By Zulkhumor Makhmudova, UWED PhD Student   The contemporary global environment increasingly requires the Turkic states not only to maintain traditional cultural cooperation but also to deepen practical and functional integration. The growing deficit of trust in international relations and the weakening influence of global institutions have created conditions in which regional mechanisms aimed at ensuring transport security, food sustainability, ecological stability, and protection against digital threats are becoming a strategic necessity. Within this context, Turkic integration is acquiring a fundamentally new geopolitical significance. In recent years, the overall economic potential of the member states of the Organization of Turkic States has increased substantially, while the volume of intra-regional trade has expanded steadily. Nevertheless, economic growth alone is insufficient. The principal challenge lies in transforming this growth into sustainable institutional integration. At the current stage, the Turkic states face four major strategic challenges: transport and logistics integration, digital transformation, ecological security, and cybersecurity. One of the most critical problems concerns the insufficient integration of transport and logistics systems. In the contemporary global economy, transit corridors have become a central element of geopolitical competition. The Russia–Ukraine war, instability in the Red Sea region, and disruptions in global supply chains have intensified the need for alternative transport routes across Eurasia. Consequently, the strategic significance of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly referred to as the “Middle Corridor,” has grown considerably. However, the effectiveness of this corridor depends not only on railway and highway infrastructure. The primary obstacles include the complexity of customs procedures, the slow exchange of information, and bureaucratic barriers in transit operations. In this regard, the implementation of digital logistics instruments such as “E-Permit,” “e-CMR,” and “eTIR” is emerging as an important strategic solution. The introduction of digital logistics platforms enables the reduction of transit time, real-time cargo tracking, and the lowering of transportation costs. This, in turn, enhances the competitiveness of the Turkic states within the global trading system. In particular, the integration of the “China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan” railway with the “Middle Corridor” substantially increases Uzbekistan’s geoeconomic importance. If implemented successfully, this project could transform the country into one of the key transit and logistics hubs of Central Asia. Nevertheless, several serious challenges remain. First, infrastructure projects require enormous financial resources. Second, transport corridors are closely connected with the strategic interests of major powers, which intensifies geopolitical pressure. Third, differences in customs regulations and technical standards continue to slow the process of logistics integration. A viable solution to these challenges would be the establishment of a unified digital transit space. This would require the full digitalization of customs systems, the automation of information exchange, and the creation of a single coordination platform among transport operators. At the same time, it would be appropriate to develop special financial mechanisms within the framework of the Turkic Investment Fund aimed at supporting logistics infrastructure projects. The second major challenge is digital transformation and technological disparity. In the modern world, economic superiority increasingly depends on artificial intelligence, data centers, cloud technologies, and large-scale data infrastructures. Consequently, the digital economy is becoming not only a technological phenomenon but also a geopolitical factor. For the Turkic states, the principal risk lies in remaining on the periphery of global technological competition. Today, the markets of artificial intelligence and advanced technologies are dominated by the United States, China, and the European Union, while the Turkic states are still at the stage of constructing a common technological space. Therefore, the establishment of a strategic cooperation network in the field of artificial intelligence has become critically important. One of the greatest difficulties in this sphere is technological asymmetry. While Türkiye and Kazakhstan possess relatively advanced digital infrastructures, in some states this sector remains at an initial stage of development. In addition, the shortage of highly qualified IT specialists constitutes a serious obstacle. The solution to this problem requires the development of common educational and innovation platforms. The initiative known as “Five Million AI Leaders” represents an important effort aimed at strengthening human capital. Furthermore, the establishment of joint AI laboratories, technoparks, startup ecosystems, and venture funds could significantly accelerate technological integration. In addition, the concept of a “Digital Turkic Corridor” possesses considerable strategic value. This initiative envisages the integration of data centers, high-speed communication channels, and cloud technologies into a unified network. If fully implemented, it could enable the Turkic states to establish an independent digital space. The third major challenge concerns ecological security. Central Asia and the Caucasus are among the regions most severely affected by climate change. Glacier melting, water scarcity, desertification, and soil degradation pose serious threats to regional stability. Most importantly, ecological problems are no longer confined to environmental issues alone; they are