The participation of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Turkestan on May 15, 2026 marked a new stage in the evolution of Uzbekistan’s policy toward the OTS and demonstrated the country’s transition toward the active shaping of the organization’s technological agenda. Since 2020, Tashkent has consistently expanded its presence within the Turkic integration space, giving it an increasingly pragmatic dimension. The Samarkand Summit of 2022 consolidated Uzbekistan’s role as one of the centers for shaping the organization’s agenda. The Turkestan Summit of 2026 qualitatively advanced this trend, as Uzbekistan emerged as one of the architects of the OTS digital strategy. The initiatives proposed by Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the summit, including the “Digital Turkic Corridor”, the Turkic Cybersecurity Alliance, a satellite climate risk monitoring system, a joint venture fund, and others, despite their diversity, are united by a common logic. Uzbekistan advocates the gradual transformation of Turkic integration into a format of infrastructure-based, technologically equipped, and institutionally mature cooperation. It is noteworthy that each initiative is based on already existing national groundwork, including six billion dollars invested in data centers and the functioning “E-permit” system. Overall, the summit held in Turkestan demonstrated that within the framework of the OTS Uzbekistan is consistently implementing a principle characteristic of Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s foreign policy doctrine, namely multidimensional cooperation supported by concrete mechanisms and capable of transforming into sustainable regional development across the OTS space. As a result, the Organization is increasingly becoming a platform aimed at strengthening trade and economic, high-tech, digital, as well as cultural and humanitarian cooperation among the brotherly nations. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The city of Samarkand once again confirmed its status as one of the key centers of international political and economic dialogue. The holding of the 59th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank in early May 2026 became not only a major international event, but also a symbol of the growing authority of the New Uzbekistan on the global stage. The forum, held under the motto “Crossroads of Progress: Advancing a Connected Future for the Region,” brought together more than four thousand representatives from over one hundred countries, including international experts, government officials, financial institutions, and business circles. The scale of the event demonstrates the growing interest of the international community in the transformations taking place in Uzbekistan and in its role in shaping a new architecture of regional cooperation. Particular attention during the forum was drawn to the speech of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in which the key results of the country’s reform course were presented. In recent years, the economy of Uzbekistan has demonstrated stable growth dynamics. Since 2016, approximately 150 billion US dollars in foreign investment have been attracted to the country, the gross domestic product has nearly tripled, and the poverty level has significantly declined. These indicators reflect the systemic modernization of public administration, economic liberalization, and the expansion of international cooperation. Equally important is the qualitative development of cooperation between Uzbekistan and the Asian Development Bank. Over thirty years of cooperation, the partnership has evolved from separate infrastructure projects into a comprehensive strategic model of interaction. The total portfolio of completed and ongoing projects has reached nearly 16 billion US dollars, while the new Partnership Program “Uzbekistan and ADB until 2030,” signed in Samarkand, предусматривает financing amounting to 12.5 billion US dollars. An important feature of the current stage of cooperation is its focus on long term technological and infrastructure transformations. Among the strategic directions outlined by the President of Uzbekistan, special attention is given to digital transformation, the development of artificial intelligence, the transition to green energy, the development of critical mineral resources, and the strengthening of regional connectivity. Particular attention should be paid to the initiative on the development of artificial intelligence and the establishment of a regional coordination center for the “Digital Highway for Asia” program in the city of Tashkent. This demonstrates Uzbekistan’s aspiration not only to adapt to global technological changes, but also to become one of the centers shaping these processes in Central Asia. In the energy sector, Uzbekistan is already demonstrating significant progress. Large scale solar and wind power plants have been commissioned in the country, while the share of renewable energy sources continues to grow. Support from international financial institutions is gradually transforming Uzbekistan into one of the key participants in the emerging green energy space of Eurasia. The Samarkand forum demonstrated that modern Uzbekistan strives not only for internal development, but also for the formation of a sustainable model of regional cooperation based on connectivity, investment, and technological modernization. Historically, Samarkand was a place where the trade and cultural routes of the Great Silk Road intersected. Today, this city is once again becoming a space where ideas for the future development of the region are being shaped and mechanisms of a new generation of international partnership are being developed. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Mokhidil Nizamova, UWED Doctoral Student   The potential cessation of Kazakh oil transit via the “Friendship” pipeline toward the Schwedt refinery in Germany represents not merely a technical alteration of transportation routes, but rather a contraction of one of the key access channels to the European market. Against the backdrop of existing dependence on Russian infrastructure and mounting sanctions pressure, this development further increases the vulnerability of Kazakhstan’s export-oriented commodity model and translates into significant socio-economic risks for the population. Firstly, oil exports to the European Union are of strategic importance for Kazakhstan. The country ranks among the five largest oil suppliers to the EU, with transit flows predominantly routed through the territory of the Russian Federation. At present, transportation via Russian infrastructure remains more economically advantageous compared to alternative routes such as the “Middle Corridor” (the Trans-Caspian route through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye), which is more costly, capacity-constrained, and exposed to regional geopolitical risks. A potential suspension of deliveries through the “Friendship” route to Germany would reduce Kazakhstan’s flexibility in the European direction and may lead to a partial decline in export revenues if alternative capacities are not rapidly expanded. Secondly, anti-Russian sanctions have already created a competitive and risk-prone environment for Kazakhstan in the European market. On the one hand, pressure on Russian exports opens a market niche that Astana seeks to occupy; on the other hand, reliance on Russian infrastructure increasingly functions as a geopolitical and economic leverage instrument, including the potential suspension of Kazakh oil shipments via Russian transit routes. The targeted disruption of one export corridor namely deliveries to Germany via “Friendship” heightens uncertainty for investors and market participants, increases the need for transit risk insurance, and raises logistical costs. This may result in reduced investment inflows into the sector and increased fiscal pressure, ultimately constraining the state’s capacity to finance social programs, infrastructure development, and employment policies. Thirdly, the socio-economic effects on the population manifest through multiple transmission channels. The oil and gas sector accounts for a substantial share of export revenues and the tax base; therefore, any sustained reduction in export flows through economically efficient routes limits fiscal space for wage growth in the public sector, social transfers, and regional development programs. Kazakhstan exports nearly all of its crude oil production; consequently, export volumes and global prices directly influence macroeconomic dynamics and domestic demand. In the event of deteriorating external conditions, a slowdown in economic growth, rising unemployment in related sectors (logistics, services, infrastructure construction), and widening regional income disparities may occur. Fourthly, these adverse effects may be mitigated if Kazakhstan accelerates the diversification of export routes and the structural transformation of its oil sector. In this regard, the following directions may be identified: expansion of supplies via Caspian–Black Sea routes (CPC, BTC pipelines), development of domestic refining and petrochemical industries, as well as increased exports to regional markets (Central Asia, China), utilization of oil swap arrangements with the Russian Federation (oil deliveries to China in exchange for Russian volumes in Baltic ports). However, in the short term, none of the alternative routes are capable of fully substituting the existing infrastructural linkage with Russia. Accordingly, a suspension of transit via the “Friendship” pipeline would likely result in an adjustment period characterized by elevated costs and increased risks to revenues and employment. In conclusion, the scenario of suspending Kazakh oil transit via the “Friendship” pipeline would exert socio-economic impacts on Kazakhstan depending on the depth and duration of the restriction, the speed of alternative route expansion, and the effectiveness of state policy in supporting the industry and population. In the case of rapid adaptation and redirection of flows, the impact may be limited to short-term logistical and price shocks. In contrast, prolonged restrictions and weak diversification could lead to declining export revenues, increased fiscal pressure, and rising social tensions. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In April 2026, the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev took part in such key events in Astana as the Regional Environmental Summit under the motto “A Shared Vision of a Sustainable Future” and the meeting of the Council of Heads of State – founders of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). The outcomes of these forums demonstrated a fundamentally new level of Uzbekistan’s environmental positioning on the regional stage. The relevance is undeniable, which is confirmed by the scale of the common threat. Temperatures in Central Asia are rising twice as fast as the global average, nearly one third of glaciers have already been lost, and more than 80 million hectares of land have undergone degradation. Against this background, Uzbekistan proposed such concrete initiatives as the creation of an interstate consortium “Clean Air of Central Asia”, the establishment of a “Green Trade Corridor” with preferential customs regimes for eco goods, a unified investment portfolio of climate projects, the development of the “Red Book of Central Asia”, as well as the holding of the World Youth Climate Forum in Uzbekistan in 2027. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that President Mirziyoyev was officially elected President of IFAS for the period 2027-2029. This is a real responsibility for the fate of millions of people whose lives are inextricably linked with the Aral Sea basin. The priorities of the upcoming chairmanship include the modernization of the Fund’s structure, the introduction of mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of its programs, and the expansion of financing instruments through the platform of the UN Multi Partner Trust Fund. The achievements presented in Astana are supported by measurable results. Thus, water saving technologies have covered 60% of Uzbekistan’s irrigated lands, annual water savings have exceeded 10 billion cubic meters, within the framework of the “Yashil makon” project about one billion trees have been planted, and the commitments under the Paris Agreement on emission reduction have been fulfilled ahead of schedule. In general, the Astana Summit clearly demonstrated that Uzbekistan is consistently translating environmental declarations into concrete political and technological solutions. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

