By Ilyos Shaymardonov, UWED Master’s Student, IAIS Research Intern
Introduction.The outbreak of the US-Iran war in early 2026 shook the global geopolitical architecture and put the strategies of major powers to a direct test. In the view of many experts, this conflict appeared to open the door to ready-made strategic opportunities for China. It was assumed that while the United States was entangled in another costly military campaign in the Middle East, Beijing would seek to fill the resulting vacuum, deepen its ties with Tehran, and accelerate its challenge to American leadership. However, this hypothesis misinterprets how China actually behaves amidst geopolitical instability. An analysis of the situation reveals that China’s response to the US-Iran war demonstrates not expansionism, but a doctrine of calculated restraint.
This, in turn, is a deliberate position stemming from China’s firm conviction regarding global economic vulnerabilities, its long-term investments within the framework of the «Belt and Road» initiative, and the belief that systemic stability, not short-term tactical gains, is the primary condition for its sustainable development.
The foundations of the China-Iran strategic partnership: The «Belt and Road» and a 25-year agreement
To understand China’s position during the war, one must first understand the nature and depth of the pre-war China-Iran relations. In March 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement. According to him, China has committed to investing up to $400 billion in the country’s infrastructure and energy sector in exchange for stable supplies of Iranian cheap oil. This agreement directly linked Iran to the «One Belt, One Road» initiative, transforming Tehran into a crucial hub connecting Central Asia with the Persian Gulf, and this corridor would allow China to bypass strategic maritime chokepoints dominated by the U.S. Navy. Iran’s official accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023 further solidified this closeness in a formal-institutional sense within the network of regional institutions led by China.
The strategic logic underlying this partnership is multifaceted. As noted by Iranian expert S. Madani, the «Belt and Road» initiative is not merely an infrastructure program but also serves as an economic tool designed to expand its sphere of influence and acquire resources amidst systemic constraints. For Iran, this initiative serves as a mechanism to maintain institutional stability and bypass sanctions, providing access to markets and capital that are difficult to attain under Western pressure. In this way, China became the primary buyer of Iranian oil, purchasing approximately 90% of the country’s crude exports. The Hudson Institute describes this relationship as crucial for Iran’s economic survival and central to Beijing’s concept of creating a secure land-based energy corridor free from U.S. maritime dominance.
From a geopolitical standpoint, this cooperation served China’s overarching interest in establishing a multipolar world order. Iran’s strategic geographic location connecting Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf has given China a diplomatic edge in a region where U.S. influence has historically been dominant. Analysts at the NESA Center observe that China’s geopolitical expansion into the Middle East is being carried out incrementally and in a risk-averse manner to avoid provoking a sharp reaction from regional or international powers. In this process, cooperation with Iran serves as a vehicle for strengthening China’s position in the Middle East without engaging in direct conflict.
Calculated restraint: why is Beijing not joining the war?
Despite the depth of Sino-Iranian relations, China’s reaction to a potential US-Iran war has been notably restrained. Beijing lacks a permanent military presence in the Greater Middle East, has no security commitments to Tehran, and does not possess the real capability to shift the military balance in such an intense conflict. Deploying an aircraft carrier group to the region to protect Chinese oil tankers would be an extremely dangerous risk for a navy that is only just beginning to develop its open-sea capabilities. This military restraint is not an admission of weakness but rather a rational response to the U.S.-China rivalry.
Analysts from «Foreign Affairs» note that Chinese leaders do not view every U.S. failure as a Chinese success, nor do they believe it is necessary to seize every geopolitical opportunity. Beijing’s calculus will be determined by whether the situation stabilizes or, conversely, descends into chaos. A regional conflict centered on the Strait of Hormuz is, in turn, a source of such chaos. This approach contrasts with the «win-lose» logic ingrained in Washington’s strategic debates. While American analysts view China as the biggest beneficiary of America’s overextension, Beijing sees a destabilizing crisis that threatens the open trading environment which is the foundation of its economic model.
China’s diplomacy is meticulously crafted to reflect this very position. While Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for maintaining the diplomatic momentum in the negotiations, Xi Jinping openly criticized the US blockade of Iranian ports as a dangerous and irresponsible act and leveraged his ties with Pakistan to urge Iranian negotiators to soften their stance.
The Atlantic Council notes that this two-pronged policy-namely, openly condemning U.S. coercive measures while covertly applying diplomatic pressure on Tehran – clearly shows Beijing’s aspiration to present itself as a responsible mediator rather than a sponsor of the war.
Economic vulnerabilities and tensions in the strait of Hormuz
The most significant systemic challenge China faces in this conflict is in the energy sector. China is the world’s largest oil importer, with about 70% of the country’s needs met by foreign sources, of which approximately one-third was previously transported through the Strait of Hormuz.
The de facto closure of this strategic transit corridor since late February 2026 has dealt a severe blow to China’s energy security. However, Beijing is not panicking, and this composure is the result of many years of meticulous preparation.
