Uzbekistan’s current context in global politics is often described as ‘post-Soviet.’ This label seems fitting when walking around Tashkent’s boulevards, exploring the subway, and witnessing the architecture. Additionally, in the sphere of soft power, the Russians have left a lasting legacy in Uzbekistan, specifically in the use of the Russian language and the popularity of Russian music. Nevertheless, in other nations described as post-Socialist, notably Russia and states in Central and Eastern Europe, the transition to market economy with the collapse of the USSR was rapid and chaotic, especially in the decade following the collapse. This is contrasted by Uzbekistan, which has only recently begun to implement economic privatization. After the death of Uzbekistan’s first president Islom Karimov in 2016, his successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, rapidly began to change the country’s economic structure. It can even be argued in certain areas like education that Uzbekistan’s recent policy goals are closer to transitions that have taken place in East-Asian nations, particularly Korea and Singapore, as opposed to Eastern European ones like Hungary or Russia.   Although never part of the Soviet Union, Hungary is a nation that experienced rapid economic changes in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Now an official observer state of the Organization of Turkic States, and enjoying friendly diplomatic relations with most Turkic states, Hungary provides a fitting case study for comparison with Uzbekistan’s current orientation as a post-Socialist nation. Although exhibiting present-day parallels, the direction of the two states’ trajectories differ. While Hungary rapidly privatized and as a result destabilized politically during the 1990s, as did most eastern European states including Russia, and then reconsolidated under prime minister Viktor Orbán, Uzbekistan is only at the beginning of a steadier and more gradual privatization, having experienced decades of centralized consolidation.   Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán welcomes president Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Budapest, May 20th, 2025, (Hungarian government photography)   Both Hungary and Uzbekistan manifest a strong emphasis on patriotism, which can be seen as a natural post-Soviet instinct against Russification and assimilation in both states. Regarding the education sector, the Hungarian Diaspora Scholarship program provides full scholarships to diaspora students at top domestic institutions, with the conditions that the scholars will learn Hungarian and engage in a project that serves their local diaspora community within 2 years after the completion of the scholarship. The goal of the program is to foster patriotic spirit and mitigate the effects of brain drain from Hungary. The El-yurt Umidi program in Uzbekistan, established in 2018 by the new president, takes the inverse solution to the same issue. By subsidizing study abroad, it attracts knowledge and experience to Uzbekistan from abroad, with the condition that scholarship recipients work for a minimum of 5 years (2 years for masters) after the completion of the program within Uzbekistan. The National Scholarship in Hungary also has a similar condition of working in Hungary for the same length of time that studies lasted under the scholarship, but the program only applies to domestic universities. What makes Uzbekistan’s policy different is its emphasis on sending students abroad, as opposed to simply consolidating them domestically.   Driving through any city in Uzbekistan, it is impossible not to notice the abundance of private learning centres, specifically for the English language, IELTS, and SAT. Consulting jobs in these areas offer incredibly lucrative opportunities for youth looking to start a business. Due to the legalization of private education in 2017, and thanks to the power of the internet and of social media in bringing success stories to students all over the country, there is sweeping demand for foreign education in Uzbekistan. Programs like El-yurt Umidi, and government subsidies into private education support the supply that is naturally growing to meet this demand. In 2024, the government announced support for paying back interest on loans that were taken out with the purpose of constructing new private educational institutions. According to this decision, the government will also cover 50% of the utility costs for newly constructed private school buildings. These drivers of privatization related to education have little in common with the experiences of other post-Socialist nations in Eastern Europe and are specific to the current social media age. The world was not so globalized or connected when Hungary was going through its transition economy 30 years ago. Further, Uzbekistan is still at an early phase of its development where education is often the only way out of poverty and low-wage labour for many families, further pulling demand.   In almost any economic sector, the ‘post-Soviet’ label fits Uzbekistan’s situation well. Its inheritance of a narrow-minded Soviet economy built entirely on cotton production, its fight against economic informalization, and its emphasis on independence and patriotism are just a few examples. Processes specific to education however are more recent, and parallels with other eastern bloc countries like Hungary become harder to draw. East-Asian nations like Singapore or Korea become relevant parallels. Singapore went from being a poor nation with high illiteracy when it declared independence to being one of the most advanced economies in the world, within the span of a few decades. Outside of its obvious geographical advantage, Singapore’s strong education system was central to its ascension, and made it the hub for technology and innovation that it is today. Singapore’s public education system is already very rigorous. Edusave accounts provide scholarships to students based on merit, incentivising competition. In 1985, like Uzbekistan recently, Singapore legalized independent schools with supplemental curricula. Like Uzbekistan, this move was largely inspired by educational programs from the US and UK.   