In their compelling policy brief, Darius Riazi and Alexander Schrier dissect the growing strategic divergence between the European Union and the United States in their engagement with Central Asia. Once unified under a broadly complementary transatlantic strategy that aimed to promote regional stability, connectivity, and liberal-democratic norms while hedging against Russian and Chinese influence, the two powers have since charted markedly different courses. The shift, catalyzed by Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, signals the erosion of a once-coordinated Western approach. The authors argue convincingly that this rift is not merely symbolic but has tangible consequences for the foreign policy calculus of the Central Asian Five (C5), whose long-standing commitment to a multi-vector foreign policy is now tested by increasingly divergent external pressures.   The European Union, as Riazi and Schrier note, has embraced a strategy of continuity and institutional maturity. Through high-profile initiatives such as the 2025 Samarkand Summit and major investments under the Global Gateway framework, the EU has positioned itself as a long-term partner committed to inclusive development, multilateralism, and green transition cooperation. With projects in critical mineral development, renewable energy, and digital connectivity, the EU is not only filling strategic voids left by retreating American programs but offering a normative alternative rooted in sustainable governance and regional integration. The EU’s explicit rejection of “spheres of influence” in favor of a “third way” of cooperation stands in stark contrast to Washington’s more transactional diplomacy under Trump.   Indeed, the return of Trump has introduced a hard pivot in U.S. engagement with the region. As the authors demonstrate, Trump’s emphasis on bilateral deals, high tariffs, and a retreat from liberal-democratic aid mechanisms such as USAID has fragmented the once-unified C5+1 framework. American diplomacy is now characterized by an assertive form of bilateral transnationalism: ad hoc deals tailored to national elites, often with a security or migration lens. While this may yield short-term concessions from individual Central Asian governments — such as Uzbekistan’s deportation initiative or Kazakhstan’s mineral negotiations — it risks undercutting the multilateral platforms and long-term development goals that previously underpinned U.S.–C5 relations. Moreover, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of U.S. support for civil society and governance projects is already being filled by China, reinforcing Beijing’s growing normative influence in the region.   The policy brief ends on a note of strategic caution and pragmatic foresight. Riazi and Schrier recommend that C5 states resist the temptation to view the EU and U.S. as a cohesive bloc and instead pursue differentiated diplomatic strategies tailored to the shifting priorities of each actor. This approach, they argue, will allow Central Asia to preserve its multi-vector foreign policy and avoid entanglement in zero-sum geopolitical rivalries. Their conclusion also gestures toward a broader global trend: the unravelling of the transatlantic consensus not only in Central Asia but across the Global South. In a world increasingly marked by multipolarity and great power competition, the authors call for a recalibration of regional strategies — not only by external actors but also by smaller states intent on preserving agency amid fragmentation.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her contribution to Working Paper of the European Institute of Romania, Nargiza Umarova offers a comprehensive appraisal of Uzbekistan’s burgeoning role as a pivotal transit hub between Central Asia and the European Union. Drawing upon recent geopolitical shifts — most notably the aftermath of the war in Ukraine and the inaugural EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand on 4 April 2025 — she underscores Uzbekistan’s strategic imperative to diversify its export routes and strengthen economic ties with Romania through the Trans-Caspian and Black Sea corridors. By tripling its exports to the EU under the GSP+ regime to US $1.15 billion since 2021, Uzbekistan has demonstrated both the viability of preferential trade frameworks and the urgent need for reliable, multimodal transport links to sustain that momentum.   Umarova delineates three “trigger points” for accelerating interregional connectivity: enhanced trade cooperation, energy export diversification, and critical-minerals logistics. She highlights Tashkent’s proactive engagement in TRACECA and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, as well as its 2019 launch of the CASCA+ corridor — an Asia-Pacific to Europe multimodal axis traversing Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Bulgaria. Her analysis stresses that harmonising these parallel initiatives could substantially expand cargo throughput along the China–Central Asia–Europe axis, notably once the December 2024-opened China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway reaches Turkmenbashi and links to the port of Constanța.   