China had been building up large crude oil reserves since 2025, a time when an oversupply in the global market and low oil prices created a unique opportunity to accumulate reserves at a low cost. Beijing is also consistently pursuing a policy of diversifying its supply sources. Following the restoration of ties temporarily severed by U.S. sanctions, China’s national oil companies have resumed purchasing Russian oil by sea. Meanwhile, the «Power of Siberia 1» pipeline continues to deliver Russian gas in volumes exceeding its designated capacity. According to an analysis by the Stimson Center, the war has accelerated a simultaneous two-way approach: purchasing from different sources and investing in green energy. Specifically, Beijing is expanding China-Algeria energy agreements through Sinopec and intensifying cooperation in clean energy with Morocco and Egypt to reduce long-term dependence on the Persian Gulf.
Disruptions at Qatar’s Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas facility have led to a declaration of force majeure on contracts with Chinese buyers, starkly highlighting the real economic costs Beijing is facing. The rising cost of energy, delays in cargo deliveries, additional insurance payments, and expenses related to rerouting shipping lanes are increasing production costs in China’s export-oriented industries. This, in turn, is causing a decline in global market demand at a time when Chinese manufacturers are facing pressure from excess capacity domestically. None of this aligns with Beijing’s strategic interests, which reinforces the key analytical conclusion that the war is not the geopolitical gift for China that Washington analysts sometimes suggest.
A diplomatic approach and a multipolar worldview
The prevailing view emerging from the conflict – that the actions of the U.S. and Israel were an act of aggression, that Iran’s response was reactive in nature, and that this conflict clearly demonstrates the price of American hegemony – is nearly identical to Beijing’s long-standing criticism of U.S. global policy.
China’s persistent call for multipolarity is taking on new meaning in the current context. The fact that the economies of more than 145 countries now trade more with China than with the U.S., combined with the serious precautions U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are taking due to energy supply disruptions, reinforces the credibility of a structural basis for a more fragmented international order. China’s vote against UN Security Council sanctions resolutions concerning Iran and the Middle East as early as March 2026, despite calling for Tehran to refrain from direct material support, will strengthen its reputation as a counterweight to Western institutional dominance.
An analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East by the Andersen and Sending think tanks sheds light on this matter. These institutions have consistently portrayed China’s infrastructure investments as a strategic threat, often significantly exaggerating the true scale of Belt and Road projects in the region. However, it is precisely this approach that inadvertently validates China’s self-portrayal as a constructive alternative power. The war will accelerate this process, as it will provide clear proof for an argument long made by critics of U.S. hegemony. Namely, that America’s military adventures create such instability that the existing order cannot absorb it without suffering losses.
Limits and long-term implications of China’s strategy
China’s strategy of calculated restraint is not without its own weaknesses and contradictions. The most prominent of these is the problem of «dual-use technologies. According to reports from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, China-affiliated firms provided commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran with high-resolution satellite imagery of U.S. military installations, including the Prince Sultan Air Base. Whether such activities are state-sanctioned or are the actions of commercial entities operating in a «gray area» this exposes Beijing to counter-pressure from Washington and undermines its position as a neutral diplomatic intermediary.
The long-term strategic loss could be even more severe. China had relied on a self-confident, defiant Iran with nuclear ambitions as the cornerstone of its «Belt and Road» strategy in the Middle East. Having suffered a heavy blow and been caught in a whirlwind of internal conflict, Iran can no longer serve as a reliable factor to distract American attention. The «Belt and Road» projects, which are dependent on Iran’s ports, railway corridors, and energy infrastructure, are now facing even greater instability. The idea of establishing a secure land-based energy corridor that bypasses key maritime points dominated by the U.S. has been dealt a serious blow. Furthermore, China’s long-standing efforts to simultaneously support Iran while balancing relations with the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf have been exposed as inherently contradictory.
The Atlantic Council’s scenario analysis outlines four possible trajectories for the post-war geopolitical order, ranging from a limited U.S. success that maintains systemic stability to a scenario where China responds with significant indirect intervention. Such an intervention would include providing advanced intelligence and logistical support to Iranian forces, as well as applying coordinated pressure in parallel theaters like the Taiwan Strait, thereby transforming the regional conflict into a systemic confrontation. Beijing will definitely prefer the first direction. Any escalation in the second direction would mean a defeat, not a victory, of the Chinese strategy.
Conclusion. China’s role in the geopolitics of the US-Iran war is neither consistent with the statement that «Beijing is the main beneficiary of the war» nor with the dismissive statement that «China is simply not in this process». Evidence suggests that Beijing is following a well-thought-out doctrine of restraint. It bears real economic costs and skillfully manages structural vulnerabilities in the energy sector. It is using the diplomatic fallout from American military action to advance its own idea of a multipolar world and is conducting covert pressure through channels that preserve the possibility of rejection. This position reflects a strategic culture that sees systemic stability as a necessary condition for national power and sees America’s excessive expansion as a cautionary lesson rather than an opportunity to expand.
This war, however, exposed the limitations of a grand strategy built on weak cooperation. A weakened Iran, disrupted Belt and Road corridors, and tight control over the transfer of dual-use technologies are all losses that Beijing did not choose and cannot easily compensate for. Whether China’s abandonment of tactical options in favor of strategic patience serves its long-term interests in the Middle East will depend on how and how quickly the war ends. The oversimplified «win-lose» pattern that prevails in Washington’s China-related debates is more of a blur than an illumination. In this crisis, China’s strength lies not in what it has done, but in what it has managed to discipline itself not to do.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
