by Uskanboev Giyosbek & Khidirov Mardonbek
This policy brief examines the “Zangezur Paradox” by asking whether a new transit route linking mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through Armenia’s Syunik region can function as a genuine peace-support instrument in the South Caucasus. It frames the corridor as more than a logistics upgrade within the broader Middle Corridor connecting China, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe: it is treated as a political test-case for post-conflict stabilisation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The central argument is deliberately conditional: the corridor can contribute to sustainable peace only if it is embedded in political normalisation, mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity, credible security guarantees, and enforceable legal arrangements that reduce uncertainty and prevent coercive reinterpretations.
The analysis is anchored in neorealism and the security dilemma, emphasising how infrastructure projects in contested spaces are rarely neutral: the very measures one side considers “connectivity” can be perceived by the other as strategic encroachment. From this angle, the corridor’s peace-building promise lies in transforming rivalry into interdependence raising the economic costs of renewed confrontation and creating shared incentives for stability. Yet the brief stresses that interdependence does not emerge automatically; without transparent governance and robust confidence-building mechanisms, the corridor risks becoming a pressure point that deepens mistrust rather than a platform for cooperation.
A major contribution of the brief is its actor-centred mapping of interests and anxieties. Azerbaijan is presented as prioritising uninterrupted, secure passage and national reintegration of Nakhchivan; Armenia is depicted as insisting on full jurisdiction rejecting any “extraterritorial” logic and reframing the concept through its “Crossroads of Peace” approach. Georgia is assessed as supportive of peace in principle but wary of losing transit primacy, while Iran is portrayed as viewing the corridor through a hard security lens, including fears of strategic isolation and a shift in regional power geometry. The United States is cast as a catalytic external sponsor seeking to institutionalise the route through international guarantees and investment, while Russia and Turkey are portrayed as balancing, respectively, concerns over influence and security architecture against pragmatic economic and strategic benefits.
The brief concludes that the Zangezur Corridor is neither a guaranteed peace dividend nor an inevitable trigger of escalation; it is a strategic instrument whose effects depend on design and sequencing. If managed through inclusive, rules-based governance clarifying customs and border modalities, establishing credible monitoring and dispute-resolution mechanisms, and keeping external competition from dominating the agenda, the corridor could consolidate a “peace through connectivity” logic. If, however, it is securitised, used as leverage, or perceived as undermining sovereignty, it may intensify geopolitical contestation and revive conflict dynamics. In short, the corridor’s value as a peace-support measure rests on whether it is operationalised as a shared economic public good rather than a zero-sum geopolitical trophy.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
