By  Shohrukhkhon Bekhzodiy  &  Sarvarbek Turaev, UWED undergraduates, interns at IAIS   Authority Without Purpose The United States of America remains the most powerful state in the contemporary international system across all key aggregate indicators. The country's defense budget in 2025 reached approximately $850 billion, exceeding the combined expenditure of the next nine states globally. The United States maintains approximately 750 military installations abroad, commands the world’s only carrier fleet capable of simultaneous operations across all oceans, and fields an armed force with the logistical capacity to project power to any theater of military operations. Yet it is precisely this uncontested dominance that gives rise to a fundamental question: why does a state possessing such unprecedented military and economic potential systematically fail to achieve its declared strategic objectives? The United States is losing global influence not as a consequence of rising competitor power, but as a result of a systemic inability to convert available potential into durable strategic outcomes. This incapacity is not the product of errors made by any particular administration; it is institutional in origin and reproduces itself regardless of who occupies the White House. Military power is deployed without political strategy. Economic coercion dismantles the dependencies upon which American leverage depends. Diplomatic commitments are violated with regularity, undermining the very possibility of trust in the American word. Alliances that historically multiplied American power are being transformed into relationships of coercion from which partners seek to disengage. Domestically, a political system incapable of ensuring strategic continuity renders any long-term American commitment structurally unreliable. Since the early 2000s, the United States has conducted large-scale military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The aggregate direct costs of these conflicts exceeded several trillion dollars. The outcomes speak for themselves: Afghanistan returned to Taliban control within days of the American withdrawal; Iraq became an arena of Iranian influence that was substantially amplified as a direct consequence of American intervention; Libya fragmented into competing armed factions; and Syria was, until recently, de facto partitioned among Russia, Iran, and Turkey, none of which represented Washington's preferred actors. This pattern is not attributable to tactical miscalculation or circumstantial misfortune. It is structural in nature. American armed forces demonstrate high effectiveness at the operational level. They are capable of defeating adversaries, seizing territory, and neutralizing discrete threats. However, military victory and political stabilization constitute fundamentally distinct objectives. An army can break a state, but it cannot build one. It is precisely this systemic incapacity that recurs from one conflict to the next. The legal dimension of this problem is equally significant. The United States Constitution originally distributed war powers between two branches of government. By law, Congress declares war, and the President wages it. In practice, however, this system has long ceased to function as designed. The pivotal moment was the War Powers Resolution of 1973, enacted in the aftermath of the Vietnam War with the aim of restoring Congressional oversight of decisions to use force. The Resolution stipulated that the President must terminate any unauthorized military operation within 60 days absent explicit Congressional authorization. This appeared to be a reasonable constraining mechanism. In practice, it was systematically dismantled by legal counsel across administrations of both parties. The Reagan administration maintained that strikes against Iranian vessels in the Persian Gulf in 1987 to 1988 constituted “isolated incidents” that did not trigger the 60-day clock. The Obama administration argued that sustained bombing of Libya beyond 60 days did not constitute "hostilities" within the meaning of the Resolution. The Biden administration contended that a yearlong campaign against the Houthis in Yemen required no Congressional authorization because the Houthis had fired first on American vessels. Each successive administration produced new legal justifications, and each generation of lawyers inherited the precedents of its predecessor, not by overturning them, but by building upon them. The result is a system in which a single individual may initiate war without parliamentary deliberation, without public articulation of success criteria, and without genuine accountability for outcomes. It is within this system that the attack on Iran under Operation “Epic Fury” became possible, carried out without a formal declaration of war and without a Congressional vote. The problem here is not the character of any particular president. The problem is that the institutional architecture designed to ensure deliberateness in military decisions was gradually, lawfully, and with the complicity of all branches of government dismantled. This arrangement is not neutral in its consequences. A war initiated without broad political consensus and without clearly defined success criteria is, with high probability, a war that will be poorly managed, poorly concluded, and inadequately understood after its termination. Such is the historical record of the past two decades. Ideological Reorientation: From International Leadership to Transactionalism Throughout much of the postwar period, the United States grounded its global presence in a conceptual framework that transcended narrow national interest. The liberal international order, for which Washington served as architect, rested on the assumption that open markets, multilateral institutions, and collective security arrangements served the interests of both the United States and its partners. This logic of mutual benefit conferred a degree of legitimacy upon American leadership in the eyes of the international community. The current approach constitutes a fundamental departure from this tradition. American foreign policy is increasingly organized around a model that may be characterized as “transactional extractivism,” wherein every international interaction is evaluated in terms of what Washington receives immediately, rather than what long-term strategic order it sustains. Allies are perceived not as partners in a collective security system, but as debtors obligated to pay for protection rendered. International institutions are regarded primarily as constraints rather than instruments. Multilateral formats are replaced by bilateral negotiations in which America’s structural superiority guarantees an asymmetric outcome. An important qualification must be acknowledged. Criticism of the former multilateral model is not without foundation. Global climate mechanisms systematically failed to meet declared targets amid rising emissions. The World Trade Organization proved incapable of disciplining China's subsidy policies. The International Atomic Energy Agency did not prevent nuclear proliferation by Iran or North Korea. The wager of the 1990s and 2000s that deep integration of China into the