Policy Briefs

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Policy Briefs

08 April, 2026

EU Strategies to Circumvent Unanimity: Overcoming Hungarian Vetoes Amid the 2026 Elections

By Jasurbek Khamrakulov, Undergraduate student at UWED, intern at IAIS Background For the last several years, the European Union has become increasingly confronted with institutional paralysis in key policy areas, particularly foreign policy and financial assistance. In this context, Hungary, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, has repeatedly used its veto power to block collective EU decisions, most notably in relation to the financial aid packages for Ukraine. This has exposed structural weaknesses in EU governance at a time of heightened geopolitical urgency. Hungary’s repeated vetoes, particularly regarding a proposed €90 billion financial assistance package for Ukraine, have provoked a wave of criticism from European leaders. Despite the strong pressure on Viktor Orbán to lift his veto on the loan,  European leaders failed to reach a breakthrough at a Brussels summit, highlighting deep divisions within the Union. Orbán justified his blockade by citing a dispute over the damaged “Druzhba” oil pipeline, supplying Hungary, while other EU leaders expressed growing frustration and accused him of undermining collective commitments, emphasizing that the aid is crucial for Ukraine’s ongoing war efforts against Russia. According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Hungary and Slovakia imported around €137 million worth of Russian oil through the pipeline in January. Oil flows reportedly stopped in late January as a result of Russian air strike that Kyiv says damaged the pipeline's western branch Ukraine. Hungary, on the other hand, disagrees, accusing Ukraine of blocking it from being used. The current situation outlines one of the main challenges EU faces in the process of decision-making, which is unanimity. The principle allows any member state to block collective decisions, regardless of the level of support among other members. In practice, this has enabled Hungary to leverage its position to extract concessions or advance domestic political narratives centered on sovereignty and resistance to Brussels. As a result of policy paralysis, critical initiatives, particularly those related to Ukraine, are delayed or blocked. Furthermore, it weakens EU's credibility and its inability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor, working for the benefit of Russia in disrupting European aid flows to Ukraine. The Hungarian case is particularly significant because it reflects not only policy disagreement, but also broader tensions regarding rule-of-law compliance and democratic standards within the EU. Mechanisms to Bypass Vetoes Some experts argue that in exceptional circumstances, such as the conflict in Ukraine, the European Union can legally bypass Hungary’s veto if it violates core EU values, particularly the principle of solidarity in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. The legal pathways to overcome this dilemma are divided in two directions. If Hungary’s veto represents a serious and systemic breach of solidarity, the decision could proceed without counting Hungary’s vote. Secondly, unanimity rules could be reinterpreted, allowing qualified majority voting in situations that pose existential threats to the EU’s security, values, and stability.  The solutions are meant to be exceptional and narrowly applied, not a general abandonment of unanimity. While critics warn that such approaches could damage trust among member states or erode legal consistency, the failure to act in the face of systemic obstruction is a greater risk, as it weakens the EU’s ability to respond quickly to global trends. EU countries are already weighing options to circumvent Hungarian veto.  EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and others have publicly stated “alternatives exist” and the EU will deliver “one way or the other”. The plans aim to reduce reliance on unanimity while preserving as much EU unity as possible. The first measure includes changing the voting system by expanding qualified majority voting(QMV) into areas that currently require unanimity, such as foreign policy decisions or parts of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Under QMV, decisions would pass with the support of 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the EU population, allowing Ukraine aid, sanctions, or enlargement steps to proceed without Hungary’s consent. However, the challenges on the way of implementing the new system include the political sensitivity of overriding a core EU principle of consensus. The second step involves advancing a “multi-speed Europe” through greater use of flexible formats, such as informal “coalitions of the willing” and enhanced cooperation among member states. This would let groups of countries move forward on security, competitiveness, or Ukraine-related financing without needing full EU-27 approval. EU treaties already permit enhanced cooperation, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly endorsed it in February, stating that where unanimity stalls progress, the bloc “should not shy away from using the possibilities foreseen in the treaties.” Such arrangements already happen, to a certain degree, especially in the context of intergovernmental agreements that bypass EU institutional framework on the security and military issues. Moreover, creating specific funds or using the proceeds of the Russian frozen assets are the alternative ways to raise the financial aid bypassing restrictions. On April 1, the European Union received €1.4 billion in windfall profits generated by interest on cash balances from the immobilized assets of the Russian Central Bank, marking the fourth such transfer following the third tranche in August 2025 and covering revenues accumulated in the second half of 2025. These extraordinary revenues are derived from EU sanctions, while the underlying assets (worth over €200 billion) remain frozen and cannot be transferred back to Russia (as reinforced by the December 2025 Council decision under Regulation 2025/2600 and Article 122 TFEU), the interest does not belong to Russia and has been repurposed to support Ukraine. This mechanism serves as a practical and robust bypass to unanimity requirements, enabling continued financing for Ukraine even amid vetoes by individual member states such as Hungary. At the same time the concept’s main drawback lies on the inability of these formats to