increasingly becoming economic and security concerns as well. Water shortages directly affect agriculture, energy systems, and food security. Consequently, ecological cooperation is becoming one of the key dimensions of Turkic integration. In this regard, initiatives aimed at establishing climate monitoring systems based on satellite data and applying artificial intelligence to the management of transboundary water resources represent important strategic solutions. Such systems would enable the early detection of droughts, forecasting of water flows, and continuous monitoring of ecological risks. At the same time, strengthening ecological diplomacy is equally important, since conflicts over water and environmental resources may intensify political tensions in the future. Therefore, the establishment of common ecological platforms and scientific centers appears necessary. The fourth challenge relates to cybersecurity and digital threats. In the contemporary world, national economies, banking systems, transportation networks, and energy infrastructures are becoming increasingly dependent on digital technologies. This significantly increases vulnerability to cyberattacks. As a result, cybersecurity has become an integral component of national security. For the Turkic states, the principal threat lies in the insufficient protection of digital infrastructure. Particularly with the rapid development of artificial intelligence technologies, the risks of cybercrime and information manipulation continue to grow. Therefore, the proposal to establish a “Turkic Alliance for Cybersecurity and the Protection of Digital Infrastructure” carries substantial strategic significance. Such an initiative could facilitate rapid information exchange, joint training programs, the preparation of specialists, and the creation of coordinated mechanisms against digital threats. However, significant obstacles remain, including differences in technological capacities and the absence of unified standards. Moreover, the issue of artificial intelligence ethics is becoming increasingly urgent. If AI technologies are misused, they may intensify information manipulation, surveillance systems, and digital control. For this reason, the development of common ethical standards based on human-centered principles is of strategic importance. Overall, Turkic integration is entering a qualitatively new stage of development. Integration is no longer limited to historical affinity or cultural solidarity. Instead, transport systems, the digital economy, ecological security, artificial intelligence, and cyber resilience are becoming the principal pillars of cooperation. Nevertheless, the success of this process depends on several factors. First, sustained political will remains essential. Second, proposed initiatives must move beyond declarative rhetoric and be translated into practical mechanisms. Third, the volume of economic and technological investment must increase significantly. If the Turkic states are able to prioritize common strategic interests over narrow national competition, the Organization of Turkic States could evolve into one of the most influential functional regional platforms in Eurasia during the twenty-first century. In particular, the formation of a unified digital space, integrated logistics systems, ecological monitoring mechanisms, and cybersecurity frameworks may elevate Turkic integration to an entirely new level. Ultimately, the integration of the Turkic world may emerge not merely as a model of cultural unity, but as a new regional development model grounded in modern digital geopolitics, economic security, and innovative development.

The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) marks a definitive shift in China’s economic trajectory, signaling an era where the “quality” of growth takes precedence over its sheer velocity. By setting a modest GDP target of 4.5–5%, Beijing acknowledges that the era of debt-fueled real estate expansion and massive infrastructure projects has reached a point of diminishing returns. Instead, the strategy pivots toward “New Quality Productive Forces”, placing a heavy bet on high-tech frontiers like artificial intelligence, quantum technology, and the low-altitude economy. This transition aims to bake innovation directly into the country’s industrial DNA, targeting a digital economy that accounts for 12.5% of GDP by the decade's end. Strategically, the plan balances domestic social reform with global environmental commitments. To correct deep-seated imbalances, China is moving to bolster its “dual circulation” model by strengthening social safety nets—such as childcare and elderly care—to finally unlock sluggish household consumption. While the plan reaffirms a commitment to carbon neutrality by 2060, it adopts a pragmatic approach to emissions, focusing on a 17% reduction in carbon intensity. Internationally, the Belt and Road Initiative is being recalibrated to favor smaller, high-yield “boutique” projects, reflecting a more cautious and selective engagement with global markets. However, the path to 2030 is fraught with structural headwinds that could test the government's resolve. The persistent drag of the property sector, industrial overcapacity, and a cautious consumer base present significant risks to these modernization goals. The success of this policy brief’s vision hinges on whether the state can successfully navigate these financial vulnerabilities while simultaneously fostering an environment where technological self-reliance can thrive without stifling the very industrial momentum it seeks to preserve. Read on the website of the Center for Progressive Reforms * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova examines why India should pay closer attention to the Trans-Afghan