than 180 countries were raised to 27–67%. Though later lowered to 10% for 75 nations, the moves disrupted global trade.   These protectionist measures, justified as efforts to restore “trade fairness” and reshore manufacturing, caused turmoil in financial markets. The S&P 500 fell by 8.5% — the worst first-quarter performance since the Nixon era. Wall Street investors suffered over $8 trillion in losses, and the U.S. economy shrank by 0.3% in Q1 2025, marking its first contraction since 2022.   Public sentiment was largely unfavorable: according to Fox News, 58% of Americans opposed the tariffs due to fears of inflation and recession. Trump, in response, blamed the economic turbulence on the Biden administration’s legacy and urged patience. Economists noted that tariff revenues ($1.9 trillion over 10 years) would fall short of covering the cost of Trump’s proposed corporate tax cut from 21% to 15%—a move estimated to cost nearly $4 trillion.   Foreign Policy. On the international front, the Trump administration pursued an assertive agenda to end major conflicts, particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East. In the case of Ukraine, Trump sought direct negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow, prompting criticism from both domestic and European allies who accused him of favoring “peace through capitulation”. U.S. military aid to Ukraine was temporarily suspended as leverage, while Trump demanded audits and “gratitude” from Kyiv, as well as resource access agreements on heavily skewed terms.   Observers noted a broader crisis within the Republican Party’s foreign policy doctrine, where loyalty to Trump appeared to eclipse traditional ideological positions. Prominent figures such as Senator Lindsey Graham and Secretary of State Marco Rubio softened previously hardline stances toward Russia.   Relations with the European Union grew strained. Vice President J.D. Vance’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference about reevaluating transatlantic solidarity and pressuring European states on defense spending and trade fueled further discord. The administration also withdrew funding from public diplomacy programs while promoting the global expansion of MAGA-aligned values.   Elements of geopolitical adventurism also surfaced: renewed efforts to purchase Greenland, coercive overtures to Canada about U.S. accession, calls for the return of the Panama Canal, continued military support for Israel, strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, unexpected outreach to Iran, and the redeployment of U.S. naval forces to Libya after five decades.   Yet, constitutional constraints hampered these ambitions. The administration faced legal hurdles requiring Senate ratification for new treaties (Republicans lack a supermajority) and compliance with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which limits unilateral presidential powers to lift sanctions on Russia, Iran, and North Korea.   Note: Passed in 2017, CAATSA mandates congressional approval for any easing or removal of certain sanctions, curbing the executive branch’s autonomy in foreign affairs.   Conclusions   I. Public opinion has largely turned against the administration. National polls show Trump’s approval ratings dropping to 39–44%, down from 53% at the start of his term. This decline is particularly evident among key voting blocs and in traditionally Republican states.   The public disapproves of Trump’s policies on trade, governance, foreign affairs, and economic management. While Trump’s media-saturating approach kept him in the spotlight, the long-term viability of his chaos-based governance remains in doubt — especially with the 2026 midterms looming.   II. Trump’s economic policies have heightened domestic anxieties and triggered global market volatility. Fears of a recession, coupled with falling oil and commodity prices, are driving sell-offs in U.S. debt. Having spent nearly a decade cultivating his image as a steward of economic growth, Trump now faces reputational risks that could erode his political capital.   Signs of a constitutional crisis are emerging. The balance of power between branches of government, long a pillar of American democracy, appears destabilized. Congress — once seen as firmly under Trump’s control — is showing signs of rebellion. Republican senators are drafting legislation independently, and Democrats, though in the minority, have begun exploring impeachment proceedings.   III. U.S. alliances are fraying. Canada is reportedly exploring EU membership, while China, South Korea, and Japan are deepening regional economic ties. Mexico is expanding cooperation across Latin America.   Despite high energy and assertive leadership, Trump’s second-term strategy of information overload and relentless initiative-taking may have overstretched the administration’s capacities. Without a clearly articulated, step-by-step roadmap, doubts are mounting over the long-term coherence and sustainability of the White House’s policy direction.