By Jasurbek Khamrakulov, Undergraduate student at UWED, intern at IAIS
Background
For the last several years, the European Union has become increasingly confronted with institutional paralysis in key policy areas, particularly foreign policy and financial assistance. In this context, Hungary, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, has repeatedly used its veto power to block collective EU decisions, most notably in relation to the financial aid packages for Ukraine. This has exposed structural weaknesses in EU governance at a time of heightened geopolitical urgency.
Hungary’s repeated vetoes, particularly regarding a proposed €90 billion financial assistance package for Ukraine, have provoked a wave of criticism from European leaders. Despite the strong pressure on Viktor Orbán to lift his veto on the loan, European leaders failed to reach a breakthrough at a Brussels summit, highlighting deep divisions within the Union.
Orbán justified his blockade by citing a dispute over the damaged “Druzhba” oil pipeline, supplying Hungary, while other EU leaders expressed growing frustration and accused him of undermining collective commitments, emphasizing that the aid is crucial for Ukraine’s ongoing war efforts against Russia. According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Hungary and Slovakia imported around €137 million worth of Russian oil through the pipeline in January. Oil flows reportedly stopped in late January as a result of Russian air strike that Kyiv says damaged the pipeline's western branch Ukraine. Hungary, on the other hand, disagrees, accusing Ukraine of blocking it from being used.
The current situation outlines one of the main challenges EU faces in the process of decision-making, which is unanimity. The principle allows any member state to block collective decisions, regardless of the level of support among other members. In practice, this has enabled Hungary to leverage its position to extract concessions or advance domestic political narratives centered on sovereignty and resistance to Brussels. As a result of policy paralysis, critical initiatives, particularly those related to Ukraine, are delayed or blocked. Furthermore, it weakens EU's credibility and its inability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor, working for the benefit of Russia in disrupting European aid flows to Ukraine. The Hungarian case is particularly significant because it reflects not only policy disagreement, but also broader tensions regarding rule-of-law compliance and democratic standards within the EU.
Mechanisms to Bypass Vetoes
Some experts argue that in exceptional circumstances, such as the conflict in Ukraine, the European Union can legally bypass Hungary’s veto if it violates core EU values, particularly the principle of solidarity in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. The legal pathways to overcome this dilemma are divided in two directions. If Hungary’s veto represents a serious and systemic breach of solidarity, the decision could proceed without counting Hungary’s vote. Secondly, unanimity rules could be reinterpreted, allowing qualified majority voting in situations that pose existential threats to the EU’s security, values, and stability. The solutions are meant to be exceptional and narrowly applied, not a general abandonment of unanimity. While critics warn that such approaches could damage trust among member states or erode legal consistency, the failure to act in the face of systemic obstruction is a greater risk, as it weakens the EU’s ability to respond quickly to global trends.
EU countries are already weighing options to circumvent Hungarian veto. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and others have publicly stated “alternatives exist” and the EU will deliver “one way or the other”. The plans aim to reduce reliance on unanimity while preserving as much EU unity as possible.
The first measure includes changing the voting system by expanding qualified majority voting(QMV) into areas that currently require unanimity, such as foreign policy decisions or parts of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Under QMV, decisions would pass with the support of 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the EU population, allowing Ukraine aid, sanctions, or enlargement steps to proceed without Hungary’s consent. However, the challenges on the way of implementing the new system include the political sensitivity of overriding a core EU principle of consensus.
The second step involves advancing a “multi-speed Europe” through greater use of flexible formats, such as informal “coalitions of the willing” and enhanced cooperation among member states. This would let groups of countries move forward on security, competitiveness, or Ukraine-related financing without needing full EU-27 approval. EU treaties already permit enhanced cooperation, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly endorsed it in February, stating that where unanimity stalls progress, the bloc “should not shy away from using the possibilities foreseen in the treaties.”
Such arrangements already happen, to a certain degree, especially in the context of intergovernmental agreements that bypass EU institutional framework on the security and military issues. Moreover, creating specific funds or using the proceeds of the Russian frozen assets are the alternative ways to raise the financial aid bypassing restrictions.
On April 1, the European Union received €1.4 billion in windfall profits generated by interest on cash balances from the immobilized assets of the Russian Central Bank, marking the fourth such transfer following the third tranche in August 2025 and covering revenues accumulated in the second half of 2025. These extraordinary revenues are derived from EU sanctions, while the underlying assets (worth over €200 billion) remain frozen and cannot be transferred back to Russia (as reinforced by the December 2025 Council decision under Regulation 2025/2600 and Article 122 TFEU), the interest does not belong to Russia and has been repurposed to support Ukraine. This mechanism serves as a practical and robust bypass to unanimity requirements, enabling continued financing for Ukraine even amid vetoes by individual member states such as Hungary. At the same time the concept’s main drawback lies on the inability of these formats to fully replace EU-27 decisions, and, furthermore, leading to the erosion of overall unity.