fully replace EU-27 decisions, and, furthermore, leading to the erosion of overall unity. The ways of compromise outlined by Kaja Kallas suggest energy-security concession - routing non-Russian crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia through Croatia’s Adria (JANAF) pipeline system as the replacement for the “Druzhba” pipeline. The European Commission’s Oil Coordination Group confirmed in late February 2026 that the Adria route from Croatia’s terminal has sufficient capacity to cover all Hungarian and Slovak needs. Croatia affirmed readiness to ensure deliveries of non-Russian cargoes, with the EU offering technical and financial support for diversification and interim measures. This strategy illustrates how targeted economic and infrastructural projects can be used alongside political pressure to bring dissenting member states back into alignment with EU objectives. In contrast to the soft mechanisms,  EU officials are also considering the stronger enforcement and financial pressure, tightening rule-of-law conditionality to withhold EU funds from Hungary. This would invoke Article 4(3) of the EU treaties (the duty of sincere cooperation) and link access to the next MFF budget, negotiations starting in July, to compliance on issues like Ukraine aid. European Council President Costa has already signaled this route, while Commissioner Michael McGrath confirmed that “if breaches to the rule of law were to occur, the suspension of payments or blocking of funding is now on the table.” The EU has already effectively frozen approval of a €16 billion defense loan for Hungary under the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) program.  The situation illustrates how the EU is using economic leverage as an indirect way to counter veto power, reinforcing compliance without formally changing unanimity rules. Hungary has warned it might reject the entire new MFF if funds remain at risk, but the approach would give the EU leverage to penalize vetoes without treaty changes. Another potential approach might involve suspending voting rights via Article 7 of the EU treaties, which allows the bloc to strip a member state’s voting privileges for serious breaches of EU values. The European Parliament already triggered Article 7 against Hungary in 2018. Reactivating or advancing it could create significant pressure even if full suspension is hard to achieve, requiring unanimity among the other 26 states. On the other hand, even pushing for Article 7 could create huge pressure on Hungary, completely isolating Hungary on Ukraine-related votes. The last and the most extreme measure is the expulsion from the EU, though it remains largely hypothetical and legally challenging because no treaty provision explicitly allows it. Some diplomats have proposed changing Article 50 (the Brexit exit clause) or other workarounds as a last resort. The idea is rarely discussed openly due to fears that Hungary would move even closer to Russia, but it is raised as a theoretical way to permanently remove a veto player from Ukraine aid and other decisions. Context of the 2026 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections On April 12,  Hungary will hold one of the crucial, future-defining parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been in power for 16 years, is facing the most intense challenge in the last several elections, from the opponent Peter Magyar, Tisza party. Polls show Orbán’s Fidesz trailing the opposition Tisza party by roughly 9–12 points. Many EU officials openly expressed hope that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán could be voted out, However, EU diplomats remained cautious, noting that even if Orbán were defeated, his successor might not fully reverse Hungary’s positions, particularly on sensitive issues like migration or EU expansion. Magyar has promised to realign Hungary more closely with the EU and NATO and unlock billions in frozen EU funds, but some officials believe any policy shift would be gradual rather than transformative. Potential Scenarios and EU reactions In the first scenario, If Orbán remains in power following the upcoming elections, the European Union is likely to systematically expand its use of veto-bypass mechanisms. In this case, tools such as enhanced cooperation, intergovernmental agreements outside the EU treaty framework, and off-budget financial instruments would become more institutionalized rather than ad hoc solutions. At the same time, the EU would likely intensify political and economic pressure on Hungary. This could include delaying or conditioning access to EU funds, increasing public criticism from EU leaders, and further isolating Hungary in diplomatic forums. While formal sanctions under mechanisms such as Article 7 remain difficult due to unanimity requirements, informal exclusion from key decision-making processes may become more pronounced. In the second scenario, A victory by opposition party would create an opportunity for a reset in EU–Hungary relations. Opposition leaders, including Péter Magyar, have signaled a more cooperative stance toward the EU, emphasizing the importance of restoring trust, unlocking frozen EU funds, and aligning Hungary more closely with common European policies. The EU would likely prioritize rapid reintegration of Hungary into consensus-based governance. This could involve accelerating the release of withheld funds, including approximately €17 billion in frozen EU cohesion and recovery funds, which have been suspended primarily over rule-of-law and corruption concerns, reestablishing Hungary’s role in collective decision-making, and reducing reliance on bypass mechanisms such as enhanced cooperation. A more constructive Hungarian position would also facilitate smoother coordination on key issues, including sanctions policy and broader geopolitical strategy. However, even a pro-EU administration may face domestic political constraints, limiting its ability to fully reverse previous positions. As a result, while institutional cohesion would likely improve, the EU may remain cautious and retain some fallback mechanisms to guard against future obstruction. Considering the current internal disagreements inside the bloc, one thing is clear - the election outcome will directly influence the EU’s strategic trajectory and institutional mechanisms in managing veto players, while maintaining long-term support for Ukraine. Regardless of the result, the EU appears determined to ensure that Hungarian case does not hinder collective action on existential foreign policy priorities.

