The 56th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum was held under the optimistic theme The Spirit of Dialogue. The serene, snow-capped peaks of the Swiss Alps stood in stark contrast to a global system undergoing profound structural transformation. While 3,000 officials from 130 countries gathered to discuss “planetary boundaries” and “shared prosperity”, private discussions and keynote speeches revealed a more defined perspective. Policymakers now need to go beyond simply managing cycles; they need to address a significant rupture in the global structure. Outdated trade rules have been replaced by new ones focused on security, sovereignty, and dirigisme. For the past decade, world leaders have used the term “transition” to allay their fears. They believed the world was merely transforming into a digital, more environmentally sustainable, yet still interconnected version of the 20th century. Davos 2026 has shattered this sense of certainty. Most now agree that we are experiencing a structural rupture, not a cyclical transition. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney offered the most serious assessment of this week: “Let me be frank. We are not experiencing a transition, but a rupture. This rupture requires more than just adaptation. It requires candor about the true state of affairs”. This “honesty” means recognizing that the rules that have historically governed organizational activity over the past century are no longer as strict as they once were. This rupture marks a definitive departure from the idea of universal cooperation. It forces leaders to stop passively observing and acknowledge a reality characterized by diverse sources of shock and disparate instability. Despite reports of chaos, global trade has demonstrated an unexpected, almost daring, resilience. The Davos Resilience Paradox posits that as geopolitical challenges intensify, trade doesn't cease; instead, it adapts, opening up new, often more complex, avenues of movement. We are constantly engaged in trade and will continue to do so. “Trade is like water flowing in a river. If an obstacle arises, it will move around it”, noted Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. This “water” is increasingly flowing through digital and service channels, largely isolated from the challenges associated with physical goods. Trade is accelerating thanks to new bilateral and regional mechanisms. The upcoming EU-Mercosur agreement and the upcoming EU-India agreement, dubbed the “mother of all deals”, demonstrate how trade is opening up innovative avenues for expansion, circumventing traditional international barriers. The most striking statistic of the year is the 262 percent increase in the scale of intervention in industrial policy since 2019. The significant increase in state dirigisme demonstrates that state intervention has evolved from a measure of last resort to a central component of modern economic policy. French President Emmanuel Macron declared, “Protectionism is not the same as protection”, thus reflecting the new doctrine. This shift is driven not only by the need for privacy for individuals; it is driven by four strategic imperatives that have become more significant than mere market efficiency: maintaining the stability of basic goods, maintaining the country's status as a leader in advanced technologies, ensuring that trade is consistent with the planet's resource constraints and climate goals, and using public authority to protect domestic labor markets. The private sector faces the challenge of managing the dramatic increase in government intervention while mitigating the negative impacts and complexities associated with such strict government measures. As the global landscape shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity, the most successful companies are shifting from “reactive risk management”, characterized by asset divestments and market exits, to a proactive approach known as “geopolitical power”. This refers to an organization's ability to leverage geopolitical intelligence to gain strategic business advantages. At its summit, the World Economic Forum established the Geopolitical Leadership Network, signaling the rise of this role to the C-suite. However, a significant disparity remains: only 20% of companies have a geopolitical position reporting directly to the C-suite. The Forum identifies five key components necessary for developing this “skill”: Building consensus between the CEO and the board to move from a wait-and-see approach to proactive opportunity generation. Use of systematic scenario planning and field information obtained from regional groups. Integration of geopolitical specialists into key decision-making structures. Integrating expertise in diplomacy and politics with an understanding of corporate logic and strategy. Ensuring their immediate impact on financial costs, production locations and supply chain configuration. The incident surrounding US President Donald Trump’s proposed purchase of Greenland exemplifies an emerging trade strategy that prioritizes security. After European countries rejected the plan, the administration threatened to impose taxes on eight of them. