By Umidjon Hasanov, 3d year student at UWED, intern at IAIS   Introduction Primary subjects of international law, in other words, states, must always act in accordance with international norms when they enter into relations with their counterparts and should not break the rules established by international bodies. However, big countries with relatively more power in the global arena, sometimes, intentionally or non-intentionally break those rules to keep their strategic interests irrelevant and prioritized. In most cases, direct measures were taken, such as direct intervention, armed conflict, blockade, quarantine, etc before the nuclear power came into existence which was accepted during 1940s. From that moment, global powers sought some alternative ways of intervention with low risk of nuclear threat, and low cost of direct confrontation. Today, global players with nuclear capability have expanded (India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel) which increases the risk of direct conflict. In order to lower the risk, they started using indirect ways of intervention, by establishing links with local agents, what academics call “proxy agents”. Countries that are going to intervene in these regional issues, usually show their activeness through political, financial and military support as much as is needed to maintain the balance of influence. Wars by proxy are indeed considered a “luxurious” feature of Cold War era. The Soviet Union and the United States used the small states and non-state actors to perform their tasks. Therefore, some scholars claim that Cold War era proxy war studies were aligned with global power competition theory. During the Cold War, in Afghanistan, both sides knew it very well if either of them gained control of the region or even a part of the country, it might create an imbalance, Soviet Union did not want American participation in political games near its southern borders, the American side did not want either Soviet expansion in the southern region of “Heartland”. Accordingly, it eventually led to a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (which was already experiencing internal armed conflicts with Islamic movements) in December 1979 to support the communist government, which caused American intervention in the conflict through its financial and military support for Islamic movements fighting against the communist government.   Primary motives from proxy war Before clearing up what the motives of proxy wars are, it is necessary to give a clear explanation “proxy relations” to separate it from traditional alliances. In proxy relations, government, movements, military companies or other subjects (playing the role of agent) usually act on behalf of and with the instructions of their principal in the region. However, allies usually consider themselves to have equal status to act, because the interests of both counties correlate in most cases. Interestingly, to start successful proxy relationship, both a principal and an agent should have a mutual need for strategic support which is not the case in traditional allies. In the global arena, allies’ positions sometimes may not come together and even contradict each other. The reason is that traditional allies have no such inevitable need for each other and have enough power to act independently. In every case, the balance of power in conflict-prone regions is the main objective of proxy existence. Middle East, Africa, South America, and even Eastern Europe is also on the list of conflict-prone regions. The principal also has to maintain its activity in the region: to expand its political influence in the region; to decrease political role of rival states in the region; to decrease the dominance of rival state in the region; to sustain the balance of power between neighboring states in the region; to create geopolitical turbulence in a distant region which is under the influence of a rival state; to back up a buffer state in order to keep the secure zone between the principal and antagonist rival state. These motives may justify the actions of the principal, even though it is not publicly announced by either global player. In fact, the history of proxy wars shows that none of these motives are static for any global player. The emergence of proxy motives can be classified according to the region where they are taking place and global players pursuing them.  In most of the Middle East proxy cases, global powers, such as the United States, Russia and regional powers like Iran have been using it to decrease the role of each other in the region. For example, Iran continuously supports Hezbollah in Lebanon because it is the best low risk way of keeping back Israel from improving its political position in the region or Russia’s extensive support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime during the Syrian civil war was an alternative way to sustain its position in this distant region. To be clear, for a hiring state to better influence the political stability of the region is the objective of using proxy networks but there are other separate motives for proxies themselves too. Proxy agents also pursue their interests through their active role in regional issues by collaborating with their principals. These motives differ according to their nature, for armed group, religious or ethnic minorities, terrorist organizations or even for a small government. These motives include: to survive in harsh political conditions of the region; to strengthen proxy’s political and ideological positions; to gain political authority in the region; to react actively on religious, ethnic and racial policies, and changes of the region; to earn money. The last one is usually seen in cases involving the military organization. These motives are not static, they can change similarly when the ators are replaced. Additionally, these motives can sometimes coexist in one case. For example, in Lebanon, the political party “Hezbollah” usually gets technical, financial and military support from Iran to strengthen its political role and authority in Lebanese parliament, also to survive amid Israel’s harsh attacks. During the Cold War period, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki (1978-79) came to power  through a revolution and sought immediate support from the Soviet Union, first of all to strengthen the ideological and political position of PDPA and secondly, to survive in harsh geopolitical context.   