The ways of compromise outlined by Kaja Kallas suggest energy-security concession - routing non-Russian crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia through Croatia’s Adria (JANAF) pipeline system as the replacement for the “Druzhba” pipeline. The European Commission’s Oil Coordination Group confirmed in late February 2026 that the Adria route from Croatia’s terminal has sufficient capacity to cover all Hungarian and Slovak needs. Croatia affirmed readiness to ensure deliveries of non-Russian cargoes, with the EU offering technical and financial support for diversification and interim measures. This strategy illustrates how targeted economic and infrastructural projects can be used alongside political pressure to bring dissenting member states back into alignment with EU objectives.
In contrast to the soft mechanisms, EU officials are also considering the stronger enforcement and financial pressure, tightening rule-of-law conditionality to withhold EU funds from Hungary. This would invoke Article 4(3) of the EU treaties (the duty of sincere cooperation) and link access to the next MFF budget, negotiations starting in July, to compliance on issues like Ukraine aid. European Council President Costa has already signaled this route, while Commissioner Michael McGrath confirmed that “if breaches to the rule of law were to occur, the suspension of payments or blocking of funding is now on the table.”
The EU has already effectively frozen approval of a €16 billion defense loan for Hungary under the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) program. The situation illustrates how the EU is using economic leverage as an indirect way to counter veto power, reinforcing compliance without formally changing unanimity rules. Hungary has warned it might reject the entire new MFF if funds remain at risk, but the approach would give the EU leverage to penalize vetoes without treaty changes.
Another potential approach might involve suspending voting rights via Article 7 of the EU treaties, which allows the bloc to strip a member state’s voting privileges for serious breaches of EU values. The European Parliament already triggered Article 7 against Hungary in 2018. Reactivating or advancing it could create significant pressure even if full suspension is hard to achieve, requiring unanimity among the other 26 states. On the other hand, even pushing for Article 7 could create huge pressure on Hungary, completely isolating Hungary on Ukraine-related votes.
The last and the most extreme measure is the expulsion from the EU, though it remains largely hypothetical and legally challenging because no treaty provision explicitly allows it. Some diplomats have proposed changing Article 50 (the Brexit exit clause) or other workarounds as a last resort. The idea is rarely discussed openly due to fears that Hungary would move even closer to Russia, but it is raised as a theoretical way to permanently remove a veto player from Ukraine aid and other decisions.
Context of the 2026 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections
On April 12, Hungary will hold one of the crucial, future-defining parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been in power for 16 years, is facing the most intense challenge in the last several elections, from the opponent Peter Magyar, Tisza party. Polls show Orbán’s Fidesz trailing the opposition Tisza party by roughly 9–12 points.
Many EU officials openly expressed hope that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán could be voted out, However, EU diplomats remained cautious, noting that even if Orbán were defeated, his successor might not fully reverse Hungary’s positions, particularly on sensitive issues like migration or EU expansion. Magyar has promised to realign Hungary more closely with the EU and NATO and unlock billions in frozen EU funds, but some officials believe any policy shift would be gradual rather than transformative.
Potential Scenarios and EU reactions
In the first scenario, If Orbán remains in power following the upcoming elections, the European Union is likely to systematically expand its use of veto-bypass mechanisms. In this case, tools such as enhanced cooperation, intergovernmental agreements outside the EU treaty framework, and off-budget financial instruments would become more institutionalized rather than ad hoc solutions.
At the same time, the EU would likely intensify political and economic pressure on Hungary. This could include delaying or conditioning access to EU funds, increasing public criticism from EU leaders, and further isolating Hungary in diplomatic forums. While formal sanctions under mechanisms such as Article 7 remain difficult due to unanimity requirements, informal exclusion from key decision-making processes may become more pronounced.
In the second scenario, A victory by opposition party would create an opportunity for a reset in EU–Hungary relations. Opposition leaders, including Péter Magyar, have signaled a more cooperative stance toward the EU, emphasizing the importance of restoring trust, unlocking frozen EU funds, and aligning Hungary more closely with common European policies.
The EU would likely prioritize rapid reintegration of Hungary into consensus-based governance. This could involve accelerating the release of withheld funds, including approximately €17 billion in frozen EU cohesion and recovery funds, which have been suspended primarily over rule-of-law and corruption concerns, reestablishing Hungary’s role in collective decision-making, and reducing reliance on bypass mechanisms such as enhanced cooperation. A more constructive Hungarian position would also facilitate smoother coordination on key issues, including sanctions policy and broader geopolitical strategy.
However, even a pro-EU administration may face domestic political constraints, limiting its ability to fully reverse previous positions. As a result, while institutional cohesion would likely improve, the EU may remain cautious and retain some fallback mechanisms to guard against future obstruction.
Considering the current internal disagreements inside the bloc, one thing is clear - the election outcome will directly influence the EU’s strategic trajectory and institutional mechanisms in managing veto players, while maintaining long-term support for Ukraine. Regardless of the result, the EU appears determined to ensure that Hungarian case does not hinder collective action on existential foreign policy priorities.