Corridor as an alternative route for strengthening its connectivity with Central Asia and Eurasia. Against the backdrop of renewed U.S. sanctions on Iran and growing instability in the Middle East, India’s reliance on the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor faces increasing uncertainty. The brief argues that these developments create a strategic need for New Delhi to diversify its transport options and consider routes that bypass Iran. The author highlights the economic and geopolitical relevance of the Termez–Naibabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi railway project, also known as the Trans-Afghan or Kabul Corridor. By linking Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the corridor could provide India with a shorter and more cost-effective land route to Central Asian and Eurasian markets. It also has the potential to reduce transport time, expand trade opportunities and strengthen India’s role in a region it increasingly views as part of its extended neighbourhood. At the same time, the brief acknowledges the political constraints surrounding the project, including India’s difficult relations with Pakistan, instability along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border and China’s growing influence through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Despite these challenges, the author argues that Uzbekistan should intensify diplomatic engagement with India, explain the economic viability of the Kabul Corridor and establish regular consultations with relevant Indian agencies on transport cooperation. Read on SIGA’s website * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Jasurbek Khamrakulov, Undergraduate student at UWED, intern at IAIS   Background In recent years, the relations between Europe and China have entered an increasingly complex and controversial phase. While the European Union is determined to engage with China in open dialogue and cooperate on common challenges, including the climate challenge, it has raised serious concerns over trade imbalances, supply chain vulnerabilities and technological competition. The EU identifies China simultaneously as a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival,” an expression first introduced in its 2019 strategic outlook and reaffirmed by EU member states in 2023. China remains one of the EU’s largest trading partners, with bilateral trade in goods reaching €732 billion in 2024. However, the EU has run trade deficit with China for decades. It amounted €359.9 billion in 2025 and surpassed the €312.2 billion deficit of 2024. China became the EU's fourth-largest partner for exports and remains its biggest for imports. Chinese companies exported the goods to Europe with the value of €559.5 billion. Besides, EU imports of manufactured goods made up 97.3% of total imports from China. The most imported manufactured goods were machinery(54.4%), other manufactured goods (33%) and chemicals (9.8%). De-risking strategy Therefore, the central theme of current EU policy has become “de-risking” strategy. The term was introduced in the strategy of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her first mandate. She emphasized the need to mitigate of dependencies on China, particularly in areas of high tech and dual-use goods.  Even under the pressure of the American worldwide tariffs imposed by the Trump’s administration in 2025, von der Leyen viewed Europe and China as two of the world's largest markets, designed to support reformed free trading system, thereby rejecting Trump’s demands for decoupling from China.  Eventually, the situation in the rare earth market intensified after China expanded export controlson several strategic minerals, such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earth minerals, which are essential for electric vehicles, renewable energy technologies, semiconductors, and defense industries. This exposed Europe’s vulnerability in global supply chains. Brussels responded by introducing “economic security doctrine” and initiating new measures focused on stockpiling, recycling, joint purchasing, and diversifying imports through partnerships with alternative suppliers. An important step was taken with the EU and the United States have signing a new strategic partnership on critical minerals aimed to reduce Western dependence on China. The agreement, signed by EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, includes coordination on mining, refining, recycling, stockpiling, and trade policies related to critical raw materials. In this context, the de-risking strategy is clearly seen in European Union’s accelerated efforts to reduce its dependence on China for critical raw materials. These initiatives build upon the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims to ensure that no more than 65% of a strategic raw material comes from a single external source.  Moreover, the core elements of the new doctrine included improving coordination among member states and accelerating the use of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. Initiatives such as “RESourceEU” were prioritized to strengthen domestic industrial capacity in sectors like batteries, AI, defense, and semiconductors. However,  one of the major obstacles facing Europe’s approach comes down to the lack of funding, domestic mining capacity and processing infrastructure to compete with Chinese companies. Maintaining the approach would require greater use of financing from the European Investment Bank for funding and to the EU's Global Gateway plan, its own version of China's Belt and Road scheme. Despite the hurdles, the EU has maintained additional tariffs on electric vehicles manufactured in China. The tariffs, first introduced in 2024 after an anti-subsidy investigation, can reach up