The Financial Times, referring to the fact that “many manufacturers are forced to pay duties on both imports and exports”, focuses on foreign manufacturers in China, which are forced to pay duties of 125% on imports of components and then 145% on exports to the U.S., thus twice falling under the impact of trade duties from the U.S., which, as noted undermines their activities.   It should be noted that it is not only Chinese companies that have been hit, but also American companies doing big business in China. This is due to the fact that there are a number of foreign companies operating in China that are not American but rely on American raw materials, which puts them in the position of having to pay both American and Chinese duties on the same goods. At the same time, “some large American manufacturers, including smartphone makers and some electronics manufacturers, have secured temporary relief from Trump”.   According to China’s General Administration of Customs, “wholly or partly foreign companies in the country last year accounted for $980bn of Chinese exports, or more than a quarter, and $820bn of imports, or more than a third”, and that “China recorded a record trade surplus of nearly $1 trillion in 2024”. An important factor is that China’s export mechanism has been driven in whole or in part by foreign companies that have sought to take advantage of China’s huge and inexpensive labour market to produce goods.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his commentary, Miraziz Masharipov, member of the IAIS Volunteers Club, argues that international relations today are being fundamentally reshaped by growing power polarization, creating a more chaotic and unstable world order. He explains that the traditional global political architecture is eroding, particularly with the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, which has accelerated existing trends. Mr. Masharipov points to three key dynamics behind this transformation: the emergence of non-traditional technological hubs, the deepening ideological gap between ultra-right and ultra-left forces, and an escalating conflict among global elites.   The author first highlights how technological power is shifting away from traditional centres like Silicon Valley to new hubs in China, India, Vietnam, Brazil, and Africa. He tells how these regions are not merely adopting but actively reshaping the future of technologies such as AI, quantum computing, and decentralized infrastructure. Yet, he warns, the expansion of these hubs is threatened by issues such as state overreach, as seen in China, and brain drain from emerging economies. This technological decentralisation, he suggests, will undermine Western leadership in setting global standards by 2030.   He then turns to the worsening ideological polarisation, particularly between ultra-right and ultra-left forces in Europe and the Americas. Mr. Masharipov describes how populist movements have eroded the traditional centrist consensus that once underpinned multilateral cooperation, with Trump’s nationalist policies further encouraging fragmentation. He argues that the paralysis within the EU and the rise of nationalist governments have weakened responses to major crises like the war in Ukraine and climate change, thereby turning international politics into a dangerously unpredictable arena.   Finally, the author discusses the evolving conflict among elites, focusing on Trump’s approach to foreign policy. He tells how Trump, unlike Biden, has chosen to engage authoritarian leaders like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un through personal diplomacy, positioning himself as a global dealmaker. He contends that this style of transactional leadership prioritises personal relations over institutional norms, thereby exacerbating the fragmentation of global governance. In conclusion, Mr. Masharipov paints a bleak picture of a world increasingly dominated by technological decentralisation, ideological extremism, and elite rivalries, all of which threaten to unravel the already fragile international system.   Read on Paradigma.uz   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In April 2025, the Government of Pakistan launched an initiative titled the “Return to Homeland,” which was characterized by the Taliban administration as an act of “forced deportation.” As a result, nearly 80,000 Afghan nationals were deported through the Torkham border crossing in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province within the span of one month. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other sources, between 19,000 and 45,000 of these individuals were forcibly expelled, while the remainder returned voluntarily or under minimal pressure.   The primary justification for the deportation process has been Pakistan’s internal security concerns. The heightened activity of terrorist organizations such as ISKP and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), along with cross-border militant movements and threats posed by criminal groups, have constituted key factors influencing this policy. During the first ten days of March 2025, five major terrorist attacks occurred in Pakistan—three in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and two in Balochistan. All five were suicide bombings, resulting in the deaths of at least 18 individuals, including 12 military personnel, five Chinese nationals, and one Pakistani citizen. While such attacks have occurred in prior years, the deaths of Chinese citizens are particularly sensitive, as China remains one of Pakistan’s most crucial economic partners. The incident has consequently strained bilateral relations.   In response to these challenges, the Pakistani government initiated the "Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan" (IFRP), grounded in both security and political considerations. While this strategy seeks to bolster domestic security and regulate migration, it has also raised serious humanitarian and regional stability concerns.   Afghanistan, on the receiving end of these deportations, now faces significant challenges. Thousands of individuals who had resided in Pakistan for many years are now expected to reintegrate into a homeland marked by weak infrastructure and a deteriorated economy. Many of the returnees lack shelter, employment, and basic resources, rendering them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist organizations such as ISKP-Khorasan and TTP.   