On April 17, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation suspended the ban on the activities of the Taliban movement within the country. By this decision, Russia officially removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations. Moscow’s motivations may lie in the following factors:   First, under conditions of international sanctions, Russia is prioritizing the development of relations with countries of the Global South, where Afghanistan plays a key role as a transit territory.    Second, Afghanistan may become a new export market for Russia. The two sides plan to increase their trade turnover to $3 billion this year.    Third, the Russian Federation is interested in Afghanistan’s substantial reserves of natural resources, including lithium, copper, and rare earth elements.    Fourth, Moscow may view the Taliban as an important partner in the fight against the terrorist network ISIS-Khorasan, especially following the events at Crocus City Hall.    Fifth, the political rapprochement between the Russian Federation and the Taliban may serve as a response to U.S. actions regarding Afghanistan, particularly the visit of former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad to Kabul in March of this year.    Sixth, closer ties with Afghanistan may represent a component of the Russian Federation’s grand strategy on the Eurasian continent, within which Afghanistan is seen as a state of key strategic importance.   Russia’s removal of the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations sets a precedent that may influence the positions of other states, particularly those currently adopting a wait-and-see approach. Specifically, Iran, Pakistan, and India may intensify their partnerships with Afghanistan. Moscow is signaling its willingness to engage in dialogue with a de jure unrecognized government, which could encourage other countries to pursue more flexible policies toward Kabul. In the long term, this development has the potential to weaken the Taliban’s international isolation.   Overall, the Russian Federation’s policy toward Afghanistan may, in certain respects, align with the interests of the Central Asian countries. One of the most significant elements in this regard is Moscow’s foreign policy perspective, which views Afghanistan as part of Central Asia. Russia could act as a partner in shaping a unified regional strategy toward Afghanistan.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The policy of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump demonstrates a steady trend to reduce funding for international initiatives. As part of this strategy, the U.S. side is reconsidering the scope and direction of foreign aid, which is already having a tangible impact on specific programs, including projects in Uzbekistan. In particular, a $2.5 million U.S. State Department grant intended to stimulate civic engagement in the republic was recently canceled.   The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) plays a significant role in the structure of U.S. support. Since the opening of the USAID office in Tashkent in 2020, there has been a significant increase in its participation in the distribution of U.S. aid. By 2024, USAID's share is estimated to have increased from 24.2% to 73.5%, indicating an institutional strengthening of their presence in the country. However, in January 2025, Donald Trump issued an executive order temporarily suspending all foreign aid from USAID for 90 days to review programs for consistency with “American values” and U.S. national foreign policy priorities.   Such measures fit into the broader context of a return to isolationist attitudes and a revision of the principles of resource allocation in favor of domestic objectives. In this sense, the current steps of the administration cannot be considered unexpected: they are a continuation of Trump's pre-election rhetoric, which implies cutting government spending, strengthening control over international obligations and ideological filtering of foreign policy initiatives.   Nevertheless, the impact of these decisions on the development of civil society in Uzbekistan appears limited. The “New Uzbekistan” concept, proclaimed in 2021, consistently emphasizes institutionalization of public initiatives, strengthening the role of non-state organizations and expanding mechanisms for civic participation. In this context, international support, including U.S. support, acts more as an additional, but not a determining factor.   Consequently, even with the reduction of external grant funding, the development of civil society institutions in Uzbekistan remains internally sustainable, relying on the political will of the leadership and public demand for modernization.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Meloni’s visit to Washington on April 17, despite the wariness of some European capitals and concerns about the erosion of EU unity, received formal support from the European Commission as a possible step toward de-escalating tensions in U.S.-EU trade relations. At the White House, Meloni delivered an ideological manifesto in favor of “restoring the greatness of the West”, emphasizing the fight against “woke ideology” as a unifying platform between Europe and the United States. She stressed that she was not talking about geography, but about a “civilizational alliance” that must be strengthened.   Despite the encouraging backdrop, her mission was complicated by several factors at once, from Rome’s limited foreign policy mandate to the growing distrust at home and among EU partners of Rome’s independent actions on the international stage. Warnings from Paris about the risk of undermining pan-European consolidation in the face of growing external pressure were particularly critical.   The Italian prime minister faced a triple challenge: to defend Italy’s economic interests, to soften the US confrontational course towards the EU and to preserve the unity of the transatlantic space. At the same time, she had to maneuver between loyalty to Trump, who sees her as a potential strategic ally, and the need to consider the interests and sensitivities of European partners who criticize Rome’s unilateral actions.   Notably, Meloni was the only EU leader invited to Trump’s inauguration, and her meeting with Vice President J.D. Vance in Rome on April 18 serves as an indicator of the U.S. establishment’s special attention to Italy. The content of her talks with Vance included discussions on the prospects for a bilateral trade deal and the search for an early resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, reflecting the new administration’s priorities for Southern Europe: an emphasis on pragmatic economic cooperation and a desire to reevaluate American involvement in European conflicts through the lens of U.S. national interests.   