The contemporary international order is undergoing a period of profound and accelerating transformation. Armed conflicts, great-power rivalry, and the erosion of multilateral institutions are reshaping the global strategic landscape in ways that affect even regions far removed from the epicenters of crisis. Central Asia, long accustomed to navigating a complex web of external pressures through careful multi-vector diplomacy, now finds itself confronting a qualitatively new environment — one defined by cascading instability, structural geopolitical competition, and the fragmentation of the rules-based order that previously offered small- and medium-sized states a degree of protection and predictability. Against this backdrop, the countries of Central Asia face a dual challenge: managing an expanding array of external risks while simultaneously identifying and seizing the strategic opportunities that this turbulent moment presents. The very forces that generate vulnerability — the restructuring of global trade, the rise of overland transit demand, and the weakening of universal governance frameworks — also create openings for a more assertive and coordinated regional posture. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the principal challenges stemming from growing international instability and outlines the foreign policy priorities through which Central Asian states can strengthen their resilience, expand their agency, and secure a more favorable position in the emerging world order. First. The formation of a multilayered conflict environment around Central Asia. Central Asia is increasingly finding itself in an environment of mounting external turbulence that is taking on the character of a “conflict trap.” The simultaneous development of armed and political crises in Ukraine, the Middle East, and South Asia is creating a cascading and interconnected configuration of instability. At the same time, the potential escalation of tensions in East Asia, particularly around the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, could further complicate the region’s strategic environment. Under these conditions, the space for foreign policy maneuver for the states of Central Asia is narrowing, while decision-making is increasingly taking place amid high uncertainty and the absence of optimal scenarios. Second. The deepening of structural contradictions resulting from rivalry among major powers. Geopolitical and military-political confrontation between leading global centers of power is creating not merely situational but long-term structural constraints for the countries of Central Asia. The region is entering a phase in which the previous logic of seeking the most advantageous and relatively balanced solutions is giving way to the politics of “non-ideal choice.” In other words, virtually any strategy in the current international environment will be accompanied by costs, compromises, and heightened political risks. This objectively increases the importance of coordinating tactical and strategic approaches at the regional level, since isolated actions by individual states are becoming less effective. Third. Rising vulnerability to energy, transport-communication, and raw material shocks. Contemporary international crises are increasingly demonstrating the dependence of the global economy on a limited number of critically important routes and hubs. Disruptions in maritime logistics, the blocking of specific straits and transport corridors, and the withdrawal of scarce resources from the market create systemic shocks far beyond the conflict zones themselves. For Central Asia, this means heightened risks related to supply disruptions, rising transit costs, price volatility, and restricted access to strategically important materials. Since some critical goods do not have rapid infrastructural or technological substitutes, external crises begin to directly affect the region’s economic resilience. Fourth. The erosion of international legal norms and the weakening of universal institutions. One of the most alarming trends is the transition from a regime of “double standards” to a situation in which common standards are increasingly losing even their formal binding force. Whereas previously international law was violated while still retaining symbolic legitimacy, there is now a growing risk of an order in which norms cease to function as a common regulatory framework. Major international actors are increasingly acting not as providers of stability but as independent sources of destabilization. For the states of Central Asia, this means a shrinking space in which universal norms and institutions can be relied upon as mechanisms for protecting the interests of small and medium-sized states. Fifth. The shift from universal multilateralism to selective coalitions. A steady shift is underway from the previous model of relatively universal multilateral engagement toward a system of pragmatic, situational, and narrowly targeted coalitions. This transformation is intensifying the asymmetry of global politics: states with limited influence resources are increasingly finding themselves not as full-fledged subjects, but as objects of external influence and competitive struggle. For Central Asia, this creates the risk of limited agency, where strategic decisions affecting the region are increasingly made without its direct participation. Sixth. The growing transactional nature of world politics and the personalization of the future order. The once-established construct of a “rules-based order” is no longer performing the role of a common normative framework. Increasingly visible is the tendency toward the emergence of a new international environment based less on institutions and more on flexible arrangements among individual centers of power and their leaders. This signals a return to a pre-universalist logic of international relations, in which security and stability are determined not by law, but by balances of capability and bargains among stronger actors. For the countries of Central Asia, such an environment is objectively less predictable and less favorable. Seventh. The fragmentation of global trade as a factor of external pressure on the region. The global trading system is undergoing profound structural transformation. Trade policy is increasingly being used not as an instrument of liberalization, but as a means of strategic competition, pressure, and redistribution of advantages. Discriminatory measures are intensifying, tariff and non-tariff restrictions are gaining significance, and supply chains are being restructured on political rather than purely economic grounds. For Central Asia, this means the need to adapt to a less open, less predictable, and more bloc-based global economy, in which access to markets, technologies, and logistics routes increasingly depends on