For the Taliban administration, this mass return could yield complex economic, political, and social repercussions. A considerable portion of the returnees are likely to migrate toward urban centers in search of employment, thereby straining already limited urban infrastructure. Failing this could result in rising unemployment, criminality, and public discontent that might severely undermine the internal stability of the country.   In turn, Iranians might also follow the Pakistan’s lead and begin to demand strict compliance with migration regulations from Afghan refugees residing within their territory, otherwise might undertake a massive deportation campaign similar to Pakistanis in near future.   At the same time, the international community has also begun to issue measured responses to the unfolding crisis. Notably, Qatar has launched a humanitarian initiative to support deported Afghan citizens by allocating $800,000 for the construction of housing in Gardez, the capital of Paktia province. Through such efforts—providing humanitarian assistance, supporting stability in Afghanistan, and mediating peace negotiations—Qatar appears to be solidifying its diplomatic standing in the international arena, particularly within the Muslim world, and positioning itself as a capable actor in resolving global crises.   In conclusion, the migration crisis along the border represents not merely a bilateral issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan but a significant challenge to broader regional security and stability. Its implications might extend to Iran, China, Central Asia, and other key regional stakeholders, influencing their political and security strategies since, migration policy of certain country reverberates across a complex system tied to human lives, stability, and international relations.   by Bobur Mingyasharov   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Deputy Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Serik Zhumangarin, who is on an official visit to Kabul, said that Astana will invest $500 million in the Trans-Afghan railway project. These funds will most likely be used to construction the Torghundi-Herat railway (113 km), which is being designed by the Afghan-German Bakhtar company with the assistance of Indian specialists.   Almost a year ago, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed to jointly implement the project to construction of the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Buldak Railway Corridor with possibe access to Pakistani ports on the Indian Ocean. This route will pass mainly through the western provinces of Afghanistan, from where it could branch off towards Iran and its ocean port of Chabahar.   For Kazakhstan, the Torgundi-Herat railway line is important in terms of extension of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to Afghanistan, which will strengthen the country’s transit position in interregional transport towards South and West Asia.   In the classical sense, the eastern branch of the INSTC connects Russia with Iran through the railway networks of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The cargo is then transported by sea to India. The proactive policy of the Taliban and Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Uzbekistan, in developing of trans-Afghan trade fills the North-South concept with new content. It’s no coincidence that Tashkent’s initiative to create the Kabul Сorridor (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway), as well as the idea of launching an alternative railway corridor through Kandahar, promoted by Ashgabat and Astana, are actively supported by Moscow.   In early April, the Russian side announced its participation in the preparation of the feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan Railway on both routes. The next step is likely to be to join a project financing consortium to gain control of alternative (in addition to Iranian transit) export channels for critical resources, including energy, to the vast markets of South Asia and the Gulf. A similar situation is developing on the TAPI gas pipeline, where Russia and Kazakhstan also intend to act in a strong tandem.   The growth of Russian cargo flows to the southern direction will provide Kazakhstan with a stable income from transit services and facilitate the expansion of trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan. It is planned to increase mutual trade to $3 billion. Astana is also interested in the exploration and development of Afghan minerals. The main issue in the implementation of these tasks remains the establishment of reliable transport links with Afghanistan. It is important for the Central Asian countries to achieve mutual coordination based on a common, pragmatic approach.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Last week, gold prices reached a historic high of USD 3,500 per ounce (31.1 grams). The growth of the cost of this resource on the world market is traditionally perceived as a positive factor, as it contributes to the strengthening of government reserves, increase in export revenues and other macroeconomic benefits. However, as the experience of several countries shows, raw material prosperity in the long term can turn into a factor that hinders economic development.   According to the Central Bank of Uzbekistan, the country’s gold reserves are estimated at 11.5 million troy ounces at the beginning of 2025. Uzbekistan is among the world’s leading gold producers: by the end of 2024, its annual production was about 105 tons, which ensures its place in the top ten of the global ranking.   It should be noted that Uzbekistan realizes both the potential benefits and risks associated with the current market environment. On the one hand, high gold prices provide the country’s economy with a significant fiscal and export bonus. On the other hand, the key issue is not the fact of rising prices, but how effectively the additional export revenues will be distributed.   Uzbekistan is currently taking measures aimed at rational use of the favorable market situation. A significant part of the raw material surplus is being channeled into long-term projects, including the development of education, health care and the technological sector. In parallel, investments are being made in non-resource sectors such as textiles, agro-processing, logistics and IT, which contribute to the creation of added value and new jobs.   