This policy brief by Nargiza Umarova argues that renewed U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port and India’s parallel deepening of trade ties with Russia and the EAEU are reshaping Central Asia’s southern connectivity choices. Although Uzbekistan had explored building logistics facilities at Chabahar, those plans have not materialised—signalling Tashkent’s caution as the port again falls under sanctions and as returns look uncertain for a country accounting for only a small share of India–Central Asia trade. At the same time, Chabahar remains central to the INSTC and to India–Iran–Russia supply chains, which incentivises Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and others to keep the route alive.
Against this backdrop, Tashkent is pivoting to an alternative: a faster, more direct land bridge to South Asia via the Trans-Afghan (Kabul) Corridor. Since 2022, Uzbekistan has promoted a multimodal Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan route, designed to cut North Eurasia–South Asia delivery times to about 20 days. The centrepiece is the Termez–Naibabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi railway, backed by a July 17 intergovernmental agreement on a feasibility study with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Preliminary estimates suggest freight volumes could reach 22 million tonnes by 2030 and 34 million tonnes by 2040, much of it in transit to larger markets, including India.
Umarova emphasises that corridor choice is not merely logistical but strategic. Extending Lapis Lazuli and INSTC pathways could divert South Asia–Europe flows toward the Caspian littoral (Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan), diluting Uzbekistan’s role as a trans-Eurasian hub. By contrast, a functioning Kabul Corridor would anchor Tashkent in the shortest Eurasia–South Asia axis, lessen dependence on Iranian infrastructure, and align with India’s interest in diversified, overland access—provided political risk in Afghanistan is managed.
The brief concludes with pragmatic prescriptions: move first and fast on the Kabul Corridor with broad Central Asian buy-in; engage New Delhi diplomatically to secure support and cargo; and pursue an SCO-wide “single transport space” to integrate standards, schedules and financing. In parallel, keep a hedging option open at Chabahar to preserve flexibility, but treat it as supplementary to a primary Trans-Afghan strategy that maximises Uzbekistan’s connectivity, resilience and transit revenues.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