foreign policy circumstances. Opportunities and Priorities for Foreign Policy Action by the Countries of Central Asia First. Strengthening regional coordination as the foundation of strategic resilience. Under conditions of mounting international instability, coordinated regional approaches are becoming increasingly important for the countries of Central Asia. This concerns not only consultations, but also the formation of a shared understanding of key external risks, security priorities, transport connectivity, and trade and economic adaptation. The greater the level of external pressure and geopolitical competition, the more important it becomes for the region to develop coordinated tactical and strategic actions. This will not eliminate external threats, but it can increase resilience, reduce vulnerability, and strengthen the region’s collective negotiating position. Second. Enhancing Central Asia’s role as a land-based transit space. The growing risks associated with maritime logistics are objectively increasing the significance of overland transport routes. In this context, Central Asia has an opportunity to strengthen its importance as a connecting space between China, Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East. For Uzbekistan, this trend opens the prospect of reinforcing its role as one of the key overland transit hubs. This is not only about economic gain, but also about the formation of a new foreign policy resource: a state that ensures transport connectivity acquires additional weight in the regional and interregional architecture. Third. Developing digital connectivity as an element of external economic resilience. Under conditions of geopolitical fragmentation, not only physical but also digital trade infrastructure is becoming increasingly important. A state’s ability to ensure the resilience of digital platforms, standards compatibility, the reliability of legal regimes, and technological interoperability is becoming a critical factor in maintaining access to external markets. For Uzbekistan and other countries of the region, a priority task is the transition from isolated digital initiatives to a comprehensive state policy in this sphere. Such a policy should include the harmonization of standards, institutional development, workforce training, and the expansion of regional coordination. Digital connectivity can become a factor in diversifying external economic ties and reducing costs amid growing global regulatory fragmentation. Fourth. Diversifying foreign policy and foreign economic ties. In a situation where the international system is becoming less universal and more competitive, the ability of states to avoid excessive dependence on any one direction, one market, or one external center of power becomes especially important. For the countries of Central Asia, this means the need to deepen a multi-vector approach based on pragmatism, flexibility, and the protection of their own interests. Diversification of partnerships enables the region not only to reduce external risks, but also to expand the space for independent maneuver in a polarized international environment. Fifth. Enhancing the region’s agency amid the crisis of global governance. The weakening of universal institutions and the growing role of selective formats do not necessarily imply only losses for Central Asia. If supported by a coordinated policy, this also opens opportunities to enhance its own agency through participation in new cooperation formats, the promotion of regional initiatives, and the strengthening of Central Asia’s status as an independent geopolitical and geo-economic space. Under the new conditions, those actors will benefit most who are able not only to adapt, but also to propose functional solutions in the areas of transit, logistics, energy, digital connectivity, and interregional interaction. Sixth. Transitioning from reactive to proactive foreign policy. The contemporary international environment requires the countries of Central Asia not only to respond to external crises, but also to develop a forward-looking strategy. Such a strategy should be aimed at early risk identification, creating mechanisms of external economic resilience, advancing beneficial transport and digital projects, and institutionally anchoring regional interests in the external sphere. A proactive approach is especially important in conditions where delays in decision-making may result in the loss of strategic opportunities. Conclusion Contemporary international instability is reshaping the strategic environment of Central Asia in ways that are both profound and enduring. The region faces a confluence of challenges that would have been difficult to anticipate even a decade ago: a multilayered conflict environment on its periphery, the structural deepening of great-power rivalry, the fragmentation of global trade, the erosion of international legal norms, and the steady retreat from universal multilateralism toward selective, transactional arrangements among dominant powers. Taken together, these trends are narrowing the space for passive, reactive foreign policy and demanding from the states of Central Asia a level of strategic clarity and regional cohesion that has not always characterized their collective responses in the past. At the same time, it would be a mistake to interpret this moment exclusively through the lens of threat and vulnerability. History repeatedly demonstrates that periods of systemic international transformation, however disruptive, tend to redistribute influence and open new avenues for actors who are prepared to act with foresight and purpose. Central Asia is no exception to this dynamic. The growing importance of overland transit routes in an era of maritime disruption, the rising premium on digital connectivity and regulatory interoperability, and the increasing demand for stable and reliable regional partners in an otherwise volatile Eurasian space — all of these trends position Central Asia as a region of genuine and growing strategic relevance. Realizing this potential, however, is neither automatic nor guaranteed. It requires the countries of the region to move decisively from adaptation to agency — from responding to external pressures to actively shaping the conditions of their engagement with the wider world. This means investing in the institutional foundations of regional coordination, so that shared interests translate into coherent and consistent collective positions rather than remaining aspirational declarations. It means accelerating the development of transport and digital infrastructure not merely as economic projects, but as instruments of foreign policy that expand the region's connectivity and reduce its dependence on any single external partner. And it means cultivating the diplomatic flexibility and strategic patience necessary