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In their incisive policy brief, Islomkhon Gafarov and IAIS volunteers Bobur Mingyasharov and Bositkhon Islamov provide a structured and comprehensive analysis of the latest and most severe escalation in India-Pakistan tensions, triggered by a deadly terrorist attack in April 2025. The report is both timely and significant, as it places the attack and its aftermath in a broader geopolitical, regional, and institutional context. The authors demonstrate a nuanced understanding of the security architecture in South Asia and identify the risks of a wider interstate conflict with remarkable clarity.   The policy brief begins with a factual account of the April 22 terrorist assault in the Pahalgam district of Jammu and Kashmir, which resulted in 26 fatalities. The group “Kashmir Resistance”, allegedly affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed responsibility. India’s claims of Pakistani complicity — backed by allegations of intelligence involvement — form the backdrop to a sweeping series of retaliatory moves, both military and diplomatic. The authors meticulously list and assess India’s responses, from mass detentions and infrastructure demolitions to the drastic step of suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, a long-standing pillar of bilateral water-sharing and a foundational agreement for regional cooperation.   In parallel, the authors explore Pakistan’s countermeasures and diplomatic posture. Islamabad’s firm denial of involvement in the attack, coupled with its readiness to submit to an international investigation, is presented as a calculated attempt to internationalize the crisis and rally global sympathy. Pakistan’s reciprocal expulsion of Indian citizens, suspension of trade, and closure of airspace represent a measured but firm riposte. Particularly insightful is the authors’ discussion of Pakistan’s non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council, which Islamabad appears intent on leveraging to gain moral and diplomatic high ground.   An important contribution of the brief lies in its focus on international actors. The authors highlight the calibrated support India has received from Western powers, the Gulf states, and even Russia and Ukraine — framing it within the global consensus against terrorism. Iran’s mediation efforts, led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, are examined as a diplomatic overture balancing Tehran’s strategic ties with both Delhi and Islamabad. The inclusion of Iran’s role demonstrates the authors’ broader regional lens and their understanding of evolving multipolar dynamics. Similarly, China’s predictable alignment with Pakistan is described as part of its long-term strategic calculus, anchored in the CPEC and wider regional ambitions.   Perhaps most compelling are the forward-looking scenarios the authors present. They warn of the potential for cross-border military escalation, proxy conflicts involving separatist groups, and even a reconfiguration of regional alignments, including possible shifts in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The brief astutely observes that the Kashmir crisis may test the credibility of multilateral institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which appears increasingly paralyzed in the face of a direct confrontation between two of its major members.   In sum, this policy brief is a cogent and multifaceted analysis of a developing regional crisis with global repercussions. By combining factual reporting with geopolitical foresight, the authors provide not only a valuable resource for policymakers and analysts, but also a stark reminder of the enduring volatility of South Asia’s most intractable fault line.   Read on Paradigma.uz   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In early May, President Donald J. Trump announced the dismissal of White House National Security Advisor Michael Waltz and his deputy, Alex Wong.   Background: Michael Waltz, 51, is a retired Green Beret officer with deployments in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Africa. He has received numerous government commendations for bravery. Waltz previously served in the White House and the Pentagon and was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 2018. Alex Wong served in Trump’s first administration as Deputy Special Representative for North Korea.   The dismissal followed public revelations that Waltz had used unsecured communication channels while coordinating sensitive National Security Council discussions on covert operations. Another key factor was his unreserved support for Israel, including frequent contact with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and efforts to escalate military confrontation with Iran — actions that ran counter to Trump’s campaign promises to end wars rather than start new ones. The impact of Waltz’s removal was somewhat mitigated by his subsequent nomination as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.   