Beyond freight logistics, Umarova envisages a “green energy corridor” threading Caspian and Black Sea seabeds to transmit up to 15 billion kWh of Uzbek solar and wind power to European markets by 2030. She argues that this initiative not only aligns with Romania’s ambition to become a regional energy-distribution hub but also cements a symbiotic Uzbek–Romanian partnership in advancing the EU’s decarbonisation and energy-security objectives. In so doing, her contribution charts a forward-looking agenda whereby transport infrastructure and clean-energy interconnectivity jointly underpin Uzbekistan’s integration into Europe’s economic and environmental architecture.   Nargiza Umarova underpins her recommendations with detailed trade statistics, corridor-development milestones and policy roadmaps, thereby furnishing policymakers with a rigorous blueprint for deepening EU–Central Asia cooperation through the prism of Uzbekistan–Romania linkages.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his latest policy brief, Dr Islomkhon Gafarov provides a detailed assessment of how the Taliban are recalibrating Afghanistan’s mineral wealth as a strategic diplomatic instrument. Faced with the collapse of international aid, asset freezes, and the dismantling of the opium economy, the Taliban leadership has turned its attention to the country’s vast untapped reserves of copper, lithium, iron ore, and uranium. Yet, rather than launching immediate large-scale exploitation, Dr Gafarov argues, the Taliban have adopted a cautious approach — employing natural resources as a form of political capital in their efforts to achieve international recognition.   Afghanistan’s subsoil potential is immense: over 1,400 deposits are identified across the country, with copper at Mes Aynak valued at over $50 billion, and lithium reserves seen as critical to the global green energy transition. While the sector has already attracted approximately $7 billion in foreign investment and officially employs 150,000 people, the Taliban appear to be treating these resources not primarily as economic assets, but as geopolitical leverage. The brief underlines how the regime is linking bilateral extraction agreements with broader negotiations over legal frameworks, with the implicit understanding that access to Afghanistan’s critical minerals could pave the way for limited international engagement or even recognition.   Dr Gafarov outlines the role of key external actors — most prominently China, whose state companies have secured long-term contracts in oil and copper, and which is now negotiating for lithium concessions. China’s interest is both economic and strategic, tied to the Belt and Road Initiative and to securing technological supply chains. India, facing rising tensions with Pakistan and aiming to scale its nuclear sector, is eyeing Afghan uranium. Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, while active, are approaching resource cooperation through broader strategic lenses, including transit infrastructure and regional power dynamics. Uzbekistan, for its part, is well positioned to assist through mineral processing facilities, cross-border logistics, and technical capacity-building.   The policy brief concludes that Afghanistan’s extractive sector, though underdeveloped, has become a central pillar of the Taliban’s shadow diplomacy. By avoiding exclusive partnerships and maintaining a multi-vector engagement strategy, the Taliban are using natural resources to generate interest without making full concessions. According to Dr Gafarov, this strategy reflects an attempt to move beyond financial survival and toward the careful construction of political legitimacy through resource diplomacy — seeking not merely contracts, but recognition.   Read on Geopolitical Monitor   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In recent years, mutual interest between Uzbekistan-and the Central Asian region more broadly-and EU member states has markedly intensified, reflecting growing engagement not only at the governmental and expert levels but also among the wider public.   From a political standpoint, the key driver of Uzbekistan-EU relations is the presence of political dialogue. Uzbekistan has established strategic partnerships with three EU member states, reflecting growing alignment and shared interests. The first such partnership was forged during President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s first term, when Hungary and Uzbekistan signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in March 2021 in Tashkent. This relationship was later elevated to the level of Expanded Strategic Partnership during President Mirziyoyev’s reciprocal visit to Budapest in May 2025. The second strategic partnership was established during President Mirziyoyev’s second term, marked by the signing of a Joint Declaration with Italy during his official visit to Rome in June 2023. The third partnership was concluded in his third term, when France and Uzbekistan adopted a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership in March 2025 in Paris, further solidifying Uzbekistan’s growing ties with key EU actors.   