The accelerating campaign for the US Congressional elections this November highlights deepening partisan polarization and a profound structural realignment of the American political system. Formally, the Republican Party retains control over both houses of Congress and the executive branch, but its political capabilities are increasingly constrained by internal divisions, growing public dissatisfaction with the administration's foreign policy course, and mounting socio-economic pressure. At the same time, the Democratic Party, despite its own internal heterogeneity, is gaining an opportunity to consolidate on an anti-Trump platform and use the White House's managerial missteps as a factor for electoral mobilization.
A distinct feature of the current period is that the struggle is unfolding simultaneously on several levels. The first level is the interparty confrontation between Republicans and Democrats for control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The second level is the intraparty struggle among the Republicans themselves—between the pro-Trump MAGA wing, centrists, and traditional conservatives. The third level is the internal redistribution of roles within the Democratic Party among the traditional party establishment, moderates, and left-leaning progressive groups. Collectively, this makes the Congressional elections not merely a contest of party machines, but an arena for a broader conflict over the future configuration of American power.
The Republican Party. A key feature of the modern Republican camp remains its high dependence on the figure of Donald Trump. In its current form, MAGA is not a classic ideological platform of American conservatism, but a personalized political structure in which the central source of legitimacy is Trump himself, his rhetoric, his behavioral style, and his ability to sustain the mobilization of the most active segment of the party's electorate. This provides Republicans with short-term mobilization energy, but simultaneously weakens the institutional resilience of the party itself, as intraparty loyalty is increasingly built not around a stable platform, but around political devotion to the leader.
Against this backdrop, three distinct lines are becoming increasingly apparent within the Republican Party. The first is the core pro-Trump faction, ready to support any agenda changes as long as they come from Donald Trump. The second consists of more establishment conservatives and party pragmatists, for whom the electoral popularity of candidates, control over Congress, and the governability of institutions remain the priorities. The third is the provisional post-Trump wing, which has not yet taken organizational shape but is already tied to the question of who will inherit the Republican base once Donald Trump's political cycle concludes. It is precisely at the intersection of these vectors that the main intraparty struggle is unfolding.
An additional factor driving growing intraparty tension is the Iranian campaign, which has exacerbated the contradiction between foreign policy hawks and electoral pragmatists within the administration and the party. A segment of the Republican establishment operates on the premise that betting on military escalation demonstrates resolve and bolsters the image of a strong government. Another segment, conversely, associates the war with rising domestic costs, deteriorating public sentiment, and the risk of defeat in the Congressional elections. In this context, even the cautious distancing of certain figures—such as Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio—from the Iranian policy line should be viewed not as an isolated incident, but as a symptom of a deepening divergence between ideological mobilization and electoral calculation.
A serious indicator of this problem has been the personnel turbulence within the executive branch. The resignation of Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem demonstrated that even the most sensitive and traditionally advantageous areas for Republicans—primarily immigration policy and homeland security—are ceasing to function automatically as a resource for consolidation. On the contrary, amidst scandals, managerial failures, and public conflict, they are beginning to be associated with the instability of the administration itself. This is particularly sensitive for the election campaign, as the immigration issue remains a core element of Republican identity.
Another factor of intraparty tension has been tariff policy. Within the MAGA sphere, protectionism remains a crucial element of economic nationalism and a symbol of the struggle to restore the US industrial base. However, the Supreme Court ruling striking down the tariffs imposed by Donald Trump, along with plaintiffs' demands for the refund of substantial sums associated with their application, demonstrate that Trump's trade policy is no longer perceived exclusively as a political asset. The gap between the mobilization benefits of tough tariff rhetoric and its actual administrative, legal, and economic consequences is becoming increasingly apparent. As a result, the divergence between proponents of ideological loyalty to the protectionist course and the interests of more pragmatic business groups is widening within the Republican Party.
The Democratic Party. Unlike the Republicans, the crisis facing the Democrats is not personalist but coalitional in nature. The Democratic Party comprises the party establishment, moderate centrists, left-wing progressives, and a radical wing that opposes corporations and military conflicts. Under normal circumstances, such fragmentation would create significant difficulties in formulating a unified strategy. However, at present, the shared rejection of Donald Trump pushes internal disputes to the background and unites the party into a broad coalition. The political logic of the Democrats is built around several interconnected vectors. First, the defense of institutions and portraying Donald Trump as a figure accelerating the erosion of traditional mechanisms of American democracy. Second, the effort to link the White House's foreign policy course with domestic socio-economic consequences, primarily the rising cost of living. Third, the use of anti-war and anti-crisis rhetoric to mobilize both moderate and progressive voters. As a result, Democrats are gaining the opportunity to unite various party segments around a common thesis: the current administration is increasing external risks without offering society either a sustainable strategy or domestic economic compensation.
