As Dr. Islomkhon Gafarov and Bositkhon Islamov argue in their policy brief on Geopolitika.no, the evolving dynamics between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2025 reflect a complex interplay of coercive diplomacy, regional rivalries, and domestic insecurities. Following the Kashmir escalation in April–May 2025, relations between Islamabad and Kabul entered a phase of what the authors call “forced cooperation”. While Pakistani authorities claimed tactical success in managing the Kashmir front, the brief underscores that this stability is conditional on calm along the Afghan border. The authors point to Pakistan’s elevation of the Afghan Taliban envoy’s status to ambassador as a defensive maneuver meant to pre-empt any Afghan-Indian rapprochement that could leave Islamabad regionally isolated.   Dr. Gafarov and Mr. Islamov emphasize the significance of China’s diplomatic engagement, particularly the informal trilateral meeting hosted in Beijing in May 2025. Chaired by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, this initiative aims not only to preserve Chinese interests, such as the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, but also to reshape the regional balance through a nascent Beijing-Kabul-Islamabad axis. Yet the authors caution that structural impediments to Afghan-Pakistani cooperation remain acute, foremost among them the threat posed by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). With operational bases reportedly spread across Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika provinces, and links to al-Qaeda and ISKP, the TTP has become a transnational destabilizer whose reach has grown precisely because of the lack of coordinated counterterrorism between the two states.   The brief further highlights how the security conflict is assuming new technological dimensions, noting with concern the emergence of Taliban drone capabilities allegedly developed at repurposed Western military installations in Kabul and Logar. With technical support traced to Russia, Iran, and China, this innovation marks a shift toward proxy warfare marked by deniability and technological escalation. In parallel, Baloch separatism, particularly the operations of the BLA, adds a layer of internal vulnerability to Pakistan’s strategic calculus, with attacks on transport infrastructure and railways threatening the viability of long-term regional integration projects such as CPEC and TAPI.   A particularly troubling trend identified by the authors is the emergence of a new militant actor, Tehrik-e-Taliban Kashmir (TTK), which aims to destabilize both India and Pakistan in pursuit of an Islamist order. Dr. Gafarov and Mr. Islamov argue that the group’s potential links to the Afghan Taliban could not only rupture Kabul’s fragile relations with Islamabad but also jeopardize its emerging diplomatic engagements with India and China. Compounding these threats is Pakistan’s mass deportation campaign against Afghan refugees, which the authors view as both a humanitarian crisis and a security liability, as displaced populations become vulnerable to recruitment by extremist factions operating in under-governed Afghan territories.   Ultimately, the authors conclude that mounting tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan pose a direct challenge to regional connectivity and development. Cross-border trade disruptions, disputes over transboundary water management, and insecurity along strategic corridors such as Balochistan and the Durand Line jeopardize major infrastructure efforts including CASA-1000 and TAPI. While the Termez–Kabul route is deemed the most viable corridor in the short term, sustained instability could force regional actors to redirect investments toward more reliable alternatives such as the Iranian port of Chabahar. Thus, despite episodic diplomatic gestures and Chinese mediation, Dr. Gafarov and Mr. Islamov portray a regional order where mistrust, militancy, and misaligned interests continue to outpace cooperation.   Read on Geopolitika.no   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In the 21st century, artificial intelligence (AI) has evolved from a technological innovation into a key instrument of global strategic competition. The relevance of this issue stems from the fact that the outcome of the AI race may redistribute centers of global influence, alter the balance of power in international politics, transform the principles of digital regulation, and establish new standards for the economy, defense, and societal governance. In this context, particular attention is drawn to the United States and China—two leading technological powers whose ambitions, strategies, and resources shape the architecture of the global AI landscape and largely determine its developmental trajectory.   Current Landscape of AI Development. The United States maintains a significant lead in private investment in AI: in 2024, American sector investments reached $109.1 billion, compared to $9.3 billion in China. Similarly, in 2023, the United States attracted approximately $67.2 billion in private AI funding, while China secured only $7.8 billion. American startups also lead in venture financing: from 2013 to 2023, U.S.-based AI companies received around $335 billion in venture capital, compared to $104 billion in China. Quantitatively, the United States also surpasses China: according to the Stanford AI Index, there are over 10,000 actively funded AI companies worldwide, of which 5,509 are American and 1,446 are Chinese.   