Uzbekistan has launched a pilot transport corridor to Mongolia via Kyrgyzstan and China. Delivery of goods along the new 4,500-kilometre road route takes eight days. This gives domestic exporters additional access to the relatively unexplored Mongolian market, which is particularly relevant in light of the strengthening of trade and economic ties with this country.   The course for intensifying mutual trade was set last year, when the President of Mongolia made his first state visit to Tashkent. During high-level negotiations, the parties set the goal of increasing trade turnover several times over, which spurred the preparation of a preferential trade agreement. During the return state visit of the head of Uzbekistan to Ulaanbaatar on 24-25 June this year, this issue was once again prioritized.   Even under the current circumstances, bilateral trade indicators show steady growth. This is especially true for Uzbek exports, which in 2024 exceeded $26 million in total, twice as much as a year earlier. This dynamic gives impetus to the development of inter-country transport links, with a particular focus on road transport, given the signing last year of an agreement between the governments of Uzbekistan and Mongolia. Given the growing demand for mutual transport, an agreement has been reached to double the number of permit forms, and preparatory work has begun on their electronic exchange based on the E-Permit system.   Uzbekistan supplies Mongolia with vegetables and fruits, food products, textiles and cars. There is enormous potential for expanding the range and volume of supplies of in-demand products. Its realization undoubtedly requires effective and reliable transport links between the countries.   Mongolia is bordered by two major powers, Russia and China, but has no direct access to the sea, which determines its complex geo-economic position. Although the country is a key link in the Russia-Mongolia-China economic corridor, which includes the cross-border railway Ulan-Ude-Naushki-Ulan Bator-Erlian-Beijing-Tianjin and a motorway to northern Chinese seaports, which brings certain financial benefits, Mongolia’s transit capabilities are limited to this small geographical area. The expansion of trade routes to neighboring regions, including Central Asia, offers Ulaanbaatar great prospects in terms of diversifying its own exports.   However, the Central Asian region is not only a promising market for Mongolia, but also a land bridge to the world’s oceans. In particular, Uzbekistan, given its desire to create a Trans-Afghan railway corridor with access to Indian Ocean ports, could become Mongolia’s gateway to South Asia. The same effect will be achieved by connecting new freight routes from Mongolia to Uzbekistan with transport and transit corridors towards Iran, its southern seaports and the rest of Western Asia. In addition, transport links with Central Asian countries will open up a route for Mongolia to the South Caucasus, Turkey and Europe via the Caspian Sea. It is believed that after the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, all these connecting routes will become even more important and attractive due to the reduction in time and costs of transporting goods.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Recently, economic and political rivalry between China and the US, including the trade war, has become a key factor in world politics. The global order formed during the era of globalization is being destabilized. The conflict between the two leading global economic players affects the entire world. The analysis presents the assessments of two leading international relations experts directly associated with Chinese government structures: Yang Xuetong from Tsinghua University and Wang Jisi from Peking University.   Technological competition between China and the United States The changing structure of trade and technological relations between China and the United States reflects growing strategic tensions and a course towards selective decoupling. The Trump administration’s America First policy marked a shift towards protectionism and attempts to curb China’s growth in key sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and advanced technologies. However, despite the tough rhetoric and tariff measures, their practical application has been limited by economic realities.   Business circles in both countries are interested in maintaining bilateral trade and investment, especially in strategically important areas such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals. Complete disengagement is seen as economically unfeasible.   Technological rivalry remains at the heart of the tension, but the depth of interdependence and the high cost of disrupting global supply chains make a complete split unlikely. The European Union takes a more balanced position, emphasizing multilateralism and regulatory autonomy, seeking to preserve technological sovereignty without open confrontation.   Overall, a model of partial, selective disengagement while maintaining limited cooperation is emerging.   Deglobalization and leadership dynamics Recent geopolitical changes point to a trend towards deglobalization, accompanied by the fragmentation of international relations and the redistribution of global leadership between the US, China and the EU. The US withdrawal from international institutions under the Trump administration, including the WHO and the Paris Agreement, as well as the strengthening of unilateral initiatives, expressed Washington’s growing skepticism towards multilateral formats. This weakened the soft power of the US, reducing the attractiveness of its model and undermining its normative leadership. Internal crises in American democracy and the increasingly coercive nature of its foreign policy have only reinforced these trends.   Against this backdrop, China continues its economic growth and pursuit of national rejuvenation, strengthening its international influence without directly challenging the existing order. This is perceived in Washington as a strategic threat.   