Despite this, internal differences within the Democratic Party have not disappeared. The party center and traditional establishment tend to emphasize restoring predictable governance, defending the rule of law, and institutional containment of the administration. The left wing seeks to use the situation to expand the social agenda, criticize the militarization of foreign policy, and exert pressure on corporate-financial groups. Nevertheless, in the short term, these differences serve to broaden the electoral reach rather than disorganize the party. Moderates and progressives appeal to different voter segments, but in the current cycle, they operate within a shared anti-Trump framework.
The Iranian Crisis as a Factor in Political Polarization. The key external factor accelerating domestic political confrontation has been the war with Iran. Unlike the traditional "rally 'round the flag" logic, the military campaign has not led to an increase in support for the administration. In the early weeks of the conflict, support for military action remained consistently low or fluctuated at a level that failed to form a stable public majority. In most polls, approval for the military campaign stood in the range of about 40%, while the share of those opposed was significantly higher. Furthermore, the most stable characteristic of public opinion has been not merely lukewarm support, but extremely high partisan polarization regarding the conflict.
Among Republicans, support for the strike on Iran remained high, whereas nearly unanimous opposition prevailed among Democrats. Independent voters also leaned more frequently toward a critical or cautious stance. This indicates that the conflict did not become an issue of national security capable of temporarily suspending partisan divisions. On the contrary, the war entered American politics from the outset as a polarizing factor, amplifying the already existing fault lines between and within the parties.
A significant factor has been the problem of strategic communication: the administration failed to foster a clear public understanding of the campaign's ultimate goals. In an environment of informational uncertainty, voters are inclined to rely not on a rational assessment of the policy course, but on their baseline level of trust in the president. As a result, military actions are perceived by a substantial portion of the electorate not as a consolidating factor, but as a risky maneuver that deepens the internal divide.
The Energy Shock and its Electoral Consequences. The most palpable channel through which the external crisis has transformed into a domestic political problem is the rise in fuel prices. The energy shock in the US has taken on not only a macroeconomic but also a direct electoral dimension. The rising cost of gasoline and diesel rapidly affected traditionally Democratic and Republican states alike, as well as swing states. Crucially, the impact hit not only coastal regions sensitive to foreign supplies, but also those states upon which the outcome of the battle for Congress heavily depends.
Foreign policy escalation has morphed into a matter of everyday well-being in the minds of citizens. For a significant portion of the electorate, the conflict with Iran ceased to be a question of geopolitics, having transformed into a catalyst for inflation and reduced purchasing power. This poses a critical challenge for Donald Trump's administration, whose political capital is rooted in the promise of economic stability. The contradiction between the foreign policy course and domestic economic priorities threatens the cohesion of the Republican electoral base.
As a consequence, Congress is becoming an arena not only for competition between the two parties but also for a more complex conflict between different models of US political development. For Republicans, the struggle is simultaneously about maintaining their majority and determining whether the party will remain an instrument of personal mobilization around Donald Trump or begin to return to a more institutional model. For Democrats, the task lies not only in securing mandates but also in utilizing the electoral cycle as a mechanism for institutional containment of the White House.
Of particular significance is the fact that interparty conflict is increasingly intertwining with intraparty struggles. Any administration decision regarding Iran, tariffs, immigration, or personnel matters immediately impacts not only relations between Republicans and Democrats but also the balance of power within the parties themselves. This is exactly what makes the current cycle qualitatively different. It is unfolding not as a battle between two relatively cohesive political blocs, but as a multiple overlay of external conflict, intraparty fragmentation, institutional overload, and public distrust.
Thus, the 2026 US Congressional election campaign reflects not merely another phase of electoral competition, but a broader crisis within the American political system. At the interparty level, it takes the form of a clash between the Republican model of personalized mobilization and the Democratic coalition of institutional containment. At the intraparty level, the conflict among the pro-Trump core, the center, and potential successors of the post-Trump era is intensifying within the Republican ranks, while Democrats are temporarily smoothing over their own contradictions through shared anti-Trump consolidation.
The Iranian crisis, rising fuel prices, the administration's personnel instability, disputes over tariff policy, and the upcoming renewal of Congress heighten the sense of managerial overload within the American system. Under these conditions, the battle for the House of Representatives and the Senate becomes a struggle not only over the distribution of mandates but also over which model of political governance will dominate the US in the coming years. This is precisely why the 2026 elections should be viewed as a crucial milestone in the transformation of American politics.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