In contrast, China has taken the lead in scientific output. According to Stanford HAI, Chinese researchers publish more AI-related articles. The Global AI Readiness Index indicates that China ranks first globally in terms of scientific publications, overtaking the United States, which ranks third. However, in the overall government readiness index, the United States retains the top position, while China ranks 16th, reflecting the stronger institutional and infrastructural maturity of the U.S.   The United States has developed a number of leading large language models (GPT-4/OpenAI, Gemini/Google, Claude/Anthropic, etc.) that have gained global prominence. Chinese companies are also creating comparable systems. For instance, Baidu’s chatbot Ernie Bot reached over 200 million users by April 2024. Nevertheless, Western products still dominate in reach: according to Al Jazeera, ChatGPT recorded around 1.86 billion views annually, whereas Ernie received only 14.9 million. The Chinese government requires formal approval of all generative AI services prior to deployment, whereas in the U.S., regulation is gradually taking shape.   AI is being actively integrated into both the military and civilian spheres in both countries, encompassing areas such as autonomous systems, intelligence, cybersecurity, medicine, transportation, and surveillance technologies.   Government Strategy and Support. Both nations have set technological leadership as a key strategic goal. Since 2020, the United States has enacted the National AI Initiative Act, established the National AI Office (Select Subcommittee on Artificial Intelligence), and adopted funding plans (such as under the CHIPS Act) to support AI research. In October 2023, the Biden Administration issued an Executive Order on the "Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development of AI," introducing requirements for red-teaming and the development of safety and privacy standards. In January 2025, the Trump Administration signed an Executive Order on “Removing Barriers” explicitly proclaiming a policy to “sustain global U.S. dominance in AI”.   China's national strategy is clearly oriented toward 2030. The “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” launched in 2017, aims to make China the global AI leader by 2030. AI is a priority in the country’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). The government is investing billions and has established “national AI teams” including Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, SenseTime, iFlytek, among others, as designated leaders by the State Council. At the same time, China is actively refining its regulatory framework. Between 2021 and 2023, the country introduced its first national regulations for algorithms—covering content recommendation, “deep synthesis” (deepfakes), and generative models. For example, the 2023 Interagency Measures stipulate that AI-generated outputs must be “truthful and accurate” and must not contradict the “core values of socialism”. Developers of major models are required to register their algorithms and undergo government security assessments. These measures reflect the essence of China's approach: centralized control over information and ideological content.   Ethics and Regulation. The ethical and regulatory approaches of the two countries differ markedly. In the U.S., openness is encouraged: most AI laboratories publish their code and datasets, and debates focus on ethics and privacy under existing legislation (e.g., GDPR, California Consumer Privacy Act) and frameworks (AI Bill of Rights, NIST Framework). Freedom of development remains high, fostering innovation through competition.   In China, efforts are geared toward strict state oversight. Regulatory bodies require pre-approval of content, and comprehensive algorithmic rules have been enacted. According to international assessments, China ranks outside the top 30 in categories related to AI governance and ethics. Thus, China prioritizes centralized supervision and censorship, while the U.S. relies on market-based competition and self-regulatory mechanisms (e.g., audits, open standards).   Forecasts and Expert Assessments. Competition is expected to intensify over the next 5–10 years. RAND Corporation (2025) projects that China may reach parity with the U.S. in terms of top-tier AI model quality within the year. In response, U.S. authorities have adopted a dual-track strategy: restricting technological exports to China while accelerating domestic innovation through major investments and light-touch regulation. However, breakthroughs by Chinese companies such as DeepSeek, Alibaba Cloud, Baidu, and Tencent are significantly narrowing the technological gap, casting doubt on the long-term dominance of the U.S.   One of the most notable examples of such progress is the company DeepSeek. Founded in 2023, it launched its R1 chatbot in January 2025, which quickly became the most downloaded free app in the U.S. App Store. The model demonstrated performance comparable to GPT-4, especially in tasks involving logical reasoning and mathematics, while consuming significantly fewer resources due to its Mixture-of-Experts architecture. This enabled DeepSeek to train its model at 42% lower cost than Western counterparts while achieving higher throughput. Despite its success, the company has already faced international scrutiny regarding the risks of misinformation.   