global economy would transform its political behavior proved to be strategically naive. In this sense, demands for a reassessment of the international architecture rest on genuine grounds. Nevertheless, a fundamental distinction exists between reforming instruments and destroying them. The institutions, alliances, and norms that the United States constructed over eight decades constituted not a burden but a multiplier of American power. They enabled Washington to shape the international agenda without recourse to direct coercion at every turn. By abandoning these instruments in pursuit of short-term tactical gains, the United States does not liberate itself from constraints; it voluntarily dismantles the architecture of its own influence. III. Alliance Erosion and Weakening Diplomacy The aggregate power of the American alliance system has historically far exceeded what the country could achieve unilaterally. NATO, bilateral security agreements in the Asia-Pacific region, and partnerships in the Middle East together formed a global network that provided Washington with persistent presence, intelligence-sharing, logistical support, and political legitimacy on a scale unattainable by any competitor. The current trajectory of engagement with allies is eroding this model. The question of burden-sharing within NATO has been reformulated from a discussion of shared responsibility into an ultimatum: pay more, or commitments will be reconsidered. Such language transforms a collective security alliance into something resembling a system of commercial patronage, where protection is provided in exchange for financial contribution rather than on the basis of shared values and strategic interests. The consequences have been swift. Canada, bound to the United States by the most extensive trade, intelligence, and defense ties in the Western world, is openly reorienting its foreign economic strategy. The current government has embarked on a course of trading partner diversification, concluded new agreements with Indonesia and India, and initiated diplomatic rapprochement with Beijing. This is not an ideological rupture. It is the pragmatic response of a state that has concluded its principal partner is unreliable. Europe displays analogous dynamics. NATO member states are indeed increasing defense expenditures, and their aggregate volume has grown by more than 100 percent since 2019, driven primarily by countries on the eastern flank. However, this increase does not reflect confidence in American guarantees; it is a response to their evident unreliability. European governments are arming themselves because they cannot afford to rely on Washington. The diplomatic picture is no more encouraging. In Ukraine, the promise to end the war within 24 hours yielded more than a year of inconclusive negotiations during which the United States periodically adopted positions that objectively aligned with Russian demands. In February 2025, Washington voted alongside Moscow in the United Nations on resolutions relating to the Russian invasion. On Gaza, the United States exercised its veto power in the Security Council six times against ceasefire resolutions, even as combat operations continued and famine conditions in the enclave were confirmed. The January 2025 ceasefire collapsed within weeks after Israel resumed its strikes. The Iranian case merits separate analysis. In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was functioning: Iran had dismantled two-thirds of its centrifuges, removed 98 percent of its enriched uranium, and opened facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. In 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the agreement. By March 2025, Iran had accumulated more than 275 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, sufficient for several nuclear warheads upon further enrichment. Negotiations initiated in April 2025 reached an impasse. The United States demanded the complete cessation of enrichment; Iran refused. In June 2025, Operation “Midnight Hammer” destroyed key facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. However, Iran's stockpiles of highly enriched uranium appear to have been evacuated in advance, and their location remains unknown. On February 28, 2026, Operation “Epic Fury” followed, in the course of which Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed and missile production facilities, the naval fleet, and dual-use installations were destroyed. Tactically, the operation achieved its stated objectives. Strategically, it created a fundamentally new problem: a state whose nuclear infrastructure has been destroyed, but whose knowledge and motivation remain intact and are now reinforced by an existential imperative to acquire deterrent capability at any cost. The concluding logic of all three cases is identical: the United States entered each situation with maximum coercive potential and exited with a worse outcome than it had at the outset. The Domestic Foundations of External Weakness An analysis of American foreign policy dysfunction would be incomplete without examining its domestic political determinants. Several interconnected structural processes undermine the capacity of the United States to conduct coherent international policy irrespective of the personnel of any given administration. The first is deep partisan polarization, which renders strategic continuity practically unattainable. The divergence between the foreign policy courses of successive administrations is so pronounced that allies are compelled to recalculate long-term projections with every change in the White House. An international agreement concluded by one president may be denounced by his successor within the first week of office. This is precisely what occurred with the JCPOA in 2018 and with the Paris Climate Agreement. Notably, within the Republican Party itself, a significant gap has emerged between traditional conservative internationalism and the current administration's course. A number of Republican senators publicly expressed concern over the curtailment of support for Ukraine and the weakening of the American position in NATO, yet party discipline under Trump's second term proved sufficiently rigid to suppress this dissent at the level of actual votes. The second process is mounting public discontent, which since 2025 has assumed organized forms. The "No Kings" movement became one of the most significant episodes of civic protest in recent American history. The first wave occurred on June 14, 2025. According to organizers’ estimates, between four and six million people participated in actions across more than 2,100 cities. The second wave in October 2025 encompassed approximately 2,700 locations nationwide, drawing an estimated five to seven million participants by various accounts. The third wave occurred on March 28, 2026, against the backdrop of the war with Iran and continuing mass deportations, and was announced by organizers as the largest day of nonviolent action in American history. The movement's name itself reflected the substance of its grievances: protesters invoked the foundational principle of American statecraft, according to which power belongs to the people and not to an officeholder who has