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's decisive intervention halted these actions, though the lesson for Davos attendees was clear. Trade measures are currently being applied not for economic but for strategic purposes, which are often difficult to foresee. The concept of “national security” has become an ambiguous one, linked to economic policy, leading corporate executives to not only monitor market trends but also engage in strategic maneuvering. Events in Greenland serve as a stark reminder that, in the current situation, security is determined solely by the discretion of the sovereign power on any given day. As the global trade landscape transforms, the old rules no longer apply. The “disruption” is irreversible, but resilience mechanisms are beginning to emerge. New growth strategies include the “trade technology paradox”, characterized by the development of artificial intelligence and digital tools that level the playing field for small and medium-sized enterprises and developing economies. In modern society, trade extends beyond financial transactions; it encompasses security, sovereignty, and survival. The fundamental advantage in business is no longer simply size, but the speed of adaptation. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

After the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan, Washington confronted a complex and enduring dilemma: how to provide humanitarian assistance to a population in acute need without conferring political legitimacy or material benefit upon the Taliban, now governing as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Since August 2021, the United States has attempted to navigate this challenge by relying on international organizations and nongovernmental actors to deliver aid, while simultaneously maintaining sanctions on Taliban leadership and restricting direct engagement with de facto authorities. This balancing act has increasingly shaped U.S. legislative, diplomatic, and humanitarian policy toward Afghanistan. Central to this approach is the effort to prevent U.S. taxpayer funds from being diverted – directly or indirectly – to the Taliban. The No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act represents the most recent and formalized expression of this objective. Introduced into Congress on January 23, 2025, the bill requires the Department of State to develop and implement a strategy aimed at discouraging foreign governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations from providing financial or material support to the Taliban, including through the misuse of U.S.-funded foreign assistance. Although still in the early stages of the legislative process, the bill signals a tightening of U.S. oversight and a potential recalibration of American engagement in Afghanistan. The legislation aligns with broader efforts to audit and reassess U.S. foreign aid following the withdrawal. A 2024 audit conducted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) identified significant weaknesses in the oversight of approximately $2.9 billion in U.S. assistance delivered after 2021. The report stated: “… remain concerned that the Department of State and USAID lack visibility into how funds are expended once they are transferred to international organizations, and that these funds may not be used as intended.” While some of these claims remain contested, the findings reinforced concerns within Congress that humanitarian channels were vulnerable to exploitation in a context where the Taliban exercised territorial and administrative control. Supporters of the No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act frame the legislation not only as a fiscal safeguard but as a moral obligation. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch has emphasized the human cost of the two-decade war, noting that more than 2,000 U.S. service members were killed and over 20,000 wounded. In this context, he characterized any transfer of U.S. funds to the IEA as “a betrayal of the victims of the war,” arguing that preventing such outcomes is a matter of accountability to both American taxpayers and those who served in Afghanistan. The bill was introduced by Senator Tim Sheehy and co-sponsored by Senators Bill Hagerty, Tommy Tuberville, and Steve Daines, all of whom have advocated a stricter approach to foreign assistance that could benefit the Taliban. The human consequences of these policy shifts are increasingly visible. A recent report by The New York Times argues that the suspension of U.S. humanitarian assistance has had serious and damaging effects on the daily lives of ordinary Afghans. Drawing on field research conducted in five provinces, the report documents how the halt in American funding disrupted programs that many families depended on for food security, healthcare, and basic survival. According to the findings, low-income households, internally displaced persons, and communities reliant on emergency assistance have been disproportionately affected. The reduction in funding has also constrained the capacity of humanitarian organizations operating on the ground. Some programs have been forced to scale down, while others have ceased operations entirely, increasing pressure on local communities already grappling with unemployment, rising prices, and prolonged economic decline. In the absence of sufficient alternative funding, the withdrawal of U.S. support has compounded existing vulnerabilities and intensified poverty in both urban and rural areas. These developments highlight a deeper structural problem underlying Afghanistan’s post-withdrawal crisis. For more than two decades, international assistance functioned not merely as emergency relief, but as a substitute for core state responsibilities, financing and delivering services such as healthcare, nutrition, and social protection. When U.S. and international aid was reduced, the effects were immediate and severe, revealing the extent to which essential services remained dependent on external actors. As a result, debates over the No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act and U.S. funding decisions are not only about aid diversion or sanctions compliance. They reflect a broader unresolved tension between humanitarian imperatives and political accountability.  