Secretary of State Marco Rubio has assumed the role of acting National Security Advisor. Rubio reportedly earned the President’s trust through his deference, unwavering loyalty, and frequent informal weekend visits to Trump for off-the-record consultations.   One of the leading contenders to permanently replace Waltz is Trump’s longtime golf partner and confidant, Steven Witkoff. Despite lacking formal credentials in foreign policy, Witkoff enjoys unique access to the President and is simultaneously overseeing negotiations with Israel, Hamas, Ukraine, Russia, and Iran — an unusual concentration of responsibilities that has drawn sharp criticism within the State Department.   Another serious candidate for the post is Stephen Miller, Deputy White House Chief of Staff and the architect of Trump’s hardline immigration agenda. Miller, one of the President’s most trusted and long-standing aides, is currently pushing for the immediate deportation of undocumented migrants without judicial hearings. Insiders credit him with turning the Homeland Security Council into a highly efficient apparatus, “outperforming the National Security Council despite having a fraction of the staff”. Given Trump’s preference for consolidating power among a narrow circle of loyalists, it is possible that Miller — like Rubio — may be tasked with holding multiple senior roles simultaneously.   These changes at the helm of national security come at a politically delicate moment. According to Washington insiders, Waltz’s departure was in part the result of a simmering feud within the Trump Administration that dates back to the start of his second term. At the heart of this struggle are two camps: foreign policy hawks like Waltz, often referred to as neoconservatives, and allies of Vice President J. D. Vance, associated with a neo-isolationist outlook. While these labels simplify a more complex internal dynamic, they provide a useful framework for understanding the evolving power structure.   The defining feature of Trump’s second term has been the outward display of loyalty among his inner circle. Yet beneath this façade lies a tripartite power struggle. The first faction comprises committed “America First” ideologues, skeptical of entangling alliances and eager to reduce U.S. military and economic burdens abroad. This group includes Vice President Vance and Donald Trump Jr., who has stepped into the informal advisory role once held by Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. Right-wing commentator Laura Loomer serves as the public voice of this faction and is reportedly influential enough to have prompted the recent ousting of NSA (electronic intelligence) Director Howe.   The second group is made up of traditional Republican internationalists and neoconservatives. Waltz was a prominent member, along with Marco Rubio and CIA Director John Ratcliffe. Despite holding high office, this faction’s sway over Trump appears to be waning.   The third, and arguably most influential faction, consists of a circle of billionaire allies — Trump’s personal oligarchy. At the forefront is Steven Witkoff, joined by Steve Bessent and Howard Lutnick, who serve as Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce respectively, as well as Elon Musk, who leads the Department of Government Efficiency.   Although this triad has thus far held together, internal tensions are becoming increasingly visible. Waltz’s removal was catalyzed by an op-ed in the Trump-aligned New York Post titled: “Steven Witkoff Should Not Be Negotiating with Iran and Russia, Say Allies and Insiders”. The piece quoted an anonymous former Trump aide who described Witkoff as “a good guy but a bumbling fool”. It also featured criticism from two analysts at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a pro-Israel think tank, who expressed doubts about Witkoff’s suitability for high-stakes negotiations with Iran.   The article prompted a swift rebuttal from Trump allies. Charlie Kirk, a prominent MAGA media figure and frequent companion of Donald Trump Jr., tweeted: “The Foundation for Defense of Democracies is leading the charge against Steven Witkoff. They are openly encouraging officials to sabotage President Trump’s efforts and derail the Iran deal. Anyone opposing Witkoff is opposing MAGA”.   These internal fissures are emerging at a time when the Trump Administration is pursuing peace accords with Iran and Russia, while trying to reassure close allies in Israel, Ukraine, and Europe. Waltz, and now Rubio, represented the continuity of traditional Republican foreign policy. But in today’s White House, President Trump remains the sole axis of authority.   This week, Trump toughened his stance on Russia by signing a new security agreement with Ukraine. While signaling a desire to end the war and revisit U.S.–Russia economic ties, Trump warned that sanctions against Moscow would follow unless President Vladimir Putin engaged in serious negotiations. He has also hinted at targeting Russia’s banking sector or imposing so-called secondary sanctions.   