Commentary

outputs_in

Commentary

19 April, 2025

China’s Response to Donald Trump’s Tariff Policy

In recent months, we have witnessed the adoption of unprecedented tariff policies by the US to many countries that have trade surplus with the US, especially against China. Based on Donald Trump’s campaign speeches, it was known that he would adopt a tough trade policy towards Beijing when he came to power. The predictions came true, but the scale of the 145% duty hike on all Chinese goods, as well as the simultaneous adoption of mirror measures by the Chinese government with a 125% duty hike on U.S. goods, came as a surprise to many. By taking retaliatory measures, China has made it clear that it is not going to give in to threats from the US and will “fight to the end” in this trade war.   In turn, the White House threatened China with additional duty hikes of up to 245% for retaliating to Chinese actions. The Wall Street Journal reported that US President Donald Trump plans to convince more than 70 countries to isolate China’s economy in exchange for lifting duties on imports.   In response, Beijing has begun a gradual reorientation towards the markets of the EU, ASEAN and the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative countries. Moreover, China has successfully shifted its production capacity to Southeast Asia and Mexico as part of its diversification of trade ties. Also in the face of high duties, Beijing has sent official letters to the governments of major nations affected by Washington’s duty hikes. In particular, active negotiations are being held with the eastern allies of the United States – South Korea, Japan and Australia, and from April 13 to 17 Xi Jinping’s tour of Southeast Asian countries – Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia – took place.   Along with this, attention should be drawn to the lack of willingness of Trump and Xi to make mutual compromises. At the beginning of Trump’s second term, attempts by Chinese representatives to establish direct channels of communication with Washington were unsuccessful, and the new White House administration is in no hurry to initiate negotiations with Beijing. The lack of stable communication channels between the leaders and their proxies creates a risk of further escalation of U.S.-China disagreements. It is not excluded that the subsequent steps of the parties will be mirror-like in nature, which will only complicate the prospects of launching full-fledged high-level negotiations.   Thus, taking into account the combined share of the U.S. and China in the world economy (about 43%), the scale and depth of the trade confrontation between the world’s two largest economies is reaching an unprecedented level. This could cause serious tensions in global trade with potentially negative consequences for the entire world economy, especially in terms of supply chain resilience. Given the new challenges, many countries are seeking to diversify their foreign trade relations, which leads to the revision and reformatting of the structure of world trade.   Analysts believe that the introduction of high tariffs will deal a particularly heavy blow to the economies of middle-income countries, whose sustainability depends largely on export revenues. In the near future, such countries may face capital outflow and lower growth rates. However, the prolonged trade friction between the U.S. and China also opens up new opportunities, such as attracting investment from both sides, creating joint production facilities, and developing alternative transportation and logistics routes.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

outputs_in

Commentary

19 April, 2025

Russia and the Taliban: Political Rapprochement

On April 17, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation suspended the ban on the activities of the Taliban movement within the country. By this decision, Russia officially removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations. Moscow’s motivations may lie in the following factors:   First, under conditions of international sanctions, Russia is prioritizing the development of relations with countries of the Global South, where Afghanistan plays a key role as a transit territory.    Second, Afghanistan may become a new export market for Russia. The two sides plan to increase their trade turnover to $3 billion this year.    Third, the Russian Federation is interested in Afghanistan’s substantial reserves of natural resources, including lithium, copper, and rare earth elements.    Fourth, Moscow may view the Taliban as an important partner in the fight against the terrorist network ISIS-Khorasan, especially following the events at Crocus City Hall.    Fifth, the political rapprochement between the Russian Federation and the Taliban may serve as a response to U.S. actions regarding Afghanistan, particularly the visit of former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad to Kabul in March of this year.    Sixth, closer ties with Afghanistan may represent a component of the Russian Federation’s grand strategy on the Eurasian continent, within which Afghanistan is seen as a state of key strategic importance.   Russia’s removal of the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations sets a precedent that may influence the positions of other states, particularly those currently adopting a wait-and-see approach. Specifically, Iran, Pakistan, and India may intensify their partnerships with Afghanistan. Moscow is signaling its willingness to engage in dialogue with a de jure unrecognized government, which could encourage other countries to pursue more flexible policies toward Kabul. In the long term, this development has the potential to weaken the Taliban’s international isolation.   Overall, the Russian Federation’s policy toward Afghanistan may, in certain respects, align with the interests of the Central Asian countries. One of the most significant elements in this regard is Moscow’s foreign policy perspective, which views Afghanistan as part of Central Asia. Russia could act as a partner in shaping a unified regional strategy toward Afghanistan.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