arrogated monarchical authority. Of particular note, the third wave of protests was explicitly directed against the war with Iran, a rare instance in which domestic political dissent was directly linked to a specific foreign policy operation. These processes mutually reinforce one another. Polarization forecloses strategic continuity. Public discontent narrows the domestic political mandate for global leadership. Taken together, they indicate that the defanging of the American predator is predominantly systemic rather than personal in origin. It is embedded in the institutional architecture of American politics and will not disappear with any change of administration. Conclusion The United States possesses the greatest aggregate power potential in the contemporary international system, and yet it exhibits a persistent inability to convert that potential into durable strategic outcomes. The gap between available power and achieved results is not incidental but structurally determined. This gap is produced at the intersection of several interacting deficits: the displacement of strategic conception by transactional calculation; the destruction of the influence multipliers constituted by alliances and institutions; the deployment of economic instruments in a manner that accelerates the diversification of dependencies; the exhaustion of diplomatic credibility in key conflict zones; and the absence of a domestic political architecture capable of ensuring strategic continuity. At the same time, it would be erroneous to interpret the foregoing analysis as a forecast of irreversible decline. The United States retains structural advantages without parallel: geographic security, the depth of its technological base, control over the world's reserve currency, and military capacity that exceeds any competitor. The question is not whether the United States has lost its potential. The question is whether it is capable of constructing the political and institutional architecture that would allow that potential to be realized. If the current trajectory persists, the international system will adapt, not because others become stronger, but because predictability and reliability will migrate to other nodes of the system. A predator that has lost the capacity for consistent action does not disappear from the ecosystem. It simply ceases to defineit. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The contemporary international order is undergoing a period of profound and accelerating transformation. Armed conflicts, great-power rivalry, and the erosion of multilateral institutions are reshaping the global strategic landscape in ways that affect even regions far removed from the epicenters of crisis. Central Asia, long accustomed to navigating a complex web of external pressures through careful multi-vector diplomacy, now finds itself confronting a qualitatively new environment — one defined by cascading instability, structural geopolitical competition, and the fragmentation of the rules-based order that previously offered small- and medium-sized states a degree of protection and predictability. Against this backdrop, the countries of Central Asia face a dual challenge: managing an expanding array of external risks while simultaneously identifying and seizing the strategic opportunities that this turbulent moment presents. The very forces that generate vulnerability — the restructuring of global trade, the rise of overland transit demand, and the weakening of universal governance frameworks — also create openings for a more assertive and coordinated regional posture. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the principal challenges stemming from growing international instability and outlines the foreign policy priorities through which Central Asian states can strengthen their resilience, expand their agency, and secure a more favorable position in the emerging world order. First. The formation of a multilayered conflict environment around Central Asia. Central Asia is increasingly finding itself in an environment of mounting external turbulence that is taking on the character of a “conflict trap.” The simultaneous development of armed and political crises in Ukraine, the Middle East, and South Asia is creating a cascading and interconnected configuration of instability. At the same time, the potential escalation of tensions in East Asia, particularly around the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, could further complicate the region’s strategic environment. Under these conditions, the space for foreign policy maneuver for the states of Central Asia is narrowing, while decision-making is increasingly taking place amid high uncertainty and the absence of optimal scenarios. Second. The deepening of structural contradictions resulting from rivalry among major powers. Geopolitical and military-political confrontation between leading global centers of power is creating not merely situational but long-term structural constraints for the countries of Central Asia. The region is entering a phase in which the previous logic of seeking the most advantageous and relatively balanced solutions is giving way to the politics of “non-ideal choice.” In other words, virtually any strategy in the current international environment will be accompanied by costs, compromises, and heightened political risks. This objectively increases the importance of coordinating tactical and strategic approaches at the regional level, since isolated actions by individual states are becoming less effective. Third. Rising vulnerability to energy, transport-communication, and raw material shocks. Contemporary international crises are increasingly demonstrating the dependence of the global economy on a limited number of critically important routes and hubs. Disruptions in maritime logistics, the blocking of specific straits and transport corridors, and the withdrawal of scarce resources from the market create systemic shocks far beyond the conflict zones themselves. For Central Asia, this means heightened risks related to supply disruptions, rising transit costs, price volatility, and restricted access to strategically important materials. Since some critical goods do not have rapid infrastructural or technological substitutes, external crises begin to directly affect the region’s economic resilience. Fourth. The erosion of international legal norms and the weakening of universal institutions. One of the most alarming trends is the transition from a regime of “double standards” to a situation in which common standards are increasingly losing even their formal binding force. Whereas previously international law was violated while still retaining symbolic legitimacy, there is now a growing risk of an order in which norms cease to function as a common regulatory framework. Major international actors are increasingly acting not as providers of stability but as independent sources of destabilization. For the states of Central Asia, this means a shrinking space in which universal norms and institutions can be relied upon as mechanisms for protecting the interests of small and medium-sized states. Fifth. The shift from universal multilateralism to selective coalitions. A steady shift is