Regions prone to conflicts There is an ongoing debate among scholars why some parts of geopolitical structures are vulnerable to conflicts while others are stable and moderate. In this regard, different academics express different opinions, for example, Stathis Kalyvas, political scientist at the University of Oxford, thinks that fragmented or incomplete territorial control creates the violence-prone zones. James Fearon, a political scientist at Stanford University, in his article, explains that conflicts in states are usually associated with weak state institutions and low income. In fact, both arguments are valid enough to take into account in monitoring the different situations. Nevertheless, there are several countries that have experienced conflicts and are experiencing even though mentioned factors do not exist in their cases. For example, Yugoslavia has experiences one of the most complex internal conflicts in Europe in the 1990s or Ukraine is experiencing since 2022. The reason behind this is not weak institutions or low income, but ethnic fragmentation and continuous confrontations. The map of Cold War conflicts indicates that (1945-1991), the majority of them have been witnessed in fragile regions where the political system was fragmented, internal conflicts flourished or ideological and religious confrontations were intense. For example, proxies in China by two different superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, were indirectly involved in internal armed conflicts between the communist party and nationalists which eventually led to the establishment of the communist government. The case of the two Korean countries backed by two major powers is an ideal example with its typical features of soft proxy relations between the agent and principal and strong alliance mutually. North Korea has been considered a strong ally of the Soviet Union in the Korean peninsula while South Korea, especially, from the end of the 1970s started to be seen as a reliable, distant ally of the United States of America since it started its heyday in trade and heavy industry. In both cases, the relations of the two major powers with two regional countries were seen as purely interest-based relations. However, this pure theory is challenged with the fact that during the Korean war, foreign policy of the United States towards the Far East aligned with Domino theory’s implementation. For the United States, containment of communism is seen as the strongest vector of its actions. According to Harry Truman, the President of the United States, controlling the spread of Soviet communist ideology in one country of the region was important to the concept of “stop the first to save the rest”. For the Soviet Union, the impact of the United States on South Korea, its economic, technological and ideological penetration was an incalculable threat to Soviet interest in the Far East, therefore, the Soviet Union also tried to limit the pressure coming from Southern allies. The conclusion from the case demonstrates that political confrontation in one region by two different ideological backgrounds led to the fragmentation of one country  into to two different countries. The impact of proxy wars on developing countries and transition economies In the twenty-first century, the new world order is being shaped by the emergence of new regional and global players. In fact, their international role is being highly assessed as majority of them are improving their economic and pragmatic relations with each other. According to the report announced by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, “This project focuses on eight “hinge states”—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates—whose strategic choices will profoundly shape the future of the international order. These states navigate between established Western alliances and rising revisionist powers, making their preferences critical to whether global governance systems adapt or erode. By examining their identities, interests, and diplomatic behaviors, this project offers a framework for how the United States and its partners can more effectively engage with these actors and manage great power competition”. However, the question regarding the current situation in developing countries and transition economies is still open to debate. In addition, how these proxy networks impact them, their international reputation and political development is the main theme of security discussions. Developing countries usually experience economically, politically, culturally and ideologically turbulent period and during these periods they are more vulnerable to proxy involvement. There are questions regarding the factors that attract proxies. How many are they and which of them are more serious compared to others? Here are some of them according to the author: Strategic location of the country: some developing countries are located in fragile zones where they have borders with one or more major powers which creates double pressure compared to the distant version of the same case － Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Mexico, Pakistan - examples that have much higher risk of proxy wars. Kazakhstan is located in the region where it shares its borders with Russia and China, Ukraine