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Policy Briefs

08 April, 2026

How is Uzbekistan Shaping a New Reality in the Geopolitics of Transport Corridors in Central Asia?

Nargiza Umarova’s policy brief for Caspian Policy Center explores how Uzbekistan is emerging as one of the key drivers of a new transport and connectivity landscape in Central Asia. Focusing on the expansion of freight transportation across the Caspian Sea and the growing strategic use of Turkmenistan’s railway and port infrastructure, the brief demonstrates how Tashkent is steadily strengthening its role in east-west transit. It outlines the practical significance of recent infrastructure and institutional developments, including the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, the evolution of the CASCA+ corridor, and new mechanisms for coordinating railway administrations across the region. Through these initiatives, Uzbekistan is not only diversifying its foreign trade routes, but also contributing to the formation of a more resilient and interconnected regional transport architecture. The brief also places these developments within a broader geopolitical and economic context, showing how Uzbekistan’s transport policy is linked to regional integration, access to European and global markets, and the search for alternatives amid geopolitical instability. Particular attention is devoted to the growing importance of cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, as well as to the strategic relevance of the Middle Corridor for the future of Central Asia’s external trade. By examining both the opportunities and the constraints surrounding new logistics chains, the brief argues that Uzbekistan is helping shape a new reality in the geopolitics of transport corridors – one in which Central Asian states are becoming more active participants in regional and transcontinental connectivity rather than remaining peripheral transit spaces. Read on Caspian Policy Center

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Policy Briefs

06 April, 2026

Turkic States Work to Develop Lapis Lazuli Corridor

In her policy brief for The Jamestown Foundation, Nargiza Umarova examines the growing significance of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor as an alternative transit route linking Afghanistan with Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and onward to European markets. The brief places particular emphasis on the corridor’s renewed relevance amid military escalation in the Middle East and deepening tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, arguing that the route offers Kabul a strategically important means of diversifying external trade channels and reducing dependence on more vulnerable transit directions. At the same time, the author highlights that the corridor is increasingly viewed not only as a logistical solution, but also as an instrument capable of reshaping broader patterns of regional connectivity. A central argument of the brief is that further development of the corridor, especially its possible extension toward Pakistan, could substantially expand the geopolitical role of Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and several Central Asian states by integrating them more deeply into trade flows between South Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. However, the analysis also underscores that such changes may alter the balance of transit significance within Central Asia itself, potentially weakening the current positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on north–south and intercontinental routes. In this sense, the brief goes beyond transport issues alone and offers a broader assessment of how emerging infrastructure projects are becoming part of a wider contest over regional influence, connectivity, and strategic relevance. The policy brief is especially valuable for showing that transport corridors in and around Afghanistan should be understood not simply as technical infrastructure initiatives, but as geopolitical projects with direct implications for trade geography, regional competition, and the future architecture of Eurasian connectivity. By linking the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to parallel railway and logistics initiatives, Umarova demonstrates that the struggle for control over routes is simultaneously becoming a struggle over the redistribution of economic opportunity and political weight across a rapidly changing macro-region. Read on Jamestown * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Policy Briefs