Senator Lindsey Graham endorsed Trump’s tougher rhetoric, revealing that he had secured the support of 72 senators for a bipartisan bill imposing “crippling” sanctions should Putin fail to enter meaningful peace talks. The legislation proposes a 500% tariff on imports from any country that buys Russian oil, gas, or uranium. If endorsed by the White House, the bill will advance to a Senate vote.   In conclusion, the recent reshuffling of national security leadership reflects more than just personnel changes; it reveals deep ideological rifts within the Trump Administration. The power struggle between proponents of aggressive foreign engagement and advocates of strategic restraint underscores the fragility of internal decision-making structures. As external pressures mount, this fragmentation may hinder the development of a coherent national security strategy — posing growing risks for the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova’s new publication presents a comprehensive examination of the evolving role of Afghanistan as a potential transit hub within the emerging transcontinental trade architecture. Under the Taliban’s stewardship, Afghan authorities have embraced a pragmatic and assertive approach toward infrastructure development, with an emphasis on regional connectivity. She highlights how key regional actors — particularly Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran — are revitalizing or expanding ambitious railway projects that pass-through Afghan territory, in pursuit of more direct access to South Asian and global markets. The Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway (the Kabul Corridor) and the western Kandahar route emerge as key arteries in these plans.   The author underscores Uzbekistan’s leading role in spearheading initiatives such as the Kabul Corridor, positioning itself as a linchpin in Central Asia’s drive toward diversified trade routes. Turkmenistan’s collaboration with Kazakhstan on a parallel western corridor and Iran’s push to complete the Khaf–Herat and Zahedan–Zaranj lines demonstrate how multiple regional actors are converging on Afghanistan as a conduit for economic integration. Importantly, Umarova details the proposed Five Nation Road — linking Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and China — which could significantly alter the current logistics map of Eurasia. The article also notes that Iran seeks to use Afghan routes to access China’s Xinjiang via the Wakhan Corridor, though this remains more aspirational than imminent.   Russia’s entry into the equation adds a strategic layer to the growing complexity. The Kremlin’s interest in linking Afghanistan to the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) via new railways is particularly significant. Russian initiatives through both the eastern and western Afghan railway routes, in cooperation with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, reflect Moscow’s intent to tap into the southward logistics flow to Pakistan and the Indian Ocean. However, the expert rightly notes the lack of confirmation from Uzbekistan Railways, suggesting that while high-level political support exists, implementation details remain unsettled.   Toward the conclusion, Nargiza Umarova engages with the broader strategic calculus, arguing that security concerns, particularly along the Pakistan route, may shift regional preferences from the Kabul Corridor to the longer but potentially more stable Kandahar route. She also emphasizes that without regional coordination, the multiplicity of competing projects could lead to fragmented infrastructure development. Harmonization and joint investment, especially from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, are framed as prerequisites for success. The article ends on a cautiously optimistic note: if the stakeholders manage to coordinate their efforts effectively, Afghanistan could transform from a landlocked conflict zone into a vital logistics corridor connecting Eurasia’s heartland to global trade routes.   Read on Bourse & Bazaar Foundation’s website   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In April 2025, the American Foreign Policy Council and its affiliated Central Asia–Caucasus Institute produced a report entitled The American Strategy for Greater Central Asia. This document, drafted by a group of distinguished experts with long-standing experience in the region, including such well-known scholars as S. F. Starr, A. Cohen, and S. Cornell, seeks to formulate a comprehensive and updated approach by Washington toward the vast expanse of Central Eurasia.   The principal aim of the strategy is to consolidate the competitive standing of the United States in a region that, in the view of the authors, will significantly influence the trajectory of Russian-Chinese relations, the broader geopolitical contest in Asia, and key commodity markets, particularly uranium, oil, and natural gas, while simultaneously ensuring open access and mitigating potential security risks.   The central conceptual innovation of the report lies in the redefinition of the very geographical scope of U.S. regional policy, expressed through the rebranding of the term “Greater Central Asia,” originally introduced in the early 2000s.   