to navigate a world in which alignments are fluid, leverage is contested, and the costs of miscalculation are rising. For Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbors, the path forward lies in embracing a proactive foreign policy paradigm — one grounded in pragmatism, reinforced by regional solidarity, and oriented toward the long-term construction of resilience rather than short-term crisis management. The current international environment, for all its uncertainty, rewards those who are able to define their interests clearly, pursue them consistently, and present themselves as indispensable nodes in the networks of connectivity, trade, and cooperation that the emerging world order will depend upon. Central Asia has the geographic position, the human capital, and the political will to be such an actor. The task now is to translate that potential into a coherent and sustained strategic vision — one that secures stability, expands agency, and affirms the region's place not at the margins, but at the functional heart of a reconfigured Eurasian space. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In recent years, the government of Afghanistan has expanded its technological capabilities for monitoring the population. Improvements in the technical infrastructure have enabled the authorities to introduce new forms of control that go beyond traditional methods. In the context of the policies pursued by the Taliban, this trend can be viewed not only as a process of modernization, but also as part of a broader strategy aimed at strengthening state governance. The digitalisation of control mechanisms creates a model resembling the concept of the “panopticon” - an ideal model of prison  introduced into the social sciences by french philosopher Michel Foucault. Within this framework, the key factor is not actual surveillance, but the perception of its constant possibility. The model assumes that individuals adjust their behavior under the perception of continuous observation, which fosters self-discipline. Thus, this mechanism enables the state to shift from practicing reactive policies to the functioning of a disciplinary form of power. From the perspective of the Afghan government, a key driver of this policy is the intention of the Taliban to mitigate social and political fragmentation, which is perceived as a major threat to regime stability. The integration of advanced surveillance technologies and the control of the information space create conditions for a transition from reactive repression to more preventive forms of social regulation. The absence of mechanisms aligned with international legal standards creates a favorable environment for the institutionalization of this model of control. This is manifested in the following ways: Firstly, in recent years, the Taliban government has demonstrated an increased interest in the systematic collection of information about the population. Since 2023, the Taliban authorities have consistently employed technological resources to strengthen and expand state control. The existence of sufficient digital infrastructure creates conditions for the authorities to establish monitoring mechanisms and broadens their capacity to carry out political persecution. According to a 2025 investigative report by the BBC, at the time the Taliban came to power, approximately 850 surveillance cameras were installed in the Afghan capital. However, since 2023, their number has increased sharply: around 90,000 cameras of manufactured in China have been installed in Kabul alone. The software allows the cameras to recognize individuals, display their images and classify each person by age, gender, and features such as the presence of a beard or a mask. This rapid expansion of surveillance systems has raised concerns within the international community. The human rights organization Human Rights Watch has warned that Afghanistan lacks data protection laws regulating the storage and use of collected footage. However, according to government statements, the data is stored for only three months, after which it is deleted and not shared with other agencies. Representatives of the Afghan Ministry of Interior claim that the cameras significantly contribute to improved security and a reduction in crime rates. Despite these claims, surveillance cameras may also be used to intensify control over civilians, particularly women in public spaces. Although local authorities assert that crime rates have significantly declined following the installation of surveillance systems, these claims cannot be independently verified. Given the opacity of Afghan legislation, it is also difficult to confirm the actual purposes for which the collected data is used. Furthermore, numerous documented cases of abuse and persecution of civilians cast doubt on official statements regarding the use of such data. Secondly, the policy of the Taliban is aimed at managing potential sources of internal instability. From the perspective of the Taliban leadership, fragmentation of the country represents a key risk that could weaken central authority. The implementation of such policies is accompanied by restrictions on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. The institutionalization of these measures reinforces structural inequalities and creates conditions for the escalation of interethnic and interreligious tensions. Beyond the capital, surveillance cameras have also been installed in other regions of Afghanistan. These provinces, which border Kabul, possess both strategic geographical importance and a significant share of non-Pashtun populations, increasing their relevance in terms of maintaining control and political stability. The deployment of cameras in areas characterized by ethnic and religious diversity suggests that these technologies may be used not only for security purposes, as officially stated, but also as tools for monitoring groups perceived as insufficiently aligned with the regime. Between 2021 and 2025, international organizations have documented numerous cases of extrajudicial killings, torture, and raids against ethnic minorities carried out by representatives of the Taliban. Reports by international human rights organisations indicate that marginalized religious and ethnic groups were deliberately deprived of humanitarian assistance, as well as access to essential services and public sector employment. Thirdly, in addition to access to advanced surveillance technologies, the Taliban possesses a substantial database of biometric and personal data left behind by Western countries in August 2021. One such database is the electronic identity system (e-Tazkira), launched in 2018 under the administration of Ashraf Ghani and still in operation today. It contains personal and biometric data of Afghan citizens, including iris scans, fingerprints, photographs, occupation, native language, home addresses, and family members’ names. According to a statement by the National Statistics and Information Agency, by the end of 2025 up to 17 million electronic identity cards had been issued, six million of which were distributed after the Taliban came to power. Moreover, the Taliban government has gone beyond the traditional use of biometric data and is collecting information on categories of the population that were previously outside the scope of state attention. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Afghan government is collecting biometric data on homeless people, beggars and criminals. The scale of coverage and the pace of ID issuance demonstrate the Taliban’s level of interest in biometric data collection and the integration of the Tazkira system into administrative governance. Reports also suggest that the Taliban has access to portable biometric identification devices previously used by the United States military. These devices enable the rapid collection of iris and fingerprint data. The data stored on devices left behind by the United States and other Western donors was reportedly not protected by basic security measures. International human rights organizations have repeatedly warned about the risk that such biometric data could be used by the Taliban to target perceived opponents, former military personnel and political activists. In addition, according to local media, the cost of obtaining identification documents is prohibitively high for much of the population: the official fee is 500 Afghanis (around 7 US dollars) for adults and 200 Afghanis for minors. However, the shortage of document issuance centers forces many citizens to incur additional transportation costs, and in remote areas where in-person visits are not possible, processing fees can reach up to 200 US dollars. Such financial barriers have concrete practical consequences: as the absence of an identity document deprives citizens of the ability to obtain a visa and, consequently, to leave the country. It also restricts access to basic services such as education, healthcare, and humanitarian aid, for which identification is often a mandatory requirement. Discontent is also fueled by the system’s ethnic classification, which divides major ethnic groups into smaller subcategories, statistically diluting the representation of ethnic minorities. Thus, based on the actions undertaken by the Taliban leadership, it can be concluded that territorial and social fragmentation are viewed as key internal risks capable of undermining regime stability. The integration of biometric databases and surveillance technologies is forming a new infrastructure of power with characteristics of a disciplinary mechanism. Moreover, the new Criminal Procedure Code adopted in January 2026 institutionalizes this approach at the legal level and represents a logical continuation of the domestic political strategy. Its adoption signals the effective consolidation of power by the political elite in Afghanistan. Under such conditions, the vulnerability of regional, ethnic, and religious minorities increases, creating a high risk of escalating internal conflicts and deepening social inequalities. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Jasurbek Khamrakulov, Undergraduate student at UWED, intern at IAIS Background For the last several years, the European Union has become increasingly confronted with institutional paralysis in key policy areas, particularly foreign policy and financial assistance. In this context, Hungary, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, has repeatedly used its veto power to block collective EU decisions, most notably in relation to the financial aid packages for Ukraine. This has exposed structural weaknesses in EU governance at a time of heightened geopolitical urgency. Hungary’s repeated vetoes, particularly regarding a proposed €90 billion financial assistance package for Ukraine, have provoked a wave of criticism from European leaders. Despite the strong pressure on Viktor Orbán to lift his veto on the loan,  European leaders failed to reach a breakthrough at a Brussels summit, highlighting deep divisions within the Union. Orbán justified his blockade by citing a dispute over the damaged “Druzhba” oil pipeline, supplying Hungary, while other EU leaders expressed growing frustration and accused him of undermining collective commitments, emphasizing that the aid is crucial for Ukraine’s ongoing war efforts against Russia. According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Hungary and Slovakia imported around €137 million worth of Russian oil through the pipeline in January. Oil flows reportedly stopped in late January as a result of Russian air strike that Kyiv says damaged the pipeline's western branch Ukraine. Hungary, on the other hand, disagrees, accusing Ukraine of blocking it from being used. The current situation outlines one of the main challenges EU faces in the process of decision-making, which is unanimity. The principle allows any member state to block collective decisions, regardless of the level of support among other members. In practice, this has enabled Hungary to leverage its position to extract concessions or advance domestic political narratives centered on sovereignty and resistance to Brussels. As a result of policy paralysis, critical initiatives, particularly those related to Ukraine, are delayed or blocked. Furthermore, it weakens EU's credibility and its inability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor, working for the benefit of Russia in disrupting European aid flows to Ukraine. The Hungarian case is particularly significant because it reflects not only policy disagreement, but also broader tensions regarding rule-of-law compliance and democratic standards within the EU. Mechanisms to Bypass Vetoes Some experts argue that in exceptional circumstances, such as the conflict in Ukraine, the European Union can legally bypass Hungary’s veto if it violates core EU values, particularly the principle of solidarity in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. The legal pathways to overcome this dilemma are divided in two directions. If Hungary’s veto represents a serious and systemic breach of solidarity, the decision could proceed without counting Hungary’s vote. Secondly, unanimity rules could be reinterpreted, allowing qualified majority voting in situations that pose existential threats to the EU’s security, values, and stability.  The solutions are meant to be exceptional and narrowly applied, not a general abandonment of unanimity. While critics warn that such approaches could damage trust among member states or erode legal consistency, the failure to act in the face of systemic obstruction is a greater risk, as it weakens the EU’s ability to respond quickly to global trends. EU countries are already weighing options to circumvent Hungarian veto.  EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and others have publicly stated “alternatives exist” and the EU will deliver “one way or the other”. The plans aim to reduce reliance on unanimity while preserving as much EU unity as possible. The first measure includes changing the voting system by expanding qualified majority voting(QMV) into areas that currently require unanimity, such as foreign policy decisions or parts of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Under QMV, decisions would pass with the support of 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the EU population, allowing Ukraine aid, sanctions, or enlargement steps to proceed without Hungary’s consent. However, the challenges on the way of implementing the new system include the political sensitivity of overriding a core EU principle of consensus. The second step involves advancing a “multi-speed Europe” through greater use of flexible formats, such as informal “coalitions of the willing” and enhanced cooperation among member states. This would let groups of countries move forward on security, competitiveness, or Ukraine-related financing without needing full EU-27 approval. EU treaties already permit enhanced cooperation, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly endorsed it in February, stating that where unanimity stalls progress, the bloc “should not shy away from using the possibilities foreseen in the treaties.” Such arrangements already happen, to a certain degree, especially in the context of intergovernmental agreements that bypass EU institutional framework on the security and military issues. Moreover, creating specific funds or using the proceeds of the Russian frozen assets are the alternative ways to raise the financial aid bypassing restrictions. On April 1, the European Union received €1.4 billion in windfall profits generated by interest on cash balances from the immobilized assets of the Russian Central Bank, marking the fourth such transfer following the third tranche in August 2025 and covering revenues accumulated in the second half of 2025. These extraordinary revenues are derived from EU sanctions, while the underlying assets (worth over €200 billion) remain frozen and cannot be transferred back to Russia (as reinforced by the December 2025 Council decision under Regulation 2025/2600 and Article 122 TFEU), the interest does not belong to Russia and has been repurposed to support Ukraine. This mechanism serves as a practical and robust bypass to unanimity requirements, enabling continued financing for Ukraine even amid vetoes by individual member states such as Hungary. At the same time the concept’s main drawback lies on the inability of these formats to fully replace EU-27 decisions, and, furthermore, leading to the erosion of overall unity. The ways of compromise outlined by Kaja Kallas suggest energy-security concession - routing non-Russian crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia through Croatia’s Adria (JANAF) pipeline system as the replacement for the “Druzhba” pipeline. The European Commission’s Oil Coordination Group confirmed in late February 2026 that the Adria route from Croatia’s terminal has sufficient capacity to cover all Hungarian and Slovak needs. Croatia affirmed readiness to ensure deliveries of non-Russian cargoes, with the EU offering technical and financial support for diversification and interim measures. This strategy illustrates how targeted economic and infrastructural projects can be used alongside political pressure to bring dissenting member states back into alignment with EU objectives. In contrast to the soft mechanisms,  EU officials are also considering the stronger enforcement and financial pressure, tightening rule-of-law conditionality to withhold EU funds from Hungary. This would invoke Article 4(3) of the EU treaties (the duty of sincere cooperation) and link access to the next MFF budget, negotiations starting in July, to compliance on issues like Ukraine aid. European Council President Costa has already signaled this route, while Commissioner Michael McGrath confirmed that “if breaches to the rule of law were to occur, the suspension of payments or blocking of funding is now on the table.” The EU has already effectively frozen approval of a €16 billion defense loan for Hungary under the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) program.  The situation illustrates how the EU is using economic leverage as an indirect way to counter veto power, reinforcing compliance without formally changing unanimity rules. Hungary has warned it might reject the entire new MFF if funds remain at risk, but the approach would give the EU leverage to penalize vetoes without treaty changes. Another potential approach might involve suspending voting rights via Article 7 of the EU treaties, which allows the bloc to strip a member state’s voting privileges for serious breaches of EU values. The European Parliament already triggered Article 7 against Hungary in 2018. Reactivating or advancing it could create significant pressure even if full suspension is hard to achieve, requiring unanimity among the other 26 states. On the other hand, even pushing for Article 7 could create huge pressure on Hungary, completely isolating Hungary on Ukraine-related votes. The last and the most extreme measure is the expulsion from the EU, though it remains largely hypothetical and legally challenging because no treaty provision explicitly allows it. Some diplomats have proposed changing Article 50 (the Brexit exit clause) or other workarounds as a last resort. The idea is rarely discussed openly due to fears that Hungary would move even closer to Russia, but it is raised as a theoretical way to permanently remove a veto player from Ukraine aid and other decisions. Context of the 2026 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections On April 12,  Hungary will hold one of the crucial, future-defining parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been in power for 16 years, is facing the most intense challenge in the last several elections, from the opponent Peter Magyar, Tisza party. Polls show Orbán’s Fidesz trailing the opposition Tisza party by roughly 9–12 points. Many EU officials openly expressed hope that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán could be voted out, However, EU diplomats remained cautious, noting that even if Orbán were defeated, his successor might not fully reverse Hungary’s positions, particularly on sensitive issues like migration or EU expansion. Magyar has promised to realign Hungary more closely with the EU and NATO and unlock billions in frozen EU funds, but some officials believe any policy shift would be gradual rather than transformative. Potential