Nargiza Umarova’s article examines how Uzbekistan continues to advance the Kabul Corridor despite rising tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The piece highlights that the Termez–Naibabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi railway remains a strategic infrastructure priority for Tashkent, Kabul, and Islamabad, as it could create the shortest overland connection between Central Asia and South Asia. The article underlines that recent upgrades to the Hairatan–Mazar-i-Sharif railway and the expansion of facilities at Naibabad station demonstrate Uzbekistan’s practical commitment to improving cross-border logistics with Afghanistan. These steps are not isolated technical measures, but part of a broader effort to strengthen Afghanistan’s role as a transit link and reduce the region’s dependence on longer maritime routes. Umarova also notes that repeated disruptions at Afghanistan–Pakistan border crossings have increased the importance of northern transit routes through Central Asia. In response, Uzbekistan is seeking to ease pressure on existing railway hubs and border stations, including by proposing the redirection of some freight traffic from the congested Saryagash–Keles crossing to the Oasis crossing point in Karakalpakstan. Overall, the article shows that the Afghan–Pakistani conflict has complicated, but not halted, the development of the Kabul Corridor. For Uzbekistan, the project remains a key element of its wider strategy to expand regional connectivity, diversify trade routes, and position Central Asia as a bridge between Europe, Eurasia, Afghanistan, and South Asia. Read on Jamestown * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Following the Taliban movement’s rise to power in August 2021, a significant part of the international community expected a rapid economic collapse of Afghanistan. The grounds for such forecasts seemed obvious: the freezing of foreign exchange reserves, the cessation of Western financial assistance, sanctions, de facto disconnection from the global banking system, and the lack of international recognition of the new regime. However, these assessments were only partially justified. Despite a severe crisis, the regime managed to maintain the controllability of the state apparatus, centralized control over financial flows, and the basic stability of the economy. Currently, the key interest lies not in Afghanistan’s development potential, but in the regime’s capacity to adapt to conditions of international isolation. De facto, the Taliban is constructing a model of a “survival economy,” based not on modernization and investment growth, but on a combination of administrative control, shadow financial mechanisms, regional trade, and indirect external support through humanitarian channels. The foundation of the regime’s financial sustainability comprises: 1. Customs Revenues. After 2021, the Taliban focused particular attention on controlling trade crossings with Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian states. Under conditions of an extremely weak production base, it is precisely imports, transit, and border duties that provide the bulk of budget revenues. According to data from the World Bank and a number of international monitoring structures, as early as the first two years after coming to power, customs and tax revenues began to recover faster than expected: in 2023–2024, the regime's monthly domestic revenues in certain periods exceeded 15–20 billion afghanis (approximately $200–250 million), with a significant part of these funds derived precisely from customs duties. International experts note that the new Administration managed to centralize the duty collection system and significantly reduce the level of grassroots corruption compared to the previous Government. If previously a significant part of revenues dissolved into regional client networks and corrupt schemes, now financial flows are concentrated to a much greater extent under the control of the movement’s central leadership. Of particularly important significance are the Torkham, Chaman, and Spin Boldak border crossings on the Pakistani direction, and trade routes through Iran and Central Asia, through which the main volume of imports of fuel, food, and consumer goods passes. As a result, the economy of the regime acquires the character of a “border rent model,” under which the state exists predominantly through the control of trade corridors and import flows, rather than the development of domestic production. It is precisely this system that provides the Taliban movement with relatively stable revenues under conditions of international isolation. 2. Mineral Extraction An additional factor became the activation of mining of mineral resources, viewed as one of the few potential sources of long-term foreign exchange earnings. According to estimates by the US Geological Survey, the total value of Afghanistan's mineral resources could reach $1–3 trillion. This refers to large reserves of copper, iron ore, lithium, cobalt, gold, and rare earth metals. Of particular significance are the Aynak copper deposit and the Hajigak iron ore basin. After returning to power, the Taliban significantly increased coal exports to Pakistan: in 2022–2023, the volume of deliveries reached 3–4 million tons annually, and the regime's revenues were estimated in hundreds of millions of dollars. In parallel, cooperation with Chinese companies intensified. In 2023, the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co of China signed an agreement on the development of oil fields in the Amu Darya basin with anticipated investments of up to $540 million during the first three years. However, the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum nullified this 25-year contract in mid-2025 because a joint ministerial committee determined that the Chinese firm had repeatedly breached its contractual obligations and failed to meet its specified investment deadlines.According to data from the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, revenues from oil extraction on the Amu Darya alone exceeded $130 million in 2025. Nevertheless, the resource sector still faces systemic constraints - a lack of infrastructure, technologies, international financing, and recognized security guarantees. Therefore, mineral extraction for now remains rather a strategic reserve of the regime and an instrument of negotiations with external partners, primarily China, than a full-fledged foundation for economic growth. At the same time, expectations of large-scale economic involvement by China have not yet materialized. Beijing demonstrates cautious pragmatism, avoiding major investments under conditions of instability. China is interested primarily in preventing terrorist threats near the borders of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and in maintaining access to Afghanistan's potential resources, but is not ready to assume the role of the primary sponsor of the Afghan economy. 