The construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal in northern Afghanistan is gradually becoming one of the most sensitive issues in Central Asian water security. For Afghanistan, the project is linked to food security, employment, and the development of the northern provinces. For Uzbekistan, it creates a new situation in the Amu Darya basin, where the water balance, the environmental sustainability of the Aral Sea region, and the modernization of the irrigation system are becoming part of a single regional agenda. The central question today is not whether the project can be stopped, but how to bring its operation into a format of regular data exchange, monitoring, and predictable interaction.
Qosh Tepa on Afghanistan’s Agenda after 2021
After 2021, Afghanistan’s domestic politics have developed under conditions of limited international legitimacy, economic uncertainty, and the population’s heavy dependence on humanitarian assistance. Against this background, projects that can be presented as evidence of governability, of the capacity to create jobs, and of rural development have become particularly important for the de facto authorities.
In this situation, the Qosh Tepa Canal is for Kabul not only an irrigation project but also an element of domestic political legitimation. The project allows the de facto authorities to demonstrate their ability to govern territory, sustain employment, and build a food base in the northern provinces. It therefore appears more realistic to expect not the termination of the project but a search for a format of negotiations on the terms of its operation.
What Is Known about the Project
In open sources, the Qosh Tepa Canal is usually described as a project about 285 km in length, involving water withdrawal from the Amu Darya and the irrigation of substantial areas of northern Afghanistan. However, the exact parameters of the future water intake, actual water losses, and the canal’s operating regime remain insufficiently transparent.
It is precisely the limited availability of verifiable technical information that makes the project particularly sensitive for downstream countries. There is currently insufficient publicly available data on a full feasibility study, an environmental assessment, and an independent engineering review of the canal.
There are already political assessments, satellite observations, and individual engineering studies concerning the project; however, a transparent system of regular data exchange has not yet been established. For the basin countries, information on actual water withdrawal, losses, the seasonal operating regime, and the condition of the earthen channel is of fundamental importance.
In this situation, the most reliable approach is a comparative one, based on the analysis of three groups of sources: official statements by Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, documents of international organizations, and independent scientific and engineering assessments.
The Afghan Logic: Why Kabul Will Continue the Project
From the Afghan perspective, the Qosh Tepa Canal is a project of not only agricultural but also political and administrative significance. The country’s northern provinces have long been perceived as an agrarian periphery and, at the same time, as a space where ethnic, trade, border, and political interests intersect. In this context, irrigation becomes an instrument of employment, food provision, and the consolidation of control over territory.
At the same time, the project remains subject to serious constraints. Afghanistan faces a shortage of engineering resources, limited access to international financing, sanctions risks, and a lack of trust on the part of its neighbors. The question is therefore not whether Afghanistan needs to develop agriculture, but whether Kabul can implement this project without heightening tensions over the Amu Darya.
For Tashkent, the most important task in this situation is to move the issue onto a technical plane. Discussing the water-withdrawal regime, water losses, the condition of the channel, and mechanisms of advance notification makes it possible to reduce uncertainty without directly linking water issues to the question of the official recognition of the de facto authorities.
Uzbekistan’s Water Security and the Downstream Factor
The significance of the Qosh Tepa Canal for Uzbekistan is determined by the country’s position in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya and by the agricultural sector’s heavy dependence on irrigated farming. Additional water withdrawal upstream may aggravate existing water-supply problems, particularly in the context of climate variability, growing demand from the agricultural sector, and persistent losses in the irrigation system.
Therefore, for Tashkent the Qosh Tepa issue is related not only to transboundary water use. It directly affectsfood security, the resilience of rural areas, the environmental situation in the Aral Sea region, and the need for accelerated modernization of the water sector.
In November 2024, measures for the rational use of water and the reduction of losses in agriculture were considered separately at the level of the country’s leadership. Among the priorities identified were the concrete lining of canals, digital metering, the introduction of water-saving technologies, and the creation of a unified information system for monitoring water consumption.
This shows that Uzbekistan treats the problem not only as an external challenge associated with Afghanistan but also as an incentive for the internal modernization of the water sector. Reducing losses, improving the accuracy of metering, and adapting the agricultural sector to less predictable transboundary flow are becoming important elements of national resilience.
At the Seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025, the President of Uzbekistan proposed declaring 2026–2036 the “Decade of Practical Actions for the Rational Use of Water in Central Asia” and stressed the need for Afghanistan’s active involvement in the regional dialogue on the joint use of the water resources of the Amu Darya basin.
Under these conditions, reducing uncertainty about the actual operating regime of the canal becomes key for Uzbekistan. Without data on water withdrawal, losses, seasonal dynamics, and the condition of the channel, any assessments will be incomplete. The priority is therefore a transition from general forecasts to continuous monitoring and verifiable information.
The Regional Dimension: Afghanistan’s New Role in the Amu Darya Basin
The construction of the canal changes not only the balance of interests between Afghanistan and the downstream countries but also the conditions of regional water governance. Afghanistan is gradually becoming an active participant in Amu Darya-related issues, whereas the earlier coordination mechanisms were formed without its full participation.