underway from the previous model of relatively universal multilateral engagement toward a system of pragmatic, situational, and narrowly targeted coalitions. This transformation is intensifying the asymmetry of global politics: states with limited influence resources are increasingly finding themselves not as full-fledged subjects, but as objects of external influence and competitive struggle. For Central Asia, this creates the risk of limited agency, where strategic decisions affecting the region are increasingly made without its direct participation. Sixth. The growing transactional nature of world politics and the personalization of the future order. The once-established construct of a “rules-based order” is no longer performing the role of a common normative framework. Increasingly visible is the tendency toward the emergence of a new international environment based less on institutions and more on flexible arrangements among individual centers of power and their leaders. This signals a return to a pre-universalist logic of international relations, in which security and stability are determined not by law, but by balances of capability and bargains among stronger actors. For the countries of Central Asia, such an environment is objectively less predictable and less favorable. Seventh. The fragmentation of global trade as a factor of external pressure on the region. The global trading system is undergoing profound structural transformation. Trade policy is increasingly being used not as an instrument of liberalization, but as a means of strategic competition, pressure, and redistribution of advantages. Discriminatory measures are intensifying, tariff and non-tariff restrictions are gaining significance, and supply chains are being restructured on political rather than purely economic grounds. For Central Asia, this means the need to adapt to a less open, less predictable, and more bloc-based global economy, in which access to markets, technologies, and logistics routes increasingly depends on foreign policy circumstances. Opportunities and Priorities for Foreign Policy Action by the Countries of Central Asia First. Strengthening regional coordination as the foundation of strategic resilience. Under conditions of mounting international instability, coordinated regional approaches are becoming increasingly important for the countries of Central Asia. This concerns not only consultations, but also the formation of a shared understanding of key external risks, security priorities, transport connectivity, and trade and economic adaptation. The greater the level of external pressure and geopolitical competition, the more important it becomes for the region to develop coordinated tactical and strategic actions. This will not eliminate external threats, but it can increase resilience, reduce vulnerability, and strengthen the region’s collective negotiating position. Second. Enhancing Central Asia’s role as a land-based transit space. The growing risks associated with maritime logistics are objectively increasing the significance of overland transport routes. In this context, Central Asia has an opportunity to strengthen its importance as a connecting space between China, Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East. For Uzbekistan, this trend opens the prospect of reinforcing its role as one of the key overland transit hubs. This is not only about economic gain, but also about the formation of a new foreign policy resource: a state that ensures transport connectivity acquires additional weight in the regional and interregional architecture. Third. Developing digital connectivity as an element of external economic resilience. Under conditions of geopolitical fragmentation, not only physical but also digital trade infrastructure is becoming increasingly important. A state’s ability to ensure the resilience of digital platforms, standards compatibility, the reliability of legal regimes, and technological interoperability is becoming a critical factor in maintaining access to external markets. For Uzbekistan and other countries of the region, a priority task is the transition from isolated digital initiatives to a comprehensive state policy in this sphere. Such a policy should include the harmonization of standards, institutional development, workforce training, and the expansion of regional coordination. Digital connectivity can become a factor in diversifying external economic ties and reducing costs amid growing global regulatory fragmentation. Fourth. Diversifying foreign policy and foreign economic ties. In a situation where the international system is becoming less universal and more competitive, the ability of states to avoid excessive dependence on any one direction, one market, or one external center of power becomes especially important. For the countries of Central Asia, this means the need to deepen a multi-vector approach based on pragmatism, flexibility, and the protection of their own interests. Diversification of partnerships enables the region not only to reduce external risks, but also to expand the space for independent maneuver in a polarized international environment. Fifth. Enhancing the region’s agency amid the crisis of global governance. The weakening of universal institutions and the growing role of selective formats do not necessarily imply only losses for Central Asia. If supported by a coordinated policy, this also opens opportunities to enhance its own agency through participation in new cooperation formats, the promotion of regional initiatives, and the strengthening of Central Asia’s status as an independent geopolitical and geo-economic space. Under the new conditions, those actors will benefit most who are able not only to adapt, but also to propose functional solutions in the areas of transit, logistics, energy, digital connectivity, and interregional interaction. Sixth. Transitioning from reactive to proactive foreign policy. The contemporary international environment requires the countries of Central Asia not only to respond to external crises, but also to develop a forward-looking strategy. Such a strategy should be aimed at early risk identification, creating mechanisms of external economic resilience, advancing beneficial transport and digital projects, and institutionally anchoring regional interests in the external sphere. A proactive approach is especially important in conditions where delays in decision-making may result in the loss of strategic opportunities. Conclusion Contemporary international instability is reshaping the strategic environment of Central Asia in ways that are both profound and enduring. The region faces a confluence of challenges that would have been difficult to anticipate even a decade ago: a multilayered conflict environment on its periphery, the structural deepening of great-power rivalry, the fragmentation of global trade, the erosion of international legal norms, and the steady retreat from universal multilateralism toward selective, transactional arrangements among dominant powers. Taken together, these trends are narrowing the space for passive, reactive foreign policy and demanding from the states of Central Asia a level of strategic clarity and regional cohesion that has