Scenarios and EU reactions In the first scenario, If Orbán remains in power following the upcoming elections, the European Union is likely to systematically expand its use of veto-bypass mechanisms. In this case, tools such as enhanced cooperation, intergovernmental agreements outside the EU treaty framework, and off-budget financial instruments would become more institutionalized rather than ad hoc solutions. At the same time, the EU would likely intensify political and economic pressure on Hungary. This could include delaying or conditioning access to EU funds, increasing public criticism from EU leaders, and further isolating Hungary in diplomatic forums. While formal sanctions under mechanisms such as Article 7 remain difficult due to unanimity requirements, informal exclusion from key decision-making processes may become more pronounced. In the second scenario, A victory by opposition party would create an opportunity for a reset in EU–Hungary relations. Opposition leaders, including Péter Magyar, have signaled a more cooperative stance toward the EU, emphasizing the importance of restoring trust, unlocking frozen EU funds, and aligning Hungary more closely with common European policies. The EU would likely prioritize rapid reintegration of Hungary into consensus-based governance. This could involve accelerating the release of withheld funds, including approximately €17 billion in frozen EU cohesion and recovery funds, which have been suspended primarily over rule-of-law and corruption concerns, reestablishing Hungary’s role in collective decision-making, and reducing reliance on bypass mechanisms such as enhanced cooperation. A more constructive Hungarian position would also facilitate smoother coordination on key issues, including sanctions policy and broader geopolitical strategy. However, even a pro-EU administration may face domestic political constraints, limiting its ability to fully reverse previous positions. As a result, while institutional cohesion would likely improve, the EU may remain cautious and retain some fallback mechanisms to guard against future obstruction. Considering the current internal disagreements inside the bloc, one thing is clear - the election outcome will directly influence the EU’s strategic trajectory and institutional mechanisms in managing veto players, while maintaining long-term support for Ukraine. Regardless of the result, the EU appears determined to ensure that Hungarian case does not hinder collective action on existential foreign policy priorities.

Nargiza Umarova’s policy brief for Caspian Policy Center explores how Uzbekistan is emerging as one of the key drivers of a new transport and connectivity landscape in Central Asia. Focusing on the expansion of freight transportation across the Caspian Sea and the growing strategic use of Turkmenistan’s railway and port infrastructure, the brief demonstrates how Tashkent is steadily strengthening its role in east-west transit. It outlines the practical significance of recent infrastructure and institutional developments, including the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, the evolution of the CASCA+ corridor, and new mechanisms for coordinating railway administrations across the region. Through these initiatives, Uzbekistan is not only diversifying its foreign trade routes, but also contributing to the formation of a more resilient and interconnected regional transport architecture. The brief also places these developments within a broader geopolitical and economic context, showing how Uzbekistan’s transport policy is linked to regional integration, access to European and global markets, and the search for alternatives amid geopolitical instability. Particular attention is devoted to the growing importance of cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, as well as to the strategic relevance of the Middle Corridor for the future of Central Asia’s external trade. By examining both the opportunities and the constraints surrounding new logistics chains, the brief argues that Uzbekistan is helping shape a new reality in the geopolitics of transport corridors – one in which Central Asian states are becoming more active participants in regional and transcontinental connectivity rather than remaining peripheral transit spaces. Read on Caspian Policy Center

In her policy brief for The Jamestown Foundation, Nargiza Umarova examines the growing significance of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor as an alternative transit route linking Afghanistan with Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and onward to European markets. The brief places particular emphasis on the corridor’s renewed relevance amid military escalation in the Middle East and deepening tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, arguing that the route offers Kabul a strategically important means of diversifying external trade channels and reducing dependence on more vulnerable transit directions. At the same time, the author highlights that the corridor is increasingly viewed not only as a logistical solution, but also as an instrument capable of reshaping broader patterns of regional connectivity. A central argument of the brief is that further development of the corridor, especially its possible extension toward Pakistan, could substantially expand the geopolitical role of Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and several Central Asian states by integrating them more deeply into trade flows between South Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. However, the analysis also underscores that such changes may alter the balance of transit significance within Central Asia itself, potentially weakening the current positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on north–south and intercontinental routes. In this sense, the brief goes beyond transport issues alone and offers a broader assessment of how emerging infrastructure projects are becoming part of a wider contest over regional influence, connectivity, and strategic relevance. The policy brief is especially valuable for showing that transport corridors in and around Afghanistan should be understood not simply as technical infrastructure initiatives, but as geopolitical projects with direct implications for trade geography, regional competition, and the future architecture of Eurasian connectivity. By linking the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to parallel railway and logistics initiatives, Umarova demonstrates that the struggle for control over routes is simultaneously becoming a struggle over the redistribution of economic opportunity and political weight across a rapidly changing macro-region. Read on Jamestown * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Farkhod Nazarov, undergraduate student at UWED, intern at IAIS The