It seems that responsibility for essential services in Afghanistan was diffused across international actors, while authority within the country evolved separately. Successes were attributed to partnership; failures were explained through insecurity, access constraints, or funding shortfalls, rather than deficiencies in governance. Over time, the boundary between humanitarian support and functional substitution blurred. As international assistance has declined, particularly following recent U.S. funding cuts, that distortion has become central to how Afghanistan’s crisis is interpreted. The withdrawal of aid is increasingly framed as the primary cause of humanitarian harm, obscuring the question of who bears responsibility for sustaining basic services once power is consolidated domestically. This framing risks conflating the prevention of suffering with the assumption of permanent obligation, transforming humanitarian support from a tool of relief into a substitute for governance. The current debate over aid, economic self-reliance, and humanitarian collapse cannot be understood without confronting this unresolved dependency. Afghanistan’s crisis is not occurring in a vacuum of authority. It is unfolding under a governing system that exercises control over territory, labor, access, and social policy, and therefore shapes humanitarian outcomes directly. Any assessment of aid withdrawal must therefore account not only for donor decisions, but for governing choices made within Afghanistan after the transition of power. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The events of recent weeks demonstrate Central Asian states’ determination to promote their own infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. Some of these initiatives are being implemented despite continuing tensions on the Afghan-Pakistani border and the conflictual nature of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad. At the end of January, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Pakistan announced that Astana was ready to finance the construction of the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak railway, also known as the Western Trans-Afghan Railway, at a cost of around $7 billion. This decision is obviously motivated by the country’s desire to strengthen its position in north-south transit transport, encompassing existing routes through Iran and new transport corridors crossing Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Astana has expressed its support for the launch of the Kabul Corridor along the Termez-Naibabad-Maidanshahr-Logar-Kharlachi route proposed by Uzbekistan in 2018. In July 2025, the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project entered a new stage of development when a trilateral intergovernmental framework agreement on the joint development of the project's feasibility study was signed. On 4 February 2026, Uzbekistan ratified the agreement and agreed with Pakistan to begin field studies on the transport corridor. The UAP project is paving the way for a new north-south trade route through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This route will provide the fastest land connection between Europe, Russia and South Asia, eliminating the need for sea crossings. Against this backdrop, Tashkent has proposed the creation of a multimodal corridor connecting Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is three times shorter than sea delivery routes. Astana’s participation in the project was discussed during bilateral talks held during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Pakistan on 4 February 2026. The parties also discussed the prospects for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) Railway Corridor. Kazakhstan joined the initiative to construction a railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province in 2024 at the invitation of the Turkmen side. In July 2025, Astana and Kabul signed a memorandum to implement the project. Kazakhstan pledged to allocate $500 million towards the construction of a railway line to Herat and the necessary accompanying infrastructure, including a logistics hub in northern Afghanistan. The stake has now been raised to cover the entire budget for the Western Trans-Afghan Route. Astana’s active interest in the TAP project may be linked to the current dynamics of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas transport corridor's development. Work began on laying the Afghan section of the 1,840-kilometre pipeline in December 2024. It is expected to reach Herat Province by the end of 2026. Russia is paying close attention to TAPI, viewing it as an opportunity to diversify and stabilize its energy exports following the loss of the premium European market. In this context, Kazakhstan can expect to earn transit profits, providing additional hope for the profitability of the railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak, as the two transport routes will clearly be synchronized. On 1 February 2026, a meeting was held in Herat between Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, and Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister. They discussed the progress of construction of the TAPI gas pipeline, the power line between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and the Torghundi-Herat railway. Both Ashgabat and Kabul are seeking to accelerate the TAPI project. At a recent meeting between Turkmenistan’s Ambassador, Khoja Ovezov, and Afghanistan’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Hedayatullah Badri, they noted the rapid pace of work on the Afghan section of the gas pipeline. According to the available data, part of the route has already been prepared for pipe installation. The dynamic development of relations with Afghanistan raises the question for Central Asian states to strengthen mutual coordination to ensure their infrastructure initiatives have complementary political and economic effects. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

by Zulkhumor Makhmudova, PhD Candidate at UWED In recent years, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has prioritized regional integration and the development of alternative transport-logistics routes. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s official visit to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, marked by a high-level diplomatic protocol and political attention, demonstrates that bilateral relations have entered a qualitatively new stage. The escort of the Uzbek President’s aircraft by the Pakistan Air Force, and the simultaneous reception by both the President and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, is not merely ceremonial but a symbolic signal of significant geopolitical meaning. Pakistan is a parliamentary republic where real executive power rests with the Prime Minister, while the President performs mostly ceremonial and representative functions. Therefore, the reception of a foreign head of state by both the President and Prime Minister simultaneously is rare in protocol practice. This reflects several key political messages: the visit carries maximum political weight; Pakistan’s internal political institutions have reached a consensus on closer ties with Uzbekistan; and engagement with Uzbekistan represents a long-term strategic approach rather than a temporary government initiative. The military escort further underscores the strategic partnership and trust placed in Uzbekistan in matters of security. President Mirziyoyev’s meeting with the Commander of the Pakistan Armed Forces, Field Marshal Asim Munir, indicates the emergence of a new strategic direction in Uzbekistan’s foreign and security policy. The meeting, held at Pakistan’s leading defense-industrial complex, underscores that cooperation extends beyond political-diplomatic dialogue to include practical industrial-military collaboration. This reflects Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach to strengthening its defense capabilities through technology transfer, experience sharing, and industrial cooperation. The development of a dedicated “roadmap” for military-technical cooperation demonstrates that this initiative is institutionalized and long-term rather than ad hoc. Negotiations with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, highlighted the institutionalization of Uzbekistan–Pakistan relations. The establishment of a Strategic Partnership Council, along with permanent coordinating mechanisms between foreign ministries, moves bilateral relations beyond personal diplomacy toward sustainable institutional frameworks. Such institutionalization signifies the elevation of relations to a “strategic partnership” level, expanding Uzbekistan’s maneuverability in South Asian affairs and increasing predictability and stability in interstate relations. The current stage of Uzbekistan–Pakistan economic relations reflects a transition from quantitative growth to qualitative deepening. Expansion of trade and the formation of an investment portfolio indicate a convergence of economic interests. Geoeconomically, Pakistan provides Uzbekistan with access to the Indian Ocean region; therefore, plans to increase trade volume to $2 billion have strategic significance. Preferential trade agreements, logistical improvements, and the removal of technical barriers serve to broaden Uzbekistan’s export geography, while the $3.5 billion investment portfolio demonstrates the long-term, complex, and institutional nature of bilateral cooperation, enhancing Uzbekistan’s attractiveness for South Asian investors. Transport and logistics cooperation is a central element of the strategic partnership. The acceleration of the Trans-Afghan Railway and the development of the Pakistan–China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan transport corridor play a key geostrategic role, connecting Uzbekistan to seaports and significantly expanding transit and trade opportunities. From an international relations perspective, these projects help mitigate the “geopolitical disconnect” between Central and South Asia, with Pakistan providing alternative and relatively stable transport routes. Subnational and regional cooperation initiatives further strengthen economic stability and integration. Humanitarian and cultural cooperation remains an important supportive component, reinforcing political and economic rapprochement through social engagement. Initiatives such as pilgrimage tourism, cultural exchanges, and joint projects on historical heritage serve to cultivate positive public opinion and legitimize strategic partnership. Leveraging shared historical and civilizational heritage enhances the cultural and long-term sustainability of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Overall, President Mirziyoyev’s visit to Pakistan demonstrates that Uzbekistan–Pakistan relations are evolving not only at a bilateral level but also as a strategic response to regional and global developments. In the context of fluctuating global energy prices, competition over transcontinental trade routes, and increasing regional security challenges, this visit enables Uzbekistan to establish a new engagement format that safeguards its economic and security interests while strengthening its position in both regional and global affairs. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