3. The Shadow Economy In parallel, the expansion of the shadow economy continues, which historically has been a crucial part of the Afghan economic system. International sanctions have only reinforced the significance of informal financial mechanisms, primarily the “hawala” system, which provides cross-border settlements outside traditional banking infrastructure. Through such networks pass trade operations, diaspora remittances, import financing, and a significant part of domestic monetary circulation. It is fundamentally important that the Taliban does not attempt to liquidate the shadow sector. On the contrary, the regime integrates it into its own governance system, utilizing the licensing of intermediaries, control of transport routes, and taxation of informal trade. As a result, the shadow economy becomes not a sign of state weakness, but one of the key mechanisms of its functioning. 4. The Narcotics Economy The narcotics economy deserves separate attention. Despite a more than 90% reduction in the production of opiates in Afghanistan following the 2022 ban, this does not indicate the complete disappearance of narcotics production. Firstly, significant volumes of opiates were accumulated in advance. Secondly, the supply deficit caused a sharp rise in prices, which partially compensated for the decline in production volumes. Thirdly, the production of synthetic drugs, primarily methamphetamine, is intensifying. International structures record a steady growth in seizures of Afghan methamphetamine in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Africa. Production is based on the ephedra plant, which is widespread in the central and western regions of the country. As a result, Afghanistan is gradually turning not only into a hub for opiate trafficking, but also into one of the new nodes for the production of synthetic drugs with higher profit margins and less dependence on the agricultural cycle. At this stage, there are no sufficient grounds to assert that the narcotics trade is the main centralized source of revenue for the regime. However, it continues to play an important role in financing regional elites, armed networks, and the shadow economy. A paradoxical but critically important factor in the stability of the regime remains international humanitarian aid, despite the absence of official recognition of the Taliban. International organizations continue to finance food programs, infrastructure projects, healthcare, and humanitarian operations. According to UN data, after 2021, Afghanistan received several billion dollars of external humanitarian support annually. In 2022 alone, the volume of international assistance exceeded $3 billion, and in 2023–2024, despite a gradual reduction in funding, the country remained one of the largest recipients of humanitarian aid in the world. Humanitarian programs in one form or another cover more than half of the country's population, while about 23 million Afghans continue to need permanent external support. Formally, these funds are directed to the population; however, factually they simultaneously support domestic demand, employment, currency circulation, and the functioning of basic social services, indirectly stabilizing the regime itself as well. Under conditions of a ruined economy, the humanitarian sector has turned into one of the largest sources of monetary circulation inside the country. Through the programs of the UN and international NGOs, food supplies, the payment of salaries to medical personnel, water supply facilities, and primary infrastructure are financed. De facto, a situation is emerging in which the international community, striving to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and mass migration, simultaneously contributes to preserving the economic sustainability of the Taliban rule. At the same time, the regime itself consistently strengthens control over the distribution of aid, personnel appointments, and the logistics of humanitarian operations, seeking to use the international presence as an instrument of administrative influence and an additional source of internal legitimacy. Thus, the main vulnerability of the regime lies in the absence of long-term sources of modernization. Without international recognition, full access to the global financial system, large-scale investments, and institutional development, Afghanistan is unlikely to be able to transition from a “survival economy” to a model of sustainable growth. Ultimately, the economic sustainability of the Taliban movement’s regime is explained not by governance efficiency in the classical understanding, but by the ability to adapt the state to conditions of prolonged isolation. Afghanistan is gradually turning into an example of “low-cost authoritarian survival,” where a combination of customs rent, the shadow economy, humanitarian support, and regional informal ties allows the preservation of controllability even without international recognition. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The Eurasian Economic Forum, held in Astana on May 29 of the current year, should be viewed not simply as a routine EAEU event, but as an indicator of a more profound geopolitical realignment within the Eurasian space. Its primary distinguishing feature lies not only in its focus on artificial intelligence and digital transformation but also in the EAEU’s attempt to redefine its own role amidst the changing external economic environment for Russia, the transformation of transport routes, the growing role of China in Eurasian economic processes, the increasing significance of middle powers, and the gradual diversification of military-technical cooperation by individual states of the region. In this sense, the forum served as a platform where the EAEU sought to present itself not as a traditional integration format requiring adaptation to new conditions, but as a new digital and regulatory platform. The agenda encompassing digital technical regulation, artificial intelligence, product labelling, electronic document management, digital transport corridors, and product traceability reflects the bloc’s ambition to transition from classic customs integration to a more complex model of controlling trade flows, standards, data, and logistics procedures. This indicates that the future influence of the EAEU will be determined not only by tariffs and market access regimes but also by those who set the digital rules for trade, certification, sanitary control, transit, and industrial cooperation. However, beneath the forum’s technocratic agenda, deeper political contradictions are evident. The Armenian factor is the most indicative in this regard. Armenia remains a member of the EAEU, yet its foreign policy and military-political trajectory increasingly diverge from the Russian line. Yerevan has effectively frozen its participation in the CSTO before, is developing relations with the EU and the US, and is diversifying its sources of weaponry, including purchases and cooperation with India and France. Economically, however, Armenia is not yet ready for a sharp break with the EAEU, as its trade, energy, and migration ties with Russia remain significant. Therefore, Armenia is becoming one of the key indicators of the transformation of the former Eurasian integration model: EAEU membership no longer implies full alignment of foreign policy priorities with Russia. This situation highlights a broader problem for Russia. In the Russian expert-political discourse, the multi-vector approach of neighboring states is often viewed through the prism of preserving regional influence. The Russian reaction to Armenia’s European course demonstrates that for Moscow, the EAEU is not exclusively an economic project, but rather as one of the elements of maintaining economic, infrastructural, and institutional connectivity within the Eurasian space. This gives rise to an internal contradiction: on the one hand, the EAEU attempts to speak the language of the digital economy, technological modernization, and barrier-free trade; on the other hand, Russian political perception continues to proceed from traditional views on regional coordination and the limits of foreign policy manoeuvre. This contradiction is particularly critical for Central Asia. The region maintains close economic ties with Russia, while simultaneously experiencing a growing desire to diversify its external partners. In the military sphere, this manifests in the gradual diversification of sources of military-technical cooperation and the expansion of ties with China, Turkey, Western, and other manufacturers. A significant part of Kazakhstan’s military-technical cooperation has traditionally been linked to the Russian direction, yet the issue of diversification is gradually becoming a component of its long-term security. For Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, this trend is even more pronounced, as their military, technological, and transport policies can increasingly less be tied solely to a single external center. In this configuration, China acts less as a forum participant and more as the primary external structural factor. The EAEU is compelled to shape its digital and transport agenda in consideration of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. For Moscow and the EEC, this creates a dual challenge: on the one hand, it is necessary to leverage Chinese investments, transport corridors, and trade dynamics; on the other hand, they need to preserve the EAEU’s own regulatory subjectivity while aligning with Chinese infrastructure initiatives. The participation of external partners, primarily Iran and the UAE, is also of particular importance. For the EAEU, Iran represents the southern vector, associated with the International North–South Transport Corridor, sanctions-resistant trade, and access to the markets of the Middle East and South Asia. The UAE, conversely, acts as a financial and logistical hub through which the EAEU seeks to expand ties with the Persian Gulf and global trade flows. The Union aims to transcend post-Soviet geography and present itself as a link in the Eurasian-Middle Eastern economic architecture. For Central Asia, such a transformation presents both opportunities and risks. The positive effect is that the countries of the region gain more tools for transport diversification, trade digitalization, reduction of transit costs, and expanded access to the markets of the EAEU, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and China. However, the risks are associated with a potential increase in regulatory dependence: digital standards, labeling systems, technical regulations, sanitary procedures, and data exchange platforms can serve not only to facilitate trade but also act as a new mechanism for controlling foreign economic flows. Nevertheless, the case of Armenia, the strengthening of China, the participation of Iran and the UAE, and the diversification of Central Asia indicate that Eurasian integration is gradually acquiring a more multi-actor character and is transforming into a space of interaction among various power centres, routes, and regulatory models. Economic Analysis The economic dimension of the forum also reveals that the digital agenda holds direct, practical significance for Uzbekistan. The EAEU remains one of the key trade and economic directions for Uzbekistan, showing stable growth dynamics. According to available data (Table 1), between 2017 and 2025, the trade