This policy brief, co-authored by Aziza Mukhammedova, Jalal Ud Din Kakar, and Zil E Huma, examines Pakistan’s long-standing reliance on militant proxies in Afghanistan through the lens of the “boomerang effect” – the idea that short-sighted strategic choices eventually return to undermine the security of the state that made them. Taking the Durand Line as both a geographic and symbolic starting point, the authors trace how this unresolved, colonial-era border dispute, combined with Pakistan’s search for “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, has produced a security environment that Islamabad can no longer effectively manage. The brief situates the current spike in cross-border tensions, retaliatory strikes and mutual accusations between Kabul and Islamabad within this longer history of proxy warfare and miscalculated geopolitical engineering.
The authors show how Pakistan’s early recognition and sustained support of the Taliban, including during the anti-Soviet jihad and later as a “friendly” regime in Kabul, was driven by the desire to counter Indian influence and secure a compliant government next door. However, over time this supposed asset turned into an autonomous actor with its own priorities. The Taliban’s refusal to compromise on the Durand Line, the persistence of Afghan Pashtun nationalism, and Kabul’s diversification of foreign ties with China, Russia, Qatar and even India have gradually eroded Pakistan’s leverage. The brief portrays this evolution as a classic case of strategic blowback: a patron that once shaped the proxy’s rise is now confronted with a neighbour unwilling to fully accommodate its security demands.
A central focus of the analysis is the emergence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a direct threat to Pakistan’s internal security. Drawing on the Global Terrorism Index, the authors highlight a 91 percent surge in TTP activity since 2023, with 482 attacks recorded in 2024 after the Taliban’s return to power. They argue that safe havens across the border, combined with Kabul’s reluctance to decisively confront TTP, have emboldened the group. At the same time, Kabul accuses Islamabad of links with IS-K, while Pakistan charges Afghanistan with using TTP and BLA as proxies – a mutual blame game that entrenches mistrust and fuels recurring clashes along the Durand Line.
In conclusion, the brief contends that Pakistan is now paying the full price of its proxy-centred doctrine. Instead of a secure western flank, Islamabad faces a hostile or at best unreliable neighbour, mounting militant violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and growing pressure on flagship projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. The need to divert military and political attention to the western border, just as India strengthens its diplomatic presence in Kabul, further complicates Pakistan’s strategic posture. The authors argue that this “boomerang effect” not only exposes the limits of proxy warfare as a long-term strategy, but also raises fundamental questions about Pakistan’s civil–military decision-making and the urgent necessity of moving towards more cooperative, rule-based regional security arrangements.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