Special attention is paid to social initiatives, including the Youth Notebook and Women's Notebook programs, which are digital platforms for targeted support of relevant categories of the population. The implementation of such projects not only contributes to social stability, but also reduces migration pressure, reducing the outflow of population to large cities and abroad.   Thus, the current rise in gold prices creates additional opportunities for Uzbekistan for economic transformation. The critical question remains whether it will be possible to avoid the “resource curse” that characterizes many commodity-based economies. Uzbekistan is demonstrating a desire not only to maximize revenues from gold mining, but also to diversify the economy through investments in human capital and innovative industries. Only time will tell how successful this strategy will be.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

On 17 April 2025, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Dhaka, Bangladesh, and held talks with her counterpart, Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary Jashim Uddin. This was the first high-level diplomatic contact between the two countries since 2010.   Throughout Bangladesh’s creation as an independent state till the 2010s, relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh have been somewhat cordial. Pakistan officially recognized Bangladesh in February 1974, under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This came after the 1972 Simla Agreement and the release of Pakistani prisoners of war by Bangladesh. That same year, Bhutto visited Dhaka, where he expressed regret for the events of 1971 and talked about working together economically, although he didn’t give a formal apology.   Relations started to improve in the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1978, Pakistan gave Bangladesh four Shenyang F-6 fighter jets, showing signs of military cooperation. The two countries kept talking during President Muhammad Ershad’s time (1982–1990). He visited Pakistan in 1986, and during the visit, both sides discussed trade and regional cooperation. These discussions took place under the framework of SAARC, which had been founded in 1985. SAARC created opportunities for regional leaders like Ershad and Zia-ul-Haq to meet and engage. However, progress in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations was slow. One reason was that many in Bangladesh (especially the Awami League) remained focused on seeking justice for the events of 1971. They also preferred maintaining closer ties with India. A key moment came in July 2002, when Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf visited Dhaka; it was the first visit by a Pakistani head of state since 1974. At the Martyrs’ Monument, he expressed regret for the “excesses” of 1971. The BNP welcomed this, but the Awami League said it wasn’t enough. Furthermore, when Sheikh Hasina returned to power in 2009, relations got colder. Her government prioritized ties with India and started trials against people accused of helping the Pakistani military in 1971. Pakistan criticized the trials, calling them politically motivated. Even though trade reached $400-450 million, by 2010, high-level talks had mostly stopped.   New Elite. Bangladesh’s government changed in August 2024 when protests led by students forced out Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. At the moment, Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Prize laureate, leads an interim government. Yunus wants Bangladesh to have good ties with multiple countries, not just India. His interim government severed its ties with New Delhi when he criticized India for sheltering the overthrown Hasina and demanded her extradition. As a result, it opened up a space (chance) for Pakistan to get closer to Bangladesh. This change is not merely reactive; it shows a deliberate attempt to redefine Bangladesh’s national identity and foreign policy, moving away from India-centric dependence toward broader regional engagement.   Although an apology was asked for the 1971 war damages from Pakistan and the request was not met. However, it should not be seen as a condition from the Bangladeshi part to Pakistan in resetting their ties, because regardless two states seem desperate in reconnection. It can even be noticed in their discussion on reviving SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) – an ASEAN-like organization for the region.   Economic cooperation is a major reason for the renewed talks between Bangladesh and Pakistan. Their bilateral trade already exceeds $1 billion. Bangladesh exports garments, and Pakistan supplies cotton, rice, and wheat. Due to the new interim ruler, M. Yunus, in February 2025, they restarted direct trade with a large rice shipment, signaling stronger economic ties. Plans for direct flights, lessening visa procedures, are also in progress to boost connectivity.   China Factor. China’s influence quietly shapes this development. Pakistan remains a close ally of Beijing. Bangladesh depends on Chinese investment for infrastructure such as roads and ports. Pakistan and Bangladesh may align with China’s South Asian ambitions. Stronger ties between them could support China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Such alignment raises India’s concerns about a shifting regional balance. Meanwhile, India closely monitors these talks because its economic ties with Bangladesh have weakened: India recently canceled a transshipment deal. This disrupted Bangladesh’s $39 billion garment export industry.   Impact on CA. Pakistan’s role as a transit hub for Bangladeshi goods from Afghanistan could boost economic ties with Central Asian nations like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Afghanistan serves as a gateway to Central Asia. Both nations already focus on this region. Enhanced cooperation might spark joint energy or infrastructure projects. Additionally, China’s Belt and Road Initiative could link Bangladesh and Pakistan to Central Asian markets. Thus, new trade routes may emerge.   By Firdavs Azimkulov   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.