Rustam Makhmudov’s analytical note for the Valdai Club considers the Middle East as a key link in the Taliban’s foreign policy legitimacy strategy after 2021. The author’s central hypothesis is that the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf are not only important partners in their own right, but also a potential “bridge” to the West and international institutions. The movement is demonstrating consistency and flexibility in this direction: from restoring and expanding official contacts with the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to building a working agenda with Iran, despite the difficult legacy of the 1990s. Significant milestones include the UAE’s acceptance of the Taliban ambassador’s credentials, a visit to Abu Dhabi by a delegation led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the participation of the de facto “Afghan authorities” in the Doha meeting under the auspices of the UN, and the resumption of the Saudi embassy in Kabul; In the Iranian vector, the accreditation of a Taliban diplomat and the visit of the Iranian foreign minister in 2025.
The second contour is a narrative strategy addressed to the “Arab street” and the Iranian audience. It involves systematic criticism of Israel’s actions and appeals to the language of international law (sovereignty, territorial integrity) to assert the Taliban as a “responsible” actor. Mahmoudov emphasizes the ritualistic nature of this rhetoric: it is rarely translated into practical steps, which is explained by the desire not to burn bridges with the West and the traditional elites of the Gulf. At the same time, the Taliban are investing in their image as “pragmatists” by emphasizing the fight against ISIS-Khorasan and the drug trade — elements that are relevant to the international security agenda.
The third layer is the economic game surrounding Afghanistan’s transit position and natural resources. The author notes China’s increased activity in oil and gas and mining, interest in lithium, and the growing involvement of regional players. Iran is becoming a leader in trade (with turnover growing to $3.197 billion in 2024 with minimal Afghan exports), the UAE is taking over the management of airports through GAAC, and Dubai is acting as a financial and business hub for the Afghan elite. Qatar is a potential investor in the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar highway (~$5 billion) and the Jabal Siraj cement project ($220 million). These initiatives are designed to strengthen the Taliban’s case for recognition by promising regional connectivity and economic returns.
The main constraint is the West’s position on women’s rights, which forms a “ceiling” for recognition and restrains even pragmatic Gulf regimes. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have publicly signaled to the Taliban that bans on women’s education and employment are unacceptable. The internal duality of the Taliban (Kandahar as the conservative core versus the more pragmatic Kabul) is freezing liberalization. Nevertheless, Mahmoudov sees a window of opportunity: Russia’s recognition of the IEA on July 3, 2025, and potentially further steps by Iran and China, could trigger a “chain reaction” and push Gulf players and some Western capitals to reassess the costs of non-recognition. In such a scenario, women’s rights risk being relegated to the level of rhetoric if the balance of power and transit-resource incentives outweigh the reputational costs.
Read on the website of the Valdai International Discussion Club
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