expansion of BRICS in 2024 reflects a broader process of transformation of the global governance architecture. The transition to a new format is accompanied by intensified discussions on the formation of alternative centers of economic coordination and the redistribution of influence within the global financial system. Under current conditions, the grouping is acquiring significance not only as a platform for dialogue among developing economies, but also as a potential instrument for the institutional reconfiguration of the Global South and the formation of a multipolar international order. An additional factor increasing interest in BRICS is the turbulence of the international order and the changing nature of U.S. foreign policy. The return to a more confrontational and protectionist approach by the administration of President Donald Trump has intensified discussions on the need to diversify economic and political partnerships among countries of the Global South, which view the grouping as a channel for access to major Asian markets, primarily China and India. Trade conflicts, sanctions policy, and threats of introducing tariff restrictions against a number of BRICS countries have underscored the vulnerability of states heavily dependent on Western markets and financial institutions. In these conditions, participation in BRICS is increasingly viewed as a tool for strategic “hedging” of risks and as a mechanism for expanding external economic opportunities. Thus, BRICS+ is beginning to be perceived not only as an economic club, but also as a potential alternative within a broader strategy of states aimed at reducing dependence on a Western-centric system of global governance. However, along with promising indicators, problems also arise in the form of fragmentation of participants’ interests and coordination barriers, which point to the weak institutionalization of the organization. The central issue becomes the ability of BRICS+ to find a balance between converting economic mass into sustainable institutional power, on the one hand, and increasing transaction costs of coordination and risks of fragmentation, on the other. As noted in expert studies, the expansion of BRICS opens new opportunities for economic growth and strengthening the grouping’s global influence. Key indicators point to a gradual deepening of economic ties within the bloc. Settlements in national currencies are expanding, and alternative payment mechanisms are being discussed, reflecting the participants’ desire to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar. The New Development Bank, established in 2014, finances infrastructure, energy, and technological projects, forming a parallel development platform for countries of the Global South. In addition, BRICS countries have created a mechanism of mutual financial support — the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), aimed at stabilizing currency markets in the event of liquidity crises. For reference: The pool of contingent currency reserves is a mechanism of mutual financial support for BRICS member states in the event of short-term liquidity problems and currency pressure. The total volume of the pool amounts to $100 billion. The distribution of contributions is as follows: China — $41 billion (41%); Brazil, Russia, and India — $18 billion each (18% each); South Africa — $5 billion (5%). These steps indicate an attempt to redistribute monetary sovereignty, reduce transactional dependence on external financial infrastructure, and form a more pluralistic model of cooperation in the context of a gradual transition to a multipolar system of international relations. Institutionally, BRICS+ positions itself as an alternative to existing financial mechanisms, offering a less hierarchical model of coordination compared to institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. However, as experts note, alongside economic advantages, the expansion of BRICS has also intensified a number of structural problems within the bloc. 1.Limited institutionalization. Unlike integration associations with developed supranational architecture, such as the European Union, BRICS+ remains predominantly an intergovernmental platform without binding norms and enforcement mechanisms. The absence of a permanent secretariat, as well as the rotational nature of the chairmanship, makes the institutional structure of the grouping relatively flexible, but at the same time limits its capacity for long-term policy coordination. Under conditions of expansion, these institutional limitations become more pronounced, as an increase in the number of participants raises the complexity of reaching consensus. It is also worth noting that despite the creation of alternative financial instruments, the scale of their operations still significantly lags behind traditional institutions of global governance. For example, access to a significant portion of funds within the CRA mechanism remains linked to compliance with IMF conditions, indicating the continued dependence of new institutions on the existing financial architecture. One of the most ambitious, yet still unrealized, directions of BRICS development remains the idea of a single currency or a common unit of account. Initially, discussions about a “BRICS currency” were actively conducted in 2023–2024; however, by 2025, the participating countries effectively abandoned rapid steps in this direction due to significant economic differences, lack of convergence of macroeconomic indicators, and political disagreements (in particular, India’s cautious position). Instead, the emphasis shifted to the creation of a unified system of settlements in national currencies. This creates a kind of institutional paradox: while striving to reform the global governance system, BRICS does not yet possess sufficient resources and mechanisms to fully replace existing international institutions. Asymmetry of economic power. A significant challenge for the internal balance of BRICS remains China’s economic dominance and the asymmetry of influence within the bloc. As a result, Beijing is likely to shape the organization’s economic agenda even without formal institutional dominance. Statistical analysis shows that China makes the largest contribution to the New Development Bank and the CRA (41% of the $100 billion pool), which in turn provides the country with an informal lever in the allocation of funds. In addition, regional projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative strengthen China’s dominance and risk turning partnerships into a debt trap. This causes caution among some participants, who seek to maintain strategic autonomy and avoid excessive dependence on Chinese economic and political initiatives. BRICS–U.S. relations: the factor of external pressure. Relations between BRICS and the United States are