The interaction between these actors reflects a shift in the global balance. The United States retains its superiority in ‘hard power,’ but China is closing the gap, especially in high technology. The world is becoming less integrated and more strategically tense, where leadership is determined not so much by economic or military potential as by the ability to manage multiple, overlapping crises.   Prospects for cooperation during Trump’s second term Donald Trump’s second term as US president is expected to complicate relations with China and the international community. The America First policy, focused on protectionism and unilateral action, will increase tensions, especially in trade, technology and ideology. Despite his confrontational rhetoric, Trump’s transactional style allows for deals that benefit the US, although internal disagreements between security hawks and economic pragmatists make it difficult to develop a consistent policy.   Pressure on China will be maintained through sanctions on human rights issues in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, while maintaining the ‘one China’ policy. Military and economic cooperation between China and the US is possible but limited by bureaucratic and political barriers, especially in the areas of military communications and crisis management. The EU will face US demands for fair trade and increased defence spending, balancing between countering Russian aggression and preventing escalation.   On the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Trump is inclined to be cautious and minimise military involvement, giving priority to domestic issues. Overall, Trump’s second term promises increased bilateral tensions, transactional diplomacy, and domestic political divisions that will require careful management to prevent escalation and maintain limited cooperation.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Ubaydullo Khojabekov, IAIS volunteer The recent protests in Los Angeles, sparked by the Trump administration’s tightening of immigration policy, have caused a huge stir both inside and outside the US. This situation is being discussed particularly actively in the Chinese media, due to both domestic political and geopolitical factors. This article examines the interpretation of events by the Chinese media, the expert community and users of digital platforms, and analyses the political narratives that are emerging in the context of US-China relations.   The mass protests in Los Angeles, dubbed the ‘Los Angeles riots’ by the press, were a reaction to the intensified activities of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) against illegal immigrants. The use of federal forces, including the National Guard and Marine Corps units, drew criticism from both American society and abroad, becoming the subject of controversy over violations of the principles of civil governance and federal law (in particular, the Posse Comitatus Act).   California Governor Gavin Newsom described what was happening as a ‘threat to democracy’ and warned of the possible transformation of the United States into an authoritarian state. Against this backdrop, suspicions of external influence on the protest movements intensified in political discourse. Republican congressmen have claimed that the protesters may have ties to organisations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Particular attention is being paid to Neville Roy Singham, an American entrepreneur who, according to a number of sources, is linked to the financial support of left-wing movements in the United States, including the Party for Socialism and Liberation (PSL).   The events in Los Angeles have attracted widespread public interest in the Chinese information space. The digital platforms WeChat and Little Red Book have become venues for ironic comments, among which the expression ‘a beautiful sight’ has become particularly popular. Thus, part of Chinese society perceives what is happening in the United States as a ‘backlash’ against American foreign policy rhetoric.   State-run publications, including Global Times and China Daily, interpret the protests as a reflection of a systemic crisis in the American model of governance. Editorial articles emphasise the duality of the US approach to protest movements: while they are supported abroad as a manifestation of democratic freedoms, they are met with harsh repression on US soil.   At the same time, a significant portion of Chinese users and commentators are taking a wait-and-see or neutral stance, preferring to remain observers. One popular comment on the WeChat platform, quoted by The Monitor, reads: “As Chinese people, we should not take sides in what is happening in America. We can simply be observers and watch this picturesque American spectacle unfold — that is enough”.   In the context of analysing Chinese perceptions, the events in Los Angeles are seen not only as a local crisis, but as a manifestation of deeper systemic failures in the governance of the largest Western state. Chinese analysts point out that President Trump may use the situation to mobilise the electorate and expand presidential prerogatives. But international attention to the use of force against peaceful protesters, as well as to the legal aspects of this intervention, may affect the foreign policy image of the United States as a ‘bulwark of democracy.’   Beijing is officially refraining from assessing the events, but is actively monitoring developments. The events in Los Angeles illustrate the vulnerability of democratic institutions in the face of internal contradictions and, according to Chinese commentators, may serve as a lesson on the need to focus on internal governance rather than foreign policy intervention.