The aim of Singapore’s policy at the time was the same as Uzbekistan’s today – to stimulate innovation in education. Although the difference between a public and private secondary school in Uzbekistan remains heavily noticeable, public opinion is optimistic. Instead of worrying about growing inequalities, students and teachers alike, in both types of schools, believe that such investments in human capital can only result in an upward spiral of innovation in the long-run for the country. Meritocratic competition in Uzbekistan has also been enlarged with the establishment of the Presidential School system in 2019. These schools are highly selective, with each school selecting only 24 students every year out of thousands of applications. Only one presidential school exists for each region of Uzbekistan, and students compete for top-tier education that is fully subsidized by the government and provides the Cambridge curriculum.   Ultimately, in cutting-edge and fundamental sectors of Uzbekistan’s economic development, most notably education, the ‘post-Soviet’ category in which Uzbekistan is so often placed is becoming almost completely irrelevant, save for the understanding of background context. Orbán’s Hungary, often described as being driven by post-Socialist dynamics in the sphere of politics, experienced a rapid period of privatization, market liberalization, and ultimately democratization in the early 1990s. Prime minister Orbán’s position as a result remains fragile, even after extensive reconsolidation and state capture, due to Hungary’s largely democratic culture. Uzbekistan’s more gradual and state supported trajectory provides a degree of stability, but political life must continue to advance at the same pace as economic and social life. Politics and economics are not separate disciplines, and where they are most interconnected is education. Education will bring new ideas into Uzbekistan, and the Uzbek government must continue to rejuvenate itself if long-term development is to be successful. As a parallel with South Korea would show, Uzbekistan is on the right path, but flexibility will be key to its long-term success.   Bibliography “About the Hungarian Diaspora Scholarship.” Hungarian Diaspora Scholarship, March 25, 2025. https://diasporascholarship.hu/en/about/. “Areas of Cooperation: Economic Cooperation.” Organizations of Turkic States, 2024. https://turkicstates.org/en/areas-of-cooperation-detail/2-economic-cooperation.   Cheang, Bryan, Bacchus Barua, Jake Fuss, Paige MacPherson, and Mackenzie Moir. “Meritocracy, Personal Responsibility, and Encouraging Investment: Lessons from Singapore’s Economic Growth Miracle.” Edited by Stephen Globerman. Realities of Socialism, Fraser Institute, February 2024, 83–106. https://doi.org/https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/meritocracy-personal-responsibility-and-encouraging-investment-lessons-from-Singapore.pdf. Education, the driving force for the development of Korea: Land of the Morning Calm develops into a prominent player in the global economy. Accessed June 3, 2025. http://koreaneducentreinuk.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/Education_the-driving-force-for-the-development-of-Korea.pdf “Encouraging Measures to Open Private Schools Determined.” Kun.uz, February 2, 2024. https://kun.uz/en/news/2024/02/02/encouraging-measures-to-open-private-schools-determined.   “Monitoring Procedure: Approved by Resolution No. 2 of the Board of Trustees of the ‘El-Yurt Umidi’ Foundation.” eyuf.uz, April 22, 2021. https://eyuf.uz/site/view-page?id=134. “Tájékoztatók a Magyar Állami Ösztöndíjjal Kapcsolatban.” Oktatási Hivatal, December 21, 2022. https://www.oktatas.hu/magyar-allami-osztondij/altalanos_tajekoztatok.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The year 2025 marked a new chapter in Russia-Afghanistan relations. On April 17, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation officially removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations. In May and June, business forums were held in Kazan and St. Petersburg, resulting in expanded access for Afghan citizens to the Russian labor market. On July 1, Taliban representative Gul Hassan arrived in Moscow and formally assumed his duties in the capacity of ambassador.   According to Zamir Kabulov, Special Representative of the President of Russia for Afghanistan, Moscow intends to host the seventh round of consultations within the framework of the “Moscow Format” this autumn. The Russian side has stated that “Afghanistan will participate as a full-fledged member”. High-level statements of this kind, along with the formal accreditation of an Afghan diplomat with ambassadorial rank, may be interpreted as an implicit signal of the beginning of a recognition process – positioning the Taliban as a legitimate actor in international relations.   Russia’s rapprochement with the Taliban is largely driven by trade and economic considerations. However, security imperatives are also playing a key role. As part of its counterterrorism efforts, the Russian government has announced its readiness to supply arms to the Afghan side. This development introduces a new dimension to bilateral engagement – arms trade – which has long been a distinctive feature of Russia’s foreign policy toolkit. In the long run, such cooperation may evolve into a broader partnership in the defense-industrial sphere, thereby strengthening bilateral ties and reorienting Kabul’s geopolitical focus more decisively toward Moscow.