The impact of the Qosh Tepa Canal on the Central Asian states is uneven and depends on their position in the Amu Darya basin, the structure of their water use, and their foreign economic interests.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remain the most sensitive countries, since both states are located in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya and depend on irrigated farming. For Turkmenistan, the issue is complicated by the fact that water-management risks are combined with an interest in preserving economic ties with Afghanistan, primarily in energy, transport, and transit infrastructure. Ashgabat’s position will therefore likely be built on a cautious balance between protecting its water interests and maintaining working contacts with Kabul.
For Kazakhstan, the significance of the Qosh Tepa Canal is predominantly indirect. Astana does not depend directly on water withdrawal from the Amu Darya; however, possible changes in the water balance are important for the Aral Sea region, the environmental sustainability of the region, and the overall effectiveness of water coordination in Central Asia.
For Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the canal’s impact is less direct. These countries are not located in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya; however, the emergence of Afghanistan as a more active water user heightens the importance of regional consultations on transboundary water resources. Their interest is related primarily to how the overall system of water-energy interaction in the region will change.
The Afghan Dimension in Uzbekistan’s Water and Transport Policy
The Qosh Tepa Canal should be considered in the broader context of Afghanistan’s transformation after 2021. Kabul seeks to integrate into regional transport, energy, and trade projects. For Uzbekistan, Afghanistan remains at once a source of water-management risks and a potential corridor to South Asia.
Uzbekistan’s approach to Afghanistan therefore cannot be limited to water issues alone. Alongside the risks associated with the Amu Darya, transit, trade, security, and southern transport connectivity remain important for Uzbekistan. This requires Tashkent to address two tasks simultaneously: protecting its water interests and maintaining working channels of engagement with Kabul.
For Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, and the Persian Gulf states, Afghanistan remains an important area in terms of transit, energy, security, natural resources, and access to regional markets. Their interest in Afghanistan may facilitate the development of infrastructure and economic projects in which Uzbekistan is also interested.
At the same time, this configuration carries a certain limitation: against the background of large transport and energy initiatives, water issues may recede into the background. It is therefore important for Tashkent to keep the Amu Darya issue on the general agenda of its engagement with Afghanistan.
Risks and Opportunities for Uzbekistan
First, the main risk is associated with a possible reduction in the available flow of the Amu Darya. This is particularly sensitive for Uzbekistan, since water scarcity is already becoming one of the region’s systemic problems. The lower-lying territories, agriculture, and the Aral Sea region are the most vulnerable. A possible reduction in water could affect not only production but also the social resilience of rural areas. In the most vulnerable districts, this could increase pressure on employment, household incomes, and state support measures.
Second, the problem of a lack of transparent data persists. Without regular exchange of information on water withdrawal, losses, and the canal’s operating regime, every low-water season may deepen mistrust between the parties. At the same time, the actual impact of the canal may differ from preliminary expert forecasts.
Third, there is an engineering risk. If the canal is operated with high water losses, seepage, or instability of the earthen channel, this will create problems not only for the downstream countries but also for Afghanistan itself, since the effectiveness of the project directly depends on the quality of its construction and operation.
Alongside the risks, opportunities for practical cooperation also remain. Uzbekistan can strengthen its role in regional water coordination if it promotes a working format of cooperation with Afghanistan: regular monitoring, technical consultations, the exchange of hydrological data, the training of specialists, and discussion of water losses. Such an approach would allow Tashkent to combine the protection of national interests with a pragmatic dialogue with Kabul.
Scenarios for the Development of the Situation
In the controlled scenario, construction of the canal continues with data exchange and technical consultations in place. In this case, the risks to the downstream countries persist but become more manageable. Monitoring, diplomatic dialogue, and the acceleration of water-saving measures remain priorities for Uzbekistan.
The baseline scenario assumes that the canal gradually reaches higher operating parameters while a data-exchange mechanism takes shape slowly. In that case, periodic tension may arise in low-water years. For Uzbekistan, this means the need to accelerate internal reforms, expand digital metering, and strengthen regional coordination.
A critical scenario is possible if maximum water withdrawal, a dry period, and the absence of transparent dialogue coincide. In this case, the water-management problem may move into a more sensitive political and diplomatic plane. An anti-crisis interagency mechanism and urgent consultations with Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries become necessary measures.
The Qosh Tepa Canal is becoming one of the key factors changing the water situation in the Amu Darya basin. For Afghanistan, it is a project of domestic development, employment, and food security. For Uzbekistan, it is a source of new water-management, environmental, and socio-economic risks, particularly given the agricultural sector’s dependence on irrigation and the sensitivity of the Aral Sea region.
The main conclusion is that the Qosh Tepa problem cannot be resolved solely through political statements or by relying on external pressure on Kabul. A more sustainable approach is a combination of internal water modernization, continuous monitoring, data exchange, and practical engagement with Afghanistan. The sooner the issue is moved onto a technical and institutional plane, the greater the chances of reducing uncertainty and preventing the water problem from becoming a source of long-term regional tension.
For Tashkent, the Qosh Tepa Canal is not only a challenge but also an opportunity to strengthen its own water policy, accelerate irrigation reforms, and advance a new model of regional dialogue on the Amu Darya. Such an approach will allow Uzbekistan to defend its national interests while maintaining pragmatic engagement with Afghanistan.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
