The C5+1 summit held in Washington, D.C., on November 6, 2025, was a landmark event, marking a qualitative transformation in relations between the United States and the five Central Asian republics. Timed to the platform’s tenth anniversary and hosted for the first time at the presidential level at the White House with President Donald Trump, the summit demonstrated a shift from predominantly declarative dialogue to the finalization of major economic agreements.   The summit took place against a backdrop of fundamental shifts in global geopolitics. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and intensifying U.S.-China competition have created a unique window of opportunity for Central Asian nations to diversify their foreign ties. For Washington, it has created an urgent need to strengthen its position in a strategically vital and resource-rich region that, in President Trump’s words, “previous American presidents neglected this region completely”. Underscoring this new level of engagement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced his intention to visit all five Central Asian countries in 2026 as part of a broader diplomatic effort to strengthen ties.   Hosting the summit in Washington D.C. itself, rather than on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly as in the past, was a significant political signal. This step, along with the U.S. Senate’s adoption of a resolution affirming the strategic importance of the format, highlights the region’s elevated status in U.S. foreign policy priorities. In the resolution, the Senate officially “affirms the strategic importance of the C5+1 platform in promoting regional sovereignty, stability, and shared security interests with the United States”. As experts noted during discussions at the Atlantic Council, the C5+1 format, launched in 2015, has evolved from a symbolic platform for dialogue into a mechanism for implementing concrete, pragmatic projects. This was facilitated by Central Asia’s own transformation, as the region has evolved from one plagued by contradictions into a more consolidated and proactive player with its own agenda.   The centerpiece of the summit was a large-scale package of trade and economic agreements. The core of this package was an accord with Uzbekistan, with President Trump announcing Tashkent’s plans to purchase and invest approximately $35 billion in key U.S. sectors over the next three years, with that figure expected to exceed $100 billion over the next decade.   The groundwork for these agreements was laid during a series of working meetings of the Uzbek delegation in Washington, which resulted in deals aimed at modernizing industrial infrastructure, introducing resource-efficient agricultural technologies, and strengthening cooperation in cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. Discussions with John Jovanovic, head of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), focused on financing projects in energy and transport. Talks with Ben Black, CEO of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), centered on accelerating the creation of a joint investment platform. A meeting with Shilpan Amin, Global Executive Director of General Motors International, addressed long-term cooperation in the automotive sector.   Kazakhstan, for its part, signed a substantial package of 29 agreements totaling approximately $17 billion. Key projects include a $2.5 billion deal with John Deere to localize the production of agricultural machinery. In the mining sector, a $1.1 billion agreement was finalized between Tau-Ken Samruk and Cove Capital for the joint development of one of the world’s largest untapped tungsten deposits.   In the high-tech, Kazakhstan signed memorandums of understanding worth around $300 million with BETA Technologies and Joby Aero Inc. to develop electric aviation and air taxi services. In finance, the National Investment Corporation of the National Bank of Kazakhstan concluded agreements worth $1 billion with leading U.S. funds, including Brookfield Asset Management and Cerberus Capital Management. A significant outcome was the announcement of Kazakhstan’s first industrial investment project in the U.S.: a $130 million memorandum signed by 1Thirty Holding to build a chemical complex.   The summit also marked breakthroughs in aviation and communications. Plans were announced for the sale of over 40 Boeing aircraft in total. The national carrier, Air Astana, signed a letter of intent for 18 new Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner wide-body jets. Tajikistan’s Somon Air plans to acquire up to 14 aircraft, while Uzbekistan Airways finalized its order for 8 Dreamliner jets. In digital communications, a landmark event was the announcement of a partnership between Elon Musk’s Starlink and the telecommunications group Veon. This agreement, Starlink’s largest direct-to-cell deal, will provide service to over 150 million potential customers, beginning with Beeline in Kazakhstan.   An analysis of these deals, however, reveals their complex nature. As some economists have noted, many of the announced agreements essentially represent a capital outflow from Central Asia to the U.S. (through leasing and credit for the purchase of aircraft, equipment, and locomotives), an approach some experts have compared to that of the Persian Gulf states. The only major direct investment into the region appears to be the tungsten mining project in Kazakhstan. This structure reflects the existing model of foreign economic exchange: the export of raw materials in return for the import of high-tech products.   