is located as a buffer state between Russia and NATO which turns it into a good battlefield for political games. Mexico is the outhern neighbor of the United States also one of only two neighbors of it. Pakistan has a more complex case where it shares its borders with Iran, India, China and Afghanistan with whom it usually has mutual conflicts. Countries with different ethnic, religious and language distinctions: in the majority of countries’ populations consist of ethnically, religiously and culturally different backgrounds which usually creates tensions of different groups － Ukraine, India, Afghanistan, Iran - examples in which ethnic population geography is disproportionate, for example, in Iran, 25% of the total population are Azers while 9% are Kurds. In Afghanistan, 22% of the total population are Pashtuns. Russian minority groups in Ukraine which was almost 18% of the total population. These numbers indicate that these countries are more vulnerable to proxies compare to the single-ethnic countries. India, Nigeria, Israel, Ethiopia - in these countries the percentage of religious minority groups is relatively high which indicates the existence of ideological disparities between them, for example, in India 15% of the population are Muslims, in Nigeria almost 50% of the population are Muslims, in Israel it is 18% and in Ethiopia 30%. Countries with low income and poor living conditions: history shows that political and ideological situations in poor countries were unstable and easy to intervene in by external threats. In fact, low salaries, hunger and poor economic and social policies were seen as driving factors. Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Congo - these countries are considered low-income countries with poor economic and social policy and in each of them political and social turbulence is high enough to create good proxies or other kind of conflicts. For example, in Syria prolonged civil war with the involvement of Russia and United States (2000’s-2025), First Congo War (1996-1997), Second Congo War (1998-2003), and Eastern Congo War (2000s- present) or Civil War in Afghanistan (1996-2001) indicates the significance of economic and cultural state of the country. Weak state institutions and lack of the rule of law: institutional structure is important because an effective government and rule of law provide the stability, development, and a secure system. There are a number of examples where strong institutional structure and rule of law provide pure development and secure political environment. Singapore, Japan, Luxembourg, Denmark and New Zealand - are considered leading countries in Government Effectiveness Index (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) in 2024. The lowest is 1.84 assessment given to New Zealand. Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland, Switzerland and Singapore - are leading countries in Control of corruption index (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) in 2024. The lowest is 1.97 assessment given to Singapore. New Zealand, Switzerland, Singapore, Denmark and Finland - according to the GPI (Global Peace Index), the composite index measuring the peacefulness of countries made up of 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators each weighted on a scale of 1-5. The lower the score the more peaceful the country and these countries were included in the top 10 countries of the world. The impact of proxy wars on developing countries and transition economies is not measured continuously; the reason for that the term itself and its interpretation is not fully comprehensive to discuss it at the government level. However, there are several general concepts. These concepts include economic, political, ideological impacts. Economic impacts - proxy wars or any other form of conflicts usually bring economic constrains and long-term crisis for the country which is actively involved in these wars as an agent. There are typical factors which lead to this consequence, first of all, continuous financial aid from its principals or in other word, “sponsors”, this is the “beautiful” logic of proxies, the sponsor always helps its player in the game. If there are more than one sponsor, then it will double or triple the economic pressure emerging within the country. This aid includes, weapons, money, credit, missiles, etc. In reality, developing countries usually face multiple challenges during their economic development and financial improvement. However, involvement in proxy conflicts ensures them the prolongation of these economic and financial constrains. Political impact -  proxy wars are considered as the best way to create a political crisis. Developing countries do not usually get involved in proxy games, the reason is obvious, it is the most destructive way to undermine the development mood. In practice, developing countries usually deal with international pressure, sanctions or at least criticism from outside for their internal policy on human rights, democracy and liberalization. However, what reaction they get for their actions as a proxy is nothing other than the escalation of the case. From outside possible reactions might include diplomatic pressure, political sanctions, isolation and other possible options. However, from inside, the situation might take a serious step, massive protests, armed conflicts, civil war, government overthrow, fragmentation of  civilians, etc. Ideological impact  -  for a strong leadership trust and support of its civilians is very important. Most developing countries usually announce neutralism, pragmatic relations with any country, respect for the territorial integrity of other countries, economic partnership as the primary principles of their foreign policy. These are generally accepted rules of international peace and security. Continuous involvement in conflicts undermines, firstly, the trust of civilians to their government, secondly, the reputation of the “young”, developing country. National ideology of the country which was formalized for a future development the first object that is destroyed as soon as this conflict expands. A nation whose general ambitions were based on modernization, development, and a peaceful life suffers from these conflicts and replaces its ambitions with hunger, stress, isolation, refuge and fear.   