By  Sabina Gulyamova , Master’s degree student at UWED, intern at the Center for Sustainable Development at IAIS This policy brief explores the relationship between climate change and migration in the Republic of Karakalpakstan. Drawing on statistical data and expert insights, the author examines contemporary migration trends in the region and their implications for socioeconomic development. The brief highlights the growing role of labor migration and remittances in supporting household livelihoods, while also examining how environmental and economic factors influence population mobility. Particular attention is given to the challenges associated with demographic change, urbanization, and regional disparities within Karakalpakstan. More broadly, the study situates Karakalpakstan within the wider context of the Aral Sea basin and Central Asia, emphasizing the links between migration, climate adaptation, water security, and sustainable development. The author concludes that strengthening resilience in environmentally vulnerable regions will require coordinated efforts in economic development, climate adaptation, and regional cooperation. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The article co-authored with Aziza Saginbaeva, Research Intern at IAIS, examines how the inauguration of President Lee Jae-myung in June 2025 has marked a shift in South Korea’s foreign policy from the value-oriented and geopolitically ambitious approach of the previous administration towards a more pragmatic strategy centred on national interests and economic security. The article argues that Central Asia is no longer treated as an autonomous geopolitical priority under Seoul’s revised foreign policy framework. Instead, the region is increasingly viewed through the lens of resource diplomacy, supply-chain resilience and access to strategically important raw materials. Particular attention is given to South Korea’s need to diversify its imports of rare earth elements and critical minerals following China’s tightening of export controls and the resulting disruption of supplies to Korean industries. According to the authors, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are well positioned to benefit from this transformation by expanding cooperation with South Korea in geological exploration, mineral extraction, advanced processing technologies and long-term supply arrangements. The article also notes that Seoul’s less confrontational approach towards China may create additional diplomatic flexibility for Central Asian governments, allowing them to deepen cooperation with South Korea without being compelled to make politically sensitive choices between competing external powers. The forthcoming Korea–Central Asia Summit in 2026 is presented as an important test of the sustainability of these relations. The authors conclude that Central Asian states should move beyond broad political declarations and offer concrete cooperation packages in lithium, uranium, rare earth elements and other critical resources. By becoming structurally integrated into South Korea’s technological and economic security architecture, the region could secure long-term Korean investment, diversify its international partnerships and strengthen its position within an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment. Read on the website of Seoul Institute of Global Affairs (SIGA) * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By  Roksana Izzatova , UWED undergraduate, Research Assistant at IAIS   The events of June 2026 revealed a profound rupture in relations between U.S. President Donald Trump and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who only a year earlier had been considered the closest ideological allies and architects of a new right-wing populist order. The public scandal triggered by Trump’s claim that Meloni had allegedly “begged” him for a joint photograph at the G7 summit became the culmination of a crisis in the transatlantic partnership that threatens to reshape the architecture of European security. Following the meeting between the two leaders during the summit in Evian-les-Bains on June 15–17 and Trump’s subsequent interview, the Italian Prime Minister released a video statement refuting the American president’s remarks and declaring that such a tone toward an ally was unacceptable. In her ironic assessment, he does not demonstrate the same degree of determination toward the opponents of the West and the United States, whose leaders he addresses in a considerably more conciliatory manner. Meloni also responded directly to accusations concerning her declining approval ratings, emphasizing that her political support is determined solely by her ability to defend Italy’s national interests. She characterized questions regarding her popularity as lying outside the competence of the American president and advised him to focus on his own approval ratings. According to public opinion surveys, her approval rating (44%) exceedsthat of Trump (36%). The diplomatic reaction of the Italian side was consistent and notably firm. Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani cancelled his planned visit to Washington scheduled for June 21–22, describing Donald Trump’s remarks as offensive. Significantly, support for Giorgia Meloni extended beyond the governing camp. Former centrist Prime Minister Matteo Renzi sharply criticized Trump’s actions, describing them as outrageous. The Evian scandal was merely the culmination of a prolonged and steadily deepening rift between the two leaders. On March 31, several U.S. bombers participating in Operation “Epic Fury” included Sigonella in their flight plan without prior coordination with the Italian authorities. When the Italian military command established that the American aircraft were already airborne, the mission was classified as a combat operation requiring parliamentary approval under bilateral agreements in force since 1954. Consequently, Italy officially denied permission for the aircraft to land. The decision was clearly political