outputs_in

Commentary

19 April, 2025

Restrictions on U.S. Aid and Civil Society Development in Uzbekistan

The policy of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump demonstrates a steady trend to reduce funding for international initiatives. As part of this strategy, the U.S. side is reconsidering the scope and direction of foreign aid, which is already having a tangible impact on specific programs, including projects in Uzbekistan. In particular, a $2.5 million U.S. State Department grant intended to stimulate civic engagement in the republic was recently canceled.   The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) plays a significant role in the structure of U.S. support. Since the opening of the USAID office in Tashkent in 2020, there has been a significant increase in its participation in the distribution of U.S. aid. By 2024, USAID's share is estimated to have increased from 24.2% to 73.5%, indicating an institutional strengthening of their presence in the country. However, in January 2025, Donald Trump issued an executive order temporarily suspending all foreign aid from USAID for 90 days to review programs for consistency with “American values” and U.S. national foreign policy priorities.   Such measures fit into the broader context of a return to isolationist attitudes and a revision of the principles of resource allocation in favor of domestic objectives. In this sense, the current steps of the administration cannot be considered unexpected: they are a continuation of Trump's pre-election rhetoric, which implies cutting government spending, strengthening control over international obligations and ideological filtering of foreign policy initiatives.   Nevertheless, the impact of these decisions on the development of civil society in Uzbekistan appears limited. The “New Uzbekistan” concept, proclaimed in 2021, consistently emphasizes institutionalization of public initiatives, strengthening the role of non-state organizations and expanding mechanisms for civic participation. In this context, international support, including U.S. support, acts more as an additional, but not a determining factor.   Consequently, even with the reduction of external grant funding, the development of civil society institutions in Uzbekistan remains internally sustainable, relying on the political will of the leadership and public demand for modernization.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