This dynamic showcases the transactional, “tit-for-tat” approach characteristic of the Trump Administration. For the United States, the benefit is clear and immediate: support for its domestic manufacturers and the creation of jobs. For the Central Asian nations, the long-term gain depends on less certain factors, such as the successful localization of production and a unaffected transfer of technological expertise. A more immediate victory appears to be the revitalization of substantive discussions in the U.S. Congress regarding the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a Cold War-era trade restriction that, according to a consensus among lawmakers and experts, has long been obsolete and yet stands as a barrier to a full-fledged economic partnership that could provide stability and predictability for investors.   A key driver of the Trump Administration’s decisive engagement is strategic competition with China, particularly over access to critical minerals. Washington is seeking to diversify its supply chains to reduce its dependence on Beijing, which controls approximately 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of processing, and whose supply restrictions have already created challenges for certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Against this backdrop, Central Asia, with its generous reserves of tungsten, uranium, antimony, copper, and lithium, becomes a vital partner for the United States. This theme was central to the summit, with even Tajikistan’s President E. Rahmon highlighting his country’s readiness to attract American investment to develop rare and strategic resources. However, the region’s nations are insisting on the development of the full production value chain, from geological exploration to finished products, to avoid remaining mere suppliers of raw materials. Turkmenistan’s interests were more narrowly focused, linked to hopes of securing U.S. support for the long-planned TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India). While no concrete decisions were made, the summit provided Ashgabat with a platform to re-emphasize the project in the context of global energy security and the diversification of supply routes bypassing Russia.   For the Central Asian nations, the summit was a crucial opportunity to advance their multi-vector foreign policies. The war in Ukraine has served as a powerful catalyst for the region’s search for alternative economic partners and trade routes. In this context, the U.S. is seen as an important counterweight not only to Russia’s influence but also to China’s. Washington’s active support for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the “Middle Corridor”) fully aligns with these aspirations. Furthermore, recent agreements to develop the “Zangezur Corridor” with U.S. participation, now dubbed the “Trump Route”, are viewed as a bottleneck through which the U.S. and its allies are opening a path to Central Asia.   Despite the announced deals, the American presence faces China’s deeply entrenched influence in the region. According to analysts, Chinese investments are structural and long-term in nature. The American approach, especially under President Trump, appears more transactional. Historically, U.S. attention to the region has been episodic, leading Central Asian leaders to be cautious about long-term prospects. The real question is whether the U.S. is prepared to invest in creating full value chains within Central Asia, including raw material processing and guaranteed offtake agreements, as China already does. The answer to this will determine whether Washington can mount a serious challenge to Beijing for long-term influence.   Beyond resources and geopolitics, significant attention was given to human capital and social development. The Kazakh delegation signed a package of agreements worth around $50 million in education and science with leading American universities and companies. A key project will be the establishment of the new Ulytau Technical University in Zhezkazgan with the participation of the Colorado School of Mines. In the financial sector, the National Bank of Kazakhstan and Visa signed a memorandum of cooperation. In healthcare, Samruk-Kazyna and Ashmore Investment Advisors announced a $150 million project to create the first Western-branded multi-profile clinic in Kazakhstan.   In addition to economic agreements, the summit was marked by important diplomatic developments. One was the announcement that Kazakhstan would join the Abraham Accords. While the move is largely symbolic, it is a clear signal of Astana’s willingness to align with Washington-led international initiatives.   However, this step should also be viewed in the broader context of Israel’s increased engagement in the region. According to Israeli diplomatic sources, since 2023 Israel has been deliberately working to deepen ties with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This strategy has several objectives: first, to create a counterweight to Iranian influence; second, to contain Türkiye’s regional ambitions; and third, to counter the spread of radicalism, especially following attempted attacks on Israeli facilities in the region after the flare-up in Gaza. For the U.S., Kazakhstan’s inclusion in this format is a diplomatic breakthrough, while for Kazakhstan itself, it is a pragmatic step within its multi-vector policy that strengthens ties with a key U.S. ally in the Middle East.   The summit also showcased the region’s aspiration for greater efficiency. President S. Mirziyoyev put forward several initiatives aimed at institutionalizing the C5+1 format, proposing the establishment of a permanent secretariat, a Coordinating Council on Investment and Trade, and a Central Asian Investment Partnership Fund. The offer to host the next summit in Samarkand also signals Uzbekistan’s desire to play a more active role in shaping the regional agenda.   