By Sanjarbek Tilavoldiev   On June 30 and July 1 of this year, another meeting on the Afghan issue took place in the Qatari capital, Doha, under the auspices of the United Nations. It is worth noting that the Taliban government officially participated in the Doha-format meetings for the second time. This indicates the Taliban’s intention to expand its diplomatic capabilities and defend its interests on the international stage. Whereas in the past, representatives of the movement were wary of criticism at such platforms, they are now approaching it constructively, seeking solutions and engaging in international dialogue.   The main focus of the meetings held in the Doha format was the issue of drug cultivation in Afghanistan, particularly opium. For many years, opium cultivation had been one of the country’s primary sources of income. However, following the Taliban’s rise to power, this figure began to decline significantly. According to statistics, after the Taliban assumed control, the area of land used for opium poppy cultivation decreased from 232,000 hectares to 7,382 hectares by 2024. In order to further reduce these figures, the authorities have resorted to the use of force when necessary. For example, in 2025, several clashes occurred between Taliban representatives and local residents in the Badakhshan province. This demonstrates that the Taliban seeks to avoid being associated on the international stage with a state involved in opium production, as such a reputation hinders its international recognition and limits the inflow of humanitarian aid and foreign investment into Afghanistan. For this reason, the movement is making efforts to combat this issue and aims to present itself as an open government ready for constructive dialogue.   In addition, within the framework of the UN-led process, the United States has maintained silence regarding the Taliban, while a number of Western countries continue to express criticism toward the movement. This, in turn, is prompting the Taliban to strengthen its relations with Eastern countries. On June 30, 2025, alongside its participation in the Doha meetings, Taliban representatives held talks with Pakistan, China, and Russia, during which important regional political issues were discussed. Such diplomatic engagement contributes to the enhancement of the Taliban’s foreign policy capacity. Notably, on July 3, 2025, shortly after the Doha talks, Russia officially recognized the Taliban government for the first time. This may lead to a further shift in Afghanistan’s orientation toward Eastern countries, should the West continue its policy of non-recognition.   Overall, the Taliban government took part in these meetings with the aim of strengthening its authority on the international stage. In this context, it sought to present itself not as a state associated with drug trafficking, but as an actor ready for meaningful diplomatic engagement. This, in turn, may accelerate the process of international recognition of the Taliban government by a larger number of states and contribute to the consolidation of its position in regional politics.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Fayoziddin Bakhriddinov   It is becoming increasingly clear that Tashkent is taking a more pragmatic approach in its relations with war-torn, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, which remains unrecognized by much of the international community. This pragmatism is most evident in the growing economic and social ties between the border regions. Uzbekistan sees Afghanistan not only as a key player in regional security but also as a potential strategic transit corridor that could provide access to South Asian markets in the future. Furthermore, Afghanistan may serve as a promising market for Uzbekistan’s products and goods. For this reason, Tashkent is attempting to prioritize economic interests even against the backdrop of ongoing challenges from Afghanistan.   Uzbekistan, which has openly embraced the stance that “Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia”, seeks to gain significant benefits through broader cooperation in areas such as transboundary water resources, counterterrorism, transportation connectivity, and trade integration. Additionally, in his April 1, 2024 interview, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized that stabilizing Afghanistan is in the shared interest of both Central Asia and the European Union. The Taliban administration received this message warmly, expressing its intention to pursue a policy based on “sincere neighborhood and mutual interests” with Uzbekistan - a clear example of the current diplomatic momentum.   Therefore, Tashkent’s pragmatism appears to be rooted in the idea that, if ideological considerations can temporarily be set aside, broad economic cooperation with Taliban-led Afghanistan could lead to deep integration between the two neighbors. A practical step in realizing this vision was the opening of the Termez International Trade Center in Surkhandarya in 2022, which has significantly boosted freight traffic between the two countries. It’s worth noting that in 2024, the total volume of trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan reached $1.1 billion, of whichover $1 billion consisted of Uzbek exports to Afghanistan. In March, both nations agreed to increase this trade volume to $3 billion, indicating that the majority of bilateral trade is driven by Uzbekistan’s exports.   