by Abdugani Karimov, PhD Candidate at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy Uzbek-Japanese relations at the present stage are among the most stable and rapidly developing relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Japan was one of the first developed countries to recognize Uzbekistan's independence: diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on January 26, 1992. Since then, bilateral dialogue has continuously developed elements of economic, political, and social interaction, leading to long-term relations. A significant stage in the development of high-level dialogue was Japan's initiation in 2004 of the multilateral format “Central Asia + Japan,” which became the first sustainable mechanism for regular interaction between the countries of Central Asia and Japan. This format allowed Tokyo to simultaneously strengthen ties with the states of the region, and the countries of Central Asia to promote their vision of stability, modernization, and cooperative security in the region. A significant impetus to the development of Uzbek-Japanese relations was given after 2016, against the backdrop of Shavkat Mirziyoyev's rise to power and the proclamation of a course towards revitalising foreign policy, economic liberalisation and attracting foreign investment. During this period, bilateral dialogue began to gradually transform from a model of predominantly “development assistance” to a partnership format focused on joint modernization, technological progress, and long-term investment. High-level visits played a special role in strengthening political trust. These included the President of Uzbekistan's state visits to Japan in 2019 and 2022, as well as regular contacts at the level of heads of government and relevant ministries. In this context, the visit of the President of Uzbekistan to Tokyo on December 20, 2025, can be seen not as a one-off diplomatic event, but as a logical continuation of the line of deepening strategic dialogue between the two countries. Agenda of the visit The program of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan's visit to Tokyo was structured as a set of political, economic, and humanitarian events reflecting the strategic nature of bilateral relations and the parties' desire for their further development. The visit included high-level talks, meetings with representatives of key Japanese government institutions, and intensive dialogue with business, financial, and educational structures. The central event of the visit was high-level talks between the President of Uzbekistan and the Japanese government. These talks focused on the prospects for developing a strategic partnership, expanding political dialogue, and coordinating positions on current international and regional issues. Particular attention was paid to issues of sustainable development, economic modernization, and the role of Uzbekistan as a key Central Asian state for Japan. During the talks, the parties emphasized their commitment to the principle of regular high-level and senior-level contacts, as well as the need for further institutional strengthening of bilateral cooperation mechanisms. The talks also highlighted the high degree of political trust between Tashkent and Tokyo, as well as their shared approaches to key international and regional issues, including support for stability and sustainable development in Central Asia. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to institutionalize regular political consultation mechanisms, reflecting the parties' desire to move their cooperation to a more systematic format. During the meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, a number of documents were signed aimed at expanding the strategic partnership in all areas. Thus, the agreements reached during the negotiations confirmed the high level of political trust between Tashkent and Tokyo and demonstrated the parties' shared approaches to key international and regional issues, including support for stability and sustainable development in Central Asia. It should be emphasized that the signing of documents during the visit was comprehensive in nature and took place both as a result of high-level negotiations and during meetings with the heads of relevant Japanese government agencies and institutions. As a result of the visit, documents were signed in a wide range of areas, in particular: First. International political cooperation. It was within this area that the Joint Statement on an Enhanced Strategic Partnership for Future Generations was signed. This is the main political and diplomatic document of the visit, which establishes a new format for bilateral relations, expanding the framework of strategic partnership to cover more areas, from the economy to humanitarian cooperation, the “green economy,” etc. This document emphasizes the