From the viewpoint of public interest, it is important to highlight the growing number of tourists visiting Uzbekistan from European Union member states. Comparing pre-pandemic figures with data from 2024, the number of EU tourists increased from approximately 70,000 to over 230,000, representing more than threefold rise. Italy, in particular, has consistently ranked among the top three EU countries in terms of tourist arrivals. In 2024, with around 40,000 Italian visitors, it became the leading EU source of tourism for Uzbekistan. These figures reflect not only a robust post-pandemic recovery but also a structural intensification of travel flows between the two countries. They signal a deepening Italian interest in Uzbekistan’s cultural and historical heritage. Additionally, there are currently four direct flights per week between Italy and Uzbekistan, further facilitating bilateral mobility. More broadly, historic cities such as Samarkand-Uzbekistan’s cultural jewel and a peer to Rome with over 2,700 years of history-as well as Bukhara and Khiva, are attracting an increasing number of visitors not only from Italy but from across the European Union. Cultural exchange serves as a vital foundation for strengthening bilateral relations. The deeper the mutual understanding, the more effective and constructive the cooperation.   At the regional level, mutual interest between Central Asian states and Italy has intensified notably since 2023. This growing engagement is reflected in a series of high-level visits to Italy by regional leaders: President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan in June 2023, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan in January 2024, and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan in April 2024. On the Italian side, President Sergio Mattarella paid official visits to Uzbekistan in November 2023 and to Kazakhstan in March 2025, underscoring Italy’s strategic commitment to deepening ties with Central Asia. From a market profile perspective, Italy ranks as Central Asia’s third-largest economic partner, following China and Russia. Among the countries of the region, Kazakhstan maintains the highest volume of trade with Italy. In 2024, bilateral trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Italy increased by 25%, reaching nearly $20 billion. Of this total, approximately $18 billion - or 90% - consisted of Kazakh crude petroleum exports to Italy. Yet, Italy’s trade turnover with other Central Asian states remained more modest: $438 million with Uzbekistan, approximately $250 million with Turkmenistan, around $240 million with Kyrgyzstan, and close to $100 million with Tajikistan. These figures highlight untapped economic potential, which opens doors for all Central Asian countries to broaden their economic horizons, and for Kazakhstan in particular, prospects for diversifying its trade landscape.   At the invitation of the President of Uzbekistan, Prime Minister of the Italian Republic Giorgia Meloni arrived in Samarkand on an official visit on May 28. As outcomes, about ten agreements, worth over 3 billion euros were signed in Samarkand. Of all, three documents aim to shape a durable and forward-looking partnership.   First and foremost, the agreements in the field of education hold particular strategic importance because true and lasting partnerships can only be forged through a profound understanding of one another – ideologically, culturally, and historically. This, in turn, is best cultivated through joint degree programs, institutional partnerships, research collaboration, and cultural exchanges. These mechanisms not only foster trust and familiarity but also build the societal infrastructure necessary for strategic, long-term alignment between nations. This vision was concretely advanced during the Samarkand meeting, where the opening of a branch of the University of Tuscia in Uzbekistan and the launch of double degree programs with the Universities of Pisa, Trento, Roma Tre, and Ca’ Foscari were announced. In parallel, to strengthen technical education, the leading Italian company Danieli and the ITS Academy of Udine signed a strategic memorandum of understanding with the Tashkent branch of the Polytechnic University of Turin.    Another fundamental document is on cooperation in sustainable development and environmental protection. Since 2015, all UN member states have committed to the ambitious “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. The partial successes and shortcomings of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the predecessor framework of the 2030 SDGs, revealed that achieving such comprehensive objectives requires more than just collective action; it demands sustained commitment, coordinated policy alignment, and adaptive strategies tailored to diverse regional contexts. Particularly pressing within this framework is the challenge of climate change. According to the Asian Development Bank’s assessment, under a high-end emissions scenario, climate change could reduce regional GDP by 17% by 2070, with losses potentially reaching 41% by the end of the century. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund projects that by 2060, the region’s economic output may decline by nearly 7%. Compounding these risks is the forthcoming implementation of the European Commission’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2026, which will impose carbon taxes on imports to the EU based on their carbon footprint. This measure aims to align international trade with global climate objectives. Without adequate preparatory measures, Uzbek exporters risk considerable fiscal losses in certain product categories. Given these significant global and regional dynamics, the signing of this cooperation agreement is both timely and critical. It represents a proactive step toward addressing shared environmental challenges and safeguarding the sustainable economic future of the region.   Third strategically consequential agreement pertains to the promotion and mutual protection of investments-an essential legal and institutional framework for fostering long-term economic integration. First, it reinforces the growing Italian economic footprint in Uzbekistan, where nearly 60 enterprises already operate with partial Italian capital, including 24 with full Italian capital. This reflects not only commercial interest but also investor confidence in Uzbekistan’s evolving business environment. Second, the agreement is aligned with a broader geopolitical and economic reconfiguration in the region. At the first C5+EU Summit in April, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a €12 billion investment package for the region, positioning the EU - and by extension its member states - as long-term stakeholders in Central Asia’s development trajectory. Additionally, Italy complements this vision by directing 41.6% of its ADB projects to Central and West Asia, underscoring its strategic political interest and development commitment to this region. Third, the C5+EU Summit yielded an agreement to open a European Investment Bank regional office in Uzbekistan - an initiative that further advances the EU’s long-term development agenda in Central Asia. Within this evolving architecture, the Italy-Uzbekistan investment protection agreement plays a critical role in de-risking capital flows, securing investor rights, and institutionalizing bilateral economic cooperation. As such, it represents not merely a legal instrument, but a forward-anchored mechanism designed to operationalize Italy’s long-term strategic and economic presence in the region.   Clearly, the Italy-Central Asia Summit held on 30th May 2025 in Astana reaffirmed the unity of our nations on the international stage. Following a few weeks from the C5+EU Summit, held in Samarkand, this event reflects the growing geopolitical importance of Central Asia. However, unlike the C5+EU format, which emphasized region-to-region model, this summit is a country-to-region engagement, signaling Italy’s intent to carve a distinct strategic and economic relationship with Central Asia - one that supplements the common EU stance while advancing Italy’s national interests. Most importantly, as expressed by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Astana during recent meeting with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on May 30th, “Italy was the first EU nation to have decided to invest in relations with Central Asia and its individual member states, setting up a stable format for the sharing of ideas…”. This is also exemplified by Italy being the first European country to initiate ministerial-level dialogue with Central Asia back in 2019, with subsequent meetings held in 2021 and 2024. Thus, this May’s summit marks the first gathering at the level of heads of state, serving as a logical continuation of earlier engagements. Since then, Berlin has also intensified its country-to-region engagement, demonstrated by the inaugural “Germany-Central Asia” summit held in Berlin on September 29, 2023, followed by the second summit in Astana on September 17, 2024.   In summary, the intensification of Uzbekistan-EU relations, particularly through the dynamic and multifaceted partnership with Italy, reflects a broader strategic recalibration in both regional and international engagement. Italy’s pioneering role – manifested in sustained political dialogue, expanding economic cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and shared commitments to sustainability - underscores a shift toward deeper, country-specific partnerships. The agreements signed during recent high-level visits signal not only the maturation of bilateral and multilateral ties but also the institutionalization of long-term collaboration. As the geopolitical and economic landscape evolves, such partnerships will be instrumental in advancing mutual interests.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Dr Islomkhon Gafarov and Mr Hamza Boltaev’s brief argues that, despite its frequent portrayal as a game-changer linking Central and South Asia, the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway remains more myth than reality. While the 2011 opening of the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif section highlights the theoretical promise of granting landlocked Central Asian states access to Gwadar and Karachi, Afghanistan’s fraught political and security landscape – compounded by the Taliban’s unrecognised status and the ongoing threat of terror groups such as ISKP – has repeatedly stalled progress. Border tensions with Pakistan, reflected in episodic closures and the April deportation of over 80,000 Afghans, only reinforce the fragility of any expanded corridor.   