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Military strikes by Israel and Iran against each other have raised the risks of blocking the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears of blocking international trade and transit corridors and ports of the Strait. Such a possible scenario is being considered by the Iranian authorities because of the “threat to national security”, Esmail Kosari, a member of the Iranian parliament’s committee on national security and foreign policy, said on June 14.   The geostrategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz for the global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade is since, according to various estimates, about 15-20% of the world’s oil, condensate, and petroleum products and more than 30% of liquefied natural gas pass through the strait. 82% of the volume of oil transported through the strait falls on Asian countries, the rest on Europe. 24% of China’s imported LNG is delivered through the strait.   Even the temporary suspension of the large Iranian seaport of Bandar Abbas in the north of the Strait may cause a collapse in international cargo flows, including from Central Asian countries. Other ports on the coast of the Strait, like Fujairah and major transshipment hubs for transporting goods to Dubai and other countries, may stand down. At the same time, it should be noted that while Saudi Arabia and the UAE can somehow bypass the Strait of Hormuz for part of their oil exports, Qatar and the UAE have no alternatives for exporting LNG.   Therefore, the Strait of Hormuz occupies an important place in the field of financial logistics, since any stop in the flow of ships through the strait will lead to enormous shipping costs around the world, the supply chain may be interrupted and become inefficient. As a result, energy prices on international markets will spiral out of control; countries both dependent on oil supplies and dependent on its sale will face devastating consequences. Thus, according to Iranian experts, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz may lead to a sharp reduction in oil supplies to the market and oil prices may rise to $250 per barrel. According to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, the closure of the strait could lead to the loss of about 5 million barrels of oil per day from the Persian Gulf and Iraq and an increase in prices to $200–$300 per barrel. JP Morgan estimates that with increased risks to ships, the price of Brent crude oil could jump to $120-130 per barrel.   Currently, oil supplies remain at the same level, although the risk that tensions in the Middle East will significantly worsen the situation is growing. The risks to oil supplies are at the highest level every day due to the uncertainty of resolving the conflict between Iran and Israel. Any further escalation will only bring the oil market closer to actual supply losses.   To summarize, we can state the following.   Firstly. The geopolitical conflict has led to a geo-economic zugzwang, which can have a huge impact on international oil supplies and global trade. International market participants will closely assess the risks not only of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, but also of trade and transport corridors and flows to the ports of the Strait. The Strait of Hormuz will increasingly become an important strategic leverage for stakeholders.   Secondly. The Strait of Hormuz has great potential for the coordinated development of the global economy. The nodal ports of the Strait are vital transit and logistics chains for international maritime trade, and not only for oil. Therefore, it is necessary that the flow of international vessels through the Strait continues unhindered, international trade through key seaports is carried out without interruption, and a mature view of the situation in the Strait of Hormuz prevails.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In recent years, complex changes in the system of international relations have forced countries around the world to use not only classic realpolitik, but also instruments of soft power. In this regard, cultural diplomacy is playing an increasingly important role, becoming a key factor in strengthening trust between states, deepening humanitarian ties, and strengthening historical, linguistic, and cultural commonalities.   From this point of view, the second China-Central Asia summit, held on 16-18 June 2025 in Astana, Kazakhstan, became an important milestone not only in political and economic terms, but also in the institutionalization of cultural diplomacy.   A number of events were held during the Astana summit to deepen cultural cooperation. Among them were: Exhibitions of national arts and crafts Joint cultural forums and international conferences Discussions on exchange programs for young people and students An investment forum on cultural tourism   Through these events, the countries of the region seek to form a common platform of values that serves not only to demonstrate their national identity but also to develop friendly relations.   The People's Republic of China is currently one of the countries pursuing the strongest soft power policy in the world. It: Promotes its language and philosophy through Confucian institutes (more than 10 in Central Asia) Luban seeks to export vocational education with workshops. Expands its sphere of influence through international film festivals, joint television projects, and online cultural platforms   All of this demonstrates a comprehensive approach to influence through culture.   Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, view these cultural diplomacy initiatives as a strategic opportunity. This process offers the following advantages: Increased mutual trust between nations. Culture is the most effective factor in uniting peoples. Thanks to cultural diplomacy, dialogue between countries with a common historical, religious and linguistic identity becomes more effective. Youth and educational exchanges. During the summit, agreements were reached on scholarship programs for young people, academic mobility and joint projects. This serves as a training ground for future diplomatic personnel. Development of tourism and infrastructure. Initiatives by China and Kazakhstan to declare a Year of Tourism and increase the flow of Chinese tourists to Central Asian countries are creating new opportunities in the areas of local infrastructure, service culture and logistics.   