in nature. Speaking before parliament, Meloni unequivocally stated Italy’s position: Italy is not a participant in the war against Iran and has no intention of becoming involved. She further characterized the American strikes as actions exceeding the boundaries of international law. This position received broad public support. At the same time, Meloni’s domestic political position became significantly more complicated. In March, she suffered defeat in a referendum on judicial reform, dealing a serious blow to her reputation as a politically invulnerable leader, while by May inflation had reached 3.3 percent, its highest level since 2023. Simultaneously, a second line of conflict emerged surrounding Pope Leo XIV. The Pontiff, a U.S. citizen, condemned American military actions in Iran during a prayer vigil at St. Peter’s Basilica. Trump responded with sharp public criticism, questioning the Pope’s competence in matters of security and foreign policy. Meloni defended the Pontiff, provoking a negative reaction from Trump. At first glance, open confrontation with the President of the United States appears politically self-destructive for a leader whose political platform was originally built upon ideological affinity with Trump’s Republican movement. However, domestic political logic reveals a more complex strategic calculation. Meloni is seriously considering holding early elections in April 2027 instead of December amid growing concern regarding the continuing erosion of electoral support. According to polling data, her party, Brothers of Italy, retains 28 percent support, while the opposition Democratic Party stands at 22 percent. However, the combined electoral potential of left-wing parties in a coalition format reaches approximately 40 percent, creating a genuine risk of losing power. In this context, the Hungarian precedent is particularly illustrative. According to a number of observers, certain elements of Donald Trump’s political style resemble the model associated with Viktor Orbán, which critics link to pressure on independent institutions, tighter control over universities, and systems that reward loyal supporters. At the same time, the most recent Hungarian elections demonstrated a noticeable weakening of Orbán’s political position. Under these circumstances, Giorgia Meloni appears to have been guided by the following strategic logic: open confrontation with Donald Trump during a period of his political weakening, against the backdrop of the unpopular war with Iran and declining approval ratings, presented several tactical opportunities. First, it enabled her to distance her government from association with the increasingly discredited Trump administration. Second, it allowed her to portray herself before the Italian electorate as a defender of national dignity and sovereignty against attacks from a powerful opponent. Third, it shifted public discourse away from economic difficulties toward questions of foreign-policy firmness. Fourth, it adapted elements of the electoral model employed by left-wing parties, which have successfully utilized anti-American sentiment and declining trust in American leadership as mobilizing factors. As a result, Meloni is no longer perceived as the White House’s most reliable European partner. Experts emphasize the irreversible nature of the rupture, pointing to her defense of the Pope as the turning point after which reconciliation became extremely difficult. The crisis also has a structural dimension: according to many scholars, nationalist movements, because of their ideological characteristics, tend to compete with one another more often than they build durable alliances. At the same time, an internal split emerged within Italy’s right-wing camp. On June 13, former General Roberto Vannacci founded the National Future party, presenting it as a genuinely right-wing alternative. The movement rapidly attracted approximately 100,000 members. The new organization challenged Meloni from the right, arguing that her cooperation with Trump had compromised her political standing and thereby increasing her incentive to pursue a more independent political course. A similar distancing from Trump’s policies can also be observed among other European right-wing populist movements. In France, Jordan Bardella, leader of the National Rally and the favorite in the 2027 presidential race, went beyond merely distancing himself from Trump and explicitly described his policies as mistaken. Tino Chrupalla, co-chair of Alternative for Germany, characterized American policy as imperial in nature and warned of the risk that confrontation could escalate into a major military conflict.The principal strategic beneficiaries of the crisis in transatlantic unity are Russia and China. For Moscow, the split between the United States and Europe represents a long-sought objective that has unexpectedly materialized. Such a division corresponds with Russia’s long-term foreign policy interests, as weakening NATO cohesion has traditionally been viewed by Russian leadership as a favorable outcome, even though the current rupture has been driven by internal developments within the United States rather than external pressure. Moscow is likely calculating that a less cohesive Europe may reduce its support for Ukraine, thereby expanding opportunities to prolong the conflict. Russia also expects that a weakened and divided Europe will inevitably lose some capacity to support Ukraine and resist Russian pressure, enabling Moscow to extend the conflict while anticipating a gradual retreat of Washington. For China, the Western split creates a strategic opportunity to deepen economic and political ties with European capitals, particularly given the contrast between the perceived predictability of Chinese policy and the impulsiveness of American decision-making. At the same time, reduced American focus on Europe increases Beijing’s operational freedom in the Indo-Pacific region. For the countries of Central Asia, and especially Uzbekistan, the weakening of American influence