In conclusion, experts agree that the C5+1 summit in Washington marked not just another stage of dialogue, but a qualitative shift in the relationship. The United States, concerned about the security of its industrial supply chains, has found willing partners in the nations of Central Asia. In turn, the region’s countries, seeking to diversify their economies, see the U.S. as a source of needed investment and technology. Despite this progress, a realistic perspective is essential: China’s economic footprint in the region remains many times larger than that of the U.S., while Moscow remains both the primary security guarantor for the region’s nations and a principal potential threat to their stability. The geographic proximity to Russia and China obliges the Central Asian states to continue pursuing a cautious foreign policy. The ultimate success of this new phase of cooperation with the U.S. will depend not on sound declarations, but on the consistent and successful implementation of the agreements signed.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief, co-authored by Aziza Mukhammedova, Jalal Ud Din Kakar, and Zil E Huma, examines Pakistan’s long-standing reliance on militant proxies in Afghanistan through the lens of the “boomerang effect” – the idea that short-sighted strategic choices eventually return to undermine the security of the state that made them. Taking the Durand Line as both a geographic and symbolic starting point, the authors trace how this unresolved, colonial-era border dispute, combined with Pakistan’s search for “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, has produced a security environment that Islamabad can no longer effectively manage. The brief situates the current spike in cross-border tensions, retaliatory strikes and mutual accusations between Kabul and Islamabad within this longer history of proxy warfare and miscalculated geopolitical engineering.   The authors show how Pakistan’s early recognition and sustained support of the Taliban, including during the anti-Soviet jihad and later as a “friendly” regime in Kabul, was driven by the desire to counter Indian influence and secure a compliant government next door. However, over time this supposed asset turned into an autonomous actor with its own priorities. The Taliban’s refusal to compromise on the Durand Line, the persistence of Afghan Pashtun nationalism, and Kabul’s diversification of foreign ties with China, Russia, Qatar and even India have gradually eroded Pakistan’s leverage. The brief portrays this evolution as a classic case of strategic blowback: a patron that once shaped the proxy’s rise is now confronted with a neighbour unwilling to fully accommodate its security demands.   A central focus of the analysis is the emergence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a direct threat to Pakistan’s internal security. Drawing on the Global Terrorism Index, the authors highlight a 91 percent surge in TTP activity since 2023, with 482 attacks recorded in 2024 after the Taliban’s return to power. They argue that safe havens across the border, combined with Kabul’s reluctance to decisively confront TTP, have emboldened the group. At the same time, Kabul accuses Islamabad of links with IS-K, while Pakistan charges Afghanistan with using TTP and BLA as proxies – a mutual blame game that entrenches mistrust and fuels recurring clashes along the Durand Line.   In conclusion, the brief contends that Pakistan is now paying the full price of its proxy-centred doctrine. Instead of a secure western flank, Islamabad faces a hostile or at best unreliable neighbour, mounting militant violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and growing pressure on flagship projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. The need to divert military and political attention to the western border, just as India strengthens its diplomatic presence in Kabul, further complicates Pakistan’s strategic posture. The authors argue that this “boomerang effect” not only exposes the limits of proxy warfare as a long-term strategy, but also raises fundamental questions about Pakistan’s civil–military decision-making and the urgent necessity of moving towards more cooperative, rule-based regional security arrangements.   Read on Eurasia Review   Jalal Ud Din Kakar works as a Research Fellow at the Center for Security Strategy and Policy Research and a PhD International Relations scholar at the School of Integrated Social Sciences, The University of Lahore. Zil E Huma, Mir Chakar Khan Rind University, Sibi, Balochistan   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief by Nargiza Umarova argues that renewed U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port and India’s parallel deepening of trade ties with Russia and the EAEU are reshaping Central Asia’s southern connectivity choices. Although Uzbekistan had explored building logistics facilities at Chabahar, those plans have not materialised—signalling Tashkent’s caution as the port again falls under sanctions and as returns look uncertain for a country accounting for only a small share of India–Central Asia trade. At the same time, Chabahar remains central to the INSTC and to India–Iran–Russia supply chains, which incentivises Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and others to keep the route alive.   