Cultural diplomacy is an important part of China's geopolitical strategic approach. The Belt and Road Initiative includes not only logistics and investment, but also humanitarian aspects such as real dialogue and cultural exchange.   In this sense, the new platform for cultural diplomacy at the Astana summit: Strengthens China's influence in the region through soft power Balances the influence of the West through sustainable alternative development Promotes the idea of human tolerance and a shared future   The special emphasis on cultural diplomacy at the China-Central Asia summit in Astana testifies to the revival of humanitarian instruments in contemporary geopolitical processes. China's strategic approach is aimed at strengthening trust, ties and cooperation between the peoples of the region through education, art, tourism, entrepreneurship and science. This policy opens the door for Central Asian countries to take their place on the international stage, engage in equal dialogue and enjoy broad opportunities.   Cultural diplomacy is becoming not only an auxiliary tool but also a structural factor shaping political and economic relations.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles’ 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue speech marks a notable shift in tone and ambition for Australian defense diplomacy. This past weekend, the International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), where high-ranking political and military leaders shared views on pressing security challenges facing the Indo-Pacific. Amid heightened regional tensions and accelerating technological change, Marles used his platform to call for a reimagining of global arms control architecture – one that moves beyond Cold War-era bilateralism and confronts the unique dynamics of a multipolar Indo-Pacific.   Marles’ remarks departed from Australia’s traditionally cautious stance. Rather than deferring to the arms control leadership of great powers, Australia positioned itself as a powerful voice in advocating for a new multilateral framework that integrates nuclear, conventional, and emerging technologies. In doing so, Marles not only reaffirmed Australia’s commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but also acknowledged its limitations in a security landscape increasingly defined by asymmetric threats, regional power competition, and the erosion of legacy agreements like New START and the INF Treaty.   Historically, Australia has played a supportive but secondary role in global arms control efforts. While it has been committed to the rules-based international order, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canberra has largely deferred to the US when it comes to shaping arms control norms and enforcement.   For decades, Australian arms control policy could be characterized by three core features: non-proliferation advocacy, alliance alignment, and regional risk management.   First, Australia’s support of non-proliferation has been a pivotal component of its foreign policy. It has consistently championed the NPT as the cornerstone of global nuclear restraint and has taken pride in its status as a non-nuclear weapons state with exemplary compliance under IAEA safeguards. Australia was also instrumental in the establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga), and has used significant political capital to urge allies to distance themselves from nuclear weapons.   Second, Australia’s security posture has been tightly tethered to the United States, particularly through the ANZUS and AUKUS alliances. This alignment extended to arms control: Canberra generally supported U.S. positions in bilateral negotiations such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NEW START) and the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. However, it rarely played a direct role in shaping the terms of these agreements, treating arms control as a domain dominated by the trans-Atlantic superpowers.   Finally, Australia’s regional approach has tended to focus on known proliferation risks, primarily North Korea and, to a lesser extent, Iran. Its arms control diplomacy has typically been reactive and risk-based, concerned more with specific threats to regional stability than wider frameworks. This has translated into strong support for sanctions, maritime interdiction of illicit weapons transfers, and efforts to prevent the spread of missile technology in Southeast Asia.   This limited scope reflected Australia’s strategic calculations: as a middle power with strong non-proliferation credentials but no nuclear arsenal, its influence in arms control was best exerted through multilateral compliance and alliance solidarity. The Cold War-era model of bilateral U.S.-Russia negotiations largely shaped the global arms control environment, and Australia operated within that model.   What Marles’ 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue speech suggests, however, is that this traditional posture may no longer be tenable.   Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles’ 2025 address at the Shangri-La Dialogue marks a significant departure from Australia’s historical approach to arms control. Moving beyond Australia’s traditional support role, Marles calls for the development of new frameworks that reflect the geopolitical and technological complexity of the current era.   