The concept now envisions a substantial expansion of the conventional American (and historically Soviet) understanding of Central Asia, traditionally limited to the five republics, by mandating the inclusion of Azerbaijan into this core. This reconfiguration is reflected in the proposed transformation of the dialogue format into a “C6+1” platform. Moreover, the strategy underscores the importance of viewing adjacent states such as Georgia, Armenia, and Mongolia as integral flanks that provide “existential support” through transport hubs, seaports, and shared economic interests.   A particularly important role is assigned to Afghanistan. While initially positioned as a peripheral element, it is envisaged as a state with the potential to be gradually integrated into the “organic whole” of the region. This marks an effort to shift the American approach toward Afghanistan from one primarily problem-oriented to one geopolitically integrated. In this way, the report attempts a conceptual redrawing of the regional space within the American strategic imagination, with the aim of constructing a new geopolitical and geoeconomic community deemed more attuned to contemporary realities and U.S. interests.   According to the document, the American strategy for Greater Central Asia is designed to address four principal tasks reflecting Washington’s key concerns. First, it seeks to manage risks associated with Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons in a region already surrounded by nuclear powers (Russia, China, India, Pakistan) and states with nuclear capability (Türkiye), thereby raising the stakes of any conflict. Second, the strategy declares a pragmatic interest in facilitating opportunities for American investment and private-sector profit, particularly in developing critical transport corridors including the so-called “Middle Corridor”, and in securing access to the region’s abundant natural resources, such as uranium, rare earths, lithium, and other strategic materials, especially in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Notably, the strategy emphasizes not only the acquisition of preferential access for the United States and its allies but also the ability to restrict access for its competitors, foremost China. Third, it maintains a strong focus on countering Islamic terrorism, both of local origin and externally infiltrated (via Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan), necessitating aggressive monitoring and close cooperation with regional governments. Fourth, the strategy is explicitly tied to the global reorientation of U.S. foreign policy towards the containment of China, identified as Washington’s principal geopolitical rival. Greater Central Asia is positioned as a critical node in this rivalry, traversed by China’s routes to Europe and the Middle East and strategically interlinking Chinese, Russian, and Iranian agendas, rendering the region a vital arena for U.S. influence and shaping through effective engagement.   To achieve these objectives, the authors propose a set of concrete policy measures and instruments grouped across several domains. In the bureaucratic-administrative sphere, the report recommends appointing a Special Presidential Envoy for Greater Central Asia within the National Security Council to coordinate the activities of U.S. agencies and embassies, as well as eliminating internal obstacles to implementing a unified regional approach – potentially through institutional reorganization within the State Department and other structures.   Economically, the creation of a non-governmental U.S.–Greater Central Asia Business Council is suggested to promote the harmonization of visa regimes, the simplification of border procedures, the development of communications, and the standardization of trade, while simultaneously advancing U.S. private-sector interests in the management of trade corridors and investment.   In the security domain, the report advocates for the establishment of a Regional Security Structure for Greater Central Asia, focused on intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation, and joint initiatives, drawing on existing American training institutions for military and security specialists, such as the George C. Marshall Center, to foster a shared understanding of threats and approaches.   Considerable attention is also given to instruments of “soft power”: the accelerated engagement of emerging elites through educational and professional programs in the United States and within the region; support for regional media outlets (in both English and local languages) to disseminate Washington’s positions more effectively; and the promotion of English-language learning. Finally, the strategy underscores the necessity of consultations and coordination with like-minded partners, including Europe, Japan, Turkey, South Korea, and India to leverage overlapping interests.   