not always characterized their collective responses in the past. At the same time, it would be a mistake to interpret this moment exclusively through the lens of threat and vulnerability. History repeatedly demonstrates that periods of systemic international transformation, however disruptive, tend to redistribute influence and open new avenues for actors who are prepared to act with foresight and purpose. Central Asia is no exception to this dynamic. The growing importance of overland transit routes in an era of maritime disruption, the rising premium on digital connectivity and regulatory interoperability, and the increasing demand for stable and reliable regional partners in an otherwise volatile Eurasian space — all of these trends position Central Asia as a region of genuine and growing strategic relevance. Realizing this potential, however, is neither automatic nor guaranteed. It requires the countries of the region to move decisively from adaptation to agency — from responding to external pressures to actively shaping the conditions of their engagement with the wider world. This means investing in the institutional foundations of regional coordination, so that shared interests translate into coherent and consistent collective positions rather than remaining aspirational declarations. It means accelerating the development of transport and digital infrastructure not merely as economic projects, but as instruments of foreign policy that expand the region's connectivity and reduce its dependence on any single external partner. And it means cultivating the diplomatic flexibility and strategic patience necessary to navigate a world in which alignments are fluid, leverage is contested, and the costs of miscalculation are rising. For Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbors, the path forward lies in embracing a proactive foreign policy paradigm — one grounded in pragmatism, reinforced by regional solidarity, and oriented toward the long-term construction of resilience rather than short-term crisis management. The current international environment, for all its uncertainty, rewards those who are able to define their interests clearly, pursue them consistently, and present themselves as indispensable nodes in the networks of connectivity, trade, and cooperation that the emerging world order will depend upon. Central Asia has the geographic position, the human capital, and the political will to be such an actor. The task now is to translate that potential into a coherent and sustained strategic vision — one that secures stability, expands agency, and affirms the region's place not at the margins, but at the functional heart of a reconfigured Eurasian space. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In recent years, the government of Afghanistan has expanded its technological capabilities for monitoring the population. Improvements in the technical infrastructure have enabled the authorities to introduce new forms of control that go beyond traditional methods. In the context of the policies pursued by the Taliban, this trend can be viewed not only as a process of modernization, but also as part of a broader strategy aimed at strengthening state governance. The digitalisation of control mechanisms creates a model resembling the concept of the “panopticon” - an ideal model of prison  introduced into the social sciences by french philosopher Michel Foucault. Within this framework, the key factor is not actual surveillance, but the perception of its constant possibility. The model assumes that individuals adjust their behavior under the perception of continuous observation, which fosters self-discipline. Thus, this mechanism enables the state to shift from practicing reactive policies to the functioning of a disciplinary form of power. From the perspective of the Afghan government, a key driver of this policy is the intention of the Taliban to mitigate social and political fragmentation, which is perceived as a major threat to regime stability. The integration of advanced surveillance technologies and the control of the information space create conditions for a transition from reactive repression to more preventive forms of social regulation. The absence of mechanisms aligned with international legal standards creates a favorable environment for the institutionalization of this model of control. This is manifested in the following ways: Firstly, in recent years, the Taliban government has demonstrated an increased interest in the systematic collection of information about the population. Since 2023, the Taliban authorities have consistently employed technological resources to strengthen and expand state control. The existence of sufficient digital infrastructure creates conditions for the authorities to establish monitoring mechanisms and broadens their capacity to carry out political persecution. According to a 2025 investigative report by the BBC, at the time the Taliban came to power, approximately 850 surveillance cameras were installed in the Afghan capital. However, since 2023, their number has increased sharply: around 90,000 cameras of manufactured in China have been installed in Kabul alone. The software allows the cameras to recognize individuals, display their images and classify each person by age, gender, and features such as the presence of a beard or a mask. This rapid expansion of surveillance systems has raised concerns within the international community. The human rights organization Human Rights Watch has warned that Afghanistan lacks data protection laws regulating the storage and use of collected footage. However, according to government statements, the data is stored for only three months, after which it is deleted and not shared with other agencies. Representatives of the Afghan Ministry of Interior claim that the cameras significantly contribute to improved security and a reduction in crime rates. Despite these claims, surveillance cameras may also be used to intensify control over civilians, particularly women in public spaces. Although local authorities assert that crime rates have significantly declined following the installation of surveillance systems, these claims cannot be independently verified. Given the opacity of Afghan legislation, it is also difficult to confirm the actual purposes for which the collected data is used. Furthermore, numerous documented cases of abuse and persecution of civilians cast doubt on official statements regarding the use of such data. Secondly, the policy of the Taliban is aimed at managing potential sources of internal instability. From the perspective of the Taliban leadership, fragmentation of the country represents a key risk that could weaken central authority. The implementation of such policies is accompanied by restrictions on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. The institutionalization of these measures reinforces structural inequalities and creates conditions for the escalation of interethnic and interreligious tensions. Beyond the capital, surveillance cameras have also been installed in other regions of Afghanistan. These provinces, which border Kabul, possess both strategic geographical importance and a significant share of non-Pashtun