Meanwhile, Chinese experts such as Song-Chun Zhu—professor, director, and head of the AI Institute at Peking University, often referred to as the “godfather” of Chinese AI—state that China is “fully capable of setting the agenda”  in the era of generative AI, thanks to the rapid development of its research and startup ecosystem. Thus, the future of AI leadership depends on how effectively the U.S. can leverage its advantages and whether China can continue to close the gap dynamically.   Overall, most forecasts are skeptical of the notion of inevitable hegemony by a single country. Independent analyses suggest that the AI race is not a “Cold War” between two superpowers, but rather a long-term technological process with strengths in different areas. While the United States leads in investment, models, and commercial innovation, China excels in implementation scale and data volume. The fate of AI leadership in the coming decade will largely depend on which country better leverages its ecosystem and resources, retains top talent, and finds a balance between openness and security.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova outlines the strategic rationale behind Uzbekistan’s efforts to establish a West-South transport axis as part of its broader ambition to emerge as a key logistics hub in Eurasia. She argues that Uzbekistan’s current participation in Europe-bound freight flows remains disproportionately low, just 2.3 percent of Central Asia’s total, despite the country’s advantageous geographic location. This marginal role, she notes, represents both a structural limitation and a latent opportunity. As European interest in Central Asian connectivity intensifies, particularly through the diversification of transport routes away from Russian infrastructure, Uzbekistan is positioning itself to fill a growing demand for new, geopolitically neutral corridors.   Umarova situates this development within the evolving geopolitical and economic relationship between Central Asia and the European Union. The EU, now Uzbekistan’s third-largest trading partner after China and Russia, has already seen a rise in bilateral trade turnover, particularly under the GSP+ trade preference scheme. Uzbekistan’s exports to Europe — dominated by chemicals and uranium — reflect both the scale and the narrow base of current exchanges. Thus, she argues, the expansion of transport connectivity is not just about logistics but about fundamentally restructuring Uzbekistan’s economic integration with global markets, enabling more diversified, higher-value exports over time.   To that end, Umarova highlights two transformative infrastructure initiatives. The first is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, which will shorten trade routes between East Asia and Europe by nearly 900 kilometers. This railway is designed to turn the Southern Corridor, previously marginalized by sanctions on Iran and logistical difficulties, into a competitive monomodal artery for transcontinental trade. Although she acknowledges that the mountainous terrain in Kyrgyzstan may limit its scalability compared to Kazakhstan’s flatter routes, Umarova argues that the southern path offers new geoeconomic options, particularly through potential linkages to the Middle East and Africa via Iran and Türkiye.   The second initiative she examines is the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway, which aims to create a direct land connection from Central Asia to South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In Umarova’s assessment, this so-called Kabul Corridor has the potential to redefine regional transit flows by offering an alternative to traditional northward routes through Russia. If successfully linked to the Northern and Middle Corridors, the Afghan route could connect Northern Europe, Russia, Belarus, the Caucasus, and parts of Southern Europe to India and the Gulf, with Uzbekistan serving as the pivotal junction. This would not only enhance the country’s logistical profile but also elevate its geostrategic relevance in a fragmenting global order.   Umarova concludes that while Uzbekistan cannot fully compete with Kazakhstan’s dominance in regional freight due to its lack of Caspian Sea access and more limited rail infrastructure, these new corridors offer pathways to mitigate existing imbalances. The key, she asserts, is not to replicate Kazakhstan’s model, but to develop complementary routes that serve new geographies and actors. If Uzbekistan succeeds in establishing itself as an indispensable link between Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East, it could profoundly shift the regional transport matrix and secure a stronger role in the international economic system.   Read on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his policy brief, Eugenio Ciarlandini examines whether China’s economic outreach through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Uzbekistan has translated into genuine cultural influence or merely reinforced existing economic dependencies. Since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s accession in 2016, Tashkent has pursued a multi-vector strategy, welcoming infrastructure investment to modernize transport links and diversify its external partnerships. His analysis begins by charting the brass-tacks achievements of the BRI — most notably the Angren–Pop railway, completed in 2016 to bypass Tajikistan, and the 2024 agreement on the Kashgar–Andijan–Jalal-Abad link — which have undeniably cemented Uzbekistan’s role in East–West trade flows and channelled nearly $90 billion in commerce between Central Asia and Xinjiang.   