predominantly confrontational in nature and remain one of the main external challenges for the expanded grouping. The return of the Donald Trump administration to a hard protectionist policy has significantly increased tensions. In 2025, the U.S. president repeatedly threatened to impose additional tariffs on countries supporting the “anti-American policy of BRICS.” Earlier, he warned of possible 100% tariffs in the event of attempts by BRICS to create an alternative currency or weaken the dominance of the U.S. dollar. The main trigger of American pressure has been the policy of de-dollarization and the creation of alternative payment mechanisms. Washington views these initiatives as a direct threat to the global status of the dollar. At the same time, the United States continues to impose sanctions against Russia and Iran — key members of the bloc — and actively attempts to split BRICS through bilateral arrangements with individual participants. Internal heterogeneity and disagreements. The grouping includes states with different levels of economic development, political regimes, and regional priorities, which significantly complicates the process of developing coordinated decisions. This heterogeneity can simultaneously act as a source of strength and a factor of vulnerability. On the one hand, the broad range of participants enhances the global representativeness of BRICS; on the other hand, it complicates the formation of a unified agenda and the coordination of collective decisions. One of the most striking manifestations of BRICS’ internal heterogeneity remains the asymmetry and complexity of bilateral relations between Russia and China — the two key “locomotives” of the grouping. As noted in expert studies, the mutual perceptions of the two countries differ significantly and largely determine the limits of their coordination within the bloc. China traditionally views Russia as an important, but increasingly dependent resource partner and a strategic counterweight to the United States, while in Russian elites there remains caution regarding the growing economic and technological power of Beijing. Historical legacy (from China’s “century of humiliation” to the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s) and contemporary disproportions (China accounts for 70% of BRICS GDP, dominance in trade and investment) create an implicit hierarchy that is only masked by the official rhetoric of “limitless partnership.” This asymmetry is particularly evident in Central Asia — traditionally a zone of Russian interests. China, through the “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative and subsequent infrastructure projects, is actively expanding its economic presence, turning the region into a corridor for its energy resources and goods. Russia is trying to maintain political and cultural influence through the EAEU and the SCO, but objectively lags behind Beijing in financial and investment capabilities. Although the sides avoid open confrontation and adhere to an implicit “division of roles” (Russia — security, China — economy), the growing dependence of Moscow on the Chinese market and technology intensifies internal contradictions within BRICS. This not only complicates the development of a unified agenda on de-dollarization and alternative payment systems, but also demonstrates a broader problem of the bloc: even among its closest partners, structural imbalances persist, which hinder deep integration and increase the risks of fragmentation. An equally serious source of disagreements within BRICS is the rivalry between China and India for influence in South Asia — a region where the interests of the two largest members of the bloc directly collide. India traditionally perceives South Asia as its sphere of influence (“Neighborhood First”), however China, through large-scale projects within the Belt and Road Initiative, is actively displacing its positions. China is developing port infrastructure (Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh), military cooperation with Pakistan and Myanmar, and providing significant loans and investments, which leads to a “debt trap” for a number of countries in the region. As a result, India views Chinese activity as a direct threat to its national security, especially in the context of territorial disputes and competition in the Indian Ocean. This competition directly affects the functioning of BRICS, complicating the achievement of consensus on key issues. Another acute manifestation of BRICS’ internal heterogeneity has been the deep contradictions between Iran and the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia and the UAE). The Sunni–Shia divide, long-standing proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as rivalry for leadership in the Islamic world and control over energy routes, make these relations one of the most explosive within BRICS. This confrontation is also clearly manifested in the current escalation of military actions by the United States and Israel against Iran. Thus, even among the key players of BRICS, structural imbalances and geopolitical contradictions persist, turning the grouping into a platform where internal disagreements often prevail over economic cooperation and hinder deep integration. The future effectiveness of BRICS+ will depend on possible directions of institutional development of the grouping, in particular: The creation of a permanent BRICS coordination secretariat, which would increase the institutional stability of the grouping and reduce transaction costs of interstate coordination. The development of mechanisms for collective decision-making and a more balanced distribution of votes in BRICS financial institutions, which may reduce concerns regarding asymmetry of influence within the grouping. The creation of a platform for regular strategic consultations among BRICS countries, which may contribute to reducing political contradictions and strengthening trust among participants. In general, it can be noted that BRICS+ demonstrates significant geo-economic potential and is gradually strengthening its position in the global economy. However, the ability of the grouping to transform quantitative growth and economic mass into sustainable institutional power remains limited. If BRICS does not resolve the problem of institutionalization, does not develop mechanisms for managing internal contradictions, and does not create more effective instruments for coordinating economic policy, the grouping risks remaining primarily a platform for political dialogue. In this case, the prospects for forming an alternative model of global governance may prove limited, and BRICS+ will retain the role of a flexible but institutionally weak association of states united more by common interests than by deep integration. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.