However, in June 2025, local media and other sources reported that the Taliban's so-called “morality police” banned Afghan women under the age of 40 from working in the Termez Free Economic Zone. The ban, reportedly lacking clear legal basis, especially targeted women working without a male guardian (“mahram”). As a result, the purchasing power within the zone might in future see substantial decline, should not only women entrepreneurs but also female consumers became scarce. Naturally, such measures pose a serious risk to bilateral trade relations and Tashkent’s strategy of fostering regional stability through economic engagement.   While Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach to Afghanistan is driven by economic interests and the ambition to strengthen its regional transit role, maintaining this approach will depend heavily on how the Taliban’s ideological stance evolves in future. If the ideology continues gaining dominance in the country, it could not only weaken Uzbekistan-Afghanistan relations but also undermine broader regional integration efforts that Tashkent is pursuing today.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Uzbekistan’s current context in global politics is often described as ‘post-Soviet.’ This label seems fitting when walking around Tashkent’s boulevards, exploring the subway, and witnessing the architecture. Additionally, in the sphere of soft power, the Russians have left a lasting legacy in Uzbekistan, specifically in the use of the Russian language and the popularity of Russian music. Nevertheless, in other nations described as post-Socialist, notably Russia and states in Central and Eastern Europe, the transition to market economy with the collapse of the USSR was rapid and chaotic, especially in the decade following the collapse. This is contrasted by Uzbekistan, which has only recently begun to implement economic privatization. After the death of Uzbekistan’s first president Islom Karimov in 2016, his successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, rapidly began to change the country’s economic structure. It can even be argued in certain areas like education that Uzbekistan’s recent policy goals are closer to transitions that have taken place in East-Asian nations, particularly Korea and Singapore, as opposed to Eastern European ones like Hungary or Russia.   Although never part of the Soviet Union, Hungary is a nation that experienced rapid economic changes in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Now an official observer state of the Organization of Turkic States, and enjoying friendly diplomatic relations with most Turkic states, Hungary provides a fitting case study for comparison with Uzbekistan’s current orientation as a post-Socialist nation. Although exhibiting present-day parallels, the direction of the two states’ trajectories differ. While Hungary rapidly privatized and as a result destabilized politically during the 1990s, as did most eastern European states including Russia, and then reconsolidated under prime minister Viktor Orbán, Uzbekistan is only at the beginning of a steadier and more gradual privatization, having experienced decades of centralized consolidation.   Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán welcomes president Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Budapest, May 20th, 2025, (Hungarian government photography)   Both Hungary and Uzbekistan manifest a strong emphasis on patriotism, which can be seen as a natural post-Soviet instinct against Russification and assimilation in both states. Regarding the education sector, the Hungarian Diaspora Scholarship program provides full scholarships to diaspora students at top domestic institutions, with the conditions that the scholars will learn Hungarian and engage in a project that serves their local diaspora community within 2 years after the completion of the scholarship. The goal of the program is to foster patriotic spirit and mitigate the effects of brain drain from Hungary. The El-yurt Umidi program in Uzbekistan, established in 2018 by the new president, takes the inverse solution to the same issue. By subsidizing study abroad, it attracts knowledge and experience to Uzbekistan from abroad, with the condition that scholarship recipients work for a minimum of 5 years (2 years for masters) after the completion of the program within Uzbekistan. The National Scholarship in Hungary also has a similar condition of working in Hungary for the same length of time that studies lasted under the scholarship, but the program only applies to domestic universities. What makes Uzbekistan’s policy different is its emphasis on sending students abroad, as opposed to simply consolidating them domestically.   Driving through any city in Uzbekistan, it is impossible not to notice the abundance of private learning centres, specifically for the English language, IELTS, and SAT. Consulting jobs in these areas offer incredibly lucrative opportunities for youth looking to start a business. Due to the legalization of private education in 2017, and thanks to the power of the internet and of social media in bringing success stories to students all over the country, there is sweeping demand for foreign education in Uzbekistan. Programs like El-yurt Umidi, and government subsidies into private education support the supply that is naturally growing to meet this demand. In 2024, the government announced support for paying back interest on loans that were taken out with the purpose of constructing new private educational institutions. According to this decision, the government will also cover 50% of the utility costs for newly constructed private school buildings. These drivers of privatization related to education have little in common with the experiences of other post-Socialist nations in Eastern Europe and are specific to the current social media age. The world was not so globalized or connected when Hungary was going through its transition economy 30 years ago. Further, Uzbekistan is still at an early phase of its development where education is often the only way out of poverty and low-wage labour for many families, further pulling demand.   