turnover with the EAEU increased from $7.2 billion to $20.2 billion (almost by 2.8 times). Uzbekistan’s exports to EAEU countries grew from $3.3 billion to $6.9 billion, while imports rose from $3.9 billion to $13.3 billion. Such dynamics demonstrate that Uzbekistan’s economic ties with the EAEU are stable and structural in nature. Table 1. Uzbekistan’s Trade Turnover with EAEU Member States (2025 vs. Q1 2026) Russia and Kazakhstan remain Uzbekistan’s primary partners within the Eurasian space, which is explained not only by the scale of their economies but also by geographical proximity, transport interconnectivity, energy flows, industrial ties, and labour mobility. For Uzbekistan, the EAEU serves not only as a sales market but also as a source of raw materials, fuel, food, industrial goods, equipment, and logistical capabilities. At the same time, Uzbekistan’s trade with the EAEU maintains a pronounced asymmetry (Table 2). Uzbekistan exports industrial goods, textiles, food, fruit and vegetable products, services, certain types of machinery, and chemical products to the Union countries. In turn, it imports metals, petroleum products, gas, grain, flour, vegetable oils, pharmaceutical products, timber, equipment, and other industrial components from EAEU countries. This deficit should not necessarily be viewed as a strictly negative factor, as a significant portion of the imports is utilized for domestic production, construction, processing, and maintaining price stability within the domestic market. This is precisely why the digitalization of trade, discussed at the forum, is of special importance to Uzbekistan. If digital transport corridors, electronic documents, navigation seals, technical regulation, sanitary and phytosanitary procedures, digital labelling, and product traceability operate effectively, they could lower export costs, expedite border crossings, enhance supply transparency, and facilitate the access of Uzbek goods to EAEU markets. Table 2. Commodity Structure of Uzbekistan-EAEU Trade (End of 2025) However, in an unfavourable scenario, these same tools could become a new layer of non-tariff barriers if digital standards are developed without considering the interests of observer states and external trading partners. Particularly sensitive sectors for Uzbekistan include agriculture, the textile industry, food processing, electrical engineering, pharmaceuticals, building materials, and transport services. These industries are either already oriented toward EAEU markets or rely on raw materials, components, and logistics routes connected to the Eurasian space. The issue of compatibility among national systems for certification, labelling, phytosanitary control, and electronic document management becomes a condition for preserving the competitiveness of Uzbek exports, rather than merely a technical detail. The investment dimension also confirms the depth of economic interconnectedness (Table 3). Over 5,000 enterprises with EAEU country capital operate in Uzbekistan, and investments from Union states are directed predominantly into the real sector: energy, metallurgy, telecommunications, logistics, light industry, mechanical engineering, and agro-industrial processing. While establishing a foundation for industrial cooperation, this requires Uzbekistan to pursue a more proactive policy toward localizing production, increasing value-added, and preventing the country from turning solely into a sales market or a hub for low-tech assembly. Table 3. EAEU Foreign Direct Investment Profile in Uzbekistan (2025) The role of the Eurasian Development Bank and other regional financial mechanisms warrants separate attention. For Uzbekistan, they can be useful in transport infrastructure projects, energy, modernization of utility networks, the agro-industrial complex, and digital logistics. The use of such instruments should be balanced with cooperation with other international financial institutions to ensure that infrastructural modernization does not create excessive dependence on a single financial and institutional framework. Equally important is the labour market. For Uzbekistan, the EAEU remains a significant destination for labour migration, and remittances from migrant workers continue to play a crucial role for households and domestic consumption. The digitalization of the EAEU labour market (electronic employment contracts, digital employment platforms, biometric tools, electronic registration, and data exchange) directly affects the interests of Uzbek citizens. Such mechanisms can simplify legal employment and reduce the level of informal employment, but simultaneously, they could tighten administrative control and generate new risks for migrants in the absence of transparent rules for protecting their rights. In this context, Uzbekistan’s internal reforms acquire foreign economic significance. Simplifying tax administration, raising the VAT transition threshold, digitalizing small and medium-sized businesses, formalizing employment, and developing electronic services create the prerequisites for the more active participation of Uzbek enterprises in cross-border digital trade. A business operating in the shadow economy cannot fully utilize digital labelling, electronic declarations, e-commerce platforms, and product traceability systems. Consequently, the internal formalization of the economy becomes a prerequisite for external competitiveness. Conclusions and Recommendations for Uzbekistan The significance of the forum for Uzbekistan should be viewed not through the logic of converging with or distancing from the EAEU, but rather as the pragmatic management of interdependence. It is important for Uzbekistan to participate in discussions regarding the EAEU’s digital and regulatory mechanisms, as they directly impact exports, transit, certification, agricultural trade, logistics, and industrial cooperation. At the same time, Tashkent must avoid decisions that could restrict its multi-vector foreign economic policy, its WTO accession negotiation process, and its cooperation with China, the European Union, Turkey, the Gulf States, and South Asia The forum in