Conclusion There is an ongoing debate on whether these proxy wars are useful for modern international relations or whether they are an unnecessary tool and should be eliminated by international norms and binding acts. On the one hand, it has been used to deter nuclear threats in different cases, from the aftermath of the WW2 to the present, however, on the other hand, proxies undermine the peaceful life of innocent people, foster continuous conflicts, and create religious, ethnic and racial tensions. The moral values of proxy wars are acceptable for both hiring state and agent, interference in regional issues and consolidation of power are taken as primary factors  which create the motive. Regions vulnerable to proxy wars are explained as territories where no any superpower has located its flag by means of “under the influence”. Apparently, those superpowers seek their stakes in those regions through different ways; governments, minority groups, political parties and movements, etc. The political, economic and social policy of countries, in majority of proxy cases, determines whether the region is ready for proxy wars or not. The more severe the situation becomes in the region, the more it is accepted as justification to start the proxy war. Countries that have crucial features that attract the proxies are counted and these crucial features include their strategic location, internal policy, ethnic and religious diversification, and economic-social state of the country, etc., which works as an assessment of readiness. Countries with the highest vulnerability to proxy wars were counted, concluding that the majority of them are in Africa, Middle East and Southern Asia. The reason behind this is the economic, political and social policy crisis, lack of stable development  and a poor institutional structure. The economic impact of proxy wars is a prolonged crisis, being financially dependent on others, especially on debtor countries (or a proxy principal), lack of industrial development and foreign investment. The political impact is isolation, sanctions, and international pressure, which  mainly undermine the internal stability of the country, leading to a poly-crisis, massive protests or even government overthrow. The conclusion expresses that internal consequences are higher than external ones. Finally, the ideological impact of proxy wars, first of all, it undermines the national development morality of a nation, it damages the reputation of the country on the international arena.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This article by Mukhammad Khodjanazarov, undergraduate student at UWED and research intern at IAIS, offers a timely and analytically grounded examination of how the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis has affected China’s energy security and strategic planning. Framed against the backdrop of military escalation around Iran and the resulting disruption of one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints, the study explores the extent to which China’s economic stability remains vulnerable to maritime supply shocks. At its core, the article argues that the crisis is not merely a regional disturbance, but a major test of the structural resilience of China’s energy system and its broader geopolitical posture. A major strength of the article lies in its multidimensional approach. Rather than treating energy security only as a matter of oil access, the author examines refinery-level vulnerabilities, macroeconomic consequences, strategic reserves, overland pipeline diversification, and the long-term transformation of China’s energy model. The analysis shows that while China remains deeply exposed to disruptions in Gulf oil supplies, it is not without important buffers. Strategic petroleum reserves, commercial stockpiles, pipeline links with Russia and Central Asia, and the relative insulation of China’s electricity system from oil dependence all emerge as key components of the country’s resilience. The article also makes a broader geopolitical argument by showing that the Hormuz crisis has reinforced Beijing’s long-term strategy of reducing dependence on vulnerable maritime corridors. In this regard, the study highlights the strategic importance of Eurasian energy connectivity, expanding partnerships with Russia and Central Asia, and the acceleration of renewable energy, electrification, and battery manufacturing. The crisis is therefore presented not only as a threat, but also as a catalyst pushing China more rapidly toward an energy system less dependent on imported seaborne oil and more rooted in technological and infrastructural adaptation. Overall, the article provides a thoughtful and policy-relevant contribution to current debates on global energy geopolitics. It convincingly demonstrates that the future of energy security will increasingly depend not only on access to fuel supplies, but also on diversification, technological capacity, and strategic adaptability. By linking immediate geopolitical risk with long-term structural transformation, the article offers a clear and persuasive interpretation of how China is seeking to navigate a more volatile international energy environment. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This article offers a timely and policy-oriented analysis of the profound disruptions reshaping Eurasia’s energy and transport architecture under the 2026 Iranian crisis. Focusing on the systemic consequences of the military escalation around Iran, the study examines how the functional blockade of the Strait of Hormuz triggered not only a sharp energy shock, but also a wider crisis in logistics, food supply chains, and regional economic security. By situating these developments within a broader geopolitical framework, the article argues that the global economy has entered a new era in which security considerations increasingly outweigh traditional assumptions of efficiency and open trade. A central contribution of the article lies in its detailed examination of how the crisis has affected Central Asia, particularly through the disruption of southern trade and transit routes. It shows that the combination of instability in Iran and renewed conflict along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border has placed the region in a condition of strategic vulnerability, cutting off previously important corridors to global markets. In this context, the article demonstrates that the consequences of the crisis extend well beyond energy pricing, influencing food security, inflationary pressures, and the future viability of major regional infrastructure initiatives. Using Uzbekistan as a case study, the article explores how the country is being compelled to revise its foreign economic and logistical strategy. Particular attention is given to the accelerated importance of the Middle Corridor and the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, both of which are presented not simply as development projects, but as strategic instruments of resilience and long-term sovereignty. The analysis highlights how Uzbekistan’s geographical position may be transformed from a structural constraint into a source of geopolitical and economic advantage, provided that route diversification and infrastructure adaptation are pursued with urgency. Overall, the article makes a compelling argument that the 2026 crisis marks a decisive turning point in Eurasian geopolitics. It concludes that Central Asian states, and Uzbekistan in particular, must adapt to a more fragmented and competitive international environment where protected and diversified corridors are becoming essential to national survival. Combining geopolitical analysis with concrete regional implications, the article provides an important contribution to current debates on energy security, connectivity, and strategic resilience in a rapidly changing international order. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

At the end of February 2026, a series of military conflicts erupted simultaneously along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border and the Middle East, particularly in the territory of Iran. The escalation of tensions along Afghanistan’s western and eastern frontiers has significantly worsened the humanitarian situation in the country. Against the backdrop of ongoing instability, the situation has created a complex balance of risks and opportunities for Central Asian states. On the one hand, security risks are likely to increase. On the other hand, Afghanistan’s growing economic vulnerability opens additional space for political influence from its northern neighbors. Amid an already existing structural crisis, the escalation of conflict in the Middle East has dealt a particularly severe blow to Afghanistan. As a result, the Afghan authorities have effectively lost the capacity to contain rising prices in the short-term period, largely due to shrinking opportunities for trade diversification. Under these conditions, the northern corridor through Central Asia is emerging as virtually the only viable alternative, at least in the near term. For Central Asian states themselves, the prospect of deepening humanitarian engagement with Afghanistan during a time of crisis is inherently dual in nature: while it entails certain risks, it may also generate significant benefits for several reasons. Firstly, the ongoing conflicts have effectively placed Afghanistan between two major geopolitical fault lines. Since November of the previous year, the closure of the border with Pakistan has disrupted traditional supply routes, while the escalation of tensions in the Middle East has also put imports from Iran at risk. As a result, March 2026 saw a sharp increase in prices, particularly for food and medical supplies. For years, Afghanistan’s geographic and political proximity to Iran provided favorable conditions for transit trade, making Iran one of the country’s largest trading partners, with an estimated turnover of around $3.2 billion. However, under current conditions, this relationship has turned into a critical dependency. This is evidenced by the most pronounced price increases being recorded in provinces bordering Iran, such as Herat. The situation has been further aggravated by the setback to the Chabahar port project, which had been viewed as a key alternative route bypassing Pakistani transit corridors. Ongoing instability in the region now casts doubt not only on the port’s viability but also on broader infrastructure initiatives. In effect, Afghanistan is facing an unprecedented level of logistical isolation. Secondly, rising tensions around Afghanistan’s borders have led to a unique pattern of dual refugee flows, placing additional strain on already fragile local infrastructure. According to reports by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian territory have increased the likelihood of a new wave of displacement, with implications for neighboring countries. Afghanistan is particularly vulnerable in this regard, as Iran has long served as one of the largest host countries for Afghan migrants. Recent developments at border crossings indicate an unusual trend: thousands of Afghans who previously held legal status in Iran are now returning home. Whereas deportations once