06 April, 2026

On the Challenges of BRICS Expansion

By Farkhod Nazarov, undergraduate student at UWED, intern at IAIS The expansion of BRICS in 2024 reflects a broader process of transformation of the global governance architecture. The transition to a new format is accompanied by intensified discussions on the formation of alternative centers of economic coordination and the redistribution of influence within the global financial system. Under current conditions, the grouping is acquiring significance not only as a platform for dialogue among developing economies, but also as a potential instrument for the institutional reconfiguration of the Global South and the formation of a multipolar international order. An additional factor increasing interest in BRICS is the turbulence of the international order and the changing nature of U.S. foreign policy. The return to a more confrontational and protectionist approach by the administration of President Donald Trump has intensified discussions on the need to diversify economic and political partnerships among countries of the Global South, which view the grouping as a channel for access to major Asian markets, primarily China and India. Trade conflicts, sanctions policy, and threats of introducing tariff restrictions against a number of BRICS countries have underscored the vulnerability of states heavily dependent on Western markets and financial institutions. In these conditions, participation in BRICS is increasingly viewed as a tool for strategic “hedging” of risks and as a mechanism for expanding external economic opportunities. Thus, BRICS+ is beginning to be perceived not only as an economic club, but also as a potential alternative within a broader strategy of states aimed at reducing dependence on a Western-centric system of global governance. However, along with promising indicators, problems also arise in the form of fragmentation of participants’ interests and coordination barriers, which point to the weak institutionalization of the organization. The central issue becomes the ability of BRICS+ to find a balance between converting economic mass into sustainable institutional power, on the one hand, and increasing transaction costs of coordination and risks of fragmentation, on the other. As noted in expert studies, the expansion of BRICS opens new opportunities for economic growth and strengthening the grouping’s global influence. Key indicators point to a gradual deepening of economic ties within the bloc. Settlements in national currencies are expanding, and alternative payment mechanisms are being discussed, reflecting the participants’ desire to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar. The New Development Bank, established in 2014, finances infrastructure, energy, and technological projects, forming a parallel development platform for countries of the Global South. In addition, BRICS countries have created a mechanism of mutual financial support — the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), aimed at stabilizing currency markets in the event of liquidity crises. For reference: The pool of contingent currency reserves is a mechanism of mutual financial support for BRICS member states in the event of short-term liquidity problems and currency pressure. The total volume of the pool amounts to $100 billion. The distribution of contributions is as follows: China — $41 billion (41%); Brazil, Russia, and India — $18 billion each (18% each); South Africa — $5 billion (5%). These steps indicate an attempt to redistribute monetary sovereignty, reduce transactional dependence on external financial infrastructure, and form a more pluralistic model of cooperation in the context of a gradual transition to a multipolar system of international relations. Institutionally, BRICS+ positions itself as an alternative to existing financial mechanisms, offering a less hierarchical model of coordination compared to institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. However, as experts note, alongside economic advantages, the expansion of BRICS has also intensified a number of structural problems within the bloc. 1.Limited institutionalization. Unlike integration associations with developed supranational architecture, such as the European Union, BRICS+ remains predominantly an intergovernmental platform without binding norms and enforcement mechanisms. The absence of a permanent secretariat, as well as the rotational nature of the chairmanship, makes the institutional structure of the grouping relatively flexible, but at the same time limits its capacity for long-term policy coordination. Under conditions of expansion, these institutional limitations become more pronounced, as an increase in the number of participants raises the complexity of reaching consensus. It is also worth noting that despite the creation of alternative financial instruments, the scale of their operations still significantly lags behind traditional institutions of global governance. For example, access to a significant portion of funds within the CRA mechanism remains linked to compliance with IMF conditions, indicating the continued dependence of new institutions on the existing financial architecture. One of the most ambitious, yet still unrealized, directions of BRICS development remains the idea of a single currency or a common unit of account. Initially, discussions about a “BRICS currency” were actively conducted in 2023–2024; however, by 2025, the participating countries effectively abandoned rapid steps in this direction due to significant economic differences, lack of convergence of macroeconomic indicators, and political disagreements (in particular, India’s cautious position). Instead, the emphasis shifted to the creation of a unified system of settlements in national currencies. This creates a kind of institutional paradox: while striving to reform the global governance system, BRICS does not yet possess sufficient resources and mechanisms to fully replace existing international institutions. Asymmetry of economic power. A significant challenge for the internal balance of BRICS remains China’s economic dominance and the asymmetry of influence within the bloc. As a result, Beijing is likely to shape the organization’s economic agenda even without formal institutional dominance. Statistical analysis shows that China makes the largest contribution to the New Development Bank and the CRA (41% of the $100 billion pool), which in turn provides the country with an informal lever in the allocation of funds. In addition, regional projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative strengthen China’s dominance and risk turning partnerships into a debt trap. This causes caution among some participants, who seek to maintain strategic autonomy and avoid excessive dependence on Chinese economic and political initiatives. BRICS–U.S. relations: the factor of external