Eugenio argues that the material benefits are clear: between 2022 and 2023, Uzbekistan’s foreign direct investment almost doubled to $7.2 billion, with Chinese capital nearly twice that of Russia’s, and GDP growth comfortably exceeding 6 percent through 2024. These figures attest to the BRI’s success in stimulating the transport, energy and construction sectors, creating local jobs and unlocking trans-Eurasian supply-chain efficiencies. Yet this economic momentum has not been matched by a corresponding upsurge in Chinese cultural presence: there remains a conspicuous absence of Confucius Institutes, Mandarin curriculum expansion or Chinese media penetration in Uzbek public life.   The author further contends that Russia’s cultural legacy retains its primacy in Uzbekistan. Russian remains the lingua franca of business, government and higher education, while a growing cohort of Uzbek students opts for Western universities and professional opportunities in North America and Europe. This persistence of Russian soft power, alongside emerging Western cultural influences, suggests that Uzbek society has not realigned its cultural orientations in step with its economic pivot toward Beijing.   In assessing China’s strategy, he maintains that its heavy emphasis on hard infrastructure — while effective in forging tangible connectivity — has overlooked the necessity of people-to-people engagement. The BRI’s evolving model, which now favours targeted, sector-specific investments, presents an opening for expanded cultural diplomacy. He proposes that Beijing supplement its infrastructure portfolio with robust academic exchanges, language programmes and joint media initiatives to cultivate deeper mutual understanding and sustained influence.   Finally, Eugenio recommends that Uzbekistan leverage its position not only to host Chinese-financed projects but also to assert greater cultural agency. Tashkent should negotiate BRI partnerships that bundle infrastructure financing with cultural cooperation clauses — such as scholarship quotas, cultural festivals and collaborative research centres. By doing so, Uzbekistan can ensure that its Silk Road resurgence fosters not only the flow of goods and capital, but also a reciprocally enriching exchange of ideas and values.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The conflict between Israel and Iran, despite its regional nature, has the potential to cause global turmoil in the oil market. Escalating tensions in the strategically important Middle East region threaten the stability of oil supplies and, in extreme scenarios, could cause price shocks comparable to the oil crises of the 1970s.     Short-term conflict – minimal impact If the military confrontation develops along the lines of the previous exchange of blows – that is, short-term, without significant infrastructure losses and the involvement of third countries – the oil market's reaction will be restrained. An example of this is the episode in the spring of 2024, when, after exchanges of blows on targets in Syria, Iraq and Iran, oil prices temporarily rose by $3-5 per barrel, but returned to their previous levels within a week.   In such situations, the market factors a ‘geopolitical premium’ into the price, but quickly adjusts when it becomes clear that there is no threat to actual supplies. This is especially true given that Iran supplies about 1–1.5 million barrels per day to the external market, which is a significant but not critical volume, especially since it goes mainly to China, which has its own strategic reserves.   Escalation and strikes on infrastructure – prices rise to $100–150 A scenario in which the conflict drags on and Iran's oil refineries, export terminals and pipelines are hit poses a much greater threat. In this case, the market will face a real reduction in supply, which could trigger a jump in prices to $100–150 per barrel.   There have been precedents of this kind: the drone attack on Saudi Aramco facilities in September 2019 led to the loss of almost 5% of global supplies and caused a one-off 19% increase in Brent crude oil prices (the sharpest jump since 1991). Although the situation was quickly resolved, it highlighted the vulnerability of infrastructure even in highly protected countries.   Given the limited ability to increase production in the short term, even for OPEC+ countries, and the possible tightening of sanctions against Iran, it will be difficult for the market to quickly make up for the loss of even 1–1.5 million barrels per day.   Threat to the Strait of Hormuz – energy shock scenario The most critical scenario involves the closure or military blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic ‘oil bottleneck.’ Between 20 and 21 million barrels of oil pass through this narrow section between Oman and Iran every day, which is about one-fifth of total global consumption.   