In almost any economic sector, the ‘post-Soviet’ label fits Uzbekistan’s situation well. Its inheritance of a narrow-minded Soviet economy built entirely on cotton production, its fight against economic informalization, and its emphasis on independence and patriotism are just a few examples. Processes specific to education however are more recent, and parallels with other eastern bloc countries like Hungary become harder to draw. East-Asian nations like Singapore or Korea become relevant parallels. Singapore went from being a poor nation with high illiteracy when it declared independence to being one of the most advanced economies in the world, within the span of a few decades. Outside of its obvious geographical advantage, Singapore’s strong education system was central to its ascension, and made it the hub for technology and innovation that it is today. Singapore’s public education system is already very rigorous. Edusave accounts provide scholarships to students based on merit, incentivising competition. In 1985, like Uzbekistan recently, Singapore legalized independent schools with supplemental curricula. Like Uzbekistan, this move was largely inspired by educational programs from the US and UK.   The aim of Singapore’s policy at the time was the same as Uzbekistan’s today – to stimulate innovation in education. Although the difference between a public and private secondary school in Uzbekistan remains heavily noticeable, public opinion is optimistic. Instead of worrying about growing inequalities, students and teachers alike, in both types of schools, believe that such investments in human capital can only result in an upward spiral of innovation in the long-run for the country. Meritocratic competition in Uzbekistan has also been enlarged with the establishment of the Presidential School system in 2019. These schools are highly selective, with each school selecting only 24 students every year out of thousands of applications. Only one presidential school exists for each region of Uzbekistan, and students compete for top-tier education that is fully subsidized by the government and provides the Cambridge curriculum.   Ultimately, in cutting-edge and fundamental sectors of Uzbekistan’s economic development, most notably education, the ‘post-Soviet’ category in which Uzbekistan is so often placed is becoming almost completely irrelevant, save for the understanding of background context. Orbán’s Hungary, often described as being driven by post-Socialist dynamics in the sphere of politics, experienced a rapid period of privatization, market liberalization, and ultimately democratization in the early 1990s. Prime minister Orbán’s position as a result remains fragile, even after extensive reconsolidation and state capture, due to Hungary’s largely democratic culture. Uzbekistan’s more gradual and state supported trajectory provides a degree of stability, but political life must continue to advance at the same pace as economic and social life. Politics and economics are not separate disciplines, and where they are most interconnected is education. Education will bring new ideas into Uzbekistan, and the Uzbek government must continue to rejuvenate itself if long-term development is to be successful. As a parallel with South Korea would show, Uzbekistan is on the right path, but flexibility will be key to its long-term success.   Bibliography “About the Hungarian Diaspora Scholarship.” Hungarian Diaspora Scholarship, March 25, 2025. https://diasporascholarship.hu/en/about/. “Areas of Cooperation: Economic Cooperation.” Organizations of Turkic States, 2024. https://turkicstates.org/en/areas-of-cooperation-detail/2-economic-cooperation.   Cheang, Bryan, Bacchus Barua, Jake Fuss, Paige MacPherson, and Mackenzie Moir. “Meritocracy, Personal Responsibility, and Encouraging Investment: Lessons from Singapore’s Economic Growth Miracle.” Edited by Stephen Globerman. Realities of Socialism, Fraser Institute, February 2024, 83–106. https://doi.org/https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/meritocracy-personal-responsibility-and-encouraging-investment-lessons-from-Singapore.pdf. Education, the driving force for the development of Korea: Land of the Morning Calm develops into a prominent player in the global economy. Accessed June 3, 2025. http://koreaneducentreinuk.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/Education_the-driving-force-for-the-development-of-Korea.pdf “Encouraging Measures to Open Private Schools Determined.” Kun.uz, February 2, 2024. https://kun.uz/en/news/2024/02/02/encouraging-measures-to-open-private-schools-determined.   “Monitoring Procedure: Approved by Resolution No. 2 of the Board of Trustees of the ‘El-Yurt Umidi’ Foundation.” eyuf.uz, April 22, 2021. https://eyuf.uz/site/view-page?id=134. “Tájékoztatók a Magyar Állami Ösztöndíjjal Kapcsolatban.” Oktatási Hivatal, December 21, 2022. https://www.oktatas.hu/magyar-allami-osztondij/altalanos_tajekoztatok.