Astana demonstrates that the EAEU is attempting to shift from a classic integration model based on customs procedures and common markets to a digital model. For Uzbekistan, this creates opportunities to lower trade barriers, expand exports, connect to digital transport corridors, develop industrial cooperation, and participate in regional infrastructure projects. In practical terms, it is advisable to utilize the forum’s outcomes to advance several directions: Accelerate efforts to eliminate technical, sanitary, and phytosanitary barriers for Uzbek goods. Develop plans to connect to digital transport corridors, electronic waybills, navigation seals, and data exchange systems. Expand industrial cooperation in sectors where Uzbekistan already possesses a production base and export potential. Carefully study the experiences with digital labeling, public procurement, agricultural platforms, and digital statistics, while adapting them to national interests. It is necessary to leverage the observer status for institutional dialogue without assuming obligations that would limit a multi-vector foreign economic policy. The core objective is not the institutional deepening of participation in the EAEU, but rather a selective engagement with those mechanisms that yield practical economic benefits without constraining strategic autonomy. Such an approach will enable the leveraging of Eurasian connectivity advantages without turning it into dependence on a single integration centre. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have long maintained a dual character: formal strategic interaction coexists with persistent mutual distrust, border confrontation, and competition for influence in the cross-border space. The current stage of developments shows that the conflict between the parties is not situational but structural, with its causes lying much deeper than current political crises or the activities of individual armed groups. A key feature of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations is that both sides view each other simultaneously as a necessary partner and as a source of threats to national security. For Pakistan, Afghanistan has traditionally been perceived through the lens of strategic vulnerability on its western flank, internal ethno-political stability, and regional rivalry with India. For Afghanistan, Pakistan remains a state seeking to limit Afghan sovereignty through political, military, and ideological influence. The foundation of the long-standing conflict lies in the divergence of fundamental perceptions of security and statehood. Pakistani strategy has historically been built on the desire to ensure a controlled and loyal political space in Afghanistan, one that would preclude the formation of a government in Kabul oriented toward close cooperation with India or support for Pashtun nationalism. This explains the long-standing reliance of Pakistan’s military-intelligence apparatus on using Afghan armed and religious-political groups as instruments of regional influence. At the same time, for a significant part of Afghanistan’s political elites and society, Pakistan is perceived as the main external factor of destabilization, contributing to the persistence of armed networks, cross-border extremism, and chronic instability within the country. Consequently, a stable model of limited cooperation without strategic trust has emerged between the two sides. One central source of tension remains the border factor. The Durand Line continues to play a role not only as a disputed boundary but also as a symbol of the unresolved issue of cross-border Pashtun identity. For Islamabad, controlling the border areas is directly linked to risks of separatism and internal destabilization. For Kabul, it is tied to the question of the historical and political legitimacy of the border. In current conditions, this factor is exacerbated by the weak governance of border regions, the activity of armed groups, and the high degree of autonomy of tribal structures. An additional source of conflict is the difference in the parties’ approaches to using radical armed movements. For a long period, Pakistan viewed some Afghan Islamist structures as instruments to advance its interests in Afghanistan. However, the gradual fragmentation of the radical milieu has led to a loss of full control over these groups. As a result, many structures initially considered a foreign policy asset have transformed into an independent threat factor for Pakistan itself. Of particular importance at present is the activity of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Following the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul, the TTP has significantly expanded its capabilities for basing, logistics, and coordination of actions on Afghan territory. According to estimates by the UN Security Council Monitoring Team, around 6,000 TTP militants are currently in Afghanistan, concentrated mainly in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan. Islamabad increasingly openly accuses the Afghan authorities of being unable or unwilling to restrict TTP activities. The Afghan side, in turn, rejects these accusations and accuses Pakistan of attempting to pressure and interfere in its internal affairs. Against the backdrop of the latest escalation of the border conflict in October 2025, clashes resulted in dozens of fatalities on both sides (by various estimates, over 60 from each country) and numerous injuries. Meanwhile, among the Afghan civilian population, according to the UN, at least 37 deaths and over 400 injuries were recorded, giving the confrontation additional intensity and making it the largest escalation in recent years. