UWED PhD Candidate Nigina Saidova’s policy brief frames nationwide AI literacy not only as a domestic development priority, but as a new instrument of Uzbekistan’s soft power in the digital age. Drawing on Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power and the expanding logic of cyber power and digital diplomacy, the brief argues that a population equipped with AI skills becomes part of a country’s international attractiveness, signalling openness, innovation, and a future-oriented national identity. In this reading, human capital in AI is no longer simply an education agenda; it becomes a reputational asset that strengthens “digital nation branding” and enhances foreign-policy communication. At the centre of the analysis is Uzbekistan’s Five Million AI Leaders initiative, presented as an extension of the Digital Uzbekistan–2030 strategy and the AI development framework through 2030. The brief highlights how the initiative is underpinned by policy architecture and measurable targets, expanding AI products and services, improving governmental readiness for AI deployment, establishing research laboratories, and building a critical mass of specialists. It situates this agenda within broader progress in IT education and youth skills development, portraying Uzbekistan as deliberately building the foundations of a competitive AI ecosystem and positioning itself to function as a regional digital hub in Central Asia. The brief then explains how the initiative is designed to transmit clear external signals: investment in youth, openness to global tech partnerships, and regional leadership in convening AI dialogue. Cooperation with major technology actors, international internships, and platforms such as the Silk Road AI Forum are presented as channels of “digital diplomacy” that integrate Uzbekistan into global innovation networks while projecting a cooperative, modernising image, distinct from more closed models of digital sovereignty. Concluding, the author recommends institutionalising this soft-power potential through diplomatic promotion at major multilateral venues, consistent English-language reporting and success stories, alignment with SDGs (especially education and decent work), and stronger emphasis on AI ethics, data protection, and rights-based governance to reinforce Uzbekistan’s credibility in international AI discussions. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The development of digital technologies in the 21st century is accompanied not only by an increase in data volumes, but also by a qualitative complication of data processing processes. Artificial intelligence (AI), big data analysis, and the development of autonomous systems and digital platforms are creating a steady and ever-growing demand for computing power. At the heart of this transformation are data centers, which are becoming critically important infrastructure for the functioning of the modern economy, public administration, and security systems. At the same time, the ground-based infrastructure of data centers faces systemic constraints. These include overloaded power grids, rising electricity costs, water shortages for cooling, and social and environmental resistance at the local community level. In a number of countries, primarily the United States, there have already been cases of new data center construction being blocked due to concerns about the environment and the load on regional power grids. Against this backdrop, experts, corporations, and governments are increasingly discussing the idea of placing computing infrastructure outside Earth—in outer space. Orbital data centers are seen as a potential response to the structural limitations of the terrestrial model of digital development and as an element in the formation of a new technological paradigm. Project initiators and international dynamics. Leading technological powers and major corporations are showing interest in orbital data centers. In the United States, this direction is being actively promoted both by the private sector and within the framework of government strategic discussions. Through Project SunCatcher, Google has announced the possibility of creating satellite computing platforms that use solar energy and autonomous life support systems for equipment. Entrepreneur Elon Musk links the prospects for orbital computing with the development of reusable rockets and the global Starlink satellite network. In his approach, space infrastructure should become an extension of the Earth's internet and cloud services, but with fundamentally different energy and spatial potential. The startup Starcloud, in partnership with NVIDIA, is developing specialized satellites with computing modules for AI tasks, focused on processing data directly in orbit. The European Union is taking a more cautious stance for now, focusing on research programs such as the ASCEND project, which aims to assess the technical feasibility and economic implications of orbital data centers. At the same time, China is demonstrating a more decisive approach. The launch of satellites as part of the Three-Body Computing Constellation (Xing Shidai / 星时代) program demonstrates Beijing's desire to take a leading position in the emerging field of space computing technologies. Technological features and limitations. From a technical point of view, orbital data centers have a number of fundamental advantages. The main one is access to solar energy outside the Earth's atmosphere. The intensity of solar radiation in space is higher than on the planet's surface, and the absence of weather factors allows for more stable energy generation. Placement in certain types of orbits minimizes periods of shading, which makes it possible for equipment to operate almost continuously. However, the space environment also imposes serious limitations. One of the key problems remains the cooling of servers. In a vacuum, there is no convective heat exchange, and heat can only be removed by radiation. This requires the use of massive radiators and complicates the architecture of orbital platforms. In addition, such designs increase the mass of the devices and, accordingly, the cost of their launch. Another critical factor is