Co-authored with Roksana Izzatova, UWED undergraduate and intern at IAIS

The parliamentary elections held in Hungary on April 12 of the current year constitute an event whose significance is determined not so much by the country’s weight in the European economy, which accounts for approximately 1.1% of EU GDP and around 2% of the bloc’s population, as by the systemic role that Hungary has acquired in European politics over the sixteen years of V. Orbán’s rule.

According to data following the count of approximately 99% of ballots, the opposition party “Tisza” led by P. Magyar is set to obtain a constitutional majority of 138 seats out of 199 in parliament, while V. Orbán’s “Fidesz” secures only 55 seats. High voter mobilisation and a record turnout of 79.5% proved to be among the key factors behind such a decisive result.

I. Factors behind V. Orbán’s defeat and the transformation of the previous model. The electoral outcome is conditioned by a combination of internal and external factors that collectively undermined the stability of Viktor Orbán’s political system.

First, anti-corruption mobilisation played a decisive role. According to independent researchers, over the years of Fidesz rule approximately €28 billion was diverted from the economy in favour of structures affiliated with the authorities. As a consequence, corruption came to be perceived as systemic and brazen, which eroded trust even among the traditional Fidesz electorate. Péter Magyar successfully capitalised on this demand politically, placing the fight against corruption at the centre of his campaign.

Second, economic discontent constituted an important factor. Economic stagnation, rising prices accompanied by low wages, and the deteriorating state of healthcare and education intensified critical sentiments. This enabled the opposition to shift the campaign’s focus away from ideological issues towards everyday socioeconomic concerns.

Third, the consolidation of the opposition and the specific character of the electoral system played a significant role. Unlike previous elections, opposition forces rallied around the Tisza party, making it possible to exploit a system previously adapted to the dominance of Fidesz.

Fourth, the external political context and the “Trump effect” proved to be an important factor. Support from D. Trump and J. D. Vance, rather than strengthening Orbán’s position, turned out to be insufficiently effective. Against the backdrop of growing anti-American sentiment in Europe and tensions linked to US foreign policy, this association reduced the attractiveness of Fidesz for part of the electorate. Consequently, the transatlantic alignment of right-wing forces became a factor of electoral risk rather than an advantage.

Fifth, a considerable role was played by the shift in perceptions of V. Orbán’s foreign policy orientation. His alignment with Russia, the blocking of EU decisions, and the critical rhetoric towards Ukraine came to be viewed as a factor of Hungary’s international isolation rather than as the defence of sovereignty.

Sixth, sociodemographic changes, in particular the increased political activity of young people, were of significant importance. Up to two-thirds of voters under the age of 30 opposed V. Orbán, and the mass mobilisation of the urban electorate became one of the key factors in the opposition’s victory.

II. Prospects for the Transformation of Hungary’s Political Course. At his first major press conference following the election victory, P. Magyar outlined the following priorities:

1. The foremost priority is the earliest possible restoration of Hungary’s access to European Union funds, given that the European Commission has suspended the disbursement of €17 billion out of the €27 billion allocated to Hungary and has refused to approve Budapest’s plan for a €150 billion credit instrument intended to stimulate defence production in the bloc’s member states. To that end, he presented a four-component plan encompassing anti-corruption measures, accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the restoration of the independence of the judiciary and investigative institutions, the guarantee of press freedom, as well as the depoliticisation of universities and the protection of academic freedom.

2. The second major direction identified by P. Magyar is consideration of Hungary’s accession to the eurozone. He linked this issue to the objective of macroeconomic stabilisation, while emphasising that a final decision should be made following an assessment of the budgetary position and consultations with economic stakeholders.
3. With regard to Ukraine, he made clear that Budapest would seek to normalise bilateral relations and expressed readiness for political dialogue with Kyiv. He simultaneously emphasised that Ukraine should not be compelled to accept peace on the basis of territorial concessions, while also declaring his opposition to Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU in the foreseeable future.
4. Magyar also stated that he supports Hungary’s withdrawal from the EU’s €90 billion credit package programme for Ukraine, citing Hungary’s poor budgetary position.
5. Despite more critical rhetoric directed at Moscow, the prime minister-elect made clear that in energy policy Hungary would proceed primarily from economic expediency. He declared his intention to continue purchasing Russian energy resources if they remain the most cost-effective option, indicating the preservation of elements of pragmatic continuity even as the overall foreign policy tone undergoes a general change.
6. On the migration issue, P. Magyar effectively confirmed the course of strict border control. He came out against the EU Migration Pact, announced his intention to maintain the border fence on the southern frontier, and made clear that the new government does not intend to accept intra-EU mechanisms for the distribution of irregular migrants.