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 was initially perceived by Pakistan as a strategic achievement capable of fostering a friendly regime and reducing threat levels on its western border. However, subsequent developments have shown the limits of such expectations. Despite historical ties between Pakistani security structures and the Afghan Taliban, Afghanistan’s new leadership demonstrates a significantly higher degree of autonomy than Islamabad had assumed. Moreover, the ideological and ethnic affinity between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP objectively limits Kabul’s readiness to take harsh action against Pakistani anti-government groups. As a result, Pakistan finds itself in a situation where the rise to power of an allied force has not strengthened security, but has instead contributed to the expansion of cross-border threats. Additional tensions have arisen from intensified border clashes, Pakistan’s construction of engineering barriers along the Durand Line, mass deportations of Afghan refugees, and rising anti-Pakistan sentiment within Afghanistan. These processes are creating long-term negative dynamics that complicate prospects for political resolution. External actors continue to exert significant influence on the conflict’s development. For India, Afghanistan remains an important avenue for strategically containing Pakistan and expanding political presence in the region. Islamabad traditionally views any increase in Indian influence in Kabul as a direct threat to its own security. It is largely the factor of India-Pakistan rivalry that explains Pakistan’s desire to retain maximum influence over Afghanistan’s internal political processes. Further exacerbation of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations followed the official visit of the Taliban government’s Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to New Delhi on October 9, 2025, where he held talks with Indian leadership on political interaction, trade, and humanitarian cooperation. In Islamabad, the intensification of contacts between Kabul and Delhi was perceived as an alarming signal and further evidence of growing Indian influence in Afghanistan, deepening the existing contradictions between Pakistan and the de facto authorities in Kabul. China is primarily interested in preventing the spread of instability to regional transport and logistics projects, including CPEC, and minimizing threats to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. In this regard, Beijing maintains working contacts with both Pakistan and Afghanistan while avoiding direct involvement in the conflict. At the same time, China is actively developing interaction with the Central Asian states, viewing the region as a key link in the Belt and Road Initiative and an important element in securing China’s western borders. Iran views the situation through the lens of the security of Shia communities, migration risks, and the struggle for influence in western Afghanistan. Tehran maintains a pragmatic approach to interaction with the Taliban, despite persistent disagreements. Simultaneously, Iran seeks to strengthen transport and economic ties with Central Asian countries, using the Afghan direction as part of a broader regional strategy, including the development of transit routes to the states of the region. Uzbekistan has acquired particular importance in regional politics. Following the Taliban’s rise to power, Tashkent has taken one of the most active and pragmatic positions among Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan consistently advocates for maintaining dialogue with Kabul, developing transport connectivity, and integrating Afghanistan into regional economic projects. For Uzbekistan, stability in Afghanistan is directly linked to the security of its southern borders, the prospects for implementing the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Khalachi railway corridor, and expanding trade and economic cooperation between Central and South Asia. Against this background, the deterioration of relations between Kabul and Islamabad, accompanied by periodic closures of key border crossings at Torkham and Chaman, negatively affects not only bilateral Afghan-Pakistani trade but also the economic interests of Central Asian states. Disruptions in goods transit, multi‑million dollar losses for foreign trade participants, rising logistics costs, and reduced predictability of transport routes undermine the region’s plans to expand access to Pakistani ports and South Asian markets. Under these circumstances, Uzbekistan seeks to maintain balanced relations with both Kabul and Islamabad, avoiding being drawn into their contradictions while advocating for the stabilization of regional transport communications. For the United States, after the withdrawal of troops, the priority remains preventing Afghanistan from becoming a global hub for transnational terrorism. At the same time, the reduced American presence has objectively diminished the possibilities for external balancing between Kabul and Islamabad. In the new conditions, the Central Asian states, primarily Uzbekistan, are increasingly emerging as independent regional mediators and platforms for diplomatic engagement on Afghan issues. Current dynamics suggest that even with the preservation of formal channels of interaction, the parties are unlikely to transition to sustainable strategic partnership in the foreseeable future. A more probable scenario is the persistence of a model of limited interaction amid periodic crises, cross-border incidents, and mutual pressure. The central contradiction of the current situation is that Pakistan, seeking to strengthen its own security by fostering a friendly political regime in Afghanistan, has instead encountered an intensification of precisely those cross-border threats it initially sought to minimize. This demonstrates the limited effectiveness of a strategy based on managed influence in the context of high fragmentation of Afghanistan’s political space and the continued activity of armed groups. As a result, regional dynamics are increasingly determined not by the controlled influence of individual external players but by a set of interconnected conflicts that go beyond the bilateral “Kabul–Islamabad” logic. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The article by Muhammad Khujanazarov, UWED undergraduate and an intern at IAIS, and Julia Davies, lecturer at UWED and a Visiting Research Fellow at IAIS, examines how the post-war liberal international order, built around the IMF, World Bank, WTO and progressively liberalised global trade, has come under pressure since the 2008 global financial crisis. The authors argue that the slowdown of globalisation, rising geopolitical rivalry, weakened multilateral institutions, and growing dissatisfaction among emerging economies have created space for regional alliances to assume stronger governance roles. Focusing on ASEAN/RCEP, BRICS+, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the article shows how these regional groupings are no longer merely supplementary platforms within the global order. Instead, they are developing independent trade rules, financial mechanisms, security practices, and normative frameworks that increasingly challenge Western-dominated multilateralism. ASEAN/RCEP is analysed through trade governance, BRICS+ through financial counter-hegemony and de-dollarisation, and the SCO through security cooperation based on sovereignty and non-interference. The central argument is that the world is moving towards a more fragmented and multipolar system of governance, where global institutions and regional organisations coexist, compete, and overlap. The authors conclude that regional alliances are unlikely to fully replace established international organisations, but they are already reshaping the rules, norms, and balance of authority in international relations. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Agricultural models developed in Spain, in particular, the intensive greenhouse systems of Almería and the regenerative landscape restoration of the Altiplano plateau, represent useful lessons for countries facing significant environmental, economic, and institutional challenges, such as Uzbekistan, characterized by an arid climate and dependence on agriculture, could significantly benefit from these proven practices. Spain has achieved great success in transforming a water-stressed environment into the “garden of Europe”, demonstrating technical innovation combined with efficient water management, resulting in enormous economic returns even with limited resources. Furthermore, the proposed two-stage approach of the Spanish model, incorporating intensive production to dominate the global market and regenerative methods to combat soil degradation and rural abandonment, is a very good example that could be implemented in Uzbekistan. Successful Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) promotes precision irrigation, integrated crop protection, greenhouse horticulture, and high-quality standards. To improve productivity, Spanish farms use electronic monitoring and drip irrigation. Almeria has 33,500 hectares of greenhouse crops used for export, and the country is a global pioneer in biological crop protection. The current Common Agricultural Policy framework (2023-2027) focuses on environmental protection and improving water efficiency . Irrigation and water management in Spain 71 % of the value of agricultural production comes from irrigated land, which accounts for 3.7 million hectares, or approximately 22 % of all agricultural land. Between 2022 and 2027 , the government will spend a record € 2.5 billion to improve 750,000 hectares. This includes installing automated flow meters, replacing open canals with pressurized pipes, and promoting smart irrigation technologies such as soil moisture sensors and automated scheduling. Spanish farms using drip/ micro-irrigation are among the most productive and consume the least water. Spain’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) strategic plan encourages competition across a wide range of climate conditions. A multi-program approach, including national recovery funds and EU rural development funds, aims to digitalize irrigation networks and reduce energy consumption. Spanish farms that use irrigation are among the most productive and consume the least water. Uzbekistan should follow Spain’s "inclusive" approach, which includes the use of digital tools, the involvement of people and communities, and significant public investment. Uzbekistan can improve the impact of agricultural reforms and modernization by combining digital technologies, community participation, and significant public investment, building on successful experiences. Agro-processing and value chains. Spain’s agri-food sector is large and complex. It comprises 30,000 companies with a combined turnover of €168 billion, accounting for approximately 23.8 % of the manufacturing industry. These include olive oil mills (1,390 companies producing approximately 1.4 million tons of olive oil annually), wineries and distilleries, fruit and vegetable canneries, and tomato paste and juice producers. Many Spanish fresh produce exporters have refrigerated warehouses and packaging facilities near their farms, as required by EU regulations. Processed olive and tomato products, canned fish, and juices are important export commodities. Uzbekistan should expand the construction of modern cold chains, juice production plants, and canning factories. To encourage agricultural processing, Spanish farmers received grants under the Common Agricultural Policy (investment assistance for rural businesses). A similar program could be implemented in Uzbekistan (through the World Bank ‘s Agriculture and Irrigation Support Program and the EBRD’s Agrifood Nexus program) using government or donor funding. For example, in Spain, the juice industry processes surplus fruits and vegetables during peak harvest periods to maintain stable prices. Spain’s processed agricultural products are often targeted at EU markets, necessitating strict quality control (HACCP, ISO standards) and compliance with food safety standards. To train local agronomists, implement pilot certification projects, and develop laboratories and digital product traceability systems, Uzbekistan should establish formal partnerships with Spanish certification bodies and experts. In Spain, cooperatives often manage enterprises processing agricultural products. Similar cooperatives could be established in Uzbekistan. This vertical coordination increases added value creation in the country. Digital Agriculture and Innovation. Spain is accelerating the digitalization of its agricultural sector to mitigate the impacts of climate change. