By Zulkhumor Makhmudova, PhD student at UWED Since the second decade of the twenty-first century, regional cooperation and integration processes in Central Asia have entered a new stage of development. In particular, the transformation of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has intensified political dialogue among the regional states and contributed to the emergence of a new model of Central Asian integration. Simultaneously, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) has evolved from a predominantly cultural and humanitarian platform into an important institution for political, economic, and geostrategic cooperation. The parallel development of these two integration processes raises an important academic question: are the OTS and Central Asian integration competing projects, or do they represent complementary forms of political integration operating at different levels? Many scholars characterize Central Asian integration as a model of regional integration based on geographical proximity. Indeed, cooperation among the states of the region is rooted in common historical experiences, shared security challenges, environmental concerns, water resource management, and economic interdependence. Since 2018, the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia have become the principal platform for regional political dialogue. In particular, the adoption of the “Central Asia–2040” Development Concept at the Sixth Consultative Meeting held in Astana in 2024 demonstrated that political rapprochement among the regional states has entered a qualitatively new stage. This document outlines the long-term strategic directions of regional cooperation and aims to establish common approaches in political dialogue, economic cooperation, and security issues. However, a distinctive feature of Central Asian integration is that it remains only partially institutionalized. Unlike the European Union, ASEAN, or even the OTS, the region does not possess a permanent secretariat, parliament, or specialized integration bodies. Decision-making is largely based on political consultations among heads of state and consensus-building mechanisms. While this flexibility facilitates pragmatic cooperation, it simultaneously limits the institutional sustainability of the integration process. Therefore, at its current stage, Central Asian integration can be described primarily as a model of political consolidation and confidence-building among regional states. The Organization of Turkic States, by contrast, represents a different model of political integration. Whereas Central Asian integration is founded on geographical proximity, the OTS is based on shared history, language, culture, and Turkic identity. In this respect, the OTS constitutes a transregional rather than a purely regional integration model. The inclusion of Türkiye and Azerbaijan alongside the Central Asian member states significantly expands its geographical scope. Consequently, the OTS should be viewed not merely as a regional organization but as a broader political cooperation platform encompassing the Turkic world. An important question arises at this point: does the growing influence of the OTS pose a challenge to Central Asian integration? Russian, European, and American expert communities offer differing interpretations of the relationship between the OTS and Central Asian integration. Russian scholars such as V. Avatkov, A. Lukin, and others regard the strengthening of the OTS as one of the emerging regional cooperation formats in Eurasia. In their view, although the organization contributes to the institutionalization of cooperation among Turkic states, it is unlikely to become an alternative geopolitical center comparable to the Eurasian Economic Union or the Commonwealth of Independent States in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, some Russian analysts emphasize that the increasing political and economic activism of the OTS may enhance Türkiye’s influence in Central Asia. Western experts tend to adopt a different perspective. Research centers in the United States and Europe generally view the OTS as a platform that promotes regional cooperation and connectivity. According to this interpretation, the development of the organization strengthens the international political subjectivity of Central Asian states and reduces the risk of excessive dependence on any single geopolitical center. European scholars, in particular, often analyze the OTS within the context of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route and the Middle Corridor, considering it an important component of emerging geoeconomic linkages between Europe and Asia. At the same time, several American strategic research institutions regard Central Asian integration itself as an important factor in strengthening the political agency of regional states. From this perspective, the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia contribute to the formation of an independent regional political agenda. The OTS, in turn, is seen as an additional mechanism that supports and extends this process within the broader Turkic space. Consequently, most Western experts do not perceive the OTS and Central Asian integration as competing initiatives but rather as integration mechanisms operating at different levels. A comparative analysis of these approaches demonstrates that Russian experts tend to focus on the geopolitical implications of the OTS, whereas European and American scholars emphasize issues such as connectivity, economic diversification, and regional stability. Nevertheless, all three expert communities increasingly acknowledge that the relationship between the OTS and Central Asian integration cannot be adequately explained through a simple competition framework. First, the Central Asian member states of the OTS simultaneously remain active participants in regional consultative formats. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan play key roles both in Central Asian integration and in the OTS. If these two projects were genuinely competing with one another, states would eventually be compelled to prioritize one framework over the other. In practice, however, no such tendency has emerged. Second, the OTS and Central Asian integration perform distinct political functions. Central Asian integration is primarily aimed at ensuring regional stability, strengthening good-neighborly relations, and addressing common regional challenges. The OTS, by contrast, extends this cooperation into a broader geopolitical space. In other words, while Central Asian integration serves as a mechanism of internal political consolidation, the OTS functions as a platform for external political projection. This dynamic is particularly evident in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has consistently identified Central Asian cooperation as a strategic priority of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. At the same time, he has actively promoted initiatives within the framework of the OTS aimed at expanding the organization’s political and economic potential. This demonstrates that Uzbekistan does not perceive these two integration platforms as contradictory but rather as interconnected mechanisms serving complementary objectives. From the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, the OTS and Central Asian integration represent institutions operating at different levels for coordinating state interests. While the Central Asian framework contributes to confidence-building and cooperation within the region, the OTS strengthens this cooperation through institutional mechanisms and enhances its international visibility and influence. From a constructivist perspective, Central Asian integration reinforces a regional identity, whereas the OTS promotes the formation of a broader political community based on Turkic identity and shared historical memory. In conclusion, it is becoming increasingly difficult to explain the relationship between the Organization of Turkic States and Central Asian integration through the concept of competition. Contemporary political developments indicate that these two integration frameworks perform distinct but complementary functions. While Central Asian integration contributes to regional political solidarity and stability, the OTS transforms this solidarity into broader forms of political cooperation and international influence within the Turkic world. Therefore, rather than viewing them as alternative projects, it is more appropriate to regard them as interconnected and mutually reinforcing elements of a multi-level integration process. Such an interpretation most accurately reflects Uzbekistan’s national interests, its multi-vector foreign policy, and the broader dynamics of regional diplomacy. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Jasurbek Khamrakulov, UWED undergraduate, intern at IAIS The President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, paid an official visit to Tashkent on 17–18 June 2026 as the final stop of his Asia tour. The visit marked an important step in the evolution of Uzbek-German relations, taking place in the context of Uzbekistan’s pragmatic economic reforms and Germany’s growing interest in diversifying supply chains, expanding labor partnerships and green transition projects. Germany has been one of Uzbekistan’s most reliable European partners since diplomatic relations were established in 1992. Bilateral trade has recently reached approximately €1.2–1.4 billion, driven predominantly by German exports of machinery, vehicles and pharmaceuticals. More than 225 enterprises with German capital operate in Uzbekistan, illustrating the deepening of economic cooperation in private sector. Previous high-level engagements, including President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visits to Germany and Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Uzbekistan in 2024, laid the groundwork for the current stage of cooperation. The visit took place against the backdrop of the annual Tashkent International Investment Forum (TIIF), Uzbekistan’s premier platform for attracting foreign investment and promoting international economic cooperation. In this context, talks between Presidents Mirziyoyev and Steinmeier focused on expanding cooperation in trade, investment, education, labor mobility and sustainable development. The negotiations concluded with the adoption of a Joint Statementoutlining priorities for deeper bilateral engagement. A significant outcome of the visit was the launch of several joint economic initiatives. These included the establishment of a semi-knockdown assembly facility for Volkswagen vehicles in Tashkent, the construction of a logistics center in the Andijan region and the production of liquid household detergents. Together, these projects demonstrate a shift from political dialogue toward practical industrial cooperation and technology transfer. Moreover, human capital development and vocational education were also outlined as crucial areas on the agenda. The two sides agreed to expand cooperation in the training of railway specialists, a sphere of growing importance, as Uzbekistan seeks to modernize its transport infrastructure and enhance regional connectivity. Plans were also announced for the establishment of modern examination and certification centers, which will help improve professional qualifications and facilitate access to employment opportunities both within Uzbekistan and abroad. These initiatives demonstrate a strong emphasis placed on education, skills development and workforce mobility in Uzbek-German relations. The discussions also produced financial agreements designed to support Uzbekistan’s objectives in sustainable development. German institutions committed grants and concessional financing for projects focused on sustainable urban development, environmental management, and infrastructure modernization. These measures correspond with Uzbekistan’s reform policy in the context of Uzbekistan’s Strategy 2030 goals and Germany’s commitment to supporting green transition in partner countries. Beyond economic cooperation, the meeting also emphasized cultural ties through visits to the Islamic Civilisation Centre and German-operated enterprises in Uzbekistan, highlighting the broader scope of bilateral engagement. The broader significance of the event lies in its focus on implementation. The agreements reached in automotive manufacturing, logistics, vocational education and sustainable development provide specific mechanisms for expanding economic cooperation. At the same time, labor mobility and skills-development initiatives address Germany’s demand for qualified workers, creating legal ways for skilled labor mobility that can simultaneously address Germany's demographic challenges and contribute to workforce development in Uzbekistan. President Steinmeier’s visit indicates not only Germany’s growing interest in Central Asia, but also Uzbekistan’s strong image as a highly important partner for Europe. The successful implementation of the initiatives could move bilateral relations to a more strategic level. More importantly, it demonstrates how Uzbekistan is becoming Germany’s principal partner in Central Asia, creating the conditions for broader European engagement with the region. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