pressure. Relations between BRICS and the United States are predominantly confrontational in nature and remain one of the main external challenges for the expanded grouping. The return of the Donald Trump administration to a hard protectionist policy has significantly increased tensions. In 2025, the U.S. president repeatedly threatened to impose additional tariffs on countries supporting the “anti-American policy of BRICS.” Earlier, he warned of possible 100% tariffs in the event of attempts by BRICS to create an alternative currency or weaken the dominance of the U.S. dollar. The main trigger of American pressure has been the policy of de-dollarization and the creation of alternative payment mechanisms. Washington views these initiatives as a direct threat to the global status of the dollar. At the same time, the United States continues to impose sanctions against Russia and Iran — key members of the bloc — and actively attempts to split BRICS through bilateral arrangements with individual participants. Internal heterogeneity and disagreements. The grouping includes states with different levels of economic development, political regimes, and regional priorities, which significantly complicates the process of developing coordinated decisions. This heterogeneity can simultaneously act as a source of strength and a factor of vulnerability. On the one hand, the broad range of participants enhances the global representativeness of BRICS; on the other hand, it complicates the formation of a unified agenda and the coordination of collective decisions. One of the most striking manifestations of BRICS’ internal heterogeneity remains the asymmetry and complexity of bilateral relations between Russia and China — the two key “locomotives” of the grouping. As noted in expert studies, the mutual perceptions of the two countries differ significantly and largely determine the limits of their coordination within the bloc. China traditionally views Russia as an important, but increasingly dependent resource partner and a strategic counterweight to the United States, while in Russian elites there remains caution regarding the growing economic and technological power of Beijing. Historical legacy (from China’s “century of humiliation” to the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s) and contemporary disproportions (China accounts for 70% of BRICS GDP, dominance in trade and investment) create an implicit hierarchy that is only masked by the official rhetoric of “limitless partnership.” This asymmetry is particularly evident in Central Asia — traditionally a zone of Russian interests. China, through the “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative and subsequent infrastructure projects, is actively expanding its economic presence, turning the region into a corridor for its energy resources and goods. Russia is trying to maintain political and cultural influence through the EAEU and the SCO, but objectively lags behind Beijing in financial and investment capabilities. Although the sides avoid open confrontation and adhere to an implicit “division of roles” (Russia — security, China — economy), the growing dependence of Moscow on the Chinese market and technology intensifies internal contradictions within BRICS. This not only complicates the development of a unified agenda on de-dollarization and alternative payment systems, but also demonstrates a broader problem of the bloc: even among its closest partners, structural imbalances persist, which hinder deep integration and increase the risks of fragmentation. An equally serious source of disagreements within BRICS is the rivalry between China and India for influence in South Asia — a region where the interests of the two largest members of the bloc directly collide. India traditionally perceives South Asia as its sphere of influence (“Neighborhood First”), however China, through large-scale projects within the Belt and Road Initiative, is actively displacing its positions. China is developing port infrastructure (Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh), military cooperation with Pakistan and Myanmar, and providing significant loans and investments, which leads to a “debt trap” for a number of countries in the region. As a result, India views Chinese activity as a direct threat to its national security, especially in the context of territorial disputes and competition in the Indian Ocean. This competition directly affects the functioning of BRICS, complicating the achievement of consensus on key issues. Another acute manifestation of BRICS’ internal heterogeneity has been the deep contradictions between Iran and the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia and the UAE). The Sunni–Shia divide, long-standing proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as rivalry for leadership in the Islamic world and control over energy routes, make these relations one of the most explosive within BRICS. This confrontation is also clearly manifested in the current escalation of military actions by the United States and Israel against Iran. Thus, even among the key players of BRICS, structural imbalances and geopolitical contradictions persist, turning the grouping into a platform where internal disagreements often prevail over economic cooperation and hinder deep integration. The future effectiveness of BRICS+ will depend on possible directions of institutional development of the grouping, in particular: The creation of a permanent BRICS coordination secretariat, which would increase the institutional stability of the grouping and reduce transaction costs of interstate coordination. The development of mechanisms for collective decision-making and a more balanced distribution of votes in BRICS financial institutions, which may reduce concerns regarding asymmetry of influence within the grouping. The creation of a platform for regular strategic consultations among BRICS countries, which may contribute to reducing political contradictions and strengthening trust among participants. In general, it can be noted that BRICS+ demonstrates significant geo-economic potential and is gradually strengthening its position in the global economy. However, the ability of the grouping to transform quantitative growth and economic mass into sustainable institutional power remains limited. If BRICS does not resolve the problem of institutionalization, does not develop mechanisms for managing internal contradictions, and does not create more effective instruments for coordinating economic policy, the grouping risks remaining primarily a platform for political dialogue. In this case, the prospects for forming an alternative model of global governance may prove limited, and BRICS+ will retain the role of a flexible but institutionally weak association of states united more by common interests than by deep integration. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Policy Briefs