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food supports the Observatory, which monitors the implementation of the Strategy digitalization agri-food sector. This strategy aims to address the digital divide, low technology adoption, increased labor productivity, environmental sustainability, and rural development, using digital transformation as a tool for modernizing the entire agri-food system. The government supports precision agriculture by providing farmers with funding for sensors and software. The country has more than twenty technology centers working in agro-tech and biotechnology, improving nutritional properties and enabling precision agriculture. Spanish entrepreneurs and agro-tech companies produce IoT (Internet of Things), use satellite services to measure moisture and provide crop management advice based on artificial intelligence (AI). Agricultural financing is also automated. For example, farmers can obtain loans for crop production through bank mobile apps. Digital horticulture is also being implemented in Uzbekistan. AI is currently being tested in pilot projects for water management, livestock monitoring, and greenhouse management. Uzbekistan is establishing “agricultural service zones” in each region. These zones will offer a wide range of IT services, including soil analysis, meteorological data, and training. Spain ‘s experience in introducing new agricultural technologies (precision irrigation systems, smart agriculture and digital monitoring, integrated crop protection, water recycling and desalination technologies, post-harvest processing and quality control technologies) to farmers is useful for Uzbekistan. Spanish research shows that training farmers and demonstrating the application of new technologies are essential. Uzbekistan should also invest in training farmers to use modern digital tools for resource allocation decision-making. Furthermore, it is important to establish collaboration between Spanish technology companies and universities and Uzbek technology companies to implement proven agricultural solutions, such as regional weather stations and mobile applications. Following the example of the Spanish Observatory group, data from Uzbek farms could be used in a national analytical system for agricultural policy decision-making. Based on Spain’s experience, the following practices were identified that Uzbekistan could adopt: Implement drip/micro irrigation and remote water monitoring everywhere. Modernization carried out in Spain (for example, pressure networks, flow meters) allowed for achieving water distribution efficiency of approximately 95% and reducing its consumption at the farm level by approximately 20%. It is recommended to stimulate the transition to drip irrigation (as in Spain’s plans), implement water consumption accounting on farms, and invest in automating canals and pumps. Combined with sensors on farms (soil moisture, weather), this can increase Uzbekistan’s water productivity. Implement integrated plant protection (IPP) systems using natural predators and targeted control, as is done by Spanish farmers. In Almería, the intensive use of pesticides (e.g., whiteflies, Tuta Absoluta) has given way to biological controls (parasitic wasps Encarsia, predatory beetles Nesidiocoris), as well as sticky traps and crop hygiene. This will reduce chemical costs, prevent the development of resistance, and ensure the export of products without residual substances. Uzbekistan can test RDI systems on key crops (e.g., cotton, tomatoes) and train farmers in monitoring and biological control methods. Development of greenhouse vegetable farming in hot/salted areas (e.g., Khorezm, Surkhandarya). The Spanish “plastic sea” in Almería (33500 hectares) yields 3 million tons of tomatoes, peppers, and other vegetables per year, 80% of which are exported. The model combines hydroponics, shading grids, and climate control. The Uzbek greenhouse cluster (with solar irrigation) could extend the growing season and supply high-quality products to new markets. It is necessary to develop regionally specialized clusters. For example, the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan could focus on growing high-quality fruits (apricots, apples) and vegetables, while Bukhara/Surkhandarya could focus on growing tropical melons and pistachios (in subtropical climates). The development of clusters involves the joint use of processing capacities, joint marketing, and R&D (as in Spanish cooperatives and chambers of commerce), which will strengthen value chains. It is necessary to encourage cooperative models aimed at pooling resources and ensuring access to markets. Spanish cooperatives (e.g., Kahamar Bank, wine/olive oil cooperatives) increase the income of their members. Uzbekistan’s new law on cooperatives provides the appropriate framework for this. The government and donors can help establish cooperatives in pilot regions by training farmers in the basics of management and establishing ties between cooperatives and exporting companies. Implement digital platforms for knowledge dissemination and farm management. Spain already has pilot applications for irrigation planning, crop forecasting, and supply chain tracking. New centers of agricultural knowledge and innovation in Uzbekistan can integrate these tools. Quality standards (such as geographical indications) must be developed to gain access to premium markets. Spanish products with protected designations of origin (wine, olive oil, jamón, fruit) have high added value. Uzbekistan does not have such products, but the country could introduce organic or other origin labels (e.g., “apricots from Kokand”) and comply with global phytosanitary standards. Although Uzbekistan has already implemented numerous progressive reforms aimed at increasing the competitiveness of its agricultural sector by studying advanced foreign agricultural practices, Spanish agricultural practices can serve as a comprehensive methodology for unlocking the full potential of Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.