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The year 2025 marked a new chapter in Russia-Afghanistan relations. On April 17, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation officially removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations. In May and June, business forums were held in Kazan and St. Petersburg, resulting in expanded access for Afghan citizens to the Russian labor market. On July 1, Taliban representative Gul Hassan arrived in Moscow and formally assumed his duties in the capacity of ambassador.   According to Zamir Kabulov, Special Representative of the President of Russia for Afghanistan, Moscow intends to host the seventh round of consultations within the framework of the “Moscow Format” this autumn. The Russian side has stated that “Afghanistan will participate as a full-fledged member”. High-level statements of this kind, along with the formal accreditation of an Afghan diplomat with ambassadorial rank, may be interpreted as an implicit signal of the beginning of a recognition process – positioning the Taliban as a legitimate actor in international relations.   Russia’s rapprochement with the Taliban is largely driven by trade and economic considerations. However, security imperatives are also playing a key role. As part of its counterterrorism efforts, the Russian government has announced its readiness to supply arms to the Afghan side. This development introduces a new dimension to bilateral engagement – arms trade – which has long been a distinctive feature of Russia’s foreign policy toolkit. In the long run, such cooperation may evolve into a broader partnership in the defense-industrial sphere, thereby strengthening bilateral ties and reorienting Kabul’s geopolitical focus more decisively toward Moscow.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The signing of a bilateral agreement between the Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan and China Energy Engineering Corporation Limited (CEEC) in June 2025 represents a pivotal development in the energy diplomacy of the South Caucasus. Held in the Chinese city of Ningbo during the official visit of Azerbaijan’s Minister of Energy Parviz Shahbazov, the agreement formalizes a comprehensive strategic partnership in the field of green energy and signals a shift in regional energy architecture with broader implications for Eurasia, including Central Asia.   The agreement encompasses multiple dimensions of renewable energy cooperation. It includes provisions for joint electricity system planning and grid analysis, the implementation of solar, hydro, and offshore wind energy projects, and the establishment of a Joint Research Center for Green Energy. One of the most strategic components of the agreement is the development of so-called "green energy interconnectors" - transnational infrastructure intended to facilitate the export and integration of renewable energy across borders.   The document outlines long-term plans for the expansion of Azerbaijan’s renewable energy capacity through 2030 and beyond. Planned projects include utility-scale solar power plants in the southern regions, offshore wind farms in the Caspian Sea, and technical advisory services provided by China’s EPPEI (Electric Power Planning & Engineering Institute). These services will include energy system modeling, grid integration simulations, load forecasting, and assessments of system stability and resilience.   The significance of this agreement is both practical and symbolic. For Azerbaijan, a country traditionally reliant on oil and gas exports, this partnership indicates a strategic move toward energy diversification and sustainable development. For China, it represents another step in its global strategy of exporting green infrastructure, technology, and energy planning capabilities under the Belt and Road Initiative framework.   In this context, the potential implications for Central Asia merit close attention. The region faces similar challenges: heavy dependence on conventional energy sources coupled with growing commitments to green transition and renewable integration. Countries like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have already articulated ambitious targets for renewable energy deployment. Azerbaijan’s model of securing Chinese capital and expertise could serve as a viable blueprint for Central Asian economies seeking technological modernization in their energy sectors. Of particular interest is the knowledge-based component of the agreement - the establishment of a joint research center and engagement of Chinese technical institutes in national grid planning. This highlights China’s role not merely as an investor, but also as a provider of analytical and institutional capacity-building. Such components could be adapted in Central Asia, where institutional frameworks for energy transition remain in development.   The geographical dimension further reinforces this dynamic. Azerbaijan’s proximity to the Caspian Sea and its borders with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan open up the possibility of future trans-Caspian energy corridors - including "green" ones. These could complement or even compete with existing regional initiatives such as the Central Asian Power System (CAPS), positioning China as a systemic actor in the post-Soviet renewable transformation.   