By Bositkhon Islamov , UWED undergraduate, Research Assistant at IAIS
Context and the logic of Iran's position. The talks at Bürgenstock are under threat of collapse because of the acute interdependence of two conflicts: the Iran–US war, which is being brought to a close by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and Israel's ongoing military campaign in Lebanon. Tehran has advanced a settlement in Lebanon as a de facto condition for continuing the dialogue, a condition also reflected in the 14-point Memorandum, the very first point of which states the need for a ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon. It was precisely Israel's attacks on Lebanon after the signing of the MoU between Iran and the US that caused the negotiation process to be pushed back from Friday the 19th to Sunday, 21 June.
Tellingly, as far back as February 2026 — two days before the American–Israeli strikes began — Iran proposed in Geneva to lower uranium enrichment from 60% to 3.67%, that is, it accepted the key nuclear demand in advance and without military pressure. The condition it maintained was precisely regional security.
The grounds for linking the two conflicts reinforce one another. Strategically: Hezbollah and the Lebanese theatre constitute the first echelon of Iran's system of asymmetric deterrence; the Israeli occupation of one-fifth of Lebanon means the degradation of that system in parallel with negotiations on the lifting of sanctions. Domestically: ultraconservatives are demanding the resumption of parliament's work (suspended since the start of the war) in order to block an unfavourable deal; the Lebanese demand allows the negotiating team to frame the MoU as a victory rather than a concession.
Israeli attacks as an instrument of disruption. Since 2 March 2026, Israeli strikes on Lebanon have claimed at least 4,057 lives, with 12,121 wounded. On 20 June — the day the Swiss talks opened — a further 32 people were killed in a single day. A key precedent: on 19 June the US and the Gulf states agreed to a ceasefire effective from 16:00 local time. According to accounts from the ground, after the appointed hour Israeli air strikes and artillery shelling of southern Lebanon continued — at least 12 violations were recorded; Lebanon's National News Agency (NNA) reported two people killed after the truce had been announced.
Tel Aviv's tactics are transparent: the Israeli military-political leadership, in the persons of Netanyahu and Katz,personally sanctioned the ceasefire, yet without withdrawing troops from the country's territory, thereby using Lebanon as a platform for pressuring Iranian decision-making and derailing the peace talks. At the same time, Israel is formally not a party to the negotiations, which relieves it of direct responsibility for their possible collapse.
In response, on 20 June the IRGC announced the reinstatement of restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, pointing directly to “Israel's crimes in Lebanon” and the US failure to honour its ceasefire commitments. On the same day 55 commercial vessels transited the strait, and the spokesman for US Central Command – CENTCOM, Captain Tim Hawkins stated that Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz.
Risks of the Iranian position. A former senior State Department official, Mark Kimmitt, bluntly characterised Iran's tactic as an “extremely unwise” and risky move, in which the entanglement of two distinct conflicts may complicate the negotiating process, since “Iran cannot control what Hezbollah will do, and the United States does not control what Israel will do. Washington and Tel Aviv have overlapping but not identical interests”.
By tying negotiating progress to the behaviour of Israel, which neither the US nor Iran fully controls, Tehran has handed Tel Aviv a de facto veto over the Iran–US deal. Any new Israeli operation — deliberate or accidental — is capable of nullifying days of negotiating progress. The stakes are raised further by the fact that the MoU already provides for the immediate lifting of sanctions on the oil sector: Tehran has an acute economic incentive not to let the process break down.
Conclusion. Thus, the linkage of the Iran–US negotiations to the situation in Lebanon is not a tactical episode but a reflection of Tehran's broader regional strategy, in which the nuclear programme, the sanctions regime and the security of allies are treated as elements of a single negotiating package. For Iran, preserving its positions in Lebanon carries not only military-strategic significance as part of a system of regional deterrence, but also domestic political value, allowing the leadership to present possible compromises on the nuclear programme as the result of achieving broader national security goals. At the same time, such a strategy significantly complicates the negotiating process, since it makes it dependent on factors lying beyond the direct control of the parties.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
