By Fatima Dalieva, an independent researcher specializing “International Relations, Political Problems of Global and Regional Issues” at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy and works as Chief Specialist at the Postgraduate Education Office.
By the third decade of the twenty-first century, transport-logistics systems and trade corridors have emerged as one of the central arenas of global geopolitical competition. Whereas geopolitical superiority in the twentieth century was largely determined by military power, territorial control, or energy resources, contemporary global influence is increasingly defined by the ability to control logistics networks, transit infrastructure, maritime routes, ports, digital transport systems, and supply chains. China’s transformation into the world’s principal manufacturing platform has elevated transport and logistics systems into a strategic component of global geopolitics.
Within the contemporary international system, the interests of the United States, Russia, and China are increasingly colliding over the control of logistics corridors, energy routes, and trade networks. In this context, Eurasia is becoming not merely a geographical space but a strategic arena in which a new architecture of the global economy is taking shape.
In recent years, Russia–China economic cooperation has expanded significantly. In particular, Western sanctions imposed after the Russia–Ukraine war accelerated Russia’s economic dependence on China. Bilateral trade reached a record level exceeding 244 billion USD in 2024. Although a temporary decline was observed in 2025, trade growth resumed in early 2026. Chinese exports to Russia increased by more than 23 percent, while Russian exports to China grew by 17 percent, demonstrating the growing interdependence of the two economies.
However, this rapprochement does not represent an equal partnership; rather, it reflects an asymmetric model of economic dependence. Russia primarily exports oil, natural gas, coal, and raw materials, while China supplies Russia with automobiles, electronics, industrial equipment, and high-technology products. This structure increasingly binds the Russian economy to raw-material exports while simultaneously strengthening Beijing’s technological and industrial dominance.
Transport and logistics systems are becoming the central element of this emerging economic model. Russia’s Far East has evolved into a major transit hub for trade with China, while cargo transportation through border crossings and newly constructed bridges has expanded rapidly. Consequently, transport-logistics cooperation has evolved beyond a purely technical sphere and has become a mechanism of strategic integration between Moscow and Beijing.
At the same time, it is precisely within the logistics sector that the sharpest contradiction between U.S. and Chinese interests is emerging. The core of the contemporary global economy lies in Chinese manufacturing and the logistics systems that distribute Chinese products worldwide. More than 80 percent of Chinese exports are transported by sea, and a substantial part of this system is controlled by Western companies. Major corporations such as Mediterranean Shipping Company, A.P. Moller - Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, Ocean Network Express, and Evergreen Marine play decisive roles in the global logistics of Chinese exports.
This creates a major geopolitical paradox. On the one hand, the United States and its Western allies seek to limit China’s geopolitical influence. On the other hand, Western logistics corporations derive enormous profits from China’s export economy. This demonstrates the extraordinarily high degree of interdependence within the global economic system.
In particular, Maersk and MSC have established deeply integrated logistics systems connected with Chinese ports. These corporations manage not only maritime shipping but also warehouses, terminals, container networks, and multimodal logistics infrastructure. As a result, the contemporary global trade system increasingly represents a symbiosis between Chinese manufacturing power and Western logistics capital.
This creates a major strategic dilemma for Washington. While the United States attempts to constrain China technologically and economically, global capital and logistics networks remain deeply dependent on Chinese production. Consequently, U.S. tariff policies and technological sanctions have not isolated China; instead, they have accelerated the restructuring of global supply chains.
The concept of “China Shock 2.0” reflects this transformation. China is no longer exporting only low-cost consumer goods; it is now dominating sectors such as electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, robotics, and semiconductors. This development poses new challenges for both the United States and Europe because the state that controls logistics routes is gradually acquiring dominance in high-technology industries as well.
Competition surrounding semiconductors and electric transportation is transforming global logistics into a strategic instrument of power. For the United States, the Taiwan issue is no longer solely political or military in nature. Since Taiwan is the center of global semiconductor production, it has also become a crucial element of logistics and technological security.
In this context, Xi Jinping’s reference to the “Thucydides Trap” carries particular significance. Beijing seeks to manage competition with the United States without allowing it to escalate into open military conflict. Both China and the United States clearly understand the depth of their mutual economic dependence. China remains heavily export-oriented, while the United States continues to dominate global capital flows and the dollar-centered financial system.
Nevertheless, this model of “managed competition” is becoming increasingly complex. American technological restrictions have compelled China to rely more heavily on domestic resources. As a result, Beijing has accelerated its strategy of technological self-sufficiency while simultaneously diversifying logistics corridors. The Belt and Road Initiative represents the central component of this strategy.
In this regard, the role of Central Asia and Russia is growing substantially. Eurasian land corridors are increasingly viewed by China as strategic alternatives to maritime trade routes. In particular, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project significantly strengthens Beijing’s geoeconomic influence in Central Asia.
Kyrgyzstan’s acquisition of 305 million USD in Chinese financial support for this railway project demonstrates the deepening of Beijing’s influence through transport-logistics diplomacy. However, an important geopolitical risk also emerges here. Since the overall project cost exceeds 5 billion USD, Kyrgyzstan will require additional external financing in the future, potentially increasing its dependence on Chinese capital.
Indeed, contemporary Chinese strategy is fundamentally centered on logistics and infrastructure diplomacy. Through loans, transport corridors, port construction, and industrial projects, Beijing is creating long-term economic dependencies. This model is frequently described as “infrastructural geopolitics.”
Russia, however, occupies a more complicated position within this process. On the one hand, Moscow benefits from economic rapprochement with China because Western sanctions have sharply restricted Russia’s access to European markets and technologies. On the other hand, China’s expanding economic influence in Central Asia and Eurasia weakens Russia’s traditional geopolitical position.
In Central Asia, Russian and Chinese interests increasingly intersect. While Moscow continues to perceive the region as part of its historical sphere of influence, Beijing primarily views it as a logistics and transit space. As a result, transport corridors are becoming the principal arena of geopolitical competition.
The United States is also actively involved in this process. Washington views Central Asia not merely as a security zone but as a strategic space capable of balancing Chinese and Russian influence. Consequently, the United States is showing growing interest in transport, energy, and digital infrastructure projects throughout the region.
In the contemporary global system, logistics is no longer simply an economic issue. It has become an instrument of geopolitical dominance, strategic security, and technological control. Those who control transport corridors, ports, logistics corporations, and information flows are able to exert substantial influence over the global economy itself.
Therefore, the current rivalry among the United States, Russia, and China is fundamentally a struggle for the “new geopolitics of logistics.” In this competition, transport corridors, maritime routes, railways, ports, and digital infrastructure increasingly play a more decisive role than traditional military force.
This rivalry is likely to intensify further in the future. The development of artificial intelligence, electric transportation, semiconductors, and green energy technologies will continue to increase the strategic importance of logistics systems. As a result, Eurasia is expected to remain one of the principal centers of global competition in the twenty-first century.
Ultimately, in the current era of geopolitical transformation, transport-logistics systems are becoming the central element of international relations. Competition among the United States, Russia, and China is increasingly unfolding precisely within this infrastructural and logistical sphere. This process will shape not only the future architecture of Eurasia but also the broader structure of the global economic and political order.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