across Eurasia creates conditions for a more flexible multi-vector foreign policy while simultaneously strengthening Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Under such circumstances, preventing excessive dependence on any single center of power becomes a strategic imperative. Thus, the conflict between Donald Trump and Giorgia Meloni is, in reality, a symptom of a profound restructuring of the global political system. The erosion of Western unity, initiated by the Iranian war and accelerated by the unpredictability of the American course, undermines the foundations of an international order built upon the assumption of uncontested American leadership. European right-wing populist parties, which originally expected support from Trump in pursuing their own anti-liberal agendas, have found themselves compelled to distance themselves from the very leader whose ideological impulses they once shared. For the Global South and the countries of Central Asia, this signifies the end of the unipolar era and the emergence of a multipolar world in which each state must independently balance its relations among competing centers of power. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By  Mirjakhon Fayzullaev , undergraduate at UWED, intern at the Center for Strategic Connectivity at IAIS This article examines the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route not only through the lens of infrastructure modernization, but also as an issue of digital governance, data interoperability, and technological sovereignty. The author demonstrates that the key constraints of the Middle Corridor are not so much the physical parameters of the route as administrative delays, the lack of coordination among digital systems, high variability in transit times, and the absence of a unified operational platform. In this context, digitalization is viewed as the main factor in enhancing the route’s competitiveness, especially for shippers for whom not only speed but also the predictability of deliveries is important. The article pays particular attention to the role of Central Asia—primarily Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—which are already developing their own digital solutions in the fields of logistics and customs administration. Kazakhstan is presented as one of the leaders in digital customs infrastructure, while Uzbekistan is promoting the E-Permit system for the electronic exchange of permits in international freight transport. The author emphasizes that combining these models could serve as the foundation for establishing a regional digital framework for the Middle Corridor. In a broader sense, the article raises the question of who will determine the rules of future Eurasian logistics: the Central Asian states themselves or external actors—China, the European Union, and international platform operators. The central conclusion of the study is that the Middle Corridor is entering a phase where competition among transport routes is increasingly shifting toward competition among digital ecosystems, data standards, and artificial intelligence. Therefore, it is important for the region to transition from the role of a transit territory to that of one of the architects of the corridor’s digital infrastructure. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Following the collapse of the USSR, the states of Central Asia faced the need to consolidate their statehood, define national development priorities, and strengthen their sovereignty. Under these conditions, regional cooperation, despite a number of individual initiatives, remained a secondary priority and was not accompanied by the creation of sustainable coordination mechanisms. During the 2000s, regional cooperation existed in a fragmented manner, while a significant part of the regional agenda was shaped within initiatives involving external partners. Under these circumstances, the role of the Central Asian states themselves in developing collective regional approaches remained limited. A significant shift occurred in 2017 when, during the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of Uzbekistan, Sh.M. Mirziyoyev, put forward an initiative to hold regular Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia. The emergence of this format coincided with a growing understanding of the need to strengthen intra-regional dialogue and seek collective approaches to addressing common challenges. Subsequently, the Consultative Meetings became a key platform for fostering an atmosphere of trust and coordinating the regional agenda. In this context, the progress achieved in regional cooperation may be regarded as a manifestation of growing regional maturity, reflecting a qualitative deepening of interaction among the Central Asian states. This process received institutional recognition within the framework of the United Nations system and was reflected in the decision of the United Nations General Assembly of 20 May 2026, when the resolution “Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Economic Integration for Sustainable Development in the Central Asian Region” was adopted by consensus. The initiative was put forward by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan during his address at the General Debate of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025. The document highlights the role and importance of regular Consultative Meetings of the Heads of Central Asian States, which over a relatively short period have become a key mechanism for political dialogue and coordination of regional cooperation. Since the launch of this format in 2018, seven Consultative Meetings have been held. For reference: the first meeting was held on 15 March 2018 in Astana (Kazakhstan), the second on 29 November 2019 in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), the third on 6 August 2021 in the National Tourist Zone “Avaza” (Turkmenistan), the fourth on 21 July 2022 in Cholpon-Ata (Kyrgyzstan), the fifth on 14 September 2023 in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), the