05 April, 2026

Proxy Wars – Introduction to the New Way of Intervention

By Umidjon Hasanov, 3d year student at UWED, intern at IAIS   Introduction Primary subjects of international law, in other words, states, must always act in accordance with international norms when they enter into relations with their counterparts and should not break the rules established by international bodies. However, big countries with relatively more power in the global arena, sometimes, intentionally or non-intentionally break those rules to keep their strategic interests irrelevant and prioritized. In most cases, direct measures were taken, such as direct intervention, armed conflict, blockade, quarantine, etc before the nuclear power came into existence which was accepted during 1940s. From that moment, global powers sought some alternative ways of intervention with low risk of nuclear threat, and low cost of direct confrontation. Today, global players with nuclear capability have expanded (India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel) which increases the risk of direct conflict. In order to lower the risk, they started using indirect ways of intervention, by establishing links with local agents, what academics call “proxy agents”. Countries that are going to intervene in these regional issues, usually show their activeness through political, financial and military support as much as is needed to maintain the balance of influence. Wars by proxy are indeed considered a “luxurious” feature of Cold War era. The Soviet Union and the United States used the small states and non-state actors to perform their tasks. Therefore, some scholars claim that Cold War era proxy war studies were aligned with global power competition theory. During the Cold War, in Afghanistan, both sides knew it very well if either of them gained control of the region or even a part of the country, it might create an imbalance, Soviet Union did not want American participation in political games near its southern borders, the American side did not want either Soviet expansion in the southern region of “Heartland”. Accordingly, it eventually led to a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (which was already experiencing internal armed conflicts with Islamic movements) in December 1979 to support the communist government, which caused American intervention in the conflict through its financial and military support for Islamic movements fighting against the communist government.   Primary motives from proxy war Before clearing up what the motives of proxy wars are, it is necessary to give a clear explanation “proxy relations” to separate it from traditional alliances. In proxy relations, government, movements, military companies or other subjects (playing the role of agent) usually act on behalf of and with the instructions of their principal in the region. However, allies usually consider themselves to have equal status to act, because the interests of both counties correlate in most cases. Interestingly, to start successful proxy relationship, both a principal and an agent should have a mutual need for strategic support which is not the case in traditional allies. In the global arena, allies’ positions sometimes may not come together and even contradict each other. The reason is that traditional allies have no such inevitable need for each other and have enough power to act independently. In every case, the balance of power in conflict-prone regions is the main objective of proxy existence. Middle East, Africa, South America, and even Eastern Europe is also on the list of conflict-prone regions. The principal also has to maintain its activity in the region: to expand its political influence in the region; to decrease political role of rival states in the region; to decrease the dominance of rival state in the region; to sustain the balance of power between neighboring states in the region; to create geopolitical turbulence in a distant region which is under the influence of a rival state; to back up a buffer state in order to keep the secure zone between the principal and antagonist rival state. These motives may justify the actions of the principal, even though it is not publicly announced by either global player. In fact, the history of proxy wars shows that none of these motives are static for any global player. The emergence of proxy motives can be classified according to the region where they are taking place and global players pursuing them.  In most of the Middle East proxy cases, global powers, such as the United States, Russia and regional powers like Iran have been using it to decrease the role of each other in the region. For example, Iran continuously supports Hezbollah in Lebanon because it is the best low risk way of keeping back Israel from improving its political position in the region or Russia’s extensive support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime during the Syrian civil war was an alternative way to sustain its position in this distant region. To be clear, for a hiring state to better influence the political stability of the region is the objective of using proxy networks but there are other separate motives for proxies themselves too. Proxy agents also pursue their interests through their active role in regional issues by collaborating with their principals. These motives differ according to their nature, for armed group, religious or ethnic minorities, terrorist organizations or even for a small government. These motives include: to survive in harsh political conditions of the region; to strengthen proxy’s political and ideological positions; to gain political authority in the region; to react actively on religious, ethnic and racial policies, and changes of the region; to earn money. The last one is usually seen in cases involving the military organization. These motives are not static, they can change similarly when the ators are replaced. Additionally, these motives can sometimes coexist in one case. For example, in Lebanon, the political party “Hezbollah” usually gets technical, financial and military support from Iran to strengthen its political role and authority in Lebanese parliament, also to survive amid Israel’s harsh attacks. During the Cold War period, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki (1978-79) came to power  through a revolution and sought immediate support from the Soviet Union, first of all to strengthen the ideological and political position of PDPA and secondly, to survive in harsh geopolitical context.   Regions prone to conflicts There is an ongoing debate among scholars why some parts of geopolitical structures are vulnerable to conflicts while others are stable and moderate. In this regard, different academics express different opinions, for example, Stathis Kalyvas, political scientist at the University of Oxford, thinks that fragmented or incomplete territorial control creates the violence-prone zones. James Fearon, a political scientist at Stanford University, in his article, explains that conflicts in states are usually associated with weak state institutions and low income. In fact, both arguments are valid enough to take into account in monitoring the different situations. Nevertheless, there are several countries that have experienced conflicts and are experiencing even though mentioned factors do not exist in their cases. For example, Yugoslavia has experiences one of the most complex internal conflicts in Europe in the 1990s or Ukraine is experiencing since 2022. The reason behind this is not weak institutions or low income, but ethnic fragmentation and continuous confrontations. The map of Cold War conflicts indicates that (1945-1991), the majority of them have been witnessed in fragile regions where the political system was fragmented, internal conflicts flourished or ideological and religious confrontations were intense. For example, proxies in China by two different superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, were indirectly involved in internal armed conflicts between the communist party and nationalists which eventually led to the establishment of the communist government. The case of the two Korean countries backed by two major powers is an ideal example with its typical features of soft proxy relations between the agent and principal and strong alliance mutually. North Korea has been considered a strong ally of the Soviet Union in the Korean peninsula while South Korea, especially, from the end of the 1970s started to be seen as a reliable, distant ally of the United States of America since it started its heyday in trade and heavy industry. In both cases, the relations of the two major powers with two regional countries were seen as purely interest-based relations. However, this pure theory is challenged with the fact that during the Korean war, foreign policy of the United States towards the Far East aligned with Domino theory’s implementation. For the United States, containment of communism is seen as the strongest vector of its actions. According to Harry Truman, the President of the United States, controlling the spread of Soviet communist ideology in one country of the region was important to the concept of “stop the first to save the rest”. For the Soviet Union, the impact of the United States on South Korea, its economic, technological and ideological penetration was an incalculable threat to Soviet interest in the Far East, therefore, the Soviet Union also tried to limit the pressure coming from Southern allies. The conclusion from the case demonstrates that political confrontation in one region by two different ideological backgrounds led to the fragmentation of one country  into to two different countries. The impact of proxy wars on developing countries and transition economies In the twenty-first century, the new world order is being shaped by the emergence of new regional and global players. In fact, their international role is being highly assessed as majority of them are improving their economic and pragmatic relations with each other. According to the report announced by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, “This project focuses on eight “hinge states”—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates—whose strategic choices will profoundly shape the future of the international order. These states navigate