Vance, on his last visit to Europe in January, criticized the bloc, accusing its leaders of failing to uphold free speech or stop illegal migration. Now arriving at the Vatican on the eve of Easter, he also held talks with the Holy See’s secretary of state, Cardinal Pietro Parolin. According to some observers, this could mean the strengthening of the “conservative axis” within the new transatlantic political alliance.   Given the $126 billion in bilateral trade and the U.S. share in Italian exports (about 10% of the total), Italy remains one of the most dependent on the U.S. market in the EU. The projected decline in GDP by 0.4-0.6% in the next two years is accompanied by the risk of losing over 50,000 jobs. Pessimism is also increasing on the financial markets: the Italian stock index showed the worst dynamics among the developed Western economies immediately after April 2. This makes the situation particularly tense: interdependence, often referred to as the basis of an “unshakeable alliance”, is turning into leverage – both for Trump and for Meloni herself.   With a public debt exceeding 136% of GDP, low growth rates and high dependence on European funding for the Recovery Plan that will end by 2026, Italy lacks sufficient economic autonomy to influence the parameters of transatlantic trade alone. An aging population, growing social spending commitments, and limited fiscal space further narrow the room for maneuver.   Meloni herself, a former representative of the far-right wing of Italian politics with roots in the neo-fascist movement, has managed to transform herself into a leader seeking international legitimacy and pragmatism without losing touch with radical right-wing rhetoric. This approach, dubbed “pragmatic radicalism” in expert circles, allows her to combine a nationalist agenda at the domestic level with a moderate foreign policy line emphasizing transatlanticism and military support for Ukraine.   Under these circumstances, Meloni is not so much imposing a “European line” on the United States as trying to convince Trump that a unified Europe can be a strategic asset for the United States rather than a threat. The concept of “zero tariffs” on manufactured goods could be not only a symbol of renewed cooperation, but also a pragmatic basis for restarting a negotiating architecture that would show the effectiveness of dialoguing with a single bloc rather than a multitude of national governments.   Although Meloni is not formally authorized to negotiate on behalf of the union, some European capitals view her mission as a tactical reconnaissance that could outline a framework for future dialogue. As Alberto Rizzi, a researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations, notes, Meloni could play the role of a “scout”, laying the groundwork for subsequent formal negotiations.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her commentary, Nargiza Umarova emphasizes the growing multidirectionality and uncertainty in Uzbekistan’s strategy for the development of trans-Afghan transport corridors. Noting the intensification of work on the feasibility study of two routes – Kabul and Kandahar – she emphasizes that Russia’s participation in the project may change the balance of previous agreements, especially with such partners as the UAE and Qatar. The expert points out that the previously prioritized Kabul route is now facing competition from the alternative Kandahar corridor, which is also being actively promoted by Turkmenistan and potentially integrated into Iranian infrastructure projects.   The Kandahar route is seen as a profitable alternative to connect Central Asia not only to Pakistan, but also to Iran and, more broadly, to India through the port of Chabahar. Ms. Umarova emphasizes that geopolitical reality – instability in Pakistan, complications in Afghan-Pakistani relations, as well as Moscow’s ambitions to expand the North-South ITC – may induce Tashkent to reconsider its transportation priorities. At the same time, as the expert emphasizes, the lack of transparency in the financing of the new project and the Uzbek side's silence on its further steps create an atmosphere of uncertainty in which every diplomatic move acquires strategic significance.   Read the English version on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The recent speech delivered by U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference — calling for a fundamental reassessment of global and European security arrangements — has catalysed a moment of reflection within Europe regarding its own strategic posture. European institutions, approaches, and value frameworks will retain their continuity; however, their future development will increasingly unfold with the prospect of limited — or minimal — U.S. involvement in mind. In this context, a recalibration of Europe’s approach towards China, India, Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus appears increasingly likely. There is a particular interest in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which can play the role of a bridge between East and West. The geopolitical location of these regions makes them very attractive for the European Union, which was confirmed during the First European Union – Central Asia Summit, which ended on April 4 in Samarkand with the signing of the Joint Declaration.   Summit Outcomes. The comprehensive mobilisation of the EU’s bureaucratic apparatus ensured that the summit’s outcomes were elevated to a structured and systemic level of cooperation. A formalised framework for bilateral engagement was established, including regular meetings of foreign ministers, working groups, and high-level platforms.   Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to deepening economic and investment ties. The European Union currently stands as Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner after China. As noted by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, trade turnover between the two regions reached €54 billion in 2024. Significantly, an agreement was reached to establish a regional office of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Uzbekistan — a move reflecting the substantial volume of European investments in regional initiatives, which already account for 40% of all foreign investment in Central Asia. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, also announced the launch of a new €12 billion Global Gateway investment package, aimed at supporting cooperation in infrastructure, digital connectivity, water and energy sectors, and critical raw materials. The EU also reaffirmed its intention to continue implementing its 2019 Strategy for Central Asia in key areas such as the green transition, climate change mitigation, energy, and sustainable agriculture.   In addition, the EU expressed its readiness to continue its Global Strategy for Central Asia (2019) in key areas such as green transition, climate change, energy, sustainable agriculture, as well as increased support for education programs through Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, Digital Education, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions.   In the domain of security, both sides outlined plans to intensify collaboration on counter-terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and organised crime, while also advancing border and migration management through platforms such as LEICA and BOMCA.   The Eurasian Highway. The Summit reiterated the particular importance of developing a network of extensive logistics routes and supply chains against the backdrop of ever deepening global fragmentation and geopolitical instability in key transportation hubs of international trade. In this regard, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), better known as the Middle Corridor, connecting China with Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, is of greatest interest to the EU. European institutions have already pledged €10 billion to support it during an investment forum in Brussels in January 2024. Global Gateway is therefore recognized as the main instrument of infrastructure cooperation between the EU and Central Asia. Thus, trade is no longer merely a pursuit of the shortest or least costly routes — it is an urgent quest for the most reliable, resilient, and politically sustainable supply chains that can endure uncertainty and reinforce strategic autonomy.   Region-to-Region Cooperation. The summit further affirmed the EU’s comprehensive support for regional integration in Central Asia. In recent years, Brussels has consistently advanced region-wide initiatives rather than focusing exclusively on bilateral channels. Alongside robust bilateral engagements that underpin effective collaboration, Central Asian states are also being encouraged to look beyond the C5+1 format and explore strategic partnerships with Azerbaijan. Such cooperation could pave the way for the EU to craft an alternative to its traditional Eastern Partnership — namely, a new Trans-Caspian Partnership.   This evolution necessitates more tailored engagement with subregions of Europe that play vital roles in transit and energy connectivity. Central Asia already maintains solid linkages with the Baltic states, which have proven themselves to be dynamic economic and investment partners. These established ties may serve as a foundation for expanding relations with the Nordic countries, thereby supporting external economic diversification and fostering a more multi-tiered political dialogue.   The Afghan Dilemma. In the broader context of global transformations, the European Union may soon revisit its policy towards Afghanistan. While the EU has exercised caution in dealing with Kabul, its strategic ally — the United States — has begun to signal a tentative re-engagement, evidenced by the informal visit to Afghanistan by former U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad in March 2025. Nevertheless, Brussels remains wary of moving too quickly, for several reasons.   First, the EU is sensitive to reputational risks drawing criticism from the democratic world.   Second, a renewed relationship with Kabul could lead to internal discourse shifts within the EU, given the electorate’s profound divergence from the Taliban on matters of civil society and governance.   Third, within Europe’s current strategic calculus, Afghanistan is often perceived as peripheral to core continental interests. However, if Europe were to place greater emphasis on deeper cooperation with Central Asia, Afghanistan could acquire newfound relevance as a strategic node.   In this regard, the EU may prefer a mediated approach, engaging Afghanistan indirectly through trusted regional partners. Uzbekistan stands out as a compelling intermediary. European policymakers recognise Tashkent’s pivotal role in Afghan affairs, particularly in the shared interest of fostering Afghanistan’s development through economic integration. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s proposal — voiced at the European Union – Central Asia Summit — to involve Afghanistan in regional economic processes closely aligns with the EU’s vision. Such initiatives may well draw the attention of European financial institutions towards investment opportunities in Afghanistan, representing a vital step towards enhancing the country’s economic stability.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The commentary is prepared under the supervision of Mushtariy Usmonova The commentary, authored by Parvina Kuchmurodova, a senior student at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy and an intern at the Centre for European Studies at IAIS, provides a comparative analysis of Estonia and Finland’s digitalization strategies. She examines how these two nations have emerged as global leaders in digital governance, each adopting distinct yet highly effective approaches to integrating digital technologies into public administration, business, and daily life. While Estonia has pioneered a radical digital transformation with its e-government infrastructure (such as the X-Road data exchange system and e-Residency programme), Finland has prioritized digital accessibility, robust ICT infrastructure, and strong business integration.   The analysis highlights key differences: Estonia’s focus on comprehensive digital public services and its global outreach through knowledge-sharing initiatives, versus Finland’s emphasis on digital literacy, broadband accessibility, and business-friendly digital policies. The author also explores how the two countries collaborate, particularly through shared cross-border digital frameworks, showcasing a commitment to advancing digitalization beyond national borders. By contrasting these models, the commentary offers insights into how different national contexts shape digital policies, providing valuable lessons for other countries seeking to enhance their digital governance and economic modernization.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.