regularity of contacts and systematic interaction between the countries. Second, the economic and investment sphere, which has always been central to relations between the countries. During the negotiations, issues related to the expansion of Japanese investment in the Uzbek economy were discussed, primarily in the areas of energy, transport, and infrastructure. The Japanese side expressed interest in further participation in projects to modernize production facilities, introduce high technologies, and develop logistics corridors connecting Central Asia with external markets. Although this is not a single formal agreement, the Uzbek and Japanese sides agreed on a portfolio of cooperation projects worth about $12 billion and initiatives to create a joint investment platform, a special economic zone in the Samarkand region, and other structures. Third, the energy agenda, including the development of green energy and energy efficiency. In the context of the global energy transition, Japan is seen by Uzbekistan as one of its key partners in the introduction of new technologies, the development of renewable energy sources, and the modernization of energy infrastructure. In addition, a number of documents were signed aimed at strengthening cooperation in the economy, energy, transport, and medicine. In a separate ceremony, Uzbekistan and JICA signed agreements that include the development of economic zones, support for education, agriculture, transport infrastructure, and the medical supply system. These documents strengthen the economic bloc of bilateral cooperation and provide resources for the modernization of key industries. Fourth: the humanitarian and educational bloc. During the meeting with JICA, issues related to the expansion of educational exchanges, personnel training, academic mobility, and cooperation between universities and research centers in the two countries were discussed. During the discussion, a cooperation agreement was signed with the University of Tsukuba. As part of the package, a memorandum was signed on the creation of a joint center or program with the University of Tsukuba and related intergovernmental agreements in the field of education and scientific exchanges. These documents are aimed at deepening academic cooperation and training modern competitive personnel. At a separate document exchange ceremony, the parties exchanged memoranda of cooperation between specific ministries, companies, and scientific institutions in the presence of the President and the Japanese Minister of Economy, reflecting the keen interest of the private and public-private sectors in bilateral projects. The role of Uzbekistan in Central Asia and Japan's participation in regional initiatives were discussed separately as part of the negotiation agenda. It was emphasized that bilateral Uzbek-Japanese relations are the foundation for broader regional cooperation. During the visit, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to developing the “Central Asia + Japan” format, launched in 2004 as a platform for regional dialogue, promoting development and coordinating projects in the fields of infrastructure, ecology, education, and human security. Conclusion The visit of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan to Japan was an important milestone in the development of Uzbek-Japanese relations and clearly demonstrated the transition of bilateral cooperation to a qualitatively new level. It confirmed that relations between Tashkent and Tokyo have gone beyond traditional economic and technical cooperation and have taken on the character of a comprehensive, strategically aligned partnership. Thus, it can be seen that Tokyo is confirming Uzbekistan's status as Japan's priority partner in Central Asia, as well as the desire of the parties to continue developing relations in a bilateral and multilateral format. The economic and humanitarian components of the visit enhanced its practical significance. Discussions and agreements on new areas of cooperation in investment, technology, education, and training, etc., demonstrate the parties' keen interest in developing bilateral cooperation, and the signing of documents worth more than $12 billion only confirms this fact. Overall, the results of the visit confirm that Uzbek-Japanese relations are increasingly based not on one-off initiatives, but on a long-term strategy of mutual trust and comprehensive measures. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has evolved into an essential economic foundation of the present global economy. The World Trade Report 2025 establishes that AI functions as a general-purpose technology which has the same transformative power as electricity and the steam engine did to reshape entire economic systems. The report achieves dual importance because it evaluates AI economic potential while warning about increased social disparities when nations pursue isolated development paths or fail to work together. The report demonstrates how AI technology will transform trade operations and create inclusive economic expansion through various mechanisms. AI technology reduces trade expenses through its ability to speed up customs operations and improve supply chain visibility and language translation services and provide digital tools for small and medium-sized enterprises to enter international markets. The joint study between the WTO and ICC revealed that 90% of businesses using AI technology achieved concrete advantages while 50% of respondents indicated AI systems improved their ability to