Against this backdrop, Tashkent is pivoting to an alternative: a faster, more direct land bridge to South Asia via the Trans-Afghan (Kabul) Corridor. Since 2022, Uzbekistan has promoted a multimodal Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan route, designed to cut North Eurasia–South Asia delivery times to about 20 days. The centrepiece is the Termez–Naibabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi railway, backed by a July 17 intergovernmental agreement on a feasibility study with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Preliminary estimates suggest freight volumes could reach 22 million tonnes by 2030 and 34 million tonnes by 2040, much of it in transit to larger markets, including India.   Umarova emphasises that corridor choice is not merely logistical but strategic. Extending Lapis Lazuli and INSTC pathways could divert South Asia–Europe flows toward the Caspian littoral (Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan), diluting Uzbekistan’s role as a trans-Eurasian hub. By contrast, a functioning Kabul Corridor would anchor Tashkent in the shortest Eurasia–South Asia axis, lessen dependence on Iranian infrastructure, and align with India’s interest in diversified, overland access—provided political risk in Afghanistan is managed.   The brief concludes with pragmatic prescriptions: move first and fast on the Kabul Corridor with broad Central Asian buy-in; engage New Delhi diplomatically to secure support and cargo; and pursue an SCO-wide “single transport space” to integrate standards, schedules and financing. In parallel, keep a hedging option open at Chabahar to preserve flexibility, but treat it as supplementary to a primary Trans-Afghan strategy that maximises Uzbekistan’s connectivity, resilience and transit revenues.   Read on Jamestown Foundation   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief by Nargiza Umarova argues that Azerbaijan is deepening engagement with the Taliban authorities through connectivity, positioning itself as a pivotal node between South Asia and Europe. At the centre is the Lapis Lazuli Corridor—launched in 2018 and revived through new outreach—which links Afghanistan via Turkmenistan, the Caspian, the South Caucasus and Turkey to the European network. Baku frames Lapis Lazuli as a southern extension of the Middle (Trans-Caspian) Corridor, offering Afghanistan alternative pathways to European markets and accelerating its integration into trans-Caspian shipping. Recent high-level contacts—culminating in July 2025 meetings at the ECO summit and a port visit to Alat—signal a proactive Azerbaijani push to grow trade, logistics and energy cooperation with Kabul.   The brief details significant Azerbaijani and Turkmen investments that underpin this strategy: Baku’s Alat Port and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, alongside Turkmenistan’s rail links to Aqina and Andkhoy and upgrades at Turkmenbashi. Maximising the utilisation of these assets creates strong incentives to extend Lapis Lazuli toward Pakistan and India. Yet such a southward pull carries geo-economic consequences for Uzbekistan. By routing South Asia–Europe cargoes across the Caspian through Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Tashkent’s aspiration to serve as the indispensable trans-Eurasian land bridge could be diluted, especially if Lapis Lazuli interlocks with Afghan segments that do not rely on Uzbek territory.   Umarova maps several corridor interactions that shape this competition. Connecting Lapis Lazuli to the Kabul (Trans-Afghan) Corridor via Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif could revive the long-mooted Five Nations Railway (China–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Iran), bypassing Uzbekistan and shortening East–West transit. Parallel Iranian rail expansions from Khaf to Herat and onward to Naibabad would further channel India–Europe flows via Iran and Turkey, eroding Central Asian and South Caucasian transit revenues. Conversely, a western Trans-Afghan line (Torghundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Buldak) championed by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could compete with the Kabul Corridor and reallocate traffic away from Uzbek routes.   The brief concludes that Uzbekistan’s best response is offensive rather than defensive: accelerate the Kabul Corridor with maximum Central Asian buy-in, stitch it to the Northern Railway Route to the EU (boosting Kazakhstan’s transit by up to 20 mtpa), and propose to Baku a joint multimodal India–Pakistan–Afghanistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–EU corridor that enlarges the Middle Corridor’s South Asia feeder base. In parallel, Tashkent should promote an alternative to the Five Nations alignment that connects China–Afghanistan–Iran through Uzbekistan and neighbours, safeguarding the commercial viability of the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat segment. The strategic through-line is clear: maintain first-mover advantage on the Kabul Corridor, align interests with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan where possible, and prevent corridor designs that structurally sideline Uzbekistan from the emergent South Asia–Europe land bridge.   Read on Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief by Aziza Mukhammedova and co-author Jalal Ud Din Kakar situates the debate over the Bagram Air Base within the post-withdrawal landscape of Afghanistan. Four years after the U.S. exit, President Donald Trump’s 2025 remarks about “taking back” Bagram reflect enduring U.S. anxieties over China’s rise and the loss of a strategic foothold on the rim of Central and South Asia. The authors trace the intellectual lineage of this idea to Rep. Michael Waltz’s 2021 warnings that abandoning Bagram would forfeit unique leverage vis-à-vis China, Russia’s south, Iran, and nuclear-armed Pakistan – an argument Trump later amplified, albeit with overstated geography.   