cosmic radiation. The impact of high-energy particles can lead to microchip malfunctions and reduced computing reliability. Special materials, shielding, and software error correction methods are used to protect equipment, but all these measures increase the cost and complexity of the systems. Economic logic and investment models. The economic efficiency of orbital data centers is directly linked to the cost of launching equipment into orbit. Despite advancements in reusable launch vehicles, the launch process remains an expensive component of the entire chain. In the short term, this renders orbital data centers less competitive compared to their terrestrial counterparts. Communication between orbital data centers and Earth is a separate challenge. High-speed channels, including laser communication systems, are required to transmit large amounts of data. Ensuring the stability of such channels, their redundancy, and protection against failures are critical tasks in the design of orbital computing systems. Nevertheless, significant economic benefits are possible in the long term. The main source of potential savings is energy. In ground-based data centers, a significant portion of operating costs is accounted for by electricity and cooling. In space, once the infrastructure is deployed, solar energy becomes virtually free, which can radically reduce the cost of computing. In addition, orbital data centers can offer unique services, such as processing Earth remote sensing data directly in orbit or providing computing resources for space missions. These niches have no direct analogues in ground-based infrastructure and may justify higher initial costs. Environmental aspects. From an environmental point of view, the idea of moving data centers into space is ambiguous. On the one hand, it reduces the burden on terrestrial ecosystems, decreases water consumption, and reduces the need to build new power plants. This is especially relevant for regions with scarce resources. The relevance of this argument is confirmed by the situation in the United States, where the rapid expansion of AI infrastructure is already having a noticeable impact on aquatic ecosystems. AI data centers in the US threaten to dry up the Great Lakes. One large center consumes as much water as hundreds of thousands of people. This has already led to falling water levels in the Great Lakes, water supply problems, and threats to agriculture. Companies that operate data centers often conceal the real data on resource consumption. On the other hand, rocket launches are accompanied by significant emissions of greenhouse gases and other substances that affect the atmosphere. The mass deployment of orbital infrastructure could lead to an increase in the carbon footprint if more environmentally friendly launch technologies are not introduced. An additional systemic risk is the increase in space debris. The increase in the number of satellites increases the risk of collisions and threatens the sustainability of near-Earth space as an environment for human activity. Geopolitical and legal implications. Orbital data centers have a pronounced geopolitical dimension. Control over computing infrastructure in space can provide states with significant advantages in data processing, intelligence activities, and complex systems management. At the same time, the line between civilian and military use of such technologies remains blurred. The existing international legal framework does not fully take into account the specific nature of orbital computing platforms. Questions arise regarding jurisdiction, access to data, and liability for possible damage. This makes it necessary to develop new international mechanisms for regulation and cooperation. In a broader geopolitical context, orbital data centers are becoming an element in the struggle for technological and regulatory leadership in the emerging digital order. Control over computing power in space means not only access to advanced data processing technologies, but also the ability to shape the standards, rules, and architecture of the global digital infrastructure. This factor is particularly significant in the context of intensifying rivalry between the world's leading powers, primarily the United States and China. China's active steps to create satellite computing clusters demonstrate Beijing's desire not only to solve applied data processing tasks, but also to establish itself as one of the architects of the future global digital infrastructure. For the United States, orbital data centers are seen as part of its technology leadership strategy. The growing needs of the AI industry and the limited capabilities of the power grid are driving the search for alternative solutions. Interest in space computing is being shown by both civilian agencies and national security organizations. In a broader strategic context, the development of orbital data centers reflects the United States' desire to ensure the long-term sustainability of critical digital infrastructure. Moving some computing power outside the country is seen as a way to reduce vulnerability to domestic energy crises, natural disasters, and potential attacks on ground-based infrastructure. Close cooperation between the state and the private sector plays an important role in the American approach. Technology corporations and specialized startups working on orbital computing platforms effectively complement government priorities in the field of innovation and security. This is particularly important in the context of increasing competition with China. The placement of data centers in orbit represents a complex and multidimensional project that combines technological innovations, economic calculations, and geopolitical interests. Potential advantages - access to energy, scalability, and reduced load on Earth's infrastructure - make this concept attractive. At the same time, significant risks associated with high costs, technical challenges, and environmental consequences remain. In the long term, orbital data centers may become an important element of global digital architecture; however, their successful implementation will require coordinated efforts from states, businesses, and international organizations. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Julia Davies’ policy brief examines the White House’s 2025 NSS as a deliberate break from the expansive, interventionist logic that has often characterised U.S. grand strategy. At the centre of her reading is the document’s attempt to cure what Washington commentators call the “Christmas tree problem”, a tendency for national security strategies to become all-encompassing wish lists. Davies argues that, instead, the NSS tries to narrow the definition of U.S. national interest to a stark, realist baseline: the survival and safety of the United States, supported by domestic resilience (borders, industrial capacity, energy, technology) and renewed instruments of state power. A major portion of the brief highlights the NSS’s hierarchy of priorities and the way it links foreign policy to a domestic political agenda. Davies notes the strategy’s five core interests – Western Hemisphere migration pressures, Indo-Pacific trade practices, bolstering Europe, Middle Eastern energy access, and winning the AI/technology race – presented as the organising logic for statecraft and resource allocation. She underscores how the strategy frames internal measures – reindustrialisation, energy reshoring, deregulation, and cultural-political programmes as the enabling foundation for achieving these external goals, making the document as much a statement of political worldview as a conventional strategic blueprint. Davies then interrogates the NSS’s regional ordering and its most controversial language. She emphasises the elevation of the Western Hemisphere to the top priority, paired with a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, alongside a more transactional, de-ideologised posture in Asia, where the strategy envisages managing U.S.–China relations through balanced trade rather than democracy-versus-autocracy framing. In contrast, she identifies the Europe section as the sharpest fault line: allies react strongly to what she presents as scolding rhetoric and a perceived double standard – non-interference is preached globally, yet Europe’s domestic trajectory is treated as a U.S. national security concern. In conclusion, the brief frames the NSS as unorthodox but internally purposeful, attracting optimism from realist and restraint-oriented audiences who welcome a higher threshold for military adventurism. At the same time, Davies flags an unresolved tension: the strategy’s non-interventionist, selective-prioritisation posture can clash with broader claims about U.S. peace-brokering and with coercive signals, particularly in the Americas. Her overall assessment is that the 2025 NSS is best understood as a strategy of tightened national interest definition, but one whose credibility will depend on whether implementation remains disciplined and consistent with the limits the document itself tries to impose. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The brief by Abdugani Karimov examines Japan’s political trajectory after the appointment of Sanae Takaichi as Japan’s first female prime minister in October 2025.  It frames her leadership as a shift from cautious pacifism towards “proactive governance” that blends economic intervention, strategic autonomy, and a renewed emphasis on national identity—an approach the author conceptualises as “strategic conservatism.” A substantial part of the brief is devoted to Takaichi’s domestic agenda, presented as a state-led effort to restore growth and public confidence. It highlights fiscal measures such as abolishing the temporary gasoline tax, raising the income-tax exemption threshold, piloting refundable tax credits, and deploying a supplementary budget of roughly 14 trillion yen to support domestic demand and digital infrastructure.  The paper identifies the most consequential economic-security linkage in the return to nuclear energy, including a plan to restart at least 17 reactors by 2030, supported—according to an NHK poll cited in the brief—by 54% of respondents (37% opposed), signalling a notable shift in public attitudes after Fukushima. On foreign and security policy, the brief describes a move from “cautious pacifism” to “controlled assertiveness,” reflected in goals such as raising defence spending to 2% of GDP and prioritising cyber/space defence integration, a Strategic Intelligence Agency, and counter-strike capabilities.  It also outlines a calibrated approach to China via the “three-D” formula—Deterrence, Dialogue, Diversification—combining firmness on sovereignty and technology with maintained diplomatic channels to avoid open confrontation. Finally, the brief argues that Japan’s Central Asia policy under Takaichi is shifting from “quiet diplomacy” to a more multidimensional strategy that connects culture with technology, infrastructure, energy security, and indirect security engagement.  Central Asia is presented as both an energy and logistics corridor and a “balancing platform” amid China’s expanding presence, with the potential revival of the “Central Asia + Japan” framework serving as a vehicle for supply-chain resilience, human-capital development, and high-quality infrastructure cooperation. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova explores how transport integration between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan has become both a driver of regional connectivity and a source of strategic competition in Eurasian transit politics. It situates bilateral cooperation in the broader transformation of Central Asian regionalism since 2016, when Uzbekistan reoriented its foreign policy towards deeper engagement with its neighbours and prioritised Central Asia as the core vector of its diplomacy. Within this renewed framework, Tashkent has consistently promoted a vision of Central Asia as a stable and interconnected region, where intraregional trade growth and expanded transit capacity reinforce one another. The brief shows how this vision is reflected in national strategies, including Uzbekistan’s Transport Strategy to 2035, which emphasises the alignment of national transport and communication systems as a precondition for unlocking the region’s full