between established Western alliances and rising revisionist powers, making their preferences critical to whether global governance systems adapt or erode. By examining their identities, interests, and diplomatic behaviors, this project offers a framework for how the United States and its partners can more effectively engage with these actors and manage great power competition”. However, the question regarding the current situation in developing countries and transition economies is still open to debate. In addition, how these proxy networks impact them, their international reputation and political development is the main theme of security discussions. Developing countries usually experience economically, politically, culturally and ideologically turbulent period and during these periods they are more vulnerable to proxy involvement. There are questions regarding the factors that attract proxies. How many are they and which of them are more serious compared to others? Here are some of them according to the author: Strategic location of the country: some developing countries are located in fragile zones where they have borders with one or more major powers which creates double pressure compared to the distant version of the same case - Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Mexico, Pakistan - examples that have much higher risk of proxy wars. Kazakhstan is located in the region where it shares its borders with Russia and China, Ukraine is located as a buffer state between Russia and NATO which turns it into a good battlefield for political games. Mexico is the outhern neighbor of the United States also one of only two neighbors of it. Pakistan has a more complex case where it shares its borders with Iran, India, China and Afghanistan with whom it usually has mutual conflicts. Countries with different ethnic, religious and language distinctions: in the majority of countries’ populations consist of ethnically, religiously and culturally different backgrounds which usually creates tensions of different groups - Ukraine, India, Afghanistan, Iran - examples in which ethnic population geography is disproportionate, for example, in Iran, 25% of the total population are Azers while 9% are Kurds. In Afghanistan, 22% of the total population are Pashtuns. Russian minority groups in Ukraine which was almost 18% of the total population. These numbers indicate that these countries are more vulnerable to proxies compare to the single-ethnic countries. India, Nigeria, Israel, Ethiopia - in these countries the percentage of religious minority groups is relatively high which indicates the existence of ideological disparities between them, for example, in India 15% of the population are Muslims, in Nigeria almost 50% of the population are Muslims, in Israel it is 18% and in Ethiopia 30%. Countries with low income and poor living conditions: history shows that political and ideological situations in poor countries were unstable and easy to intervene in by external threats. In fact, low salaries, hunger and poor economic and social policies were seen as driving factors. Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Congo - these countries are considered low-income countries with poor economic and social policy and in each of them political and social turbulence is high enough to create good proxies or other kind of conflicts. For example, in Syria prolonged civil war with the involvement of Russia and United States (2000’s-2025), First Congo War (1996-1997), Second Congo War (1998-2003), and Eastern Congo War (2000s- present) or Civil War in Afghanistan (1996-2001) indicates the significance of economic and cultural state of the country. Weak state institutions and lack of the rule of law: institutional structure is important because an effective government and rule of law provide the stability, development, and a secure system. There are a number of examples where strong institutional structure and rule of law provide pure development and secure political environment. Singapore, Japan, Luxembourg, Denmark and New Zealand - are considered leading countries in Government Effectiveness Index (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) in 2024. The lowest is 1.84 assessment given to New Zealand. Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland, Switzerland and Singapore - are leading countries in Control of corruption index (-2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) in 2024. The lowest is 1.97 assessment given to Singapore. New Zealand, Switzerland, Singapore, Denmark and Finland - according to the GPI (Global Peace Index), the composite index measuring the peacefulness of countries made up of 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators each weighted on a scale of 1-5. The lower the score the more peaceful the country and these countries were included in the top 10 countries of the world. The impact of proxy wars on developing countries and transition economies is not measured continuously; the reason for that the term itself and its interpretation is not fully comprehensive to discuss it at the government level. However, there are several general concepts. These concepts include economic, political, ideological impacts. Economic impacts - proxy wars or any other form of conflicts usually bring economic constrains and long-term crisis for the country which is actively involved in these wars as an agent. There are typical factors which lead to this consequence, first of all, continuous financial aid from its principals or in other word, “sponsors”, this is the “beautiful” logic of proxies, the sponsor always helps its player in the game. If there are more than one sponsor, then it will double or triple the economic pressure emerging within the country. This aid includes, weapons, money, credit, missiles, etc. In reality, developing countries usually face multiple challenges during their economic development and financial improvement. However, involvement in proxy conflicts ensures them the prolongation of these economic and financial constrains. Political impact -  proxy wars are considered as the best way to create a political crisis. Developing countries do not usually get involved in proxy games, the reason is obvious, it is the most destructive way to undermine the development mood. In practice, developing countries usually deal with international pressure, sanctions or at least criticism from outside for their internal policy on human rights, democracy and liberalization. However, what reaction they get for their actions as a proxy is nothing other than the escalation of the case. From outside possible reactions might include diplomatic pressure, political sanctions, isolation and other possible options. However, from inside, the situation might take a serious step, massive protests, armed conflicts, civil war, government overthrow, fragmentation of  civilians, etc. Ideological impact  -  for a strong leadership trust and support of its civilians is very important. Most developing countries usually announce neutralism, pragmatic relations with any country, respect for the territorial integrity of other countries, economic partnership as the primary principles of their foreign policy. These are generally accepted rules of international peace and security. Continuous involvement in conflicts undermines, firstly, the trust of civilians to their government, secondly, the reputation of the “young”, developing country. National ideology of the country which was formalized for a future development the first object that is destroyed as soon as this conflict expands. A nation whose general ambitions were based on modernization, development, and a peaceful life suffers from these conflicts and replaces its ambitions with hunger, stress, isolation, refuge and fear.   Conclusion There is an ongoing debate on whether these proxy wars are useful for modern international relations or whether they are an unnecessary tool and should be eliminated by international norms and binding acts. On the one hand, it has been used to deter nuclear threats in different cases, from the aftermath of the WW2 to the present, however, on the other hand, proxies undermine the peaceful life of innocent people, foster continuous conflicts, and create religious, ethnic and racial tensions. The moral values of proxy wars are acceptable for both hiring state and agent, interference in regional issues and consolidation of power are taken as primary factors  which create the motive. Regions vulnerable to proxy wars are explained as territories where no any superpower has located its flag by means of “under the influence”. Apparently, those superpowers seek their stakes in those regions through different ways; governments, minority groups, political parties and movements, etc. The political, economic and social policy of countries, in majority of proxy cases, determines whether the region is ready for proxy wars or not. The more severe the situation becomes in the region, the more it is accepted as justification to start the proxy war. Countries that have crucial features that attract the proxies are counted and these crucial features include their strategic location, internal policy, ethnic and religious diversification, and economic-social state of the country, etc., which works as an assessment of readiness. Countries with the highest vulnerability to proxy wars were counted, concluding that the majority of them are in Africa, Middle East and Southern Asia. The reason behind this is the economic, political and social policy crisis, lack of stable development  and a poor institutional structure. The economic impact of proxy wars is a prolonged crisis, being financially dependent on others, especially on debtor countries (or a proxy principal), lack of industrial development and foreign investment. The political impact is isolation, sanctions, and international pressure, which  mainly undermine the internal stability of the country, leading to a poly-crisis, massive protests or even government overthrow. The conclusion expresses that internal consequences are higher than external ones. Finally, the ideological impact of proxy wars, first of all, it undermines the national development morality of a nation, it damages the reputation of the country on the international arena.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Policy Briefs