They underline Bagram’s dual identity: once a Soviet-built, U.S.-expanded mega-hub with dual runways and tens of thousands of personnel; now a symbol of Taliban authority and of Washington’s hurried exit. Any restoration of U.S. control collides with blunt Taliban red lines – publicly articulated by defense chief Fasihuddin Fitrat – and the group’s broader narrative of sovereignty. While Afghanistan’s economic freefall, aid dependence, and asset freezes create theoretical bargaining chips (humanitarian relief, sanctions relief, travel waivers), the authors caution that such concessions risk legitimizing an internationally isolated regime and entrenching rights abuses, especially against women.   A second strategic constraint is China’s expanding presence. Beijing’s early diplomatic normalization, investment signals, and interest in Afghanistan’s resource endowment reduce Western leverage and offer the Taliban alternatives to U.S. engagement. Pakistan’s role further narrows Washington’s room for maneuver: Islamabad’s ties to both Beijing and the Taliban make support for a U.S. return to Bagram strategically costly, even if it could theoretically exert pressure.   The brief concludes that retaking Bagram is highly implausible without far-reaching political compromises that Washington may find unacceptable. More broadly, the episode is a proxy for the U.S.–China contest across the region. Practical policy, the authors imply, lies less in resurrecting a base than in calibrated diplomacy, targeted humanitarian and economic tools, and coordination with regional actors that preserves influence without conferring de facto recognition on the Taliban.   Read on World Geostrategic Insights   Jalal Ud Din Kakar is a Research Fellow at the Center for Security Strategy and Policy Research and PhD International Relations scholar at the School of Integrated Social Sciences, University of Lahore, Pakistan.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Rustam Makhmudov’s analytical note for the Valdai Club considers the Middle East as a key link in the Taliban’s foreign policy legitimacy strategy after 2021. The author’s central hypothesis is that the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf are not only important partners in their own right, but also a potential “bridge” to the West and international institutions. The movement is demonstrating consistency and flexibility in this direction: from restoring and expanding official contacts with the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to building a working agenda with Iran, despite the difficult legacy of the 1990s. Significant milestones include the UAE’s acceptance of the Taliban ambassador’s credentials, a visit to Abu Dhabi by a delegation led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the participation of the de facto “Afghan authorities” in the Doha meeting under the auspices of the UN, and the resumption of the Saudi embassy in Kabul; In the Iranian vector, the accreditation of a Taliban diplomat and the visit of the Iranian foreign minister in 2025.   The second contour is a narrative strategy addressed to the “Arab street” and the Iranian audience. It involves systematic criticism of Israel’s actions and appeals to the language of international law (sovereignty, territorial integrity) to assert the Taliban as a “responsible” actor. Mahmoudov emphasizes the ritualistic nature of this rhetoric: it is rarely translated into practical steps, which is explained by the desire not to burn bridges with the West and the traditional elites of the Gulf. At the same time, the Taliban are investing in their image as “pragmatists” by emphasizing the fight against ISIS-Khorasan and the drug trade — elements that are relevant to the international security agenda.   The third layer is the economic game surrounding Afghanistan’s transit position and natural resources. The author notes China’s increased activity in oil and gas and mining, interest in lithium, and the growing involvement of regional players. Iran is becoming a leader in trade (with turnover growing to $3.197 billion in 2024 with minimal Afghan exports), the UAE is taking over the management of airports through GAAC, and Dubai is acting as a financial and business hub for the Afghan elite. Qatar is a potential investor in the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar highway (~$5 billion) and the Jabal Siraj cement project ($220 million). These initiatives are designed to strengthen the Taliban’s case for recognition by promising regional connectivity and economic returns.   The main constraint is the West’s position on women’s rights, which forms a “ceiling” for recognition and restrains even pragmatic Gulf regimes. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have publicly signaled to the Taliban that bans on women’s education and employment are unacceptable. The internal duality of the Taliban (Kandahar as the conservative core versus the more pragmatic Kabul) is freezing liberalization. Nevertheless, Mahmoudov sees a window of opportunity: Russia’s recognition of the IEA on July 3, 2025, and potentially further steps by Iran and China, could trigger a “chain reaction” and push Gulf players and some Western capitals to reassess the costs of non-recognition. In such a scenario, women’s rights risk being relegated to the level of rhetoric if the balance of power and transit-resource incentives outweigh the reputational costs.   Read on the website of the Valdai International Discussion Club   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.