transit potential. The study provides a detailed overview of the current state of transport connectivity between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, underscoring the structural asymmetries created by Uzbekistan’s double-landlocked status and Kazakhstan’s advantageous geography, seaports and direct rail links to both China and Russia. Despite these asymmetries, the two countries have made notable progress in integrating their transport systems, as seen in the growth of bilateral trade to over USD 4.3 billion by the end of 2024 and the expansion of joint infrastructure projects. Key initiatives such as the planned Uchkuduk–Kyzylorda corridor, the Darbaza–Maktaaral railway to decongest the Saryagash checkpoint, the Beineu–Shalkar highway, and the newly launched International Center for Industrial Cooperation “Central Asia” illustrate how connectivity projects are intended not only to shorten distances and reduce travel times, but also to turn border regions into new hubs of industrial and logistics activity linked to transcontinental routes. At the same time, Umarova demonstrates that this integration is accompanied by intensifying competition over control of transit flows and strategic corridors. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are simultaneously partners and rivals in shaping the geography of Eurasian transport, particularly along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and emerging Trans-Afghan links to South Asia. Kazakhstan’s long-standing institutionalisation of the TITR and its ambition to remain the primary logistics hub of Eurasia contrast with Uzbekistan’s efforts to diversify access routes via multimodal corridors that bypass existing Kazakh monopolies, including the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan highway and the planned railway on the Kashgar–Torugart–Makmal–Jalal-Abad–Andijan axis. Parallel initiatives – such as the CASCA+ corridor and competing Afghan transit schemes – risk fragmenting governance frameworks, duplicating infrastructure and diluting Central Asia’s collective bargaining power with external actors like China, the European Union, Turkey and Gulf partners. In its policy conclusions, the brief argues that without stronger coordination mechanisms between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the region may fall short of realising its full potential as a central bridge in Eurasian connectivity. Umarova calls for the alignment of tariff policies, customs digitalisation, and transport strategies; the creation of unified supervisory structures for Trans-Caspian transit that can reconcile CASCA+ with TITR; and a mutually agreed architecture for Trans-Afghan routes to the Indian Ocean that avoids a zero-sum race for transit rents. She also highlights the importance of reviving earlier regional proposals for a joint strategy and institutional frameworks on transport communications, potentially under UN auspices. Ultimately, the experience of Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan relations is presented as a microcosm of transport-driven regionalism in Central Asia: genuine progress in integration is evident, but only a cooperative, rather than competitive, approach will enable the region to consolidate its position as a resilient and indispensable connector between Europe and Asia. Read on Turan Research Center * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief by Saodat Umarova, PhD candidate at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED), examines how economic and energy cooperation with the European Union has become a key expression of Uzbekistan’s emerging “Western vector” in foreign policy. Against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition and Central Asia’s search for diversified partnerships, the study situates Uzbekistan–EU relations within broader regional dynamics, showing how Tashkent increasingly looks to Europe not only as a market, but as a strategic partner in reform, modernisation and connectivity. The brief first traces the evolution from the 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to the new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), signed in 2025, which upgrades the relationship to a more institutionalised and strategic level. It highlights how the EPCA and Uzbekistan’s accession to the EU’s GSP+ scheme in 2021 have reshaped the legal and economic foundations of bilateral ties, accelerating trade growth and improving market access for Uzbek exports. Particular attention is given to the way trade preferences and regulatory convergence create both opportunities and obligations, linking economic benefits to progress on governance, labour rights and the rule of law. A central part of the analysis is devoted to strategic sectors of cooperation that will define the future architecture of the partnership: energy, the green transition, critical raw materials and digital connectivity. The brief shows how European investment and technology support Uzbekistan’s ambitions in renewables and green hydrogen, while cooperation on critical minerals and infrastructure projects opens pathways for Uzbekistan’s integration into higher value-added segments of global supply chains. At the same time, EU-backed initiatives in digitalisation, cybersecurity and e-governance reinforce Uzbekistan’s bid to position itself as a regional digital and logistics hub. Finally, the author places the bilateral agenda within the larger framework of EU–Central Asia connectivity strategies and Global Gateway investments, underlining both the scale of potential benefits and the structural challenges. She points to the need for sustained reforms in Uzbekistan, credible implementation of EU financial commitments, and careful geopolitical balancing vis-à-vis Russia, China and other external actors. Overall, the brief presents Uzbekistan–EU cooperation as a revealing test case of Uzbekistan’s multi-vector diplomacy: a promising Western-oriented trajectory that can strengthen the country’s resilience and modernisation, provided that both sides manage expectations and maintain long-term political and economic commitment. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.