The Myth of the Trans-Afghan Corridor

Policy Briefs

05 June, 2025

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The Myth of the Trans-Afghan Corridor

Dr Islomkhon Gafarov and Mr Hamza Boltaev’s brief argues that, despite its frequent portrayal as a game-changer linking Central and South Asia, the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway remains more myth than reality. While the 2011 opening of the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif section highlights the theoretical promise of granting landlocked Central Asian states access to Gwadar and Karachi, Afghanistan’s fraught political and security landscape – compounded by the Taliban’s unrecognised status and the ongoing threat of terror groups such as ISKP – has repeatedly stalled progress. Border tensions with Pakistan, reflected in episodic closures and the April deportation of over 80,000 Afghans, only reinforce the fragility of any expanded corridor.

 

Moreover, external actors have pursued alternative routes that dilute the railway’s centrality. India’s prioritisation of the Chabahar-based North–South Corridor via Iran, coupled with Tehran’s own strategic interest in that model, diverts investment away from the Pakistan-linked project. China views the Trans-Afghan link merely as an adjunct to CPEC rather than a priority, while Russia hedges between multiple options under Western sanctions.

 

Within Central Asia, too, national preferences diverge: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan favour routes that bypass Uzbekistan, whereas Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan look to Chinese-backed corridors. Uzbekistan alone has advanced materially by completing the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif line, yet even Tashkent recognises that deeper engagement with Iran offers a more immediate pathway to seaports. In the authors’ conclusion, the corridor’s future hinges on strategic alignment among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran — three “Islamic gateways” whose mutual distrust and competing interests threaten to render the Trans-Afghan Corridor a geopolitical mirage rather than a functioning transport artery.

 

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* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.