Finally, it is important to situate this agreement within the broader context of the global energy transition. Countries with high solar irradiance, untapped wind potential, and small hydropower resources are emerging as critical nodes in the reconfiguration of the global energy map. Azerbaijan is among the first post-Soviet states to propose a comprehensive and technologically advanced partnership with China in this sphere. Central Asian states, if they maintain political stability and openness to international capital and technical cooperation, may replicate and adapt this approach to fit their own energy security strategies.   In conclusion, the Azerbaijan–China renewable energy agreement should be viewed not only as a national development strategy, but also as a potential accelerator of regional transformation. For Central Asia, the agreement offers a case study in integrating renewable energy, upgrading grid infrastructure, and leveraging international expertise - all essential components for a resilient and diversified energy future.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague took place at a pivotal moment for the Euro-Atlantic community. Set against the backdrop of renewed geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and rising concerns about long-term strategic cohesion within the alliance, the summit offered an important opportunity to reassess priorities and commitments. The presence of U.S. President Donald Trump was especially influential, shaping both the outcomes and the tone of the discussions, particularly on defense spending and transatlantic security arrangements.   Among the most consequential developments was the formal adoption of a new target of allocating 5% of GDP toward defense and related expenditures by 2035. This marked a substantial increase from the previous 2% guideline and appeared to reflect a convergence between longstanding American calls for greater burden-sharing and European recognition of an evolving security environment. Although framed as a collective response to persistent threats, the target also underscores ongoing disparities in capabilities and expectations among alliance members. President Trump, for his part, presented the agreement as a significant success for the United States and emphasized the importance of directing the additional resources toward military procurement, preferably through domestic production.   The U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, conducted shortly before the summit, drew considerable attention. While President Trump characterized the operation as a decisive strategic achievement, early assessments from intelligence sources and international partners were more cautious. Differing interpretations of the operation’s effectiveness illustrated the challenges of aligning military actions with multilateral consensus. At the same time, the broader diplomatic implications of the Israel-Iran ceasefire remained unresolved, even as leaders expressed support for continued efforts to de-escalate tensions and re-engage in negotiation processes.   The summit also reflected the role of personal diplomacy in alliance dynamics. Remarks made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, including a moment of referring to Trump as a paternal figure in negotiations, were widely interpreted as part of a broader effort to maintain constructive engagement with the United States. While such gestures may have helped to reinforce cohesion during the summit, they also raised questions about the degree to which institutional decisions are increasingly shaped by the personalities and preferences of individual leaders.   Ukraine’s position within NATO discussions remained highly prominent. President Volodymyr Zelensky offered a direct warning that Russia could target a NATO member state within the next five years, urging the alliance to accelerate its commitments. While NATO leaders reiterated their support for Ukraine, including increased defense assistance and industrial cooperation, the issue of formal membership remained unresolved. Diverging views, particularly from Hungary, highlighted the persistent ambivalence within the alliance over Ukraine’s future integration and the broader question of enlargement.   The economic dimension of the summit was not ignored either. French President Emmanuel Macron expressed concern over the potential contradiction between increased defense spending and rising trade frictions across the Atlantic. His remarks reflected a growing awareness that military commitments must be supported by stable economic foundations and mutual trust among allies. Macron’s intervention thus served as a reminder of the interdependence between strategic, political, and economic dimensions of transatlantic relations.   The Dutch role in hosting the summit further illustrated the importance of diplomatic symbolism. Through careful planning and a personalized approach to engagement, including high-level hospitality extended to President Trump, the Netherlands aimed to reinforce the alliance’s unity and demonstrate its continued relevance. These efforts may have contributed to the relatively smooth adoption of summit declarations, even amid underlying tensions on key policy issues.   In sum, the 2025 NATO Summit demonstrated that while institutional commitments can be reaffirmed and policy goals realigned, the strategic autonomy of the alliance remains contested. NATO today is adjusting to a security landscape shaped as much by institutional priorities as by the personalities steering them. Whether this transformation strengthens or destabilizes the alliance in the long term remains an open question.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.