This policy brief by Nargiza Umarova argues that Azerbaijan is deepening engagement with the Taliban authorities through connectivity, positioning itself as a pivotal node between South Asia and Europe. At the centre is the Lapis Lazuli Corridor—launched in 2018 and revived through new outreach—which links Afghanistan via Turkmenistan, the Caspian, the South Caucasus and Turkey to the European network. Baku frames Lapis Lazuli as a southern extension of the Middle (Trans-Caspian) Corridor, offering Afghanistan alternative pathways to European markets and accelerating its integration into trans-Caspian shipping. Recent high-level contacts—culminating in July 2025 meetings at the ECO summit and a port visit to Alat—signal a proactive Azerbaijani push to grow trade, logistics and energy cooperation with Kabul.
The brief details significant Azerbaijani and Turkmen investments that underpin this strategy: Baku’s Alat Port and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, alongside Turkmenistan’s rail links to Aqina and Andkhoy and upgrades at Turkmenbashi. Maximising the utilisation of these assets creates strong incentives to extend Lapis Lazuli toward Pakistan and India. Yet such a southward pull carries geo-economic consequences for Uzbekistan. By routing South Asia–Europe cargoes across the Caspian through Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Tashkent’s aspiration to serve as the indispensable trans-Eurasian land bridge could be diluted, especially if Lapis Lazuli interlocks with Afghan segments that do not rely on Uzbek territory.
Umarova maps several corridor interactions that shape this competition. Connecting Lapis Lazuli to the Kabul (Trans-Afghan) Corridor via Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif could revive the long-mooted Five Nations Railway (China–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Iran), bypassing Uzbekistan and shortening East–West transit. Parallel Iranian rail expansions from Khaf to Herat and onward to Naibabad would further channel India–Europe flows via Iran and Turkey, eroding Central Asian and South Caucasian transit revenues. Conversely, a western Trans-Afghan line (Torghundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Buldak) championed by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could compete with the Kabul Corridor and reallocate traffic away from Uzbek routes.
The brief concludes that Uzbekistan’s best response is offensive rather than defensive: accelerate the Kabul Corridor with maximum Central Asian buy-in, stitch it to the Northern Railway Route to the EU (boosting Kazakhstan’s transit by up to 20 mtpa), and propose to Baku a joint multimodal India–Pakistan–Afghanistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–EU corridor that enlarges the Middle Corridor’s South Asia feeder base. In parallel, Tashkent should promote an alternative to the Five Nations alignment that connects China–Afghanistan–Iran through Uzbekistan and neighbours, safeguarding the commercial viability of the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat segment. The strategic through-line is clear: maintain first-mover advantage on the Kabul Corridor, align interests with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan where possible, and prevent corridor designs that structurally sideline Uzbekistan from the emergent South Asia–Europe land bridge.
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* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