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The signing of a bilateral agreement between the Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan and China Energy Engineering Corporation Limited (CEEC) in June 2025 represents a pivotal development in the energy diplomacy of the South Caucasus. Held in the Chinese city of Ningbo during the official visit of Azerbaijan’s Minister of Energy Parviz Shahbazov, the agreement formalizes a comprehensive strategic partnership in the field of green energy and signals a shift in regional energy architecture with broader implications for Eurasia, including Central Asia.   The agreement encompasses multiple dimensions of renewable energy cooperation. It includes provisions for joint electricity system planning and grid analysis, the implementation of solar, hydro, and offshore wind energy projects, and the establishment of a Joint Research Center for Green Energy. One of the most strategic components of the agreement is the development of so-called "green energy interconnectors" - transnational infrastructure intended to facilitate the export and integration of renewable energy across borders.   The document outlines long-term plans for the expansion of Azerbaijan’s renewable energy capacity through 2030 and beyond. Planned projects include utility-scale solar power plants in the southern regions, offshore wind farms in the Caspian Sea, and technical advisory services provided by China’s EPPEI (Electric Power Planning & Engineering Institute). These services will include energy system modeling, grid integration simulations, load forecasting, and assessments of system stability and resilience.   The significance of this agreement is both practical and symbolic. For Azerbaijan, a country traditionally reliant on oil and gas exports, this partnership indicates a strategic move toward energy diversification and sustainable development. For China, it represents another step in its global strategy of exporting green infrastructure, technology, and energy planning capabilities under the Belt and Road Initiative framework.   In this context, the potential implications for Central Asia merit close attention. The region faces similar challenges: heavy dependence on conventional energy sources coupled with growing commitments to green transition and renewable integration. Countries like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have already articulated ambitious targets for renewable energy deployment. Azerbaijan’s model of securing Chinese capital and expertise could serve as a viable blueprint for Central Asian economies seeking technological modernization in their energy sectors. Of particular interest is the knowledge-based component of the agreement - the establishment of a joint research center and engagement of Chinese technical institutes in national grid planning. This highlights China’s role not merely as an investor, but also as a provider of analytical and institutional capacity-building. Such components could be adapted in Central Asia, where institutional frameworks for energy transition remain in development.   The geographical dimension further reinforces this dynamic. Azerbaijan’s proximity to the Caspian Sea and its borders with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan open up the possibility of future trans-Caspian energy corridors - including "green" ones. These could complement or even compete with existing regional initiatives such as the Central Asian Power System (CAPS), positioning China as a systemic actor in the post-Soviet renewable transformation.   Finally, it is important to situate this agreement within the broader context of the global energy transition. Countries with high solar irradiance, untapped wind potential, and small hydropower resources are emerging as critical nodes in the reconfiguration of the global energy map. Azerbaijan is among the first post-Soviet states to propose a comprehensive and technologically advanced partnership with China in this sphere. Central Asian states, if they maintain political stability and openness to international capital and technical cooperation, may replicate and adapt this approach to fit their own energy security strategies.   In conclusion, the Azerbaijan–China renewable energy agreement should be viewed not only as a national development strategy, but also as a potential accelerator of regional transformation. For Central Asia, the agreement offers a case study in integrating renewable energy, upgrading grid infrastructure, and leveraging international expertise - all essential components for a resilient and diversified energy future.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague took place at a pivotal moment for the Euro-Atlantic community. Set against the backdrop of renewed geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and rising concerns about long-term strategic cohesion within the alliance, the summit offered an important opportunity to reassess priorities and commitments. The presence of U.S. President Donald Trump was especially influential, shaping both the outcomes and the tone of the discussions, particularly on defense spending and transatlantic security arrangements.   Among the most consequential developments was the formal adoption of a new target of allocating 5% of GDP toward defense and related expenditures by 2035. This marked a substantial increase from the previous 2% guideline and appeared to reflect a convergence between longstanding American calls for greater burden-sharing and European recognition of an evolving security environment. Although framed as a collective response to persistent threats, the target also underscores ongoing disparities in capabilities and expectations among alliance members. President Trump, for his part, presented the agreement as a significant success for the United States and emphasized the importance of directing the additional resources toward military procurement, preferably through domestic production.   