Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have long maintained a dual character: formal strategic interaction coexists with persistent mutual distrust, border confrontation, and competition for influence in the cross-border space. The current stage of developments shows that the conflict between the parties is not situational but structural, with its causes lying much deeper than current political crises or the activities of individual armed groups.
A key feature of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations is that both sides view each other simultaneously as a necessary partner and as a source of threats to national security. For Pakistan, Afghanistan has traditionally been perceived through the lens of strategic vulnerability on its western flank, internal ethno-political stability, and regional rivalry with India. For Afghanistan, Pakistan remains a state seeking to limit Afghan sovereignty through political, military, and ideological influence.
The foundation of the long-standing conflict lies in the divergence of fundamental perceptions of security and statehood. Pakistani strategy has historically been built on the desire to ensure a controlled and loyal political space in Afghanistan, one that would preclude the formation of a government in Kabul oriented toward close cooperation with India or support for Pashtun nationalism. This explains the long-standing reliance of Pakistan’s military-intelligence apparatus on using Afghan armed and religious-political groups as instruments of regional influence.
At the same time, for a significant part of Afghanistan’s political elites and society, Pakistan is perceived as the main external factor of destabilization, contributing to the persistence of armed networks, cross-border extremism, and chronic instability within the country. Consequently, a stable model of limited cooperation without strategic trust has emerged between the two sides.
One central source of tension remains the border factor. The Durand Line continues to play a role not only as a disputed boundary but also as a symbol of the unresolved issue of cross-border Pashtun identity. For Islamabad, controlling the border areas is directly linked to risks of separatism and internal destabilization. For Kabul, it is tied to the question of the historical and political legitimacy of the border. In current conditions, this factor is exacerbated by the weak governance of border regions, the activity of armed groups, and the high degree of autonomy of tribal structures.
An additional source of conflict is the difference in the parties’ approaches to using radical armed movements. For a long period, Pakistan viewed some Afghan Islamist structures as instruments to advance its interests in Afghanistan. However, the gradual fragmentation of the radical milieu has led to a loss of full control over these groups. As a result, many structures initially considered a foreign policy asset have transformed into an independent threat factor for Pakistan itself.
Of particular importance at present is the activity of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Following the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul, the TTP has significantly expanded its capabilities for basing, logistics, and coordination of actions on Afghan territory. According to estimates by the UN Security Council Monitoring Team, around 6,000 TTP militants are currently in Afghanistan, concentrated mainly in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan. Islamabad increasingly openly accuses the Afghan authorities of being unable or unwilling to restrict TTP activities. The Afghan side, in turn, rejects these accusations and accuses Pakistan of attempting to pressure and interfere in its internal affairs.
Against the backdrop of the latest escalation of the border conflict in October 2025, clashes resulted in dozens of fatalities on both sides (by various estimates, over 60 from each country) and numerous injuries. Meanwhile, among the Afghan civilian population, according to the UN, at least 37 deaths and over 400 injuries were recorded, giving the confrontation additional intensity and making it the largest escalation in recent years.
The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 was initially perceived by Pakistan as a strategic achievement capable of fostering a friendly regime and reducing threat levels on its western border. However, subsequent developments have shown the limits of such expectations. Despite historical ties between Pakistani security structures and the Afghan Taliban, Afghanistan’s new leadership demonstrates a significantly higher degree of autonomy than Islamabad had assumed.
Moreover, the ideological and ethnic affinity between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP objectively limits Kabul’s readiness to take harsh action against Pakistani anti-government groups. As a result, Pakistan finds itself in a situation where the rise to power of an allied force has not strengthened security, but has instead contributed to the expansion of cross-border threats.
Additional tensions have arisen from intensified border clashes, Pakistan’s construction of engineering barriers along the Durand Line, mass deportations of Afghan refugees, and rising anti-Pakistan sentiment within Afghanistan. These processes are creating long-term negative dynamics that complicate prospects for political resolution.
External actors continue to exert significant influence on the conflict’s development. For India, Afghanistan remains an important avenue for strategically containing Pakistan and expanding political presence in the region. Islamabad traditionally views any increase in Indian influence in Kabul as a direct threat to its own security. It is largely the factor of India-Pakistan rivalry that explains Pakistan’s desire to retain maximum influence over Afghanistan’s internal political processes.
Further exacerbation of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations followed the official visit of the Taliban government’s Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to New Delhi on October 9, 2025, where he held talks with Indian leadership on political interaction, trade, and humanitarian cooperation. In Islamabad, the intensification of contacts between Kabul and Delhi was perceived as an alarming signal and further evidence of growing Indian influence in Afghanistan, deepening the existing contradictions between Pakistan and the de facto authorities in Kabul.
China is primarily interested in preventing the spread of instability to regional transport and logistics projects, including CPEC, and minimizing threats to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. In this regard, Beijing maintains working contacts with both Pakistan and Afghanistan while avoiding direct involvement in the conflict. At the same time, China is actively developing interaction with the Central Asian states, viewing the region as a key link in the Belt and Road Initiative and an important element in securing China’s western borders.
Iran views the situation through the lens of the security of Shia communities, migration risks, and the struggle for influence in western Afghanistan. Tehran maintains a pragmatic approach to interaction with the Taliban, despite persistent disagreements. Simultaneously, Iran seeks to strengthen transport and economic ties with Central Asian countries, using the Afghan direction as part of a broader regional strategy, including the development of transit routes to the states of the region.
Uzbekistan has acquired particular importance in regional politics. Following the Taliban’s rise to power, Tashkent has taken one of the most active and pragmatic positions among Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan consistently advocates for maintaining dialogue with Kabul, developing transport connectivity, and integrating Afghanistan into regional economic projects.
For Uzbekistan, stability in Afghanistan is directly linked to the security of its southern borders, the prospects for implementing the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Khalachi railway corridor, and expanding trade and economic cooperation between Central and South Asia. Against this background, the deterioration of relations between Kabul and Islamabad, accompanied by periodic closures of key border crossings at Torkham and Chaman, negatively affects not only bilateral Afghan-Pakistani trade but also the economic interests of Central Asian states. Disruptions in goods transit, multi‑million dollar losses for foreign trade participants, rising logistics costs, and reduced predictability of transport routes undermine the region’s plans to expand access to Pakistani ports and South Asian markets. Under these circumstances, Uzbekistan seeks to maintain balanced relations with both Kabul and Islamabad, avoiding being drawn into their contradictions while advocating for the stabilization of regional transport communications.
For the United States, after the withdrawal of troops, the priority remains preventing Afghanistan from becoming a global hub for transnational terrorism. At the same time, the reduced American presence has objectively diminished the possibilities for external balancing between Kabul and Islamabad.
In the new conditions, the Central Asian states, primarily Uzbekistan, are increasingly emerging as independent regional mediators and platforms for diplomatic engagement on Afghan issues.
Current dynamics suggest that even with the preservation of formal channels of interaction, the parties are unlikely to transition to sustainable strategic partnership in the foreseeable future. A more probable scenario is the persistence of a model of limited interaction amid periodic crises, cross-border incidents, and mutual pressure.
The central contradiction of the current situation is that Pakistan, seeking to strengthen its own security by fostering a friendly political regime in Afghanistan, has instead encountered an intensification of precisely those cross-border threats it initially sought to minimize.
This demonstrates the limited effectiveness of a strategy based on managed influence in the context of high fragmentation of Afghanistan’s political space and the continued activity of armed groups. As a result, regional dynamics are increasingly determined not by the controlled influence of individual external players but by a set of interconnected conflicts that go beyond the bilateral “Kabul–Islamabad” logic.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