Iran has repeatedly threatened to block the strait in the event of military aggression. If such a threat becomes a reality, even for a few days, oil prices could rise sharply to $200-300 per barrel. In the event of a large-scale naval blockade, insurance companies refusing to operate in the region and tanker traffic coming to a halt, even more extreme figures are theoretically possible — $500-1000 per barrel — although these seem hypothetical in the short term.   This would create a domino effect: global supply chains will face a sharp increase in logistics costs, prices for petrol, aviation fuel, food and fertilisers will rise, inflationary pressure will increase in importing countries, central banks will tighten monetary policy, global GDP may contract by 1–2%.   Constraining factors Despite the dramatic potential for developments, a number of factors may constrain explosive price growth: Strategic oil reserves in OECD countries and China are capable of temporarily compensating for the drop in supply. The flexibility of OPEC+, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, allows for rapid increases in production in emergencies. US shale oil could increase production by 500-700 thousand barrels per day within 3-6 months. Diplomatic pressure on Iran from China and Russia, which are interested in stability in the region.   At the moment, the oil market is living on expectations. If the conflict between Israel and Iran remains limited, the price increase will be short-term and moderate. However, its prolongation or the involvement of third countries (e.g., the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE) could radically change the picture.   The key risk is the Strait of Hormuz. Its closure, even for a few days, would trigger an energy shock and global inflation. Therefore, despite all the scenarios, the world's leading countries are making efforts to prevent the situation from escalating to that level.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In their compelling policy brief, Darius Riazi and Alexander Schrier dissect the growing strategic divergence between the European Union and the United States in their engagement with Central Asia. Once unified under a broadly complementary transatlantic strategy that aimed to promote regional stability, connectivity, and liberal-democratic norms while hedging against Russian and Chinese influence, the two powers have since charted markedly different courses. The shift, catalyzed by Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, signals the erosion of a once-coordinated Western approach. The authors argue convincingly that this rift is not merely symbolic but has tangible consequences for the foreign policy calculus of the Central Asian Five (C5), whose long-standing commitment to a multi-vector foreign policy is now tested by increasingly divergent external pressures.   The European Union, as Riazi and Schrier note, has embraced a strategy of continuity and institutional maturity. Through high-profile initiatives such as the 2025 Samarkand Summit and major investments under the Global Gateway framework, the EU has positioned itself as a long-term partner committed to inclusive development, multilateralism, and green transition cooperation. With projects in critical mineral development, renewable energy, and digital connectivity, the EU is not only filling strategic voids left by retreating American programs but offering a normative alternative rooted in sustainable governance and regional integration. The EU’s explicit rejection of “spheres of influence” in favor of a “third way” of cooperation stands in stark contrast to Washington’s more transactional diplomacy under Trump.   Indeed, the return of Trump has introduced a hard pivot in U.S. engagement with the region. As the authors demonstrate, Trump’s emphasis on bilateral deals, high tariffs, and a retreat from liberal-democratic aid mechanisms such as USAID has fragmented the once-unified C5+1 framework. American diplomacy is now characterized by an assertive form of bilateral transnationalism: ad hoc deals tailored to national elites, often with a security or migration lens. While this may yield short-term concessions from individual Central Asian governments — such as Uzbekistan’s deportation initiative or Kazakhstan’s mineral negotiations — it risks undercutting the multilateral platforms and long-term development goals that previously underpinned U.S.–C5 relations. Moreover, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of U.S. support for civil society and governance projects is already being filled by China, reinforcing Beijing’s growing normative influence in the region.   The policy brief ends on a note of strategic caution and pragmatic foresight. Riazi and Schrier recommend that C5 states resist the temptation to view the EU and U.S. as a cohesive bloc and instead pursue differentiated diplomatic strategies tailored to the shifting priorities of each actor. This approach, they argue, will allow Central Asia to preserve its multi-vector foreign policy and avoid entanglement in zero-sum geopolitical rivalries. Their conclusion also gestures toward a broader global trend: the unravelling of the transatlantic consensus not only in Central Asia but across the Global South. In a world increasingly marked by multipolarity and great power competition, the authors call for a recalibration of regional strategies — not only by external actors but also by smaller states intent on preserving agency amid fragmentation.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.