sixth on 9 August 2024 in Astana (Kazakhstan), and the seventh on 16 November 2025 in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). During the latest meeting, the Republic of Azerbaijan joined the consultative format on a permanent basis. The eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of Central Asian States is scheduled to be held on 8 October 2026 in the National Tourist Zone “Avaza” in Turkmenistan. Regular Consultative Meetings of the Heads of Central Asian States have contributed to the formation of a fundamentally new political atmosphere in the region, ensuring a transition from fragmented efforts to a more coordinated framework of interaction. As a result, conditions have been created for the development of a unified regional vision and a fuller realization of collective potential, which in turn opens additional opportunities for expanding cooperation with UN structures and other international organizations. Efforts to develop consolidated approaches among regional states are also reflected in the “Central Asia Plus” formats, the number of which has exceeded 10 in recent years. In this regard, the resolution encourages deeper economic integration and enhanced connectivity in Central Asia, as well as the full utilization of the region’s collective potential as one of the necessary conditions for sustainable development and the free movement of people, goods, and services. Industrial cooperation and strengthening ties among small and medium-sized enterprises in the region are identified as key growth drivers, expected to stimulate innovation and job creation. The document calls on Member States, relevant UN bodies, and agencies to expand support for Central Asia, flexibly aligning their programs with the priorities defined by the states of the region for their further prosperity. Within the framework of the document’s development, extensive political and diplomatic work was carried out (over 10 multilateral consultations and numerous bilateral negotiations), resulting in an agreed text consistent with the principles of universality of UN resolutions, as well as the foreign policy and foreign economic interests of the Republic. As a result, the document received broad interregional support. The resolution was co-sponsored by 66 states representing all major regions of the world across five continents. The adopted resolution reflects a qualitatively new stage in the development of regional cooperation in Central Asia and may be regarded as an indicator of the region’s maturity. The document indicates a gradual shift from a national agenda to regional interests, while preserving the existing nature of relations between the countries of the region. The resolution also demonstrates the role of the Republic of Uzbekistan as a state capable of initiating and advancing regionally significant international initiatives, thereby shaping elements of a collective Central Asian agenda at the global level. One of the key substantive shifts is the transformation of the regional narrative: from a focus on risks and challenges (Afghanistan, extremism, migration processes) to issues of economic integration, trade and transport connectivity, and sustainable development. In a broader context, Central Asia is increasingly positioning itself not only as an object of international aid, but also as a participant in shaping global agenda outcomes, including sustainable development, energy security, and transport connectivity. Overall, the adoption of this resolution reflects the consolidation of efforts by the states of the region aimed at shaping a more coordinated and institutionally resilient framework of interaction in Central Asia. The document effectively enshrines, at the level of the United Nations General Assembly, the formation of a new configuration of regional cooperation, based on the strengthening of interconnectivity, the institutionalization of dialogue, and the gradual reinforcement of the international standing of the states of the region. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Noah Gao’s article, published on the platform of the Beijing Club for International Dialogue, examines the growing strategic weight of Central Asian countries in the changing Eurasian order. Based on his visit to Uzbekistan, participation in the Second China–Central Asia Studies Forum, and field observations, the author argues that Central Asia is moving from the position of a peripheral “buffer zone” toward the role of an active regional player. The article pays particular attention to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as the main engines of regional transformation. It highlights market reforms, industrial modernization, digital development, investment attraction, and transport connectivity as key factors behind Central Asia’s economic rise. Uzbekistan is presented as a particularly dynamic case, combining demographic growth, manufacturing development, digital entrepreneurship, and an increasingly active regional policy. A central theme of the article is the role of young people and new elites in Central Asia’s development. Gao notes that the region’s demographic growth, expanding higher education system, and internationalized training of specialists are creating a new generation with strong global ambitions. At the same time, the article points to a gap in China’s engagement with young Central Asian elites, arguing that China’s economic presence has not yet been matched by sufficient influence in education, talent development, and intellectual networks. Overall, the article frames Central Asia as an emerging centre of connectivity, capital, technology, and geopolitical agency. It argues that the region’s future importance will be shaped not only by transport corridors and natural resources, but also by digital infrastructure, financial platforms, artificial intelligence, tourism, cultural diplomacy, and the ability of Central Asian states to pursue independent, multi-vector strategies. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.