The U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, conducted shortly before the summit, drew considerable attention. While President Trump characterized the operation as a decisive strategic achievement, early assessments from intelligence sources and international partners were more cautious. Differing interpretations of the operation’s effectiveness illustrated the challenges of aligning military actions with multilateral consensus. At the same time, the broader diplomatic implications of the Israel-Iran ceasefire remained unresolved, even as leaders expressed support for continued efforts to de-escalate tensions and re-engage in negotiation processes.   The summit also reflected the role of personal diplomacy in alliance dynamics. Remarks made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, including a moment of referring to Trump as a paternal figure in negotiations, were widely interpreted as part of a broader effort to maintain constructive engagement with the United States. While such gestures may have helped to reinforce cohesion during the summit, they also raised questions about the degree to which institutional decisions are increasingly shaped by the personalities and preferences of individual leaders.   Ukraine’s position within NATO discussions remained highly prominent. President Volodymyr Zelensky offered a direct warning that Russia could target a NATO member state within the next five years, urging the alliance to accelerate its commitments. While NATO leaders reiterated their support for Ukraine, including increased defense assistance and industrial cooperation, the issue of formal membership remained unresolved. Diverging views, particularly from Hungary, highlighted the persistent ambivalence within the alliance over Ukraine’s future integration and the broader question of enlargement.   The economic dimension of the summit was not ignored either. French President Emmanuel Macron expressed concern over the potential contradiction between increased defense spending and rising trade frictions across the Atlantic. His remarks reflected a growing awareness that military commitments must be supported by stable economic foundations and mutual trust among allies. Macron’s intervention thus served as a reminder of the interdependence between strategic, political, and economic dimensions of transatlantic relations.   The Dutch role in hosting the summit further illustrated the importance of diplomatic symbolism. Through careful planning and a personalized approach to engagement, including high-level hospitality extended to President Trump, the Netherlands aimed to reinforce the alliance’s unity and demonstrate its continued relevance. These efforts may have contributed to the relatively smooth adoption of summit declarations, even amid underlying tensions on key policy issues.   In sum, the 2025 NATO Summit demonstrated that while institutional commitments can be reaffirmed and policy goals realigned, the strategic autonomy of the alliance remains contested. NATO today is adjusting to a security landscape shaped as much by institutional priorities as by the personalities steering them. Whether this transformation strengthens or destabilizes the alliance in the long term remains an open question.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Uzbekistan has launched a pilot transport corridor to Mongolia via Kyrgyzstan and China. Delivery of goods along the new 4,500-kilometre road route takes eight days. This gives domestic exporters additional access to the relatively unexplored Mongolian market, which is particularly relevant in light of the strengthening of trade and economic ties with this country.   The course for intensifying mutual trade was set last year, when the President of Mongolia made his first state visit to Tashkent. During high-level negotiations, the parties set the goal of increasing trade turnover several times over, which spurred the preparation of a preferential trade agreement. During the return state visit of the head of Uzbekistan to Ulaanbaatar on 24-25 June this year, this issue was once again prioritized.   Even under the current circumstances, bilateral trade indicators show steady growth. This is especially true for Uzbek exports, which in 2024 exceeded $26 million in total, twice as much as a year earlier. This dynamic gives impetus to the development of inter-country transport links, with a particular focus on road transport, given the signing last year of an agreement between the governments of Uzbekistan and Mongolia. Given the growing demand for mutual transport, an agreement has been reached to double the number of permit forms, and preparatory work has begun on their electronic exchange based on the E-Permit system.   Uzbekistan supplies Mongolia with vegetables and fruits, food products, textiles and cars. There is enormous potential for expanding the range and volume of supplies of in-demand products. Its realization undoubtedly requires effective and reliable transport links between the countries.   Mongolia is bordered by two major powers, Russia and China, but has no direct access to the sea, which determines its complex geo-economic position. Although the country is a key link in the Russia-Mongolia-China economic corridor, which includes the cross-border railway Ulan-Ude-Naushki-Ulan Bator-Erlian-Beijing-Tianjin and a motorway to northern Chinese seaports, which brings certain financial benefits, Mongolia’s transit capabilities are limited to this small geographical area. The expansion of trade routes to neighboring regions, including Central Asia, offers Ulaanbaatar great prospects in terms of diversifying its own exports.   