to 35.3% depending on the manufacturer. However, the EU has also demonstrated a pragmatism by allowing individual companies to negotiate tariff exemptions through minimum-price agreements and import quotas. In February 2026, the European Commission approved the first such exemption for Volkswagen’s China-made Cupra Tavascan model, showing that Europe seeks to manage economic competition with China rather than choose the path of immediate decoupling. At the same time, the European Commission recommended the member states exclude of equipment from Huawei and ZTE as part of a broader strategy to strengthen cybersecurity and reduce strategic vulnerabilities linked to “high-risk suppliers” in key sector, such as critical digital infrastructure. The move demonstrates how the European rhetoric is going far beyond trade into the digital security, where technological dependence is now viewed as a geopolitical risk. This process of securitization is also evident in the EU’s climate policies and protectionism. A major example is the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which entered into force in January and applies carbon pricing to imports of emissions-intensive goods such as steel, aluminium, and cement. Since China is a major exporter of these products, the mechanism creates additional compliance costs and competitive pressure for Chinese firms, while encouraging cleaner production standards. Geopolitical dimensions One of the main sensitive obstacles to ease EU-China relations lies in the geopolitical tensions.  China’s close relationship with Russia remains a major concern for European policymakers, especially regarding sanctions circumvention. Meanwhile, China’s expanding influence in the Global South, especially in regions rich in critical minerals such as Latin America and Africa, also overlaps with Europe’s own diversification strategies. As a result, European companies are gradually adjusting their business models through supplier diversification, localization strategies, and closer geopolitical risk assessment. The engagement of the EU with China has long been shaped by the trends and development of Transatlantic relations. Over the last several months, the growing tensions between Europe and the United States have created opportunities for China to re-engage with Europe, but on terms favorable to Beijing. Chinese analysts increasingly interpret Europe’s push for “strategic autonomy” as a sign that the EU may distance itself from Washington and soften its strategy towards China. However, Europe’s de-risking policies are not simply the result of American pressure, but come from the EU’s own assessment of strategic vulnerabilities linked to Chinese supply chains, state subsidies and technological dependencies. As the pressure from the US rapidly grows, China will likely attempt to exploit transatlantic tensions by offering selective economic incentives and pressure Europe to loosen its economic restrictions. European and Chinese perceptions Chinese experts often describe Europe’s policy as an over-securitization of economic relations that damages the EU’s own economic interests. They argue that reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains increases production costs and complicates the continent’s green and digital transitions by limiting access to affordable Chinese technologies and industrial goods. Some media channels even claim that Europe’s de-risking is turning into a form of “de-development”caused by pressure from the United States rather than by Europe’s own economic interests. From the constructivist perspective, European perceptions of China are becoming extremely complex and contradictory. While many Europeans support reducing economic dependence on China and favor diversifying trade relations, Chinese exports to Europe continue to grow rapidly, especially in major economies such as Germany, France, and Italy. Public opinion reflects a tension between concern over European deindustrialization and consumers’ attraction to affordable Chinese products. These divisions are also geographical, with Southern European countries generally more open to Chinese economic engagement than more industrialized northern states. Many European governments continue pursuing pragmatic engagement with China despite Brussels’ tougher regulatory approach. Ongoing visits by European leaders, including Friedrich Merz’s visit in February are viewed as evidence that many EU member states still value economic cooperation and recognize the importance of Chinese markets. A harder line on China is gaining momentum inside the European Commission. It is actively exploring the unused Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) that would include tariffs, import/export restrictions, bans on public procurement participation, restrictions on intellectual property rights, to counter Chinese economic pressure. A key debate among the 27 Commissioners on the EU’s China strategy is scheduled for 29 May 2026. This shift follows frustration with Beijing’s lack of meaningful concessions despite repeated EU concerns and Chinese retaliation threats over EU legislation such as the “Made in Europe” Industrial Accelerator Act. Despite the Commission’s tougher stance, member states remain divided. Germany’s Chancellor F. Merz has expressed the intention of a long-term trade deal with Beijing. Spain continues to pursue close economic ties, while France and Belgium call for a firmer approach to protect European industries. Activating stronger tools like the ACI would require qualified majority support. Policy recommendations Given the potential risks and internal inconsistencies, a key takeaway for the EU should be continuing a balanced and pragmatic de-risking strategy rather than full economic decoupling from China. Firstly, the