handle trade-related risks. The research demonstrates how AI technology enables more businesses from developing nations to join international trade activities. Professionals forecast machine intelligence's ability to accelerate productivity growth globally by about 0.68 percentage points per annum, delivering a 37% increase of trade volumes around the world and a 13% development of global GDP by 2040. Of critical importance is the fact that information services – a cluster comprising cloud technologies, software products, and AI-based services – could expand trade by more than a 40% threshold, meaning digital economies and service-based growth models now possess a considerable competitive advantage. However, the report also identifies critical challenges. Artificial Intelligence may exacerbate divergence between advanced and developing economies if policy coordination is not properly coordinated. Those economies having larger incomes with better infrastructure, improved digital qualities, and better government, are set to gain by far. Conversely, low-income economies are set to be further isolated by their weak digital infrastructure and deficiency of technical know-how. Modelling by the WTO reveals high-income economies are set to achieve income gains of up to 14%, yet low-income economies may achieve a meagre 8% if they fail to invest first in digital technologies and implement inclusive policies. If low-income economies are, however, equal their counterparts in infrastructure and uptake of AI, their income growth potential becomes even larger theirs. Another crucial aspect addressed by the report pertains to the labor market and inequality. With regard to overall pay, it will rise, but it is also estimated to fall for highly and moderately qualified individuals, as their jobs are automatable more compared to less qualified individuals. It might alleviate income inequality but challenge middle-class workers, for which there is a strong need for retraining and adjustment of skills policies. The WTO report shows how a multilateral, rules-based trading system is essential for AI to help all. Such rules as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the TRIPS Agreement are already doing their job by cutting down equipment prices, simplifying services trade, and stimulating innovation. The WTO also devised the AI Trade Policy Openness Index (AI-TPOI), which shows large cross-country differences across service barriers, trade barriers, and data regulation. Remarkably, economies of low income are observed to be more open, but it primarily indicates a deficiency of adequate regulation and infrastructure necessary for adequate integration of AI. To make AI a genuine inclusive growth driver, it should also be accompanied by complementary policies. Today, a large majority of funding, programmes, and subsidies for AI for educational purposes remain concentrated in industrialized countries, hence increasing odds of AI benefits getting stuck in those economies. It is also necessary for trade rules and institutions of AI governance to collaborate. Regional trade policy initiatives are barely even venturing into addressing AI, and they comprise largely a group of advanced economies, encompassing barely a circle of urgent source of concern. The influence of artificial intelligence could exacerbate cross-country distances or induce more social cohesion – depending on what happens at this moment of time. The report also stresses how essential transparency, policy discourse, and upgrading capacities by initiatives such as Digital Trade for Africa and Women Exporters in the Digital Economy Fund (WEIDE) are. Those examples derive how it is achievable for inclusivity if supported by comprehensive policies and enough finances. It is clearly concluded that AI has the potential to enhance global trade, raise incomes, and expand access to economic growth. It, however, awaits necessary investment for digital infrastructure, human capital development, and sound global policy framework. World Trade Organization holds a critical position to guarantee a trade policy supports universal access to AI technologies, compensates for regulatory bifurcation, and engenders a sense of shared prosperity. The coming years will be decisive: whether AI divides or unites mankind rests on our common policy decisions and collaborative actions across nations. For Uzbekistan as the nation moves toward a more diverse and innovation-based economy, the results revealed in the WTO World Trade Report 2025 have significant relevance.  As Uzbekistan is in the process of digitalization, education reform, and in the accession process to the WTO, transformational potential of artificial intelligence in the areas of trade and production put Uzbekistan in a favorable position. With investing into digital infrastructure, data management, and education in line with AI will help Uzbekistan integrate into global value chains and strengthen the export competitiveness – especially in the textile, agricultural, and services sectors. Insights of the report align with Uzbekistan's national development goals that seek regional inequality mitigation and the strengthening of human capital. Uzbekistan will not only benefit from the center for smart, sustainable, and inclusive economic growth in Central Asia, but could also enhance its competencies through active participation in the multilateral trade system, complemented by the proactive adoption of AI-based trade facilitation policies. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.