populations, increasing their relevance in terms of maintaining control and political stability. The deployment of cameras in areas characterized by ethnic and religious diversity suggests that these technologies may be used not only for security purposes, as officially stated, but also as tools for monitoring groups perceived as insufficiently aligned with the regime. Between 2021 and 2025, international organizations have documented numerous cases of extrajudicial killings, torture, and raids against ethnic minorities carried out by representatives of the Taliban. Reports by international human rights organisations indicate that marginalized religious and ethnic groups were deliberately deprived of humanitarian assistance, as well as access to essential services and public sector employment. Thirdly, in addition to access to advanced surveillance technologies, the Taliban possesses a substantial database of biometric and personal data left behind by Western countries in August 2021. One such database is the electronic identity system (e-Tazkira), launched in 2018 under the administration of Ashraf Ghani and still in operation today. It contains personal and biometric data of Afghan citizens, including iris scans, fingerprints, photographs, occupation, native language, home addresses, and family members’ names. According to a statement by the National Statistics and Information Agency, by the end of 2025 up to 17 million electronic identity cards had been issued, six million of which were distributed after the Taliban came to power. Moreover, the Taliban government has gone beyond the traditional use of biometric data and is collecting information on categories of the population that were previously outside the scope of state attention. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Afghan government is collecting biometric data on homeless people, beggars and criminals. The scale of coverage and the pace of ID issuance demonstrate the Taliban’s level of interest in biometric data collection and the integration of the Tazkira system into administrative governance. Reports also suggest that the Taliban has access to portable biometric identification devices previously used by the United States military. These devices enable the rapid collection of iris and fingerprint data. The data stored on devices left behind by the United States and other Western donors was reportedly not protected by basic security measures. International human rights organizations have repeatedly warned about the risk that such biometric data could be used by the Taliban to target perceived opponents, former military personnel and political activists. In addition, according to local media, the cost of obtaining identification documents is prohibitively high for much of the population: the official fee is 500 Afghanis (around 7 US dollars) for adults and 200 Afghanis for minors. However, the shortage of document issuance centers forces many citizens to incur additional transportation costs, and in remote areas where in-person visits are not possible, processing fees can reach up to 200 US dollars. Such financial barriers have concrete practical consequences: as the absence of an identity document deprives citizens of the ability to obtain a visa and, consequently, to leave the country. It also restricts access to basic services such as education, healthcare, and humanitarian aid, for which identification is often a mandatory requirement. Discontent is also fueled by the system’s ethnic classification, which divides major ethnic groups into smaller subcategories, statistically diluting the representation of ethnic minorities. Thus, based on the actions undertaken by the Taliban leadership, it can be concluded that territorial and social fragmentation are viewed as key internal risks capable of undermining regime stability. The integration of biometric databases and surveillance technologies is forming a new infrastructure of power with characteristics of a disciplinary mechanism. Moreover, the new Criminal Procedure Code adopted in January 2026 institutionalizes this approach at the legal level and represents a logical continuation of the domestic political strategy. Its adoption signals the effective consolidation of power by the political elite in Afghanistan. Under such conditions, the vulnerability of regional, ethnic, and religious minorities increases, creating a high risk of escalating internal conflicts and deepening social inequalities. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Jasurbek Khamrakulov, Undergraduate student at UWED, intern at IAIS Background For the last several years, the European Union has become increasingly confronted with institutional paralysis in key policy areas, particularly foreign policy and financial assistance. In this context, Hungary, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, has repeatedly used its veto power to block collective EU decisions, most notably in relation to the financial aid packages for Ukraine. This has exposed structural weaknesses in EU governance at a time of heightened geopolitical urgency. Hungary’s repeated vetoes, particularly regarding a proposed €90 billion financial assistance package for Ukraine, have provoked a wave of criticism from European leaders. Despite the strong pressure on Viktor Orbán to lift his veto on the loan,  European leaders failed to reach a breakthrough at a Brussels summit, highlighting deep divisions within the Union. Orbán justified his blockade by citing a dispute over the damaged “Druzhba” oil pipeline, supplying Hungary, while other EU leaders expressed growing frustration and accused him of undermining collective commitments, emphasizing that the aid is crucial for Ukraine’s ongoing war efforts against Russia. According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Hungary and Slovakia imported around €137 million worth of Russian oil through the pipeline in January. Oil flows reportedly stopped in late January as a result of Russian air strike that Kyiv says damaged the pipeline's western branch Ukraine. Hungary, on the other hand, disagrees, accusing Ukraine of blocking it from being used. The current situation outlines one of the main challenges EU faces in the process of decision-making, which is unanimity. The principle allows any member state to block collective decisions, regardless of the level of support among other members. In practice, this has enabled Hungary to leverage its position to extract concessions or advance domestic political narratives centered on sovereignty and resistance to Brussels. As a result of policy paralysis, critical initiatives, particularly those related to Ukraine, are delayed or blocked. Furthermore, it weakens EU's credibility and its inability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor, working for the benefit of Russia in disrupting European aid flows to Ukraine. The Hungarian case is particularly significant because it reflects not only policy disagreement, but also broader tensions regarding rule-of-law compliance and democratic standards within the EU. Mechanisms to Bypass Vetoes Some experts argue that in exceptional circumstances, such as the conflict in Ukraine, the European Union can legally bypass Hungary’s veto if it violates core EU values, particularly the principle of solidarity in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. The legal pathways to overcome this dilemma are divided in two directions. If Hungary’s veto represents a serious and systemic breach of solidarity, the decision could proceed without counting Hungary’s vote. Secondly, unanimity rules could be reinterpreted, allowing qualified majority voting in situations that pose existential threats to the EU’s security, values, and stability.  