EU must accelerate the diversification of strategic supply chains. Priority sectors include critical raw materials, semiconductors, batteries, pharmaceuticals, and green technologies. This requires rapidly expanding trade and investment agreements with alternative suppliers in Latin America (particularly MERCOSUR), Africa, and the Indo-Pacific to reduce exposure to geopolitical shocks, export controls, and economic coercion. Secondly, Europe needs to strengthen its domestic industrial and technological base through targeted industrial policy. The Critical Raw Materials Act, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and green industrial subsidies should be complemented by increased funding for research and development, faster permitting for strategic projects, and infrastructure modernization. While pursuing these goals, the EU must avoid excessive protectionism that could raise consumer costs, slow down innovation, or trigger damaging reactions. Instead, it should rely on precise, WTO-compatible tools such as anti-subsidy measures, investment screening, and cybersecurity standards in high-risk sectors. Thirdly, the EU should overcome internal fragmentation by developing a more unified and coherent China policy. National differences have too often undermined collective decision-making. Achieving consensus among key member states will significantly enhance the Union’s negotiating position. At the same time, the EU should deepen strategic partnerships with Indo-Pacific democracies, including Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia, in critical minerals, technology standards, digital governance, and maritime security. These partnerships will help reduce over-reliance on China without undermining the free and open trading system. Ultimately, Europe’s approach toward China is best understood not as a move toward confrontation, but as an attempt to find the proper way in the anarchic international system through pragmatic balancing. The potential success can be only achieved if Europe’s de-risking strategy represents both a response to geopolitical pressures and a long-term effort to reach strategic autonomy in the multipolar order. And that strategic autonomy begins with unity; without it, Europe negotiates with China not as a power, but as a collection of voices. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Khabibulla Khayrullaev, UWED undergraduate, intern at IAIS   Origins and Institutional Framework On January 20, 2025, the first day of his second term, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 14158, establishing the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). Structured as a temporary division embedded within the existing United States Digital Service (renamed the United States DOGE Service), the organization was assigned an 18-month mandate with a formal termination date of July 4, 2026 – the 250th anniversary of American independence, which Trump called “the perfect gift to America”. Entrepreneur Elon Musk, who had donated more than $290 million to Trump’s 2024 campaign — the largest individual political donation in American history — led DOGE as a “special government employee”,  a status permitting a maximum of 130 working days per year. DOGE’s stated mission was to modernize federal information technology, maximize productivity, and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. In practice, teams of young technology professionals, many recruited directly from Musk’s own companies or straight out of college, were deployed across dozens of federal agencies with broad authority to cancel contracts, terminate grants, and facilitate mass layoffs, operating with limited interagency coordination and frequently without prior legal review.   The Savings Claim: What DOGE Says vs. What Analysts Find DOGE’s official “wall of receipts”, a public tally on its website, claims between $160 and $215 billion in savings as of early 2026. Musk’s original public promise of $2 trillion was subsequently revised downward to $1 trillion, then further to $150–200 billion — a reduction of more than 90% from the initial target. A February 2026 CBS News investigation found that the 13 largest claimed cancellations were all incorrect, and journalists identified billions of dollars in miscounting. A rigorous counter-analysis by the nonpartisan Partnership for Public Service estimated that DOGE’s actions — including paying tens of thousands of employees for months of unworked leave under the ‘Fork in the Road’ deferred-resignation program, litigation costs, and precipitous productivity losses — will cost taxpayers $135 billion in fiscal year 2026 alone. The Yale Budget Lab separately calculated that the reduction of IRS staffing by roughly 40% will cost the federal government $323 billion in lost tax revenue over the next decade due to reduced auditing capacity and lower compliance rates. In a deposition made public in March 2026, DOGE employee Nate Cavanaugh acknowledged that cost-cutting efforts fell far short of the original $2 trillion goal. The deposition was part of a lawsuit filed by the American Council of Learned Societies, alleging that DOGE used OpenAI’s ChatGPT to algorithmically identify and cancel more than $100 million in diversity, equity, and inclusion grants, a practice critics described as using automation to circumvent congressional authorization. In total, DOGE claimed to have canceled 13,440 contracts and eliminated the roles of more than 300,000 federal employees.   