Marles’ core argument was unambiguous: bilateral arms control, particularly between the U.S. and Russia, is no longer sufficient in a multipolar, tech-driven world. This speech comes in light of Russian military aggression against its neighbors and its invasion of Ukraine, as well as the U.S. increasingly distancing itself from global partnerships. In recent weeks, the Trump administration has imposed a series of isolationist trade measures — including a 10 per cent tariff on all Australian goods and a planned 50 per cent steel and aluminum tariff — signaling a shift away from the liberal economic order it once championed. Simultaneously, cuts to foreign aid and development assistance have left strategic vacuums in regions where U.S. influence was once decisive. As American foreign policy turns inward, Australia appears to be recalibrating its defense diplomacy, recognizing that reliance on a single great power to underwrite regional security is no longer tenable.   While Marles does not explicitly remove the U.S. from the equation – he even references Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s reaffirmation of the Indo-Pacific as America’s strategic priority – his speech subtly signals a growing awareness that U.S. leadership alone is no longer sufficient to guarantee regional stability. Instead, Marles positions Australia as both a contributor to and advocate for a more inclusive and distributed model of security governance. Marles’ call for a multilateral arms control framework thus reflects not just a critique of bilateralism, but also a broader strategic response to a less engaged and less predictable United States.   At the same time, Marles linked traditional arms control to emerging technologies and new domains of warfare, such as cyber, space, and autonomous systems. The framing that ‘traditional arms control frameworks are being surpassed without any established method of control to supplement them’ reflects a recognition that deterrence and escalation risks now extend well beyond nuclear warheads and delivery systems. It also suggests that Australia sees arms control not as a relic of the Cold War, but as a living framework that must evolve in parallel with military modernization.   This is a profound shift. Rather than merely supporting international arms control from the sidelines, Australia is signaling its intention to participate in shaping the rules, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. In invoking both the legacy of the NPT and the need for a new ‘architecture of restraint,’ Marles situates Australia as a middle power prepared to bridge the gap between declining bilateralism and a still-unrealized multilateralism in arms control.   This pivot is also framed as consistent with Australia’s strategic modernization under AUKUS. Marles carefully reaffirmed Australia’s compliance with the NPT, particularly in relation to its acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. But he also argued that this capability would contribute to regional geostrategic balance – in other words, that Australia’s growing military strength is a stabilizing force. By embedding arms control within broader strategic logic, the speech effectively connects non-proliferation norms with hard power realities.   In sum, the speech advances a new doctrine: arms control as a modern, growing Indo-Pacific security imperative, not just a Cold War inheritance.   Building on his critique of bilateral arms control, Marles outlined a forward-looking vision for a multilateral Indo-Pacific security architecture. Recognizing the unique challenges of this diverse and volatile region, Australia aims to leverage its position as a middle power to facilitate cooperative frameworks that transcend traditional alliances and embrace broader multilateralism.   Central to this vision is the integration of multiple actors and mechanisms. Marles emphasized the importance of working closely with established regional institutions such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum, while simultaneously reinforcing strategic partnerships like the Quad and AUKUS. This multi-layered approach creates an interconnected web of security cooperation that balances the interests of major powers with those of smaller states.   Importantly, Australia’s push for regional arms control does not seek to undermine its alliance with the United States but rather complements it by encouraging burden-sharing and broader responsibility among Indo-Pacific states. By positioning itself as a convener and mediator, Canberra aims to bridge the gap between U.S. leadership and the diverse interests of regional partners, crafting a global order that is both inclusive and resilient.   Moreover, Australia’s advocacy for an inclusive Indo-Pacific security architecture reflects its recognition of the rising strategic ambitions of regional powers such as China, India, Japan, and Indonesia. Marles’ proposal implicitly acknowledges that durable peace and security require not only U.S.-led initiatives but the active engagement and ownership of these key states. The goal is to build mechanisms where cooperation on arms control can be decoupled from broader geopolitical rivalries, fostering dialogue and mutual restraint even amid competition.   Finally, Marles’ vision signals a more proactive Australian diplomatic posture. Rather than passively adapting to shifting great power dynamics, Australia is positioning itself as an agenda-setter and bridge-builder capable of convening diverse interests and facilitating consensus. This elevates Canberra’s diplomatic profile and reflects a broader trend among middle powers seeking to shape global governance through multilateral institutions tailored to contemporary security challenges.   This strategic recalibration aligns with Australia’s broader defense modernization and diplomatic efforts under the AUKUS framework and the 2024 National Defence Strategy. It reflects Canberra’s understanding that sustainable regional stability will depend on a multilateral ‘architecture of restraint’ that adapts to technological innovation, geopolitical complexity, and the erosion of legacy agreements. In this way, Australia is charting a path from the Cold War’s bilateral arms control legacy toward a more pluralistic, regionally embedded framework for peace and security.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.