dominated cross-border flows, there is now a noticeable increase in so-called “voluntary” returns. Reports suggest that up to 1,500 individuals per day, including those with valid passports and residence permits are leaving Iran. A similar pattern is emerging along Afghanistan’s eastern borders. According to UN data, more than 100,000 people were displaced within the first week of clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, Afghan media report that forced deportations continue at a rate of up to 20,000 individuals per week. Importantly, a large share of returnees lack both financial resources and viable opportunities for rapid economic reintegration. This not only increases pressure on the domestic economy but also risks becoming a source of longer term socio-economic instability. The current cyclical nature of migration flows further undermines Afghanistan’s resilience to ongoing crises. Thirdly, declining international funding combined with disruptions to logistical routes has deepened Afghanistan’s economic vulnerability. This leaves the Taliban authorities with limited capacity to stabilize the domestic market or maintain social order. The situation is further exacerbated by a shortfall in donor support. According to Georgette Gagnon, Acting Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), a sharp reduction in funding has significantly worsened the humanitarian outlook. In 2026, humanitarian organizations planned to assist 17.5 million Afghans, requiring $1.71 billion in funding. However, only around 10% of this amount has been secured to date. Beyond financial constraints, the conflict has also created barriers to physical access for humanitarian assistance. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that several of its transit centers have suffered damage during recent fighting along the Pakistani border. Moreover, the organization has suspended operations in a number of provinces due to security concerns. Despite growing needs, the ability to deliver aid remains severely constrained. In this context, underfunding has become a critical factor exacerbating the crisis. Fourthly, there has been a marked deterioration in food security. Over the past year, this issue has become as prominent on the international agenda on the same level as gender inequality. Data from the World Food Programme indicate a dramatic worsening of the situation. It is estimated that in the winter of 2026, more than 17 million Afghans were facing acute food insecurity. This figure saw an increase of 3 million compared to the previous year. Particularly alarming is the rise in malnutrition among vulnerable groups. Nearly 4 million children are suffering from malnutrition, many of whom require urgent medical assistance. International organizations notethat the food crisis has reached its peak in recent decades, with some acknowledging that they are no longer able to meet emergency needs due to insufficient funding. The factors mentioned above point to Afghanistan’s critical dependence on external assistance. At the same time, existing infrastructure and the political willingness of Central Asian states to engage, particularly Uzbekistan,  with Afghanistan may create a paradoxical opportunity. Prolonged military and political crises in the Middle East, combined with strained relations with Pakistan, are likely to further strengthen and expand the presence of Central Asian goods within Afghanistan’s import structure. In the long term, this may contribute to the development of more stable and trust-based economic ties between the countries. Looking ahead, Central Asian states may capitalize on the current situation to consolidate their role as key transit and humanitarian hubs linking Afghanistan with the outside world. The development of transport and logistics infrastructure, the expansion of humanitarian programs, and improved regional coordination could contribute both to stabilizing Afghanistan’s economy and to enhancing regional connectivity. Thus, despite the evident risks, the current crisis has the potential to reshape the regional architecture of cooperation. Provided that a coordinated policy is developed, Central Asian states may not only mitigate security threats but also use the situation to expand economic engagement, strengthen transport corridors and enhance their geopolitical significance in the region. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Mubina Khodjaevа, Master’s student at UWED, IAIS Research Intern The military operation carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran in late February 2026 became a new source of tension in the Middle East and drew reactions from several countries in the Asia-Pacific region (APR). The stated goals of the operation - preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and changing the strategic balance have increased debate about the use of force without broad international support and its possible effects on regional stability. Overall, several APR countries took a cautious approach, limiting their responses mainly to diplomatic statements and calls for de-escalation. China expressed the clearest position. On March 2, 2026, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, stated that China supports Iran in protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity and stressed the need to stop military actions. A spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry, Mao Ning, also warned about the risk of the conflict spreading and called for respect for international law. This response reflects Beijing’s long-standing view that the use of force without approval from the United Nations Security Council is unacceptable. It also reflects China’s practical interests, since Iran is important for the country’s energy security. Chinese analysts also note that a rise in tensions could draw U.S. attention and resources away from other regions, which may create new diplomatic opportunities for Beijing. Japan took a more restrained position. The country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern about the situation and pointed to possible risks to stable energy supplies. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi confirmed Tokyo’s long-standing view that Iran should not develop nuclear weapons and stressed the need for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. At the same time, the Japanese government did not openly criticize the actions of the United States, reflecting an effort to balance its alliance commitments with its economic interests. Japanese analysts note that continued instability in the Middle East may push Tokyo to speed up efforts to diversify energy sources and reduce dependence on supplies from the region. Malaysia offered a critical view of the situation. During a parliamentary debate, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim described Israel’s actions, supported by the United States, as a violation of international order. This position follows Kuala Lumpur’s traditional foreign policy approach, which emphasizes sovereignty and international law. Malaysian analysts note that the country’s stance is also influenced by strong public support for the Palestinian issue, which plays an important role in domestic political discussions and reflects solidarity with Muslim countries during the Middle Eastern crisis. Notably, Indonesia adopted a cautious but active approach. The country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairsexpressed regret over the failure of negotiations between the United States and Iran but did not place direct blame on either side. At the same time, President Prabowo Subianto stated that Indonesia is ready to support dialogue and consider taking on a mediating role. Representatives of the country’s largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, also called for an end to violence and for stronger diplomatic efforts. Given the organization’s strong influence in Indonesian society and its links with Islamic institutions abroad, it could serve as an additional channel for dialogue between the parties. Possible support for Iran from Nahdlatul Ulama may partly be explained by religious factors, as the organization often shows solidarity with Muslim countries during international crises. However, Indonesian analysts note that Jakarta’s initiative may face difficulties, as Indonesia has limited political and strategic influence over the main actors in the conflict. Overall, the responses of Asia-Pacific countries show differences in tone but share a common element of caution and limited readiness to become directly involved in the Middle Eastern crisis. On the one hand, countries in the region are interested in maintaining stable energy markets and trade routes. On the other hand, they seek to avoid political risks related to participation in the conflict. In the near future, Asia-Pacific countries will likely continue to rely mainly on diplomatic responses, limiting their involvement to official statements, mediation initiatives, and support for international mechanisms of conflict resolution. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This article by Mr. Dilshod Olimov provides a comprehensive policy-oriented analysis of the evolving energy geopolitics of Central Asia in the period from 2016 to 2030, with a particular focus on the strategic role of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The study argues that the traditional model of regional energy competition, historically based on the control of resources and transit routes, is gradually being replaced by a new paradigm centred on energy system resilience, infrastructure reliability, and institutional capacity. In this context, factors such as grid sovereignty, seasonal balancing capacity, investment mobilisation, and energy diplomacy increasingly determine the geopolitical position of states in the region. The paper examines how Uzbekistan has emerged as a pivotal actor within this transformation due to its large domestic energy market, central geographical location within regional power networks, and the comprehensive energy sector reforms initiated since 2016. Particular attention is given to the institutional and economic reforms implemented under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, which have significantly reshaped the country’s electricity and natural gas sectors, expanded renewable energy capacity, and improved the investment climate. These reforms have contributed to strengthening Uzbekistan’s energy security while simultaneously broadening its diplomatic and economic maneuvering space. The article also evaluates the structure of energy balances across Central Asian states and demonstrates how asymmetries between hydro-based and hydrocarbon-based energy systems create both vulnerabilities and opportunities for regional cooperation. In this regard, the development of cross-border electricity trade, modernization of power grids, and the creation of a regional electricity market such as the REMIT initiative supported by the World Bank, are examined as key mechanisms for transforming regional interdependence into a source of stability and mutual benefit. Finally, the study explores the broader geopolitical environment surrounding Central Asia’s energy transition, including the growing involvement of external actors such as China, the European Union, and the United States. The article concludes that Uzbekistan’s strategy of diversifying energy sources, expanding renewable generation, strengthening grid resilience, and promoting regional electricity market integration positions the country as a central “node of resilience” in the emerging energy architecture of Central Asia. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.