A distinctive feature of the proposed strategy is its pronounced pragmatism and departure from earlier approaches, criticized by the authors as fragmented and insufficiently integrated into the global U.S. agenda. Acknowledging the objective limitations of American capabilities, such as the inability to rival Chinese investments under the Belt and Road Initiative or to provide hard security guarantees akin to NATO membership, the strategy places emphasis on more flexible and frequently indirect methods of influence.   Equally significant is the stated intent to work in partnership with the governments of regional states, viewing them as principal agents of implementation rather than mere objects of influence. Indicative, too, is the declared departure from demanding democratization and human rights compliance as preconditions for cooperation. Instead, the priority is accorded to stability, economic prosperity, and openness to the outside world, premised on the assumption that political freedoms may follow in due course as a by-product of economic development.   Furthermore, the strategy highlights the encouragement of regionally exclusive institutions to be established by the states of Greater Central Asia themselves, drawing parallels with ASEAN or the Nordic Council, as mechanisms to strengthen their collective agency and resilience to external domination. The United States is assigned the role of partner rather than participant in such frameworks.   In sum, the report articulates a renewed and more geopolitically focused concept of American policy toward the broadly defined Greater Central Asia. This vision clearly positions the region as one of the principal arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and implicitly with Russia. The shift away from prioritizing immediate democratization in favor of engaging with existing regimes to pursue geopolitical and economic objectives reflects a potential reorientation of U.S. foreign policy priorities in this part of the world.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his latest policy brief, Dr. Islomkhon Gafarov presents a layered analysis of Washington’s shifting strategies toward Afghanistan following the return of the Taliban to power. He outlines four key stages in U.S. policy — ranging from counterterrorism to political disengagement and direct engagement — underscoring the lack of a coherent long-term vision. This phase reflected Washington’s continued prioritisation of national security concerns over broader engagement.   The second stage was marked by strategic disengagement, as the United States distanced itself from Afghanistan’s internal politics and ceased involvement in infrastructure projects such as TAPI and CASA-1000. The Trump administration’s role, however, introduced a dual-track policy — partly rhetorical, in line with the MAGA campaign narrative, and partly strategic, with direct contacts initiated with Taliban representatives by mid-2020. This shift demonstrated an awareness of Afghanistan’s enduring geopolitical significance, especially in the context of U.S. competition with China.   As Dr. Gafarov observes, the current U.S. approach combines rhetorical condemnation of the Taliban’s human rights abuses with pragmatic engagement, including the recent release of an American hostage after high-level contacts with Taliban officials. These moves indicate a nuanced recalibration of policy, driven partly by China’s growing presence in Afghanistan and the urgency of reasserting U.S. influence in a strategically pivotal region. The Taliban, for their part, demand parity in negotiations, rejecting both the return of U.S. equipment and the conditional release of frozen Afghan assets — signalling their intent to frame themselves as sovereign actors rather than subordinates.   In examining future scenarios, the author identifies two potential directions: a wait-and-see policy banking on internal shifts within the Taliban (particularly favouring the more pragmatic Sirajuddin Haqqani over the ideologically rigid Akhundzada), or the use of economic levers such as Afghanistan’s frozen assets to counter Chinese encroachment. Both scenarios highlight the instrumental role of Afghanistan in wider geopolitical rivalries, especially between the United States and China. Notably, the recent U.S. cancellation of the bounty on Haqqani may hint at a selective engagement strategy favouring more pliable Taliban factions.   Finally, Uzbekistan emerges in his analysis as a key mediator in restoring U.S.-Taliban relations. Given Tashkent’s strategic ties with both Washington and Kabul, its neutral stance, and its past cooperation on military logistics, Uzbekistan could provide a valuable bridge for diplomatic re-engagement. Shared views on regional stability, coupled with Uzbekistan’s proximity and influence in Afghanistan, strengthen this possibility. Overall, Dr. Gafarov concludes that the erratic evolution of U.S. policy reflects not only the complexities of Taliban rule but also Washington’s broader struggle to reconcile normative commitments with geostrategic imperatives.   Read on Kun.uz   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.