New dialogues with the US in the field of migration indicate the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in Uzbekistan's foreign labor policy. It is noteworthy that these partnerships are aimed not only at increasing labor exports, but also at training human capital based on international standards. The meetings held within the framework of the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) in New York demonstrated that Uzbekistan is becoming an increasingly active participant in the global migration agenda. In particular, the interpretation of migration not as an “economic necessity” but as an “investment in human capital” is an important conceptual change in modern migration policy. This approach means viewing labor migration not only as a means of earning foreign exchange or alleviating unemployment, but also as a mechanism for integrating national human resources into the requirements of the international labor market. The institutional partnerships being established with the US in the medical, transport, and agro-industrial sectors solve several strategic tasks. Firstly, by improving the professional and language competencies of migrants, competitive personnel are prepared. Secondly, the risks of illegal migration are reduced, as official and targeted recruitment channels are expanded. Thirdly, the issue of legal protection of Uzbek labor migrants is becoming the focus of bilateral dialogue. At the same time, this process also means the formation of the concept of “labor diplomacy” in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Today, the issue of migration is becoming not only a social or economic issue, but also a geopolitical and demographic factor. Opportunities to enter a highly qualified labor market such as the USA will allow Uzbekistan to integrate human resources into the global value chain. On May 18-19, Tashkent became an important forum for dialogue on international migration issues. More than 600 experts, officials and representatives of international organizations from about 50 countries of the world gathered in one place within the framework of the “Tashkent International Migration Forum - 2026”. The initiative to hold the International Migration Forum in Tashkent demonstrates the country's intention to become a regional platform for shaping migration policy in Central Asia. In his speech at the forum, the Director of the Migration Agency, Behzod Musaev, noted: “Today, the issue of migration has become not only a labor market or economic process, but also a matter of human dignity, trust and shared responsibility”. In today’s global environment, states are judged not only by borders, but also by trust, cooperation and respect for human dignity. Uzbekistan is trying to form a new migration policy based on this principle. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The participation of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Turkestan on May 15, 2026 marked a new stage in the evolution of Uzbekistan’s policy toward the OTS and demonstrated the country’s transition toward the active shaping of the organization’s technological agenda. Since 2020, Tashkent has consistently expanded its presence within the Turkic integration space, giving it an increasingly pragmatic dimension. The Samarkand Summit of 2022 consolidated Uzbekistan’s role as one of the centers for shaping the organization’s agenda. The Turkestan Summit of 2026 qualitatively advanced this trend, as Uzbekistan emerged as one of the architects of the OTS digital strategy. The initiatives proposed by Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the summit, including the “Digital Turkic Corridor”, the Turkic Cybersecurity Alliance, a satellite climate risk monitoring system, a joint venture fund, and others, despite their diversity, are united by a common logic. Uzbekistan advocates the gradual transformation of Turkic integration into a format of infrastructure-based, technologically equipped, and institutionally mature cooperation. It is noteworthy that each initiative is based on already existing national groundwork, including six billion dollars invested in data centers and the functioning “E-permit” system. Overall, the summit held in Turkestan demonstrated that within the framework of the OTS Uzbekistan is consistently implementing a principle characteristic of Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s foreign policy doctrine, namely multidimensional cooperation supported by concrete mechanisms and capable of transforming into sustainable regional development across the OTS space. As a result, the Organization is increasingly becoming a platform aimed at strengthening trade and economic, high-tech, digital, as well as cultural and humanitarian cooperation among the brotherly nations. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The city of Samarkand once again confirmed its status as one of the key centers of international political and economic dialogue. The holding of the 59th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank in early May 2026 became not only a major international event, but also a symbol of the growing authority of the New Uzbekistan on the global stage. The forum, held under the motto “Crossroads of Progress: Advancing a Connected Future for the Region,” brought together more than four thousand representatives from over one hundred countries, including international experts, government officials, financial institutions, and business circles. The scale of the event demonstrates the growing interest of the international community in the transformations taking place in Uzbekistan and in its role in shaping a new architecture of regional cooperation. Particular attention during the forum was drawn to the speech of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in which the key results of the country’s reform course were presented. In recent years, the economy of Uzbekistan has demonstrated stable growth dynamics. Since 2016, approximately 150 billion US dollars in foreign investment have been attracted to the country, the gross domestic product has nearly tripled, and the poverty level has significantly declined. These indicators reflect the systemic modernization of public administration, economic liberalization, and the expansion of international cooperation. Equally important is the qualitative development of cooperation between Uzbekistan and the Asian Development Bank. Over thirty years of cooperation, the partnership has evolved from separate infrastructure projects into a comprehensive strategic model of interaction. The total