28 March, 2026

The 2026 Strait of Hormuz Crisis and Chinese Energy Security: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Vulnerability, Resilience, and Strategic Adaptation

This article by Mukhammad Khodjanazarov, undergraduate student at UWED and research intern at IAIS, offers a timely and analytically grounded examination of how the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis has affected China’s energy security and strategic planning. Framed against the backdrop of military escalation around Iran and the resulting disruption of one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints, the study explores the extent to which China’s economic stability remains vulnerable to maritime supply shocks. At its core, the article argues that the crisis is not merely a regional disturbance, but a major test of the structural resilience of China’s energy system and its broader geopolitical posture. A major strength of the article lies in its multidimensional approach. Rather than treating energy security only as a matter of oil access, the author examines refinery-level vulnerabilities, macroeconomic consequences, strategic reserves, overland pipeline diversification, and the long-term transformation of China’s energy model. The analysis shows that while China remains deeply exposed to disruptions in Gulf oil supplies, it is not without important buffers. Strategic petroleum reserves, commercial stockpiles, pipeline links with Russia and Central Asia, and the relative insulation of China’s electricity system from oil dependence all emerge as key components of the country’s resilience. The article also makes a broader geopolitical argument by showing that the Hormuz crisis has reinforced Beijing’s long-term strategy of reducing dependence on vulnerable maritime corridors. In this regard, the study highlights the strategic importance of Eurasian energy connectivity, expanding partnerships with Russia and Central Asia, and the acceleration of renewable energy, electrification, and battery manufacturing. The crisis is therefore presented not only as a threat, but also as a catalyst pushing China more rapidly toward an energy system less dependent on imported seaborne oil and more rooted in technological and infrastructural adaptation. Overall, the article provides a thoughtful and policy-relevant contribution to current debates on global energy geopolitics. It convincingly demonstrates that the future of energy security will increasingly depend not only on access to fuel supplies, but also on diversification, technological capacity, and strategic adaptability. By linking immediate geopolitical risk with long-term structural transformation, the article offers a clear and persuasive interpretation of how China is seeking to navigate a more volatile international energy environment. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.