Moreover, external actors have pursued alternative routes that dilute the railway’s centrality. India’s prioritisation of the Chabahar-based North–South Corridor via Iran, coupled with Tehran’s own strategic interest in that model, diverts investment away from the Pakistan-linked project. China views the Trans-Afghan link merely as an adjunct to CPEC rather than a priority, while Russia hedges between multiple options under Western sanctions.   Within Central Asia, too, national preferences diverge: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan favour routes that bypass Uzbekistan, whereas Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan look to Chinese-backed corridors. Uzbekistan alone has advanced materially by completing the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif line, yet even Tashkent recognises that deeper engagement with Iran offers a more immediate pathway to seaports. In the authors’ conclusion, the corridor’s future hinges on strategic alignment among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran — three “Islamic gateways” whose mutual distrust and competing interests threaten to render the Trans-Afghan Corridor a geopolitical mirage rather than a functioning transport artery.   Read on The Asia Today   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The policy brief by Dr Islomkhon Gafarov and Bobur Mingyasharov begins by situating China’s triangular diplomacy between Islamabad and Kabul within the framework of its Global Security Initiative (GSI), which emphasises cooperative security as a cornerstone of Beijing’s external strategy. Against a backdrop of escalating Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan activity, cross-border skirmishes, trade disruptions and the mass expulsion of Afghan migrants, Beijing has stepped forward as an interested mediator seeking to stabilise South Asia. By convening an informal trilateral meeting of foreign ministers in Beijing on 21 May 2025 — attended by China’s Wang Yi, Pakistan’s Muhammad Ishaq Dar and Afghanistan’s Amir Khan Muttaqi — China signalled its intent to translate declarative support for regional harmony into tangible diplomatic action.   The brief underscores that Beijing’s newfound activism is, in large part, a reaction to the April–May 2025 Kashmir crisis, which reminded Chinese strategists that South Asia remains prone to sudden conflagrations that could imperil the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The conflict between India and Pakistan not only threatened vital overland routes to the Indian Ocean but also prompted Beijing to shore up Pakistan’s western flank. For Islamabad, whose western border with Afghanistan has long been porous and volatile, stabilisation is essential if it is to avoid a two-front predicament when tensions flare with New Delhi.   Afghanistan’s shifting foreign policy orientation presents a further complication for Chinese objectives. Such a recalibration could erode China’s leverage over Kabul and weaken the coherence of a trilateral framework. The brief also highlights Tehran’s growing diplomatic activism — exemplified by Iranian mediation efforts during the Kashmir crisis — and Beijing’s unease at ceding influence to Iran in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In parallel, the authors posit that Western retrenchment in post-withdrawal Afghanistan was at least partially calculated to draw Chinese focus into a volatile region, thereby diverting Beijing’s attention from Indo-Pacific affairs. In sum, China faces a complex web of competing influences and must navigate these carefully if it is to retain its strategic primacy.   In its concluding analysis, the policy brief argues that China’s GSI is now transitioning from rhetorical commitment to on-the-ground diplomacy, with the recent trilateral meeting marking a critical inflection point. The likelihood of reconciliation between Islamabad and Kabul is rising, driven by each party’s own political and economic calculus as well as Beijing’s concerted intermediation. Beyond its immediate benefits for South Asian stability, such rapprochement bears considerable significance for Central Asian states, particularly in relation to the Trans-Afghan Corridor and access to Pakistani ports. These linkages are integral to China’s broader connectivity agenda under the BRI and the future security of CPEC. Looking ahead, Beijing is expected to institutionalize its mediation — potentially through enhanced Afghan participation in the BRI or Beijing’s support for Kabul’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — thereby embedding the resolution of Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions within multilateral frameworks.   Read on:DNA News PakistanIslamabad Post   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.