outputs_in

Commentary

19 April, 2025

Meloni and Trump: A Conservative Alliance in an Era of European Turbulence

Meloni’s visit to Washington on April 17, despite the wariness of some European capitals and concerns about the erosion of EU unity, received formal support from the European Commission as a possible step toward de-escalating tensions in U.S.-EU trade relations. At the White House, Meloni delivered an ideological manifesto in favor of “restoring the greatness of the West”, emphasizing the fight against “woke ideology” as a unifying platform between Europe and the United States. She stressed that she was not talking about geography, but about a “civilizational alliance” that must be strengthened.   Despite the encouraging backdrop, her mission was complicated by several factors at once, from Rome’s limited foreign policy mandate to the growing distrust at home and among EU partners of Rome’s independent actions on the international stage. Warnings from Paris about the risk of undermining pan-European consolidation in the face of growing external pressure were particularly critical.   The Italian prime minister faced a triple challenge: to defend Italy’s economic interests, to soften the US confrontational course towards the EU and to preserve the unity of the transatlantic space. At the same time, she had to maneuver between loyalty to Trump, who sees her as a potential strategic ally, and the need to consider the interests and sensitivities of European partners who criticize Rome’s unilateral actions.   Notably, Meloni was the only EU leader invited to Trump’s inauguration, and her meeting with Vice President J.D. Vance in Rome on April 18 serves as an indicator of the U.S. establishment’s special attention to Italy. The content of her talks with Vance included discussions on the prospects for a bilateral trade deal and the search for an early resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, reflecting the new administration’s priorities for Southern Europe: an emphasis on pragmatic economic cooperation and a desire to reevaluate American involvement in European conflicts through the lens of U.S. national interests.   Vance, on his last visit to Europe in January, criticized the bloc, accusing its leaders of failing to uphold free speech or stop illegal migration. Now arriving at the Vatican on the eve of Easter, he also held talks with the Holy See’s secretary of state, Cardinal Pietro Parolin. According to some observers, this could mean the strengthening of the “conservative axis” within the new transatlantic political alliance.   Given the $126 billion in bilateral trade and the U.S. share in Italian exports (about 10% of the total), Italy remains one of the most dependent on the U.S. market in the EU. The projected decline in GDP by 0.4-0.6% in the next two years is accompanied by the risk of losing over 50,000 jobs. Pessimism is also increasing on the financial markets: the Italian stock index showed the worst dynamics among the developed Western economies immediately after April 2. This makes the situation particularly tense: interdependence, often referred to as the basis of an “unshakeable alliance”, is turning into leverage – both for Trump and for Meloni herself.   With a public debt exceeding 136% of GDP, low growth rates and high dependence on European funding for the Recovery Plan that will end by 2026, Italy lacks sufficient economic autonomy to influence the parameters of transatlantic trade alone. An aging population, growing social spending commitments, and limited fiscal space further narrow the room for maneuver.   Meloni herself, a former representative of the far-right wing of Italian politics with roots in the neo-fascist movement, has managed to transform herself into a leader seeking international legitimacy and pragmatism without losing touch with radical right-wing rhetoric. This approach, dubbed “pragmatic radicalism” in expert circles, allows her to combine a nationalist agenda at the domestic level with a moderate foreign policy line emphasizing transatlanticism and military support for Ukraine.   Under these circumstances, Meloni is not so much imposing a “European line” on the United States as trying to convince Trump that a unified Europe can be a strategic asset for the United States rather than a threat. The concept of “zero tariffs” on manufactured goods could be not only a symbol of renewed cooperation, but also a pragmatic basis for restarting a negotiating architecture that would show the effectiveness of dialoguing with a single bloc rather than a multitude of national governments.   Although Meloni is not formally authorized to negotiate on behalf of the union, some European capitals view her mission as a tactical reconnaissance that could outline a framework for future dialogue. As Alberto Rizzi, a researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations, notes, Meloni could play the role of a “scout”, laying the groundwork for subsequent formal negotiations.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

outputs_in

Commentary

11 April, 2025

Trans-Afghan Railroad: Will Uzbekistan Develop the Kandahar Route?

In her commentary, Nargiza Umarova emphasizes the growing multidirectionality and uncertainty in Uzbekistan’s strategy for the development of trans-Afghan transport corridors. Noting the intensification of work on the feasibility study of two routes – Kabul and Kandahar – she emphasizes that Russia’s participation in the project may change the balance of previous agreements, especially with such partners as the UAE and Qatar. The expert points out that the previously prioritized Kabul route is now facing competition from the alternative Kandahar corridor, which is also being actively promoted by Turkmenistan and potentially integrated into Iranian infrastructure projects.   The Kandahar route is seen as a profitable alternative to connect Central Asia not only to Pakistan, but also to Iran and, more broadly, to India through the port of Chabahar. Ms. Umarova emphasizes that geopolitical reality – instability in Pakistan, complications in Afghan-Pakistani relations, as well as Moscow’s ambitions to expand the North-South ITC – may induce Tashkent to reconsider its transportation priorities. At the same time, as the expert emphasizes, the lack of transparency in the financing of the new project and the Uzbek side's silence on its further steps create an atmosphere of uncertainty in which every diplomatic move acquires strategic significance.   Read the English version on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.