portfolio of completed and ongoing projects has reached nearly 16 billion US dollars, while the new Partnership Program “Uzbekistan and ADB until 2030,” signed in Samarkand, предусматривает financing amounting to 12.5 billion US dollars. An important feature of the current stage of cooperation is its focus on long term technological and infrastructure transformations. Among the strategic directions outlined by the President of Uzbekistan, special attention is given to digital transformation, the development of artificial intelligence, the transition to green energy, the development of critical mineral resources, and the strengthening of regional connectivity. Particular attention should be paid to the initiative on the development of artificial intelligence and the establishment of a regional coordination center for the “Digital Highway for Asia” program in the city of Tashkent. This demonstrates Uzbekistan’s aspiration not only to adapt to global technological changes, but also to become one of the centers shaping these processes in Central Asia. In the energy sector, Uzbekistan is already demonstrating significant progress. Large scale solar and wind power plants have been commissioned in the country, while the share of renewable energy sources continues to grow. Support from international financial institutions is gradually transforming Uzbekistan into one of the key participants in the emerging green energy space of Eurasia. The Samarkand forum demonstrated that modern Uzbekistan strives not only for internal development, but also for the formation of a sustainable model of regional cooperation based on connectivity, investment, and technological modernization. Historically, Samarkand was a place where the trade and cultural routes of the Great Silk Road intersected. Today, this city is once again becoming a space where ideas for the future development of the region are being shaped and mechanisms of a new generation of international partnership are being developed. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Mokhidil Nizamova, UWED Doctoral Student   The potential cessation of Kazakh oil transit via the “Friendship” pipeline toward the Schwedt refinery in Germany represents not merely a technical alteration of transportation routes, but rather a contraction of one of the key access channels to the European market. Against the backdrop of existing dependence on Russian infrastructure and mounting sanctions pressure, this development further increases the vulnerability of Kazakhstan’s export-oriented commodity model and translates into significant socio-economic risks for the population. Firstly, oil exports to the European Union are of strategic importance for Kazakhstan. The country ranks among the five largest oil suppliers to the EU, with transit flows predominantly routed through the territory of the Russian Federation. At present, transportation via Russian infrastructure remains more economically advantageous compared to alternative routes such as the “Middle Corridor” (the Trans-Caspian route through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye), which is more costly, capacity-constrained, and exposed to regional geopolitical risks. A potential suspension of deliveries through the “Friendship” route to Germany would reduce Kazakhstan’s flexibility in the European direction and may lead to a partial decline in export revenues if alternative capacities are not rapidly expanded. Secondly, anti-Russian sanctions have already created a competitive and risk-prone environment for Kazakhstan in the European market. On the one hand, pressure on Russian exports opens a market niche that Astana seeks to occupy; on the other hand, reliance on Russian infrastructure increasingly functions as a geopolitical and economic leverage instrument, including the potential suspension of Kazakh oil shipments via Russian transit routes. The targeted disruption of one export corridor namely deliveries to Germany via “Friendship” heightens uncertainty for investors and market participants, increases the need for transit risk insurance, and raises logistical costs. This may result in reduced investment inflows into the sector and increased fiscal pressure, ultimately constraining the state’s capacity to finance social programs, infrastructure development, and employment policies. Thirdly, the socio-economic effects on the population manifest through multiple transmission channels. The oil and gas sector accounts for a substantial share of export revenues and the tax base; therefore, any sustained reduction in export flows through economically efficient routes limits fiscal space for wage growth in the public sector, social transfers, and regional development programs. Kazakhstan exports nearly all of its crude oil production; consequently, export volumes and global prices directly influence macroeconomic dynamics and domestic demand. In the event of deteriorating external conditions, a slowdown in economic growth, rising unemployment in related sectors (logistics, services, infrastructure construction), and widening regional income disparities may occur. Fourthly, these adverse effects may be mitigated if Kazakhstan accelerates the diversification of export routes and the structural transformation of its oil sector. In this regard, the following directions may be identified: expansion of supplies via Caspian–Black Sea routes (CPC, BTC pipelines), development of domestic refining and petrochemical industries, as well as increased exports to regional markets (Central Asia, China), utilization of oil swap arrangements with the Russian Federation (oil deliveries to China in exchange for Russian volumes in Baltic ports). However, in the short term, none of the alternative routes are capable of fully substituting the existing infrastructural linkage with Russia. Accordingly, a suspension of transit via the “Friendship” pipeline would likely result in an adjustment period characterized by elevated costs and increased risks to revenues and employment. In conclusion, the scenario of suspending Kazakh oil transit via the “Friendship” pipeline would exert socio-economic impacts on Kazakhstan depending on the depth and duration of the restriction, the speed of alternative route expansion, and the effectiveness of state policy in supporting the industry and population. In the case of rapid adaptation and redirection of flows, the impact may be limited to short-term logistical and price shocks. In contrast, prolonged restrictions and weak diversification could lead to declining export revenues, increased fiscal pressure, and rising social tensions. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.