By Roksana Izzatova , UWED undergraduate, Research Assistant at IAIS
The events of June 2026 revealed a profound rupture in relations between U.S. President Donald Trump and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who only a year earlier had been considered the closest ideological allies and architects of a new right-wing populist order.
The public scandal triggered by Trump’s claim that Meloni had allegedly “begged” him for a joint photograph at the G7 summit became the culmination of a crisis in the transatlantic partnership that threatens to reshape the architecture of European security.
Following the meeting between the two leaders during the summit in Evian-les-Bains on June 15–17 and Trump’s subsequent interview, the Italian Prime Minister released a video statement refuting the American president’s remarks and declaring that such a tone toward an ally was unacceptable. In her ironic assessment, he does not demonstrate the same degree of determination toward the opponents of the West and the United States, whose leaders he addresses in a considerably more conciliatory manner.
Meloni also responded directly to accusations concerning her declining approval ratings, emphasizing that her political support is determined solely by her ability to defend Italy’s national interests. She characterized questions regarding her popularity as lying outside the competence of the American president and advised him to focus on his own approval ratings. According to public opinion surveys, her approval rating (44%) exceedsthat of Trump (36%).
The diplomatic reaction of the Italian side was consistent and notably firm. Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani cancelled his planned visit to Washington scheduled for June 21–22, describing Donald Trump’s remarks as offensive.
Significantly, support for Giorgia Meloni extended beyond the governing camp. Former centrist Prime Minister Matteo Renzi sharply criticized Trump’s actions, describing them as outrageous.
The Evian scandal was merely the culmination of a prolonged and steadily deepening rift between the two leaders. On March 31, several U.S. bombers participating in Operation “Epic Fury” included Sigonella in their flight plan without prior coordination with the Italian authorities. When the Italian military command established that the American aircraft were already airborne, the mission was classified as a combat operation requiring parliamentary approval under bilateral agreements in force since 1954. Consequently, Italy officially denied permission for the aircraft to land.
The decision was clearly political in nature. Speaking before parliament, Meloni unequivocally stated Italy’s position: Italy is not a participant in the war against Iran and has no intention of becoming involved. She further characterized the American strikes as actions exceeding the boundaries of international law. This position received broad public support.
At the same time, Meloni’s domestic political position became significantly more complicated. In March, she suffered defeat in a referendum on judicial reform, dealing a serious blow to her reputation as a politically invulnerable leader, while by May inflation had reached 3.3 percent, its highest level since 2023.
Simultaneously, a second line of conflict emerged surrounding Pope Leo XIV. The Pontiff, a U.S. citizen, condemned American military actions in Iran during a prayer vigil at St. Peter’s Basilica.
Trump responded with sharp public criticism, questioning the Pope’s competence in matters of security and foreign policy. Meloni defended the Pontiff, provoking a negative reaction from Trump.
At first glance, open confrontation with the President of the United States appears politically self-destructive for a leader whose political platform was originally built upon ideological affinity with Trump’s Republican movement. However, domestic political logic reveals a more complex strategic calculation.
Meloni is seriously considering holding early elections in April 2027 instead of December amid growing concern regarding the continuing erosion of electoral support.
According to polling data, her party, Brothers of Italy, retains 28 percent support, while the opposition Democratic Party stands at 22 percent. However, the combined electoral potential of left-wing parties in a coalition format reaches approximately 40 percent, creating a genuine risk of losing power.
In this context, the Hungarian precedent is particularly illustrative. According to a number of observers, certain elements of Donald Trump’s political style resemble the model associated with Viktor Orbán, which critics link to pressure on independent institutions, tighter control over universities, and systems that reward loyal supporters. At the same time, the most recent Hungarian elections demonstrated a noticeable weakening of Orbán’s political position.
Under these circumstances, Giorgia Meloni appears to have been guided by the following strategic logic: open confrontation with Donald Trump during a period of his political weakening, against the backdrop of the unpopular war with Iran and declining approval ratings, presented several tactical opportunities.
First, it enabled her to distance her government from association with the increasingly discredited Trump administration. Second, it allowed her to portray herself before the Italian electorate as a defender of national dignity and sovereignty against attacks from a powerful opponent. Third, it shifted public discourse away from economic difficulties toward questions of foreign-policy firmness. Fourth, it adapted elements of the electoral model employed by left-wing parties, which have successfully utilized anti-American sentiment and declining trust in American leadership as mobilizing factors.
As a result, Meloni is no longer perceived as the White House’s most reliable European partner. Experts emphasize the irreversible nature of the rupture, pointing to her defense of the Pope as the turning point after which reconciliation became extremely difficult. The crisis also has a structural dimension: according to many scholars, nationalist movements, because of their ideological characteristics, tend to compete with one another more often than they build durable alliances.
At the same time, an internal split emerged within Italy’s right-wing camp. On June 13, former General Roberto Vannacci founded the National Future party, presenting it as a genuinely right-wing alternative. The movement rapidly attracted approximately 100,000 members. The new organization challenged Meloni from the right, arguing that her cooperation with Trump had compromised her political standing and thereby increasing her incentive to pursue a more independent political course.
A similar distancing from Trump’s policies can also be observed among other European right-wing populist movements. In France, Jordan Bardella, leader of the National Rally and the favorite in the 2027 presidential race, went beyond merely distancing himself from Trump and explicitly described his policies as mistaken. Tino Chrupalla, co-chair of Alternative for Germany, characterized American policy as imperial in nature and warned of the risk that confrontation could escalate into a major military conflict.
The principal strategic beneficiaries of the crisis in transatlantic unity are Russia and China. For Moscow, the split between the United States and Europe represents a long-sought objective that has unexpectedly materialized. Such a division corresponds with Russia’s long-term foreign policy interests, as weakening NATO cohesion has traditionally been viewed by Russian leadership as a favorable outcome, even though the current rupture has been driven by internal developments within the United States rather than external pressure.
Moscow is likely calculating that a less cohesive Europe may reduce its support for Ukraine, thereby expanding opportunities to prolong the conflict. Russia also expects that a weakened and divided Europe will inevitably lose some capacity to support Ukraine and resist Russian pressure, enabling Moscow to extend the conflict while anticipating a gradual retreat of Washington.
For China, the Western split creates a strategic opportunity to deepen economic and political ties with European capitals, particularly given the contrast between the perceived predictability of Chinese policy and the impulsiveness of American decision-making. At the same time, reduced American focus on Europe increases Beijing’s operational freedom in the Indo-Pacific region.
For the countries of Central Asia, and especially Uzbekistan, the weakening of American influence across Eurasia creates conditions for a more flexible multi-vector foreign policy while simultaneously strengthening Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Under such circumstances, preventing excessive dependence on any single center of power becomes a strategic imperative.
Thus, the conflict between Donald Trump and Giorgia Meloni is, in reality, a symptom of a profound restructuring of the global political system. The erosion of Western unity, initiated by the Iranian war and accelerated by the unpredictability of the American course, undermines the foundations of an international order built upon the assumption of uncontested American leadership.
European right-wing populist parties, which originally expected support from Trump in pursuing their own anti-liberal agendas, have found themselves compelled to distance themselves from the very leader whose ideological impulses they once shared.
For the Global South and the countries of Central Asia, this signifies the end of the unipolar era and the emergence of a multipolar world in which each state must independently balance its relations among competing centers of power.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