The solutions are meant to be exceptional and narrowly applied, not a general abandonment of unanimity. While critics warn that such approaches could damage trust among member states or erode legal consistency, the failure to act in the face of systemic obstruction is a greater risk, as it weakens the EU’s ability to respond quickly to global trends. EU countries are already weighing options to circumvent Hungarian veto.  EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and others have publicly stated “alternatives exist” and the EU will deliver “one way or the other”. The plans aim to reduce reliance on unanimity while preserving as much EU unity as possible. The first measure includes changing the voting system by expanding qualified majority voting(QMV) into areas that currently require unanimity, such as foreign policy decisions or parts of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Under QMV, decisions would pass with the support of 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the EU population, allowing Ukraine aid, sanctions, or enlargement steps to proceed without Hungary’s consent. However, the challenges on the way of implementing the new system include the political sensitivity of overriding a core EU principle of consensus. The second step involves advancing a “multi-speed Europe” through greater use of flexible formats, such as informal “coalitions of the willing” and enhanced cooperation among member states. This would let groups of countries move forward on security, competitiveness, or Ukraine-related financing without needing full EU-27 approval. EU treaties already permit enhanced cooperation, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly endorsed it in February, stating that where unanimity stalls progress, the bloc “should not shy away from using the possibilities foreseen in the treaties.” Such arrangements already happen, to a certain degree, especially in the context of intergovernmental agreements that bypass EU institutional framework on the security and military issues. Moreover, creating specific funds or using the proceeds of the Russian frozen assets are the alternative ways to raise the financial aid bypassing restrictions. On April 1, the European Union received €1.4 billion in windfall profits generated by interest on cash balances from the immobilized assets of the Russian Central Bank, marking the fourth such transfer following the third tranche in August 2025 and covering revenues accumulated in the second half of 2025. These extraordinary revenues are derived from EU sanctions, while the underlying assets (worth over €200 billion) remain frozen and cannot be transferred back to Russia (as reinforced by the December 2025 Council decision under Regulation 2025/2600 and Article 122 TFEU), the interest does not belong to Russia and has been repurposed to support Ukraine. This mechanism serves as a practical and robust bypass to unanimity requirements, enabling continued financing for Ukraine even amid vetoes by individual member states such as Hungary. At the same time the concept’s main drawback lies on the inability of these formats to fully replace EU-27 decisions, and, furthermore, leading to the erosion of overall unity. The ways of compromise outlined by Kaja Kallas suggest energy-security concession - routing non-Russian crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia through Croatia’s Adria (JANAF) pipeline system as the replacement for the “Druzhba” pipeline. The European Commission’s Oil Coordination Group confirmed in late February 2026 that the Adria route from Croatia’s terminal has sufficient capacity to cover all Hungarian and Slovak needs. Croatia affirmed readiness to ensure deliveries of non-Russian cargoes, with the EU offering technical and financial support for diversification and interim measures. This strategy illustrates how targeted economic and infrastructural projects can be used alongside political pressure to bring dissenting member states back into alignment with EU objectives. In contrast to the soft mechanisms,  EU officials are also considering the stronger enforcement and financial pressure, tightening rule-of-law conditionality to withhold EU funds from Hungary. This would invoke Article 4(3) of the EU treaties (the duty of sincere cooperation) and link access to the next MFF budget, negotiations starting in July, to compliance on issues like Ukraine aid. European Council President Costa has already signaled this route, while Commissioner Michael McGrath confirmed that “if breaches to the rule of law were to occur, the suspension of payments or blocking of funding is now on the table.” The EU has already effectively frozen approval of a €16 billion defense loan for Hungary under the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) program.  The situation illustrates how the EU is using economic leverage as an indirect way to counter veto power, reinforcing compliance without formally changing unanimity rules. Hungary has warned it might reject the entire new MFF if funds remain at risk, but the approach would give the EU leverage to penalize vetoes without treaty changes. Another potential approach might involve suspending voting rights via Article 7 of the EU treaties, which allows the bloc to strip a member state’s voting privileges for serious breaches of EU values. The European Parliament already triggered Article 7 against Hungary in 2018. Reactivating or advancing it could create significant pressure even if full suspension is hard to achieve, requiring unanimity among the other 26 states. On the other hand, even pushing for Article 7 could create huge pressure on Hungary, completely isolating Hungary on Ukraine-related votes. The last and the most extreme measure is the expulsion from the EU, though it remains largely hypothetical and legally challenging because no treaty provision explicitly allows it. Some diplomats have proposed changing Article 50 (the Brexit exit clause) or other workarounds as a last resort. The idea is rarely discussed openly due to fears that Hungary would move even closer to Russia, but it is raised as a theoretical way to permanently remove a veto player from Ukraine aid and other decisions. Context of the 2026 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections On April 12,  Hungary will hold one of the crucial, future-defining parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been in power for 16 years, is facing the most intense challenge in the last several elections, from the opponent Peter Magyar, Tisza party. Polls show Orbán’s Fidesz trailing the opposition Tisza party by roughly 9–12 points. Many EU officials openly expressed hope that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán could be voted out, However, EU diplomats remained cautious, noting that even if Orbán were defeated, his successor might not fully reverse Hungary’s positions, particularly on sensitive issues like migration or EU expansion. Magyar has promised to realign Hungary more closely with the EU and NATO and unlock billions in frozen EU funds, but some officials believe any policy shift would be gradual rather than transformative. Potential Scenarios and EU reactions In the first scenario, If Orbán remains in power following the upcoming elections, the European Union is likely to systematically expand its use of veto-bypass mechanisms. In this case, tools such as enhanced cooperation, intergovernmental agreements outside the EU treaty framework, and off-budget financial instruments would become more institutionalized rather than ad hoc solutions. At the same time, the EU would likely intensify political and economic pressure on Hungary. This could include delaying or conditioning access to EU funds, increasing public criticism from EU leaders, and further isolating Hungary in diplomatic forums. While formal sanctions under mechanisms such as Article 7 remain difficult due to unanimity requirements, informal exclusion from key decision-making processes may become more pronounced. In the second scenario, A victory by opposition party would create an opportunity for a reset in EU–Hungary relations. Opposition leaders, including Péter Magyar, have signaled a more cooperative stance toward the EU, emphasizing the importance of restoring trust, unlocking frozen EU funds, and aligning Hungary more closely with common European policies. The EU would likely prioritize rapid reintegration of Hungary into consensus-based governance. This could involve accelerating the release of withheld funds, including approximately €17 billion in frozen EU cohesion and recovery funds, which have been suspended primarily over rule-of-law and corruption concerns, reestablishing Hungary’s role in collective decision-making, and reducing reliance on bypass mechanisms such as enhanced cooperation. A more constructive Hungarian position would also facilitate smoother coordination on key issues, including sanctions policy and broader geopolitical strategy. However, even a pro-EU administration may face domestic political constraints, limiting its ability to fully reverse previous positions. As a result, while institutional cohesion would likely improve, the EU may remain cautious and retain some fallback mechanisms to guard against future obstruction. Considering the current internal disagreements inside the bloc, one thing is clear - the election outcome will directly influence the EU’s strategic trajectory and institutional mechanisms in managing veto players, while maintaining long-term support for Ukraine. Regardless of the result, the EU appears determined to ensure that Hungarian case does not hinder collective action on existential foreign policy priorities.

Nargiza Umarova’s policy brief for Caspian Policy Center explores how Uzbekistan is emerging as one of the key drivers of a new transport and connectivity landscape in Central Asia. Focusing on the expansion of freight transportation across the Caspian Sea and the growing strategic use of Turkmenistan’s railway and port infrastructure, the brief demonstrates how Tashkent is steadily strengthening its role in east-west transit. It outlines the practical significance of recent infrastructure and institutional developments, including the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, the evolution of the CASCA+ corridor, and new mechanisms for coordinating railway administrations across the region. Through these initiatives, Uzbekistan is not only diversifying its foreign trade routes, but also contributing to the formation of a more resilient and interconnected regional transport architecture. The brief also places these developments within a broader geopolitical and economic context, showing how Uzbekistan’s transport policy is linked to regional integration, access to European and global markets, and the search for alternatives amid geopolitical instability. Particular attention is devoted to the growing importance of cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, as well as to the strategic relevance of the Middle Corridor for the future of Central Asia’s external trade. By examining both the opportunities and the constraints surrounding new logistics chains, the brief argues that Uzbekistan is helping shape a new reality in the geopolitics of transport corridors – one in which Central Asian states are becoming more active participants in regional and transcontinental connectivity rather than remaining peripheral transit spaces. Read on Caspian Policy Center

In her policy brief for The Jamestown Foundation, Nargiza Umarova examines the growing significance of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor as an alternative transit route linking Afghanistan with Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and onward to European markets. The brief places particular emphasis on the corridor’s renewed relevance amid military escalation in the Middle East and deepening tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, arguing that the route offers Kabul a strategically important means of diversifying external trade channels and reducing dependence on more vulnerable transit directions. At the same time, the author highlights that the corridor is increasingly viewed not only as a logistical solution, but also as an instrument capable of reshaping broader patterns of regional connectivity. A central argument of the brief is that further development of the corridor, especially its possible extension toward Pakistan, could substantially expand the geopolitical role of Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and several Central Asian states by integrating them more deeply into trade flows between South Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. However, the analysis also underscores that such changes may alter the balance of transit significance within Central Asia itself, potentially weakening the current positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on north–south and intercontinental routes. In this sense, the brief goes beyond transport issues alone and offers a broader assessment of how emerging infrastructure projects are becoming part of a wider contest over regional influence, connectivity, and strategic relevance. The policy brief is especially valuable for showing that transport corridors in and around Afghanistan should be understood not simply as technical infrastructure initiatives, but as geopolitical projects with direct implications for trade geography, regional competition, and the future architecture of Eurasian connectivity. By linking the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to parallel railway and logistics initiatives, Umarova demonstrates that the struggle for control over routes is simultaneously becoming a struggle over the redistribution of economic opportunity and political weight across a rapidly changing macro-region. Read on Jamestown * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.