  By Doston Tukhliev, UWED undergraduate, IAIS intern   In early April 2026, the US domestic agenda once again centered on the immigration issue, which under the Donald Trump administration has definitively transformed from a standard public policy area into a key instrument of domestic political mobilization and administrative pressure on opposition-leaning jurisdictions. The trigger for the new wave of discussions was a statementby the US Department of Homeland Security regarding the possible suspension of international passenger processing at several airports located in so-called “sanctuary cities” if local authorities continue to refuse full cooperation with federal immigration agencies. This measure goes far beyond the specialized immigration sphere, affecting trade, tourism, the investment climate, and the very architecture of relations between Washington and local governments. It is worth noting that the current US Secretary of Homeland Security, Markwayne Mullin, who was appointed in March 2026, previously served as a Senator from Oklahoma and as a member of the US House of Representatives. He is considered one of the consistent proponents of the Trump administration’s hardline immigration stance and advocates for stronger federal control over border and homeland security. As a reminder, the term “sanctuary cities” in the United States refers to cities and counties where local authorities, to varying degrees, restrict the sharing of migrant data with federal agencies, refuse to hold detainees solely on immigration detainers without a court order, or generally minimize local police involvement in enforcing federal immigration laws. Essentially, the US administration is demonstrating its readiness to shift its confrontation with sanctuary cities from the political and legal realm to direct infrastructural pressure. While previously the main levers were lawsuits, threats of grant restrictions, and public political criticism, the possibility of using international airports as a tool of coercion is now under discussion. Given that such jurisdictions include the country’s largest urban centers, such as Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, this step could not only complicate international travel but also deal a blow to the business activity of cities that traditionally serve as foundational hubs of the American economy. Adding particular significance to these developments is the fact that the current escalation is unfolding parallel to the ongoing dispute over birthright citizenship. In early April, the US Supreme Court heard arguments in a case related to the Trump administration’s attempt to restrict the automatic granting of citizenship to children born on US soil to parents lacking legal permanent status. Even during the hearings, many justices displayed a skeptical attitude toward the White House’s position, representing a rare example of serious institutional resistance to the administration’s hardline immigration policy. Thus, the immigration agenda in the US is increasingly becoming an arena for a simultaneous clash among the executive branch, the judiciary, the states, and municipalities. In other words, the current dispute over US immigration policy is developing along three interconnected lines. First, the White House seeks to maximize the federal center’s authority over immigration control and force local authorities to operate under strict administrative subordination. Second, the judicial system is attempting to determine whether such steps comply with the US Constitution and whether they exceed presidential authority. Third, sanctuary cities that limit cooperation with federal immigration agencies are resisting Washington’s attempts to subordinate local politics. As a result, the immigration issue in the US is turning into more than just a debate about borders and illegal immigration; it is becoming a broader conflict over the balance of power among the federal government, the courts, and local self-governance. Against this backdrop, it should be noted that the conflict over sanctuary cities is deeply rooted not only in law but also in politics and ideology. For the Republican administration, such cities are a symbol of resistance to the federal agenda, an expression of a liberal governance model, and an example of local elites seeking to limit the central government’s authority in matters that Washington views as pertaining to sovereignty and national security. This is precisely why the immigration issue is being integrated into the White House’s broader strategy of strengthening the vertical executive power and demonstrating the center’s ability to enforce uniform federal standards – even on territories that possess significant political and economic resources. Notably, this approach alters the very nature of American federalism. While previous disputes between the center and local governments over immigration were largely protracted legal battles revolving around competing jurisdictions, the executive branch is now increasingly and openly signaling its readiness to impose material costs on those who disagree. In this sense, immigration policy ceases to be solely a matter of border control and alien status, turning instead into an instrument of administrative pressure against political opponents. This course objectively increases the risk that the struggle over immigration will increasingly be accompanied by the paralysis of certain elements of transportation and administrative infrastructure. Importantly, the White House’s hardline approach is largely driven by domestic political calculations. The immigration issue remains one of the most mobilizing topics for Donald Trump’s electoral base, meaning any tightening of policy can be used as clear proof that the administration is fulfilling its promises to “restore order”. At the same time, excessive pressure on major cities and transportation hubs carries obvious risks for the US itself, jeopardizing international ties, tourism flows, and the business reputation of American metropolises. As a result, the White House secures short-term political dividends while simultaneously laying the groundwork for growing domestic institutional turbulence. In a broader sense, these developments indicate that current American immigration policy is becoming less about combating illegal immigration per se. Rather, it is an attempt to use the immigration issue to reshape the balance of power within the US political system itself, strengthening the federal center by weakening local autonomy. If this trajectory continues, the United States risks facing a further deepening of the conflict among the White House, the courts, and the country’s largest cities, with the immigration agenda definitively becoming one of the primary triggers of a domestic political crisis. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Zulkhayo Nishanova, Assistant Teacher at the Department of International Economics of UWED The escalation of the military-political situation in the Middle East, including the conflict surrounding Iran and the temporary restriction of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, has had a significant impact on global energy and food markets. The Strait of Hormuz is a key route in global energy logistics, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil supply and more than 30% of liquefied natural gas pass. Amid transit restrictions in late February–March 2026, the global oil market experienced a sharp price surge: Brent crude prices increased by 60–64% over a short period, exceeding USD 110 per barrel. This price increase was accompanied by high volatility and the emergence of a so-called “war premium” in energy prices. As of April 8, 2026, partial stabilization of the situation is being observed. The United States and Iran, with mediation by Pakistan, reached an agreement on a two-week ceasefire, conditional upon ensuring safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which Israel also joined. The Republic of Uzbekistan officially supported this decision, noting its importance as a step toward de-escalation and a transition to a political and diplomatic resolution. Global markets responded promptly to these developments: Brent crude prices declined to around USD 94 per barrel, while natural gas prices in Europe fell by approximately 18.5% to USD 518 per thousand cubic meters. This indicates a reduction in the geopolitical premium and a high sensitivity of prices to changes in the external political environment. At the same time, the increase in prices of precious metals reflects the persistence of uncertainty and cautious behavior among investors. The rise in energy prices during the escalation period had a multiplicative effect on the global economy, primarily through increased transportation, logistics, and production costs. This has already been reflected in global food price dynamics. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the global food price index increased by 2.4% in March 2026 compared to the previous month. The highest growth was recorded in certain categories: vegetable oils rose by 5.1%, sugar by 7.2%, and wheat by 4.3%. Additional pressure is being generated through the fertilizer market: urea prices exceeded USD 700 per ton, increasing by approximately 70% since the beginning of the year. The global mineral fertilizer price index rose by 38 points over the month, reaching 183 (with a base value of 100 in 2010). Considering that a significant share of fertilizer supplies passes through the Persian Gulf region, logistical constraints are increasing agricultural production costs and creating risks of delayed food price growth. The economy of the Republic of Uzbekistan is also, to some extent, exposed to these external shocks. According to official statistics, annual inflation in March 2026 amounted to 7.1%, with the main contribution coming from the food sector (accounting for 76.2% of the increase in the consumer price index). Monthly growth in food prices reached 1.2%, significantly exceeding the dynamics of non-food goods (0.3%) and services (0.2%). In particular, price increases have been observed for meat (up to 15% year-on-year), eggs (17%), as well as sugar and fish. Food inflation stands at approximately 5.6% on an annual basis, reflecting the continued pressure from external factors. External shocks are transmitted to the domestic economy through the fuel channel. Rising prices for oil and petroleum products lead to higher transportation and production costs, creating a chain effect of increasing prices for goods and services. In addition, rising fertilizer prices may affect the cost of agricultural production in subsequent production cycles. At the same time, the current situation is characterized by mixed trends. On the one hand, the achieved ceasefire and the initiation of negotiations create conditions for short-term stabilization of energy prices and a reduction in inflationary pressure. If the ceasefire is maintained and a stable political and diplomatic dialogue is established, further declines in oil and gas prices and gradual normalization of logistics chains are possible. Under this scenario, inflation in the Republic of Uzbekistan may remain within the range of 7–7.5% by the end of 2026. On the other hand, the temporary nature of the ceasefire (two weeks) implies the persistence of high risks of renewed escalation. In the event of a breakdown of the agreement and a resumption of the conflict, there is a likelihood of oil prices rising again to USD 110–130 per barrel, further increases in fertilizer prices, and intensified inflationary pressure, which could accelerate inflation to 8% or higher. Thus, the escalation in the Middle East has had a significant impact on global markets and the economy of Uzbekistan. However, current signs of de-escalation create a window of opportunity for stabilizing the macroeconomic situation. In these conditions, the implementation of a balanced economic policy aimed at reducing vulnerability to external shocks becomes crucial. To minimize negative impacts and capitalize on emerging opportunities, it is advisable to: in the short term — strengthen monitoring of fuel and socially significant food prices, ensure readiness to apply targeted regulatory measures, and utilize state reserves and commodity intervention mechanisms when necessary; in the medium term — intensify diversification of energy and fertilizer supply sources, develop alternative logistics routes, and expand support measures for agriculture, including subsidizing fuel and fertilizer costs; in the long term — accelerate the development of alternative energy, improve energy efficiency of the economy, reduce dependence on imported resources, and increase domestic food production and processing capacity. In addition, it is recommended to take advantage of the current stabilization of global prices to build strategic reserves of energy resources and food at more favorable prices, thereby enhancing the resilience of the economy to potential future external shocks. Overall, despite the existing risks, the current situation creates preconditions for stabilizing price dynamics and strengthening the macroeconomic stability of the Republic of Uzbekistan, provided that comprehensive and proactive policy measures are implemented in a timely manner. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.