The Human Toll: Federal Workers Left Behind Between January 2025 and January 2026, 386,826 workers departed the federal government, including approximately 17,000 through formal reductions in force and many thousands more through DOGE’s ‘Fork in the Road’ deferred-resignation offer. Simultaneously, only 122,000 new workers joined the federal workforce – a 55% decrease from 2024 hiring levels. Among those fired, 24,000 were subsequently rehired following court orders finding the terminations unlawful, including bird flu researchers at the Department of Agriculture who had been dismissed without apparent awareness of their role. An NBC News investigation published April 22, 2026 spoke with 13 former federal employees and found that seven remain fully unemployed. The organization WellFed, which supports displaced federal workers, estimates that only 25% of its members have found new employment. Among former USAID workers, the group OneAID estimates at least 50% remain unemployed. Unemployment benefits have lapsed for many; healthcare coverage has become precarious. One former IRS employee described the 2026 tax filing season as likely the most difficult "since the pandemic," citing severe understaffing and mounting backlogs.   The GAO Report and Data Security Failures (April 28, 2026) In what represents one of the most significant institutional accountability findings of the DOGE era, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report on April 28, 2026 concluding that the Treasury Department granted a DOGE associate access to sensitive federal payment systems, systems that process trillions of dollars in government transactions, without fully following its own security controls. The GAO confirmed that DOGE personnel did not always comply with Treasury’s established protocols either. The DOGE employee central to the GAO‘s findings was Marko Elez, who resigned from Treasury on February 6, 2025after the public disclosure of racist social media posts and subsequently went on to work for DOGE at other agencies. The GAO found that Treasury’s data loss prevention tools failed to block Elez from improperly sending unencrypted information on foreign aid to DOGE associates at the General Services Administration. Rep. Richard Neal, the senior Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee, stated that “GAO has confirmed our worst fears”.  The GAO confirmed it is working on additional audits of DOGE access across other government systems.   Musk’s Departure and What Remained Elon Musk officially departed his role on May 29, 2025, upon the expiration of his 130-day “special government employee” term. His departure was accompanied by a post on X stating: “The @DOGE mission will only strengthen over time as it becomes a way of life throughout the government”.  White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt confirmed that DOGE employees embedded in agencies as political appointees would remain: “The DOGE leaders are each and every member of the president’s cabinet, and the president himself”. Approximately 100 DOGE employees remain embedded across federal departments, having transitioned from their temporary DOGE roles into permanent political appointments. The administration has simultaneously launched a Gen Z federal hiring initiative – the “US Tech Force” — to rebuild federal technology capacity using young software engineers and AI specialists recruited from Silicon Valley. The Office of Personnel Management has contracted with Workday, Inc.to process federal retirement applications, marking a significant step toward the privatization of core governmental functions. At the same time, the administration’s proposed 2027 federal budget seeks to nearly halve NASA’s budget from $7.3 billion to $3.9 billion, while DOGE has claimed to have worked with the National Science Foundation to cancel DEI-related grants. A 57% majority of Americans, according to a Washington Post–ABC–Ipsos poll, disapprove of the way Musk handled his role in the Trump administration. About six in ten say they are worried the president has done too much to cut the size of the federal government.   The July 4 Terminus: End of an Organization, Continuation of a Project DOGE is scheduled to formally dissolve on July 4, 2026, coinciding with Trump’s proposed “Great American Fair” celebrating the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. The formal termination of the organization, however, will not end the restructuring it has initiated. The civil service hiring criteria introduced under DOGE, which require applicants to submit essays articulating alignment with the administration’s policy goals, represent a fundamental departure from the merit-based system established by the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883. The AI Deregulation Decision Tool, designed to analyze and eliminate half of the federal government’s 200,000+ regulations by January 2027, continues its work. The DOGE experiment has demonstrated that the American federal bureaucracy can be disrupted at speed and at scale through a combination of executive authority and private-sector aggressiveness. It has also demonstrated the institutional costs of disruption without adequate process: billions of dollars in litigation, hundreds of thousands of displaced workers, degraded service capacity in agencies from the IRS to the VA, and now a formal GAO finding of security failures in the handling of the government’s most sensitive financial systems. Whether the restructuring that emerges from this process produces a more efficient state or merely a more politically compliant one – remains the defining question of DOGE’s contested legacy. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