It was also underscored that Hungary must resolve the matter of daily fines amounting to €1 million, which it faces for non-compliance with a previous ruling of the European Court of Justice concerning the treatment of migrants.

At the same time, Hungary’s policy within the OTS will in all likelihood maintain institutional continuity, yet acquire a more pragmatic and depoliticised character. Budapest is unlikely to withdraw from the organisation, given Hungary’s status as an observer state, the presence of an OTS representation in Budapest, and the already well-established network of economic, educational, and politico-diplomatic contacts.

The new course will be built not on exploiting the Turkic vector as a symbol of foreign policy alternative to Brussels, but on its functionalisation as a channel for transport, investment, energy, and educational cooperation.

In this sense, Hungary under P. Magyar may retain the role of a European partner within the OTS, albeit in a less ideologised and more coherent form aligned with the general European line.

Thus, Hungary is transitioning from the model of “confrontational sovereignism” to a model of limited pro-European pragmatism.

In domestic policy, the key task will be the reform of Fidesz’s institutional legacy. Over the years of V. Orbán’s rule, entrenched mechanisms of control were established ranging from constitutional norms to a network of loyal actors in the economy and the media. Even with a constitutional majority, the new authorities will encounter institutional resistance.

Nevertheless, reforms of the judicial system and the restoration of the rule of law, the depoliticisation of the media and the curtailment of oligarchic structures’ influence, anti-corruption reforms, and a revision of the public procurement system are all to be expected.

III. European and International Implications. These elections may be assessed as an indicator of the resilience of the nationalist wave in Central Europe. The change of power in Budapest will inevitably prompt a recalibration of political calculations for a broad range of actors. The results of the elections in Hungary carry consequences that extend far beyond the national level.

First, they signify a weakening of the right-wing populist bloc in Europe. V. Orbán was a key figure for Eurosceptic and nationalist forces, including parties in France, Germany, and Italy. His departure from power reduces their institutional influence and reshapes the configuration of transnational networks of right-wing movements.

Second, the elections reflect a crisis of the transatlantic right-wing alliance. Support for V. Orbán from the Trump Administration and American conservatives not only failed to assist him but actually became a risk factor. This may have implications for the United States as well, where Democrats are already interpreting the election results as a potential signal for domestic politics.

Third, of significance is the redistribution of power within the EU. The opposition’s victory strengthens the position of the European Commission and reduces the influence of states inclined to block decisions. This may accelerate decision-making on Ukraine, sanctions policy, and questions of the rule of law.

Fourth, the consequences for Russia are of a dual nature. On the one hand, Moscow loses one of its partners within the EU; on the other, the pragmatic course of P. Magyar and the persisting energy interdependence mean that Russia will retain channels of influence, albeit in a more limited form.

IV. Implications for Central Asia and Uzbekistan. For Central Asia, the maintenance of a stable liberal-pro-European orientation within the EU would be of generally positive significance. Above all, this creates a more reliable foundation for the long-term access of Central Asian states to grant resources, concessional financing, technical assistance, and blended finance instruments, and increases the likelihood that already announced initiatives will not be impeded by political disputes within the EU.

In practical terms, this yields several advantages for the region. First, more consistent progress on infrastructure and logistics projects becomes more probable, above all along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, which the EU regards as a strategically important direction for diversifying routes and supply chains.

Second, the basis for financing projects in the areas of water management, climate resilience, and energy modernisation is strengthened: the EIB has already announced its intention to provide €365 million, which is expected to mobilise up to €1 billion in investments in sustainable transport, water management, and climate resilience in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Third, European support in the field of human capital is preserved and expanded through the DARÍA and Erasmus+ programmes, which is of particular importance for workforce training, university mobility, and the adaptation of the regional economy to new technological requirements.

Collectively, this strengthens the international agency of Central Asia: the region gains the opportunity to engage with Brussels not as a collection of disparate states, but as a more disciplined and resource-endowed centre of power with a long-term interest in the region.

* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.