However, the Central Asian region is not only a promising market for Mongolia, but also a land bridge to the world’s oceans. In particular, Uzbekistan, given its desire to create a Trans-Afghan railway corridor with access to Indian Ocean ports, could become Mongolia’s gateway to South Asia. The same effect will be achieved by connecting new freight routes from Mongolia to Uzbekistan with transport and transit corridors towards Iran, its southern seaports and the rest of Western Asia. In addition, transport links with Central Asian countries will open up a route for Mongolia to the South Caucasus, Turkey and Europe via the Caspian Sea. It is believed that after the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, all these connecting routes will become even more important and attractive due to the reduction in time and costs of transporting goods.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Recently, economic and political rivalry between China and the US, including the trade war, has become a key factor in world politics. The global order formed during the era of globalization is being destabilized. The conflict between the two leading global economic players affects the entire world. The analysis presents the assessments of two leading international relations experts directly associated with Chinese government structures: Yang Xuetong from Tsinghua University and Wang Jisi from Peking University.   Technological competition between China and the United States The changing structure of trade and technological relations between China and the United States reflects growing strategic tensions and a course towards selective decoupling. The Trump administration’s America First policy marked a shift towards protectionism and attempts to curb China’s growth in key sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and advanced technologies. However, despite the tough rhetoric and tariff measures, their practical application has been limited by economic realities.   Business circles in both countries are interested in maintaining bilateral trade and investment, especially in strategically important areas such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals. Complete disengagement is seen as economically unfeasible.   Technological rivalry remains at the heart of the tension, but the depth of interdependence and the high cost of disrupting global supply chains make a complete split unlikely. The European Union takes a more balanced position, emphasizing multilateralism and regulatory autonomy, seeking to preserve technological sovereignty without open confrontation.   Overall, a model of partial, selective disengagement while maintaining limited cooperation is emerging.   Deglobalization and leadership dynamics Recent geopolitical changes point to a trend towards deglobalization, accompanied by the fragmentation of international relations and the redistribution of global leadership between the US, China and the EU. The US withdrawal from international institutions under the Trump administration, including the WHO and the Paris Agreement, as well as the strengthening of unilateral initiatives, expressed Washington’s growing skepticism towards multilateral formats. This weakened the soft power of the US, reducing the attractiveness of its model and undermining its normative leadership. Internal crises in American democracy and the increasingly coercive nature of its foreign policy have only reinforced these trends.   Against this backdrop, China continues its economic growth and pursuit of national rejuvenation, strengthening its international influence without directly challenging the existing order. This is perceived in Washington as a strategic threat.   The interaction between these actors reflects a shift in the global balance. The United States retains its superiority in ‘hard power,’ but China is closing the gap, especially in high technology. The world is becoming less integrated and more strategically tense, where leadership is determined not so much by economic or military potential as by the ability to manage multiple, overlapping crises.   Prospects for cooperation during Trump’s second term Donald Trump’s second term as US president is expected to complicate relations with China and the international community. The America First policy, focused on protectionism and unilateral action, will increase tensions, especially in trade, technology and ideology. Despite his confrontational rhetoric, Trump’s transactional style allows for deals that benefit the US, although internal disagreements between security hawks and economic pragmatists make it difficult to develop a consistent policy.   Pressure on China will be maintained through sanctions on human rights issues in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, while maintaining the ‘one China’ policy. Military and economic cooperation between China and the US is possible but limited by bureaucratic and political barriers, especially in the areas of military communications and crisis management. The EU will face US demands for fair trade and increased defence spending, balancing between countering Russian aggression and preventing escalation.   On the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Trump is inclined to be cautious and minimise military involvement, giving priority to domestic issues. Overall, Trump’s second term promises increased bilateral tensions, transactional diplomacy, and domestic political divisions that will require careful management to prevent escalation and maintain limited cooperation.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.