  By Ismoilova Soliha, UWED undergraduate, intern at IAIS   The parliamentary elections in Slovenia, held on March 22, concluded with a narrow margin between the leading political forces. The «Freedom Movement» (Gibanje Svoboda, GS), headed by Prime Minister Robert Golob, secured approximately 28.5-28.66% of the vote and obtained 29 seats in parliament. While, the Slovenian Democratic Party( Slovenska Demokratska Stranka), led by Janez Janša, received around 27.9-28.1% of the vote. The minimal difference between the two parties underscores a pronounced degree of political polarization within Slovenian society. The electoral campaign was further complicated by serious allegations of foreign interference, involving the Israeli private intelligence firm «Black Cube», which Slovenian authorities have associated with alleged influence operations purportedly benefiting the opposition. These developments have raised significant concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral process, the resilience of democratic institution and broader issues of national sovereignty.   Election campaign and key political actors More than 10 political parties and coalitions participated in the parliamentary elections in Slovenia, with over 1300 candidates representing a wide range of political forces were nominated. Prime Minister Golob’s main political opponent, populist politician and supporter of US President Donald Trump, Janes Janša, previously served as Prime Minister of Slovenia three times. Golob, in turn entered national politics relatively recently, rising to power in 2022 as the leader of a center-left  coalition composed of three parties, making a significant shift in Slovenia’s political landscape. The election campaign of Janez Janša was structured around a clear confrontational logic, positioning the party in opposition to what it described as the «post-socialist left». A central element of the campaign strategy was the mobilization of voters through value-based polarization and competing visions of socio-economic development. The SDS presented itself as a political force aiming to «liberate the Slovenian people from the dominance of Golob’s government». In contrast, the governing center-left coalition led by Robert Golob was framed by its opponents as promoting policies associated with redistribution, egalitarianism and increased state dependence among citizens. In this context, Janša campaign adopted a distinctly adversarial rhetoric, encapsulated in the binary framing of «Us versus them», which reinforced the broader dynamics of political polarization within Slovenia’s electoral landscape.  The main lines of opposition in the SDP campaign emphasized «ambition and meritocracy instead of envy and egalitarianism». Janez Janša framed his political message around the idea of restoring motivation and purpose, arguing that societal progress depends on competition, performance-based rewards and a strong incentive for success as a means of improving the overall welfare of Slovenians. The party also promoted the conception of an «effective state», which prioritizes individual freedom and autonomy over dependence on government structures. This approach included calls for reduced bureaucracy, lower taxation and the creation of a more favorable environment for both citizens and entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the SDP strongly criticized what it described as the government’s migration policy, particularly its perceived lack of distinction between legal and illegal migration. Within this narrative, the party argued that the broader objective of the left was to alter Slovenia’s ethnic and cultural composition as well as the structure of the electorate, in order to secure long-term electoral advantages. On the other hand, the Freedom Movement (Gibanje Svoboda, GS) promoted a program centered on balanced and sustainable development, emphasizing a «green» transition, including plans related to the gradual phase-out of coal-based energy production such as the Šoštanj Thermal Power Plant (TEŠ 6), accompanied by socially just transition measures. The party’s agenda also highlighted innovation-driven economic growth, healthcare system reform and a pro-European, liberal-progressive political orientation. In the social policy domain, particular attention was given to improving quality of life, strengthening support for both younger and older generations and reducing social inequalities. The party sought to present a model of governance that reconciles environmental sustainability with economic competitiveness. Overall, the central message of the campaign was the pursuit of long-term sustainable development across social, environmental and economic dimensions, while reaffirming Slovenia’s role as an active and responsible member of the European Union and the broader European political community. On the economic front, the party set an ambitious objective of positioning Slovenia among the world’s 20 most competitive economies by 2030, accompanied by targeted annual GDP growth of approximately 3-5%. Particular emphasis is placed on strengthening innovation capacity, accelerating the transition to renewable energy sources and advancing digital transformation across key sectors of the economy. In addition, the program prioritizes the modernization of public service, especially in healthcare and education, as central pillars for long-term productivity and sustainable development. The party emphasizes a strong pro-European orientation and alignment of its program with the European Union’s strategic objectives, particularly in the areas of the green transition and climate neutrality. A key priority is promotion of a just decarbonization process (pravično razogljičenje), which includes the gradual phase-out of the TEŠ 6 coal-fired unit by 2030, accompanied by targeted  measures to support workers and regions economically dependent on the coal industry. Both major political forces have devoted significant attention to the future of the Šoštanj Thermal Plant (TEŠ 6), framing it as a central issue in debates over energy, economic policy and national sovereignty. The SDP has strongly criticized the government’s plan to phase out coal-based energy production, arguing that the premature closure of TEŠ 6 could undermine Slovenia’s energy independence and lead to substantial job losses, particularly in regions dependent on the coal industry. In contrast, Golob has justified the planned closure primarily on economic and regulatory grounds. He points to the increasing costs associated with the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) which has significantly raised the price of carbon allowance and consequently, the cost of coal-based electricity generation. With annual CO₂ emissions estimated at approximately 3.1-3.4 million tonnes at full capacity, TEŠ 6 is particularly exposed to rising carbon prices, which in 2026 fluctuated between €72 and €92 per tonne. As a result, the plant has become structurally unprofitable, promoting the government to allocate more than  €400 million in subsidies since 2024 to sustain its operations. Within this framework, the Golob government presents EU ETS obligations as a key economic rationale for the accelerated phase-out of TEŠ 6. Conversely, SDP portray such policies as externally imposed pressures from Brussels, framing the closure as a form of deindustrialization that threatens Slovenia’s energy security, employment, especially in the Šaleška Valley and the long-term stability of the country’s industrial base. The Šaleška Valley region ( including the towns of Velenje and Šoštanj), where TEŠ 6 is located has long been a center of industrial and mining activity, providing employment to several thousand workers directly and indirectly linked to the plant. The prospective closure of the facility therefor entails significant socio-economic risks, including job losses, declining regional incomes and potential increase in electricity and district heating prices for local residents. This issue became a central theme in the campaign of the SDP. Janša repeatedly framed the rapid phase-out of TEŠ 6 as «betrayal of workers» and an act of «energy capitulation», using the issue to mobilize support in industrial regions. In areas with strong ties to the energy and mining sectors, particularly in eastern and northeastern parts of Slovenian support for the SDP has traditionally been higher. In these regions, a considerable segment of the electorate perceived the policies of the «Freedom Movement» as a direct threat to their economic security, contributing  to stronger electoral backing for Janša despite Golob’s broader national appeal. Thus, what initially appears as a technical question of climate and energy policy has evolved into a deeper ideological confrontation between proponents of a progressive «green transition» and those prioritizing national energy sovereignty, industrial stability and economic pragmatism.   Election results and their consequences Pre-election polls and analytical forecasts consistently pointed to a highly competitive race, although at various stages of the campaign the momentum appeared to shift in favor of the opposition. In early 20266, the SDP gradually took the lead with several polls indicating support levels ranging from 20% to 28% at times placing it ahead of the ruling party. By February, the gap between the two main political forces had widened to approximately 5% points in favor of the SDP, raising expectations of a potential return of Janez Janša to power. By march, however, the situation had become increasingly uncertain. Aggregated polling data suggested that while the SDP maintained a slight lead at around 29% liberal bloc led by Golob remained electorally competitive, largely due to its coalition-building potential. In the final days before the election, most analysts converged on the assessment that the margin between the two camps would be minimal, likely resulting in a fragmented legislature without a decisive majority. In this context, although the opposition was at times perceived as the frontrunner, the final outcome ultimately confirmed the high volatility of the electorate and the deep polarization of Slovenian society.  The election was marked by high tensions around issues of migration, security and national identity. The «Black Cube» scandal has become a turning point in recent weeks, allegations have surfaced that representatives of an Israeli private intelligence company visited Slovenia, met with individuals associated with the SDP and were involved in leaking recording aimed at discrediting the Golob government on corruption charges. After the news became public, public opinion shifted sharply, support for the SDP declined, while the «Freedom Movement» began to gain momentum. As a result, Golob’s party previously trailing in the polls managed to secure a narrow electoral victory, winning by approximately 0.4-0.6%. The results of the Slovenian elections indicate the emergence of a fragmented political landscape in which no major party commands enough support to govern independently. Under these conditions, coalition-building with smaller parties such as the New Slovenia-Christian Democrats, the Slovenian People’s Party, the Focus Party, the Social Democrats and the Left Party will play a crucial role. This not only complicates the government formation process but also  introduces a degree instability, as governance will rely heavily on fragile inter-party compromises. At the same time, the elections exposed a pronounced level of political polarization. Voting patterns reflect deep structural cleavages, including urban-rural